D.B.Civil Misc. Application Nos.356/2019, 344/2019, 494/2019 & 495/2019:
1. For the reasons mentioned in the applications, delay in filing the appeals is condoned.
2. Applications are allowed. D.B.Civil Special Appeal Nos.521/2019, 509/2019, 724/2019 and 725/2019:
1. The appellants grievance is that the learned Single Judge erroneously upheld the order of cancellation of sale deed.
2. The facts- set out by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment are that the Dausa Gangapur Motor Stand Union, sought and was granted allotment of land for the purpose of constructing a motor stand. The Town Improvement Board, Dausa al
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lotted a parcel of land on 28.06.1960 by an order. The sale deed was subsequently registered, by the Board, in favour of the individual members of the Dausa Gangapur Motor Stand Union, in their capacity as office bearers. Subsequently in 1966 some individuals claiming themselves to be members of the Union executed sale deeds which are in dispute.
3. The Municipal Board, Dausa filed an application under Section 80(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 for cancellation of the sale deed. In the meanwhile, apparently on 03.05.2000, on the application by the present appellants, the Board decided to shift the motor stand and permitted the appellants to use the land in dispute for commercial purposes and sought approval of the State Government. Objections were also invited subsequently. The resolution of 03.05.2000 of the Municipal Board was challenged before the District Collector, Dausa, which on 25.04.2001 directed maintenance of status quo. This order was eventually set aside by the Divisional Commissioner. The District Collector later after remand, quashed the resolution of 03.05.2000 by an order dated 26.07.2004 as well as the public notice.
4. In these circumstances, the present appellants approached this Court claiming to be aggrieved and contending inter alia that the Rajasthan Urban Area (Allotment) of Land Rules, 1954, under which the land was allotted and sale deed was registered, did not place any restriction upon the sale. It was also urged that the restrictive stipulation in clause 7, with respect to the sale without permission, was not enforced as it had been subsequently deleted.
5. The State and Municipal Board contended before the learned Single Judge that the purpose for which the land was allotted initially and subsequently sold, primarily was for use as motor stand and that allottee/union could not thereafter alienate or transfer it contrary to these conditions.
6. The learned Single Judge after considering the pleadings and the submissions of the parties and taking note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in ITC Limited Vs. State of UP & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 493, upheld the cancellations/setting aside of the sale- to the appellants. The Single Judge concluded as follows:
“17. The argument raised by the counsel for the petitioners that the Municipal Board has rightly passed the resolution dated 03.05.2000 and therefore, the Collector has no jurisdiction to set aside the same as they have purchased the land in dispute by way of registered Sale deed is not acceptable because the Collector has rightly passed the order dated 26.07.2004 under its revisional jurisdiction as provided under Section 80 Sub-clause-2 of the Act of 1959. The second argument raised by counsel for the petitioners that the collector was not having jurisdiction to set aside the registered sale deed issued by the Improvement Board is also not acceptable as the Collector while adjudicating the matter under its revisional jurisdiction has rightly set aside the sale deed on the ground that condition no.2 of the sale deed has been violated and the land in dispute was allotted only for the purpose of Bus stand. The third argument raised by the counsel for the petitioners that there is violation of principles of natural justice as without hearing the petitioners order has been passed by the collector, in my considered view the petitioners might have purchased the land by way of registered sale deed but since seller of the land in dispute was not having legal title to sell the land in dispute, the sale deed was in nullity and allowing the writ petition at this stage amounts to restoring the illegal order passed by the Municipal Board, Dausa as has been held in the matter of Jagan Singh (supra).”
7. Before this Court, learned counsel emphasised that a perusal of sale deed executed in favour of the original purchaser clearly shows that names of individuals were entered as transferees and these individuals, in turn, sold the property subsequently. It was also submitted that the Municipal Board never objected to the shifting of the bus stand or even the sale and, in fact, had on 03.05.2000 permitted the use. It was stated that in these circumstances the learned Single Judge erred in placing reliance on condition No.7 which had been deleted.
8. Counsel for the respondents however, submitted that this Court should not interfere with the Single Judge’s finding given the fact that the binding decision of the Supreme Court was relied upon. It was moreover submitted that the Union could not be said to have sold the property, having regard to the entirety of the circumstances in these cases.
9. Although the appellants may be correct in contending that the condition No.7 was not applicable (as is apparent from the allotment letter which seems to suggest that said printed conditions were struck out), nevertheless, the second condition with respect to the use of the land for the purpose of bus stand, cannot be denied. The Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge by relying upon ITC Limited (supra) is correct. Furthermore, having regard to the provisions of the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958, which clearly stipulates in Section 5 that property of any society vests in its governing body, the transfer, in this case, appears to have been vitiated. A look at the registered sale deed would show that the individuals who had claimed to be office bearers were shown as owners/transferees/vendors. Clearly this was impermissible because the land was allotted by the Municipal Board to the society on whose behalf the office bearers, secured conveyance. In such event, without a proper resolution by the society that such transfer was for its benefit, or in accordance with the procedures prescribed in its bye-laws, the transfer could not have been supported.
10. For these reasons, the Court is of the opinion that there is no merit in the appellants arguments.
11. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed