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Veetrag Investments & Finance Co. (Plaintiffs) v/s Premier Brass & Metal Works Pvt. Ltd. (Defendants) and Seskaria Sons Pvt. Ltd. (Applicants) and Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay (Respondent)

    CHAMBER SUMMONS NO.696 OF 2001 IN EXECUTION APPLICATION NO.445 OF 2000 IN SUMMARY SUIT NO.4150 OF 2000

    Decided On, 07 February 2002

    At, High Court of Judicature at Bombay

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.A. PATIL

    D.H. Mehta i/b. Yogesh P. Yagnik, for plaintiff. Pravin Samdani i/b. Ms. A.T. Shah & Associates, for applicant.



Judgment Text

J.A. PATIL, J.


The applicant company has taken out this Chamber Summons under Order 21, Rule 90 of the C.P. Code for the following main reliefs:


(a) Delay, if any, in taking out this Chamber Summons be condoned.


(b) That the order dated 30th March, 2001 for sanction of sale of office premises situate at 3rd floor, Seksaria Chambers, 139, Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Mumbai- 400 023 in favour of plaintiff be set aside & quash attachment if any levied thereon on 23rd November, 2000 or any other date be raised and warrant of sale if any be set aside pursuant thereto.


(c) Court Receiver High Court Bombay be directed to renter the demise premises if the possession is handed over to the plaintiff pursuant to the said order dated 30-3-01.


2.The applicant company is the owner and landlord of building known as "Seksaria Chambers", Opposite Commerce House, 139, Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Mumbai- 400 023. The defendant company is a monthly tenant of the applicant in respect of the office premises bearing No.307 situate on third floor of the said building. According to the applicant, the defendant was not paying rent since March, 1997 and also failed to use the demised premises. Therefore, the applicant terminated the tenancy of the defendant by a notice dated 3-5-2000 and a supplementary notice dated 12-5-2000. In the affidavit filed in support of the chamber summons on 25-6-2001, it is stated that the applicant intends to file eviction suit against the defendant for recovery of possession.


3.The plaintiff company had filed Summary Suit No.4150 of 1997 against the defendant for recovery of a sum of Rs.66,92,814/-. In the said suit the plaintiff also took out Notice of Motion No.3664 of 1998 on 5-12-1998 and prayed for attachment before judgment under Order 38, Rule 5 of the C.P. Code of the premises in occupation of the defendant. When the said Notice of Motion came up for hearing, the learned Counsel for the defendant made a statement that the defendant would maintain status quo in relation to the premises in his occupation. In view of that statement no order was passed by the Court. The said suit came to be decreed partly on 16-2-2000, and the defendant company was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 24 lacs to the plaintiff alongwith interest thereon. At the time of the final disposal of the suit, the learned Counsel for the defendant made a statement that the defendant was not prepared to continue with the statement made in Notice of Motion No.3664 of 1998. The learned Judge, therefore, thought that in order to prevent execution of the decree being defeated by the defendant it was necessary to make the said Notice of Motion absolute. Accordingly, by the same order, the learned Judge appointed Court Receiver in respect of the demise premises of the defendant with a direction to the Court Receiver to take only formal possession and appoint the defendant as his agent on usual terms and conditions. Accordingly, the Court Receiver took formal possession of the demised premises on 3-3-2000. Thereafter, the plaintiff again took out Chamber Summons No. 366 of 2000 seeking a variation in the order dated 16-2-2000 therein the plaintiff made grievance that one Mr. Agrawal had been already put in possession of the demised premises as a sub-tenant. However, the said Agrawal filed an affidavit on behalf of the defendant stating that he was not a sub-tenant in the said premises. Consequently, the learned Single Judge by his order dated 28-3-2000, directed the Court Receiver to hold a bid between the plaintiff and defendant and to find out who was giving a better return for the utilisation of the demised premises. The order further provided that in the event the Receiver found that it is the plaintiff who is in a position to give better return, the Receiver was directed to appoint the plaintiff as his agent. By a subsequent order dated 5-5-2000, the learned Single Judge further directed the Court Receiver to proceed according to the earlier order dated 28-3-2000. The Court Receiver was further directed to take formal possession of the property and thereafter invite bids between the parties. Accordingly, the Court Receiver appointed Parelkar & Dallas as the valuers and they submitted the report dated 3-5-2000 wherein they valued of the land at Rs. 46,99,500/- and the cost of construction at Rs. 3,40,252/-. On the basis of these two figures, the valuers calculated net compensation in respect of the demised premises at Rs. 4,63,785/- p.a. i.e. Rs. 38,700/- p.m. It may be pointed out that the defendant preferred Appeal No. 360 of 2000 against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff. The said appeal however, was dismissed by a Division Bench on 19-6-2000. The Spl. leave petition filed by the defendant also came to be dismissed on 20-11-2000. The plaintiff again took out Chamber Summons No. 667 of 2000 praying for leave to set-off the amount of royalty, security deposit and other charges payable to the Court Receiver in respect of the demise premises against the decretal amount. The said chamber summons was made absolute on 3-8-2000.


4.The plaintiff filed Execution Application No. 445 of 2000 on 17-11-2000. On 30-3-2001 the plaintiff moved the Court and obtained the Judges order whereby the Court Receiver was directed the sell the demised premises to the plaintiff or its nominee for a sum of demised, 40 lacs. It was further ordered that the plaintiff would be entitled to set-off the said amount of Rs. 40 lacs against the total decretal amount with interest and cost thereon till the date which came to demised, 64,62,104/-. The Court Receiver was further directed to hand over possession of the demised premises to the plaintiff. By the same order, the Court Receiver was discharged. It appears that thereafter on 16-4-2001, the plaintiff was put in possession of the demised premises. Thereafter, by a letter dated 21-5-2001, the plaintiffs Advocate informed the applicant about the Judges orders dated 30-3-2001. Thereafter, the applicant through their Solicitor informed the Court Receiver by a letter dated 28-5-2001 not to hand over possession of the demised premises to the plaintiff and to give inspection of certain documents. It may have to be noted that the Court Receiver had already put the plaintiff in possession of the demised premises on 16-4-2001. The applicant thereafter took out this chamber summons on 26-6-2001.


5.On behalf of the applicant company, its director Omprakash has filed his affidavit wherein he has contended that the Judges order dated 30-3-2001 was obtained by the plaintiff by practising fraud upon this Court and committing irregularities in procedure. It is contended that the sale of the demised premises in demised of the plaintiff is contrary to law and on that ground the sale is liable to be set aside. He further pointed out that the Judges order dated 30-3-2001 came to be passed in demised of the plaintiff without hearing the applicant. It is stated that the tenancy of the defendant having been already terminated, he was only statutory tenant with no right or interest in the demised premises and, therefore, he could not have sub-let or transferred the same contrary to the provisions of section 26 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. It is further contended that the tenanted premises were not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree. Shri Omprakash has further stated in his affidavit that the plaintiff failed to obtain requisite permission under Order XXI, Rule 72 before making a bid to purchase the demised premises. It is also contended that the value of the demised premises at Rs. 40 lacs is grossly inadequate. It is further stated that the plaintiff did not give proper identity and description of the demised premises. Lastly, it is submitted that the applicant came to know about the order dated 30-3-2001 on 22-5-2001.


6.On behalf of the plaintiff company, its partner Sureshkumar has filed his affidavit in reply wherein, he has contended that the plaintiff has by operation of law became tenant of the applicant and, therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this chamber summons. He has referred to the various development before the impugned order came to be passed and contended that the Court is always empowered to order sale of property attached by it. Sureshkumar has further contended that the chamber summons is barred by limitation. He has further affirmed that the commercial premises of a person can be attached and sold in execution of a decree. He has pointed out that way back in 1998, the plaintiff had informed the applicant about the filing of the suit as well as the attachment of the said property before judgment. It is alleged that in spite of that the applicant did nothing in the matter and now at the belated stage, the applicant is trying to get the sale set aside.


7.I have heard Shri Samdani for the applicant and Shri Mehta for the plaintiff. Shri Mehta has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the chamber summons on the ground of bar of limitation. He pointed out that the impugned order was made on 30-3-2001, whereas the chamber summons is taken out on 26-6-2001 i.e. after a period of 88 days. Referring to Article 127 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of 60 days from the date of sale to set aside the sale in execution of a decree, Shri Mehta submitted that the chamber summons is clearly barred by time. He further referred to the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act and pointed out that no extension of prescribed period is available to any application under the provisions of Order 21 of the C.P. Code. Shri Samdani on the other hand, pointed out that the chamber summons is taken out under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 19 on the ground of material irregularity and fraud in conducting the same and, therefore, according to him, Article 127 does not have any application to it. Shri Samdani submitted that the chamber summons is covered by Article 137 which is a residuary Article prescribing a period of limitation of three years. On a careful consideration of the rival submissions in this respect, I am not inclined to accept the submission of Shri Samdani that the present chamber summons is covered by Article 137 and not by Article 127 of the Limitation Act. The Limitation Act does not make any distinction between a mere application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree and an application to set aside sale on the ground of irregularity or fraud. This is clear from the provisions of section 17 which deals with the effect of fraud or mistake and provides for exclusion of time. In substance, it inter alia states that where an application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or the application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it. It will thus be seen that even though, there cannot be any condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act still there can be exclusion of time under section 17.


In the instant case, the prescribed limitation period of 60 days expired on 30-5-2001 i.e. during the summer vacation. Therefore, in the normal course the applicant would have been required to file the chamber summons immediately on re-opening of the Court i.e. on 6th June, 2001. However, the chamber summons is taken out on 26-6-2001 and therefore there is a delay about 20 days. As I have already pointed out, Omprakash, the director of the applicant-company has stated in para 11 of his affidavit that the applicant came to know about the impugned order on 22-5-2001. He has further stated that thereafter, the applicant through its Advocate requested the Court Receiver on 28-5-2001 for inspection. However, the learned Advocate after attending the matter met with an accident and was bedridden. What is material and relevant to note is that the applicant was not and could not be aware of the impugned order dated 30-3-2001 as the same was passed without any notice to it. The plaintiff informed the applicant about the said order on 21-5-2001. It is not the date that the applicant came to know about the alleged fraud or irregularity committed in the sale. Therefore, the period of 30-3-2001 till 22-5-2001 will have to be excluded under section 17 of the Limitation Act. In other words, the period of limitation will start to run from 22-5-2001. Consequently, it is obvious that the chamber summons is well within time. In view of this position, I reject the challenge made by the plaintiff to the maintainability of this chamber summons on the ground of Bar of limitation.


8.The next submission made by Shri Samdani is that the demised premises are not liable to be attached. There is no dispute on the fact that the applicant is the owner and landlord of the entire building of which the demised premises are a part and that the defendant is only a tenant in the demised premises. The question which arises is whether tenanted premises are liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree passed against the tenant himself. In this respect Shri Mehta drew my attention to section 60 of the C.P. Code which contains a list of the properties which are liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. The list contains lands, houses or other buildings etc. The proviso to section 60 specifies the properties which shall not be liable for attachment and sale. Shri Mehta referred to Clause k(c) of section 60 which in substance states that the interest of a lessee of a residential building to which the provisions of law for the time being in force relating to control of rents and accommodation apply, is not liable to attachment or sale Admittedly, the demised premises are commercial premises. Therefore, the submission of Shri Mehta is that the same is liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree. In this respect Shri Mehta relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Union Bank of India v. Mittersain Rupchand, 1995 (4) Bom.C.R. 256 (D.B.) : 1995 Bank.J. (Bom.) 130 : A.I.R. 1995 Bombay 371, wherein it was held that the exclusion of properties mentioned in section 60 of the C.P. Code specifically refers to residential premises and not to premises used for non-residential purposes. It was further held that goodwill and tenancy rights in such premises would be saleable property and, therefore, they would be liable to attachment and sale. It was also held that section 15(i) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short, "the Rent Act, 1947") would be no Bar. Section 15(1) in substance prohibits the tenant from sub-letting or transferring or giving on licence the premises in his occupation. This is however, subject to any contract to the contrary. In other words, if there is a contract between the landlord and tenant whereby the form of permits, letter then such a transfer of the premises would be valid.


9.Shri Samdani, however, pointed out that the Rent Act, 1947 has been repealed by the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rent Act, 1999", for short), section 58 of the said Act provides for repeal of the Rent Act, 1947. It may be noted that the Rent Act, 1999 came into force with effect from 31-3-2000. The impugned order ordering sale of the demised premises in demised of the plaintiff was made on 30-3-2001 i.e. exactly one year after the coming into force of the Rent Act, 1999. It is therefore, obvious that the question as to whether tenancy and goodwill in respect of the premises which are non-residential can be transferred, is governed not by a Rent Act, 1947 but, the Rent Act, 1999. Shri Samdani referred to the provisions of section 26 of the Rent Act, 1999 which provides that in the absence of contract tenant not to sub-let or transfer or give on licence. The section reads :


"Section 26:- Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, for the time being in force, but subject to any contract to the contrary, it shall not be lawful for any tenant to sub-let or give on licence the whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein :


Provided that, the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases any premises or class of premises other than those let for business, trade or storage to such extent as may be specified in the notification."


10.The proviso enables the State Government to permit in any area the transfer of interest in the premises held on lease other than those let for business. It is not brought to my notice that the State Government has issued any notification under the proviso of section 26 of the Rent Act, 1999. Even in that case, the notification cannot be in respect of the premises let for business. It is therefore, clear that in the absence of any contract, the tenant has no right to sub-let or transfer the premises held by him whether they are for residential or non-residential purposes. The argument of Shri Samdani is to the effect that the sale of the demised premises as per the order dated 30-3-2001 is contrary to the provisions of section 26 of the Rent Act, 1999. According to him, Court cannot permit anything to be done which violates the provisions of any Act. In other words, what the defendant could not have done otherwise legally done, cannot be got done through Court. In view of that the submission of Shri Samdani in this behalf is sound and sustainable. Therefore, the same will have to be upheld.


11.Coming to the second submission of Shri Samdani, it is to the effect that proper procedure prescribed by Order 21 of the C.P. Code for selling the attached property i.e. demised premises has not been followed and, therefore, there has been a material irregularity in the sale. With the result, the sale is liable to be set aside. The submission of Shri Samdani requires to be considered carefully in the light of the relevant provisions of the C.P. Code. Section 51 refer to the powers of the Court to enforce the execution and prescribed certain procedure in execution. One of such modes is by attachment and sale. Whenever, a decree for money is passed, the decretal amount can be recovered by proceeding against the movable or immovable property of the judgment-debtor. Section 60 refers to the property which is liable for attachment and sale in execution of the decree and it includes lands, houses or other buildings. In the instant case, the demised premises have been attached under Order 21, Rule 54 of the C.P. Code on 18-11-2000. Order 21, Rule 64 deals with the power of the executing Court to sale the attached property and to pay the sale proceed to the person entitled to. It reads as under :


"Rule 64: Any Court executing a decree may order that any property attached by it and liable to sale, or such portion thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold, and that the proceeds of such sale, or a sufficient portion thereof, shall be paid to the party entitled under the decree to receive the same."


12.It is important to note that the power of the Court contemplated by this Rule relates to the property which is attached and liable to sale. We have already seen above that the commercial premises in possession of the judgment debtor are not liable for sale. Section 65 lays down by whom the sale is to be conducted and in what manner it is to be made. It reads as under :


"Rule 65: Save as otherwise prescribed, every sale in execution of a decree shall be conducted by an officer of the Court or by such other person as the Court may appoint in this behalf and shall be made by public auction in manner prescribed."


13.It is important to note that the provisions of Rule 65 which are mandatory and they state that the sale shall be made by public auction. Rule 66 deals with proclamation of intended sale and requires the decree-holder to give necessary particulars in respect of the property sought to be sold. Sub-clause (3) of Rule 66 states that every application for an order for sale under this Rule shall be accompanied by a statement signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verifying the pleadings. Rule 67 states the mode of making out proclamation which is to be in the same manner prescribed by Rule 54. It empowers the Court to direct that, such proclamation shall also be published in the Official Gazette or in a local newspaper. Rule 68 prescribes time of sale and it states that no sale without the consent of judgment-debtor in writing can take place until after expiry of at least 15 days in the case of immovable property from the date on which the copy of the proclamation is affixed on the Court-house of the Judge ordering the sale. Rule 69 deals with adjournment of stoppage of sale in the discretion of the Court. Rule 71 provides for resale of the property on account of the purchasers default. Rule 72 prohibits the decree-holder to bid for or buy property without permission. It reads :


"Rule 72: (1) No holder of a decree in execution of which property is sold shall, without the express permission of the Court, bid for or purchase the property.


(2) Where a decree-holder purchases with such permission, the purchase-money and the amount due on the decree may, subject to the provisions of section 73, be set off against one another, and the Court executing the decree shall enter up satisfaction of the decree in whole or in part accordingly.


(3) Where a decree-holder purchases, by himself or through another person, without such permission, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the judgment-debtor or any other person whose interests are affected by the sale, by order set aside the sale; and the costs of such application and order, and any deficiency of price which may happen on the re-sale and all expenses attending it, shall be paid by the decree-holder."


Rule 83 provides for postponement of sale; where the judgment-debtor satisfies the Court that he can raise the decretal amount and pay the same to decree-holder. Rule 84 provides for depositing of 25% of purchase money by the intending purchaser and Rule 85 requires the purchaser to pay full amount of the purchase money on the 15th day after the close of sale. Rule 86 provides for procedure in case there is a default in payment of the purchase money. Rule 87 requires fresh notification to be issued for re-sale of immovable property. Rule 88 provides that where the property sold is a share of undivided immovable property and two or more persons, one of whom is a co-sharer respectively bid the same sum for such property or then the bid shall be deemed to be the bid of the co-sharer. Rule 89 states about the application by a person claiming interest in the property to have the sale set aside subject to certain conditions and compliance. Rule 90 under which present chamber summons is taken out contemplates an application to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. Sub-section (2) states that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts prove, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of irregularity or fraud. Rule 91 contemplates an application by the purchaser himself to set aside the sale on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property. Rule 92 states as to when the sale becomes absolute. Rule 93 provides for return of purchase money where the sale is set aside. Rule 94 speaks about grant of certificate of purchase to the purchaser. Rule 95 states about the delivery of property in possession of judgment-debtor.


14. My object to pointing the relevant provisions of Order 21 is only to show that there is a prescribed procedure for conducting sale of the attached property in execution of a decree. The Court is bound to follow the said procedure which is mandatory and in no case except where the judgment-debtor himself gives consent, the Court can dispense with or by-pass the prescribed procedure for conducting sale of the immovable property of the judgment-debtor.


15. My view is fortified by two decisions. The first of which is Srikakula Chinna Venkatanarayana v. Pannapati Elias, A.I.R. 1954 Madras 1024, wherein the facts were that the plaintiff had purchased certain property in a public auction and he was put in possession thereto but the defendants subsequently, dispossessed the plaintiff forcibly. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of possession. The main plea in defence was that the Court sale held itself was illegal and void because there was no publication of the proclamation relating to the sale. The High Court referred to certain earlier decisions and held that where there is no publication or conduct of the sale, then it is not a case of mere irregularity. It is as if a sale had not been held at all within the meaning of the Code of C.P. Code.


The Second Decision is by a learned Single Judge (Dhabe, J.) of this Court in Gulabsingh v. Chandrapal Singh, A.I.R. 1987 Bombay 90. In that case the facts were that there was a partition suit in which the parties filed an application for passing a consent decree in terms of the compromise arrived at between them. The property in respect of which the partition was sought was a house property and it was found that the same was not capable of being partitioned into specified shares. The consent terms, therefore, provided that the suit house should be sold and the sale proceeds should be divided between the parties according to their respective shares. The sale was to be effected within a period of six months. However, as no sale took place within the prescribed period, an application was moved by one of the parties for appointment of Receiver to sell the suit house. The trial Court passed an order appointing a Commissioner to sell the suit house by public auction and to divide the sale proceeds amongst the parties as per their shares. It appears that the Commissioner appointed an Architect as a valuer for assessing the market value of the suit house and thereafter, the Commissioner published an advertisement in a daily newspaper, inviting written offers from the intending purchasers. The Commissioner thereafter, submitted his report and the trial Court accepted the offer of demised. 1,27,000/- given by one of the parties. Later on the some of the remaining parties filed objections, praying for setting aside the sale on the ground that they were entitled to purchase the suit house. The principal question which was before the High Court, was, as to whether the mode of sale by calling offers by advertisement can be said to be a form of public action. The learned Judge referred to the meaning of the word "auction" as given in the Halsbury's Laws of England, which is to the effect,


"the auction is a manner of selling or letting property by bids, usually to the highest bidder by public competition. The prices which the public are asked to pay are the highest which those who bid can be tempted to offer by the skill and tact of the auctioner under the excitement of open competition".


It was therefore, observed that an auction held by public competition wherein every bider has right to raise his own bid. However, in a sale by tender, no such opportunity is available to the tenderer. Once he gives his offer that is final and cannot be raised, whereas in public auction each bidder knows the bid of the other person. In the mode of sale by calling for offers or tenders, none of the persons or tenderers know the price offered by the other. The learned Judge considered this aspect and proceeded to observe "It is well settled that the provisions of Rule 65 of

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Order 21 of the Code are mandatory and therefore, every sale in execution of the decree under the Code has to be by public auction". Consequently, the sale conducted by the Commissioner by inviting the offers through an advertisement was held to be not proper and legal and the same was set aside. 16. It will thus be seen that sale of immovable property which has been attached in execution of a decree can be made only by a public auction in the prescribed manner. The prescribed manner of publishing or conducting a sale is as per the provisions of Order 21, Rule 66 to Rule 89 of the C.P. Code. In the instant case, none of these provisions has been followed by the Court. On the contrary they are by-passed and the demised premises are allowed to be sold to the plaintiff under the Judges order dated 30-3-2001, which was made without any notice to the applicant who happens to be the owner of the sale. Shri Mehta submitted before me that it cannot be said that there was any irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale in question, as the sale was done as per the order of the Court. It is not possible to agree with Shri Mehta in view of the aforesaid discussion. The Court cannot evolve its own procedure or adopt the one suggested by the decree-holder for publishing and conducting a sale of the property attached in execution of a decree. At any rate the Court is bound to follow the procedure prescribed by law and it cannot by-pass the same. Shri Mehta made reference to Clause 2 of Rule 90 of Order 21 of C.P. Code, which states that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. According to Shri Mehta there is nothing to show that the plaintiff sustained any such substantial injury. It is not possible to agree with Shri Mehta in this respect since it is the grievance of the plaintiff that the value of the demised premises for demised. 40 lakhs is grossly inadequate and that it does not represent the market value. The possibility of the demised premises fetching higher price cannot be ruled out had it been sold by public auction. In that event, there would have been a competition amongst the bidders to purchase the demised premises by raising their bids to higher. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiff has suffered substantial injury on account of the irregularity which has been committed in the sale of the demised premises. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, I am inclined to set aside the sale of the demised premises in demised of the plaintiff. 18. In the result, the chamber summons is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (b) subject to the deletion of the bracked portion which reads "& quash attachment if any levied thereon on 23rd November, 2000 or any other date be raised". It is clarified that the attachment of the demised premises will continue and that the plaintiff/decree-holder will be at liberty to follow the prescribed procedure for sale of the demised premises.
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