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Ved Vrata v/s Madan Lal Bishnoi

    S.A.O. No. 386 of 1985

    Decided On, 24 July 1990

    At, High Court of Delhi

    By, THE HONBLE MRS. JUSTICE SUNANDA BHANDARE

    For the Appearing Parties : R.K. Makhija, S.C. Gulati, R.K. Anand, A.K. Bhasin, Advocates.



Judgment Text

SUNANDA BHANDARE, J.


This is an appeal filed by the landlord against the judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 8th September 1985 whereby the judgment of the Controller dated 7th August 1985 was confirmed and the execution petition filed by the landlord was dismissed and objections filed by the respondent were allowed. The landlord let out the premises to the respondent under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act for a period of 3 years from 15th July 1978. The period of tenancy expired on 15th July 1981. The respondent,

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however, did not vacate the premises as agreed to by him and therefore the appellant-landlord filed the execution petition. In reply to the execution petition, the respondent-tenant stated that the landlord had obtained the permission from the Additional Rent Controller for letting out the premises for a limited period by playing fraud on the Court and by suppressing true facts.


2. Apart from the objection regarding the letting purpose and the alleged fresh tenancy created in favour of the respondent-tenant after the period had expired, it is stated in the objection petition that the landlord had not stated reasons in his application seeking permission for giving the premises under Section 21 as to why he did not require the premises for 3 years.


3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has cited before me a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Yamuna Maloo v. Shri Anand Swarup: 1990 (1) RLR 462, wherein the Court has observed as follows:


"Section 14 of the Act deals with a normal tenancy and protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction. Section 21 of the Act, on the other hand, places the tenant outside the purview of Section 14 and provides for an order of eviction at the time of creation of the tenancy. There is a purpose behind enacting Section 21 of the Act. The Legislature considered it appropriate that should a landlord not need his residential premises for a period, instead of keeping the same vacant the same could be available for a tenant's use on being let out for a limited period conditional upon the tenant's surrendering possession as soon as the tenancy terminates by efflux of time and the need of the landlord revives. The conditions to be fulfilled at the time of creation of such a tenancy are three, namely, (i) the landlord would not require the premises for a particular period, (ii) the Controller must be satisfied about that position, and (iii) the tenant agrees to vacate the premises at the end of the period".


"Both in Vohra's case and in Shiv Chander Kapoor's case though not arising for determination in either, it has been stated while laying down the rule that proceeding to challenge limited tenancy has to be taken during the currency of the tenancy, an objection filed by the tenant could be looked into is indeed an obiter. We would like to make it clear that the rule having been stated to the contrary in Vohra's case, there was indeed no warrant to indicate the contra situation. Perhaps to meet the eventuality which might arise in a particular case, neither of the two Benches of this Court wanted to close the avenue of enquiry totally and that is why in both the cases decided by coordinate Benches the exception has also been indicated. It must be understood on the authority of the said two decisions and our judgment now that if the tenant has objection to raise to the validity of the limited tenancy it has to be done prior to the lapse of the lease and not as a defence to the landlord's application for being put into possession. We would like to reiterate that even if such an exercise is available that must be taken to be very limited and made applicable to exceptional situations. Unless the tenant is able to satisfy the Controller that he had no opportunity at all to know the facts earlier and had come to be aware of them only then, should such an objection be entertained".


4. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties in the light of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court, in my view, the respondent has not made any exceptional ground for not allowing execution. Admittedly the tenant did not file his objections during the period of lease and has not given any reason for not approaching the Court before the period had expired. The Respondent has also not made out any case of serious fraud. It also cannot be said that the appellant had given a non-existent reason to the Rent Controller while obtaining permission for letting the premises for a limited period. In my view, therefore, the Courts below were not right in rejecting the prayer of the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, prays that some time be given to the tenant to vacate the premises. The respondent has given an undertaking to this Court that he will vacate the premises within a period of 11/2 years. The undertaking of the respondent is recorded separately.


5. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the judgments of the Additional Rent Controller and the Reat Control Tribunal are set aside. The appellant is entitled to get back possession from the respondent, however, I grant 11/2 years time i.e. till 31st January 1990 to the respondent to vacate the premises. The undertaking given by the respondent is accepted.


6. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms
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