1. This is an application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") filed by sole applicant Umesh Chandra Saxena with a prayer to quash Case No.101 of 2006 (Crime No.726 of 2004), under Sections 420, 218, 471 IPC, Police Station Bhagatpur, District Moradabad, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Thakurdwara, Moradabad.
2. Facts in brief, as disclosed in the application, are that accused-applicant was appointed as Assistant Teacher in Prathmik Vidyalaya Bhadgawan, District Moradabad on 29.10.1988. Applicant was transferred from time to time. Vide order dated 27.01.2004 passed by Assistant Basic Education Officer (hereinafter referred to as "ABEO") Bhagatpur Tanda, District Moradabad, applicant while working at Primary School Chatarpur Nayak was directed to join Primary School Bhagatpur Tanda on 28.01.2004. On 13.02.2004, ABEO wrote a letter to applicant seeking details of distribution of mid-day meals and scholarship to the students of Primary School Bhagatpur Tanda. Said enquiry was made probably on some complaint made by parents of students to the District Magistrate, Moradabad against Gram Pradhan of Village Bhagatpur Tanda alleging about the irregularities in distribution of scholarship and mid day meal to the students in the year 2003-04. A fact finding enquiry was conducted by Sri A.K. Singh, District Social Welfare Officer, Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as "DSWO") and Sri M.K. Kandpal, District Backward Class Welfare Officer, Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as "DBCWO"). They submitted report dated 29.07.2004 holding Sri Babban Ali, Gram Pradhan, Shiv Autar, Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikari and Sri Mahesh Kumar Saxena, Headmaster of School, guilty of embezzlement of government revenue and recommended recovery of Rs.1800/- and also departmental enquiry against Gram Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikari and Headmaster of School.
3. Thereafter, a First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as "FIR") was registered as Case Crime No.726 of 2004 dated 20.10.2004, under Sections 420, 409 IPC on a written report of Sri A.K. Singh, DSWO and Sri M.K. Kandpal, DBCWO dated 29.07.2004. The FIR stated that complaint was related to distribution of scholarship meant for students of minority class. On the demand raised by Primary School, Bhagatpur Tanda, a sum of Rs.1,15,500/- as scholarship was credited to the account of Gram Panchayat meant for 385 students in the financial year 2003-04. Aforesaid information was received from the department of Minority Welfare. Said figure does not match with figure given in the complaint, inasmuch as, 381 students were said to have been given scholarship as mentioned at point no.3 of the complaint. On comparison, it was found that though date of birth of children of one parent was different but he was placed in one class. Point No.4 of the complaint stated that Uzama baby, daughter of Zille Hasan, was shown studying in Class-IV for several years but in the year of enquiry, her name was shown in Class-V. Her father told that she used to go to school, off and on. When girl was interrogated, she also admitted about the factum of going to school sometimes but could not tell even name of Teachers or the fellow students. Names of students in Point No.5 of complaint were shown in Primary School, Bhagatpur Tanda and scholarship was alleged to be given there. Their names were not found enrolled in Ramawati Inter College. Similarly with regard to Point No.6, when enquiry was made about Nafees Ahmed, it was told that he was studying in Class-IV and since he was poor in studies, his guardians sent him back to lower class. This is illegal and scholarship of Rs.300/- given to this student is liable to be recovered. At Point No.7, there is a student Gulam Mohammad aged about 15-16 years who has been shown studying in Class-V and scholarship was given to him. In fact, he was not studying and engaged in some profession and only for the purposes of scholarship, his name was entered as a student. Likewise, other students like Yunus Imammuddin and Sukhlal, mentioned at serial nos.8 to 10 of the complaint were shown to be admitted only for the purposes of scholarship. Similar complaints were mentioned at serial nos.12 and 13. Point No.14 concerned with the irregularities regarding mid-day meal. In a nutshell, it was found by Enquiry Officer that at the time of disbursement of scholarship, fake admissions in two schools were made in connivance with Gram Pradhan Babban Ali, Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikari Shiv Autar Verma and Principal Mahesh Kumar Saxena who had misused their authority and in connivance with each other have embezzled public government money which is required to be recovered.
4. District Magistrate, Moradabad issued a notice dated 08.10.2004 requiring Gram Pradhan Sri Babban Ali, Gram Panchayat Adhikari, Bhagatpur Tanda to show cause why his financial and administrative powers be not withdrawn since he has committed serious irregularities in distribution of scholarship to the students. District Panchayat Raj Officer, Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as "DPRO") also issued order for recovery of Rs.1800/- from parents of the students failing which it shall be recovered from the concerned Gram Pradhan or Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikari or Teacher.
5. Gram Development Officer, Bhagatpur Tanda, vide letter dated 17.11.2004, informed District Minority Welfare Officer (hereinafter referred to as "DMWO") that DPRO has sent a Bank Draft of Rs.1800/- being amount of scholarship recovered, for transmitting the same. Thereafter, vide order dated 01.10.2014, District Basic Education Officer, Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as "DBEO") placed Sri Mahesh Kumar Saxena, Headmaster, Primary School, Bhagatpur Block, Bhagatpur Tanda under suspension. However, Investigating Officer (hereinafter referred to as "I.O.") colluded with actual accused persons and in order to exonerate them, in an illegal manner, implicate applicant and also tried to arrest applicant illegally by raiding his house at midnight on 03.01.2005 which was reported by applicant's wife to Senior Superintendent of Police, Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as "SSP") vide letter dated 04.01.2005. Later, I.O. submitted charge-sheet No.26 of 2005 dated 18.03.2005 arising from Case Crime No.726 of 2004 dated 20.10.2004, under Sections 420, 218, 471 IPC implicating only the applicant for the alleged fictitious and fraudulent distribution of scholarship of Rs.1800/- to the students.
6. Magistrate has taken cognizance to the charge-sheet and issued process, hence, entire proceedings are challenged on the ground that applicant has been falsely implicated; there is no evidence against him; everything was done earlier to the joining of applicant; and, in the fact finding enquiry conducted by department itself, fault was found on the part of Gram Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikari and Headmaster of School while I.O. after taking money has falsely implicated applicant, hence, entire proceedings against applicant are malicious and liable to be set aside.
7. Sri Raj Kumar Khanna, learned counsel appearing for applicant has placed reliance on a Supreme Court's decision in State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi 2005 (1) SCC 568 and Mohammed Ibrahim Vs. State of Bihar 2009 (8) SCC and urged that in order to implicate applicant, forged and manufactured evidence has been adduced against him and, therefore, entire proceedings are malicious and are liable to be quashed.
8. Basically, contention of learned counsel for applicant is that investigation has been held wrongly and only to implicate applicant; evidence has been manufactured and, therefore, all these factual aspects should be tried and examined by this Court in an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the criminal proceedings initiated against applicant should be quashed.
9. "Whether there is any such scope of enquiry/ investigation at this stage under Section 482 Cr.P.C." is the moot question which needs be considered.
10. Scope of judicial review at this stage to interfere under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very limited. If allegations contained in FIR taken to be true, and evidence collected by police is looked into, it can be said that offences under aforesaid Sections in respect whereof cognizance has been taken and process has been issued, is not made out, only then interference is justified. Scope of judicial review in such matters has been laid down by Supreme Court time and again and it would be fruitful to have a retrospect of some authorities on the subject.
11. At the stage of charge sheet factual query and assessment of defence evidence is beyond purview of scrutiny under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The allegations being factual in nature can be decided only subject to evidence. In view of settled legal proposition, no findings can be recorded about veracity of allegations at this juncture in absence of evidence. Supreme Court has highlighted that jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. be sparingly/rarely invoked with complete circumspection and caution. In Md. Allauddin Khan Vs. The State of Bihar & Others 2019 (6) SCC 107, Supreme Court observed as to what should be examined by High Court in an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and in paras 15, 16 and 17 said as under :
"15. The High Court should have seen that when a specific grievance of the appellant in his complaint was that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have committed the offences punishable under Sections 323, 379 read with Section 34 IPC, then the question to be examined is as to whether there are allegations of commission of these two offences in the complaint or not. In other words, in order to see whether any prima facie case against the accused for taking its cognizable is made out or not, the Court is only required to see the allegations made in the complaint. In the absence of any finding recorded by the High Court on this material question, the impugned order is legally unsustainable.
16. The second error is that the High Court in para 6 held that there are contradictions in the statements of the witnesses on the point of occurrence.
17. In our view, the High Court had no jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence of the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C.") because whether there are contradictions or/and inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses is essentially an issue relating to appreciation of evidence and the same can be gone into by the Judicial Magistrate during trial when the entire evidence is adduced by the parties. That stage is yet to come in this case."
12. Recently, above view has been reiterated in Criminal Appeal No.175 of 2020 (State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Yogendra Singh Jadaun and another) by Supreme Court vide judgment dated 31.01.2020.
13. The principles which justify interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by Court have been laid down in various authorities in which Supreme Court's judgment in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 was leading precedent and thereafter matter has also been examined by even Larger Benches.
14. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal and others (supra) issue of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been considered and what is laid down therein in paragraph 102, has been repeatedly followed and reiterated consistently. In a very recent judgment in Google India Private Limited Vs. Visakha Industries and Ors., AIR 2020 SC 350, guidelines laid down in paragraph 102 in Bhajal Lal's case (supra) have been reproduced as under :
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
15. Court has also reproduced note of caution given in paragraph 103 in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) which reads as under :
"103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."
16. What would be the scope of expression "rarest of rare cases" referred to in para 103 in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) has been considered in Jeffrey J. Diermeier and Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. , 2010 (6) SCC 243, Court has said that words "rarest of rare cases" are used after the words 'sparingly and with circumspection' while describing scope of Section 482 CrPC. Those words merely emphasize and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words 'sparingly and with circumspection'. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression "rarest of rare cases" is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasize that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection.
17. Supreme Court in Jeffrey J. Diermeier (supra) infact referred to an earlier Three Judges' Bench judgment in Som Mittal Vs. State of Karnataka, 2008 (3) SCC 753, to explain phrase "rarest of rare cases". In Som Mittal (supra), Court also said that exercise of inherent power under Section 482 CrPC is not a rule but exception. Exception is applied only when it is brought to notice of Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be added if trial is allowed to proceed where accused would be harassed unnecessarily or if trial is allowed to linger when prima facie it appears to Court that trial would likely to be ended in acquittal. Whenever question of fact is raised which requires evidence, Courts always said that at pre trial stage i.e. at the stage of cognizance taken by Magistrate power under Section 482 CrPC would not be appropriate to be utilized, since, question of fact has to be decided in the light of evidence which are yet to be adduced by parties.
18. In Lakshman vs. State of Karnataka and others, 2019 (9) SCC 677 Court said that it is not permissible for High Court in application under Section 482 CrPC to record any finding wherever there are factual disputes. Court also held that even in dispute of civil nature where there is allegation of breach of contract, if there is any element of breach of trust with mens rea, it gives rise to criminal prosecution as well and merely on the ground that there was civil dispute, criminality involved in the matter cannot be ignored. Further whether there is any mens rea on part of accused or not, is a matter required to be considered having regard to facts and circumstances and contents of complaint and evidence etc, therefore, it cannot be said pre judged in a petition under Section 482 CrPC.
19. In Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu and Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 3913, Court reiterated that inherent jurisdiction though wide and expansive has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise would justify by tests specifically laid down in Section itself. In paragraph 14 of judgment, Court said :
"14. For interference Under Section 482, three conditions are to be fulfilled. The injustice which comes to light should be of a grave, and not of a trivial character; it should be palpable and clear and not doubtful and there should exist no other provision of law by which the party aggrieved could have sought relief." (emphasis added)
20. Court also said that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it were Trial Court. Court has only to be prima facie satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against accused. For that limited purpose, Court can evaluate material and documents on record but it cannot appreciate evidence to conclude whether materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting accused. High Court should not exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC embarking upon an enquiry into whether evidence is reliable or not or whether on reasonable apprehension of evidence, allegations are not sustainable, or decide function of Trial Judge. For the above proposition, Court relied on its earlier authority in Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works Limited and others vs Mohd. Sharaful Haque and others, 2005 (1) SCC 122.
21. Power under section 482 CrPC should not be exercised to stifle legitimate prosecution. At the same time, if basic ingredients of offfences alleged are altogether absent, criminal proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 CrPC. Relying on M.A.A. Annamalai Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. , 2010 (8) SCC 524, Sharda Prasad Sinha Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 and Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Ors., 1976 AIR 1976 SC 1947, Court in Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu and Ors. (supra) said that where allegations set out in complaint or charge sheet do not constitute any offence, it is open to High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash order passed by Magistrate taking cognizance of offence. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC is intended to prevent abuse of process of Court and to clear ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under CrPC. Magistrate also has to take cognizance applying judicial mind only to see whether prima facie case is made out for summoning accused persons or not. At this stage, Magistrate is neither required to consider FIR version nor he is required to evaluate value of materials or evidence of complainant find out at this stage whether evidence would lead to conviction or not.
22. It has also been so observed in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and Ors., 2017 (16) SCC 772 and Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta and Ors. , 2015 (3) SC 424 and followed recently in Roshni Chopra and others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2019 (7) Scale 152. Here Court also referred to judgment in Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal and Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, wherein paragraph 9, Court said that in determining the question whether any process has to be issued or not, Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not and whether there is sufficient ground for conviction; whether the evidence is adequate for supporting conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry.
23. However, it is also true that at the stage of issuing process to the accused, Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons. In U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meaking Limited and others, 2000 (3) SCC 745, after referring to a decision in Kanti Bhadra Shah Vs State of West Bengal 2001 SCC 722, Court said :
"Legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of complaint without issuing process. There is no such requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passed detailed order while issuing summons. Process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that Magistrate had not passed a speaking order."
24. Same proposition was reiterated in Nupur Talwar Vs Central Bureau of Investigation and others, 2012 (11) SCC 465.
25. In a Three Judges' Bench in Parbatbhai Aahir and Ors. Vs State of Gujarat and Ors, 2017 (9) SCC 641, Court has observed that Section 482 CrPC is prefaced with an overriding provision. It saves inherent power of High Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In Paragraph 15 of the judgment Court summarized as under :
"(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash Under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power Under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
26. Above observations have been reiterated in Arun Singh and other Vs State of U.P. passed in Criminal Appeal no.250 of 2020 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5224 of 2017), decided by Supreme Court on 10.02.2020.
27. The authority relied on by learned counsel for applicant in State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) is a judgement delivered by a Three Judges' Bench of Supreme Court on a 'Reference' made to larger Bench expressing doubt on the law laid down by a Two Judges' Bench in Satish Mehra Vs. Delhi Administration and Another 1996 (9) SCC 766 in view of an earlier Three Judges' decision in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja and Others 1979 (4) SCC 274 and State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh 1977 (4) SCC 39.
28. Following point was considered by larger Bench:
"Can the Trial Court at the time of framing of charge considering the material filed by accused."
29. Supreme Court answered the aforesaid question in para-23 and holding that decision in Satish Mehra (supra) is not correct, said as under:-
"23. As a result of aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra's case holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided."
30. In recording of its conclusion as above, Court categorically said that at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, defence of accused cannot be put forth. If the contention of accused is accepted, it would mean that accused can be permitted to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge for examination thereof at that stage which is against basic principle of criminal jurisprudence. Court further said that criminal law has never accepted any circumstance, when during trial, an accused can be given opportunity to lead evidence in defence before charge is proved by prosecution by leading evidence.
31. The decision in Mohammed Ibrahim Vs. State of Bihar (supra) is also founded on totally different facts and has no application. Therein, a complaint was filed against Mohammed Ibrahim and others (hereinafter referred to as "accused-appellants") in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madhubani alleging that he was owner of Katha No.715 Khasra No.1971 and 1973 ad measuring 1 bigha, 5 Katha and 18 Dhurs though Md. Ibrahim, the first accused had no connection with the said land and no title thereto. Yet, he executed two registered sale deeds dated 2.6.2003 in favour of second accused in respect of a portion of the said land measuring - 8 Khatas and 13 Dhurs. Accused-appellants- 3, 4 and 5 were witness, scribe and stamp vendor to said sale deeds and conspired with accused-1 and 2 to forge said documents and when confronted with said forgery, they abused Complainant/Informant and hit him with fists and told him that he can do what he wanted, but they would get possession of the land on the basis of said documents. Aforesaid complaint, filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., resulted in order dated 19.07.2003 passed by Magistrate observing that prima facie offences under Sections 323, 341, 420, 467, 471, 504 IPC are made out, hence, police was directed to register a report and proceed for investigation. Accordingly, FIR was registered on 10.10.2003 at Police Station Pandaul. After investigation, a charge sheet was filed on 4.9.2004. Accused applied for discharge. According to first accused, Complainant and first accused is a cousin and owners of Plot Nos.1973 and 1971 jo
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intly. Plots were inherited by Sri Badri Mian's son (father of complainant) and by Muthu Mian's son. As per family arrangement, a portion of said plots came to the share of Girja (mother of first accused) and that portion was in possession of her husband who got it mutated in his name and paying land revenue. After his death, land came into the possession of her son i.e. the first accused. His name was entered/ mutated in record and he was paying land revenue. He bonafide sold a portion of land measuring 8 Khatas and 13 Dhurs to the second accused. Sale deeds were valid and complainant filed a false complaint. Other accused denied any collusion or complicity in any offence. It was also contended that in any case, allegations constitute only a civil dispute having no criminality and no offence is made out which is an offence punishable under any law. Application was contested by prosecution on the ground that during investigation, it was found that plot sold was part of land allotted to Badri, grandfather of Complainant and first accused could not produce any documents in support of his title, hence, I.O. submitted charge-sheet against accused relating to preparation of false sale deeds. Magistrate vide order dated 14.12.2005 rejected application for discharge observing that there was sufficient material for framing charges. Accused thereafter filed an application under Section 482 Cr.PC for quashing order dated 14.12.2005 passed by Magistrate rejecting discharge application. In the meantime, charge-sheet was also filed against other accused. High Court rejected application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground that Magistrate had found sufficient material showing complicity of accused and this order was challenged before Supreme Court. It formulated a question as under:- "Whether the material on record prima facie constitutes any offence against accused?" 32. Supreme Court in Mohammed Ibrahim Vs. State of Bihar (supra), considered the submission of learned counsel of accused-appellants that if allegation made in the complaint and FIR, even if accepted in its entirety did not disclose the ingredients of offence of forgery or cheating or insult or wrongful restraint or causing hurt or there was no other material and, therefore, their application ought to have been accepted. Court examined Sections 464, 420, 504 IPC separately. From a perusal of aforesaid provisions and also the allegations contained in FIR and other material, Court found that no offences under Sections 420, 467, 471, 504, 341, 323 IPC were made out. It is thus evident that aforesaid judgement is based on different facts and has no application to the facts of this case. 33. Here during investigation, I.O. has found that name of Umesh Chand Saxena was mentioned in documents prepared for distribution of scholarship falsely and fraudulently. In fact, documents were prepared subsequently by accused-applicant and that is why, I.O. found that Gram Pradhan and Secretary have no role in the offence and they were left. Various documents which have been placed before this Court by learned counsel for applicant are still unproved documents and yet to led as evidence in Trial Court. Hence, this Court cannot examine the same and it cannot be said that no offence against applicant is made out. 34. Application lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.