w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n



Team Global Logistics Pvt. Ltd V/S Commissioner of Service Tax


Company & Directors' Information:- E F C LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70102WB2004PTC097851

Company & Directors' Information:- B N GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U15400PB2014PTC038543

Company & Directors' Information:- S J LOGISTICS (INDIA) LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000MH2003PLC143614

Company & Directors' Information:- K V GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U24100DL2014PTC263567

Company & Directors' Information:- GLOBAL CORPORATION LIMITED [Active] CIN = L74999DL1992PLC048880

Company & Directors' Information:- S S I LOGISTICS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U99999MH2005PTC159282

Company & Directors' Information:- 2 X 2 LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000MH2012PTC237062

Company & Directors' Information:- E-LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63011TN2000PTC046210

Company & Directors' Information:- E I T A LOGISTICS LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60300WB1989PLC047611

Company & Directors' Information:- T & I GLOBAL LTD. [Active] CIN = L29130WB1991PLC050797

Company & Directors' Information:- N E C C LOGISTICS LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1985PLC019748

Company & Directors' Information:- N E C C LOGISTICS LIMITED [Active] CIN = L74899DL1985PLC019748

Company & Directors' Information:- I AND D LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090MH1997PTC110517

Company & Directors' Information:- I AND D LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63013DL2004PTC127097

Company & Directors' Information:- K G GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999DL2000PTC104788

Company & Directors' Information:- A. V. GLOBAL CORPORATION PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090DL2007PTC159315

Company & Directors' Information:- LOGISTICS CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74140MH1995PLC089729

Company & Directors' Information:- M + R LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U61100TN2001PTC046793

Company & Directors' Information:- A N GLOBAL LIMITED [Active] CIN = U92110MH1985PLC035269

Company & Directors' Information:- D S GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1995PTC071516

Company & Directors' Information:- TEAM GLOBAL LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH2005PTC152812

Company & Directors' Information:- A B C GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U51909PB2011PTC035103

Company & Directors' Information:- T. R . LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60230WB2010PTC150866

Company & Directors' Information:- U K LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U51909TN2015PTC099539

Company & Directors' Information:- C & C LOGISTICS LIMITED. [Strike Off] CIN = U63090DL2011PLC221415

Company & Directors' Information:- T & S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Liquidation] CIN = U63013DL2005PTC138435

Company & Directors' Information:- I A T GLOBAL COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U24116DL1997PTC084916

Company & Directors' Information:- J D GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U51909DL1997PTC091270

Company & Directors' Information:- S A LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U51909OR2003PTC007049

Company & Directors' Information:- A 2 Z LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090TN2005PTC056777

Company & Directors' Information:- GLOBAL LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000MH2005PTC151133

Company & Directors' Information:- B N G GLOBAL INDIA LIMITED [Active] CIN = U52590DL2011PLC225377

Company & Directors' Information:- S E R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45203MH1998PTC116822

Company & Directors' Information:- N K COMPANY (GLOBAL) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U52390WB2010PTC153624

Company & Directors' Information:- K B K GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U24296DL2016PTC290487

Company & Directors' Information:- C M LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63040DL1997PTC088966

Company & Directors' Information:- G I R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899WB1992PTC194872

Company & Directors' Information:- L V LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60221KA2005PTC036675

Company & Directors' Information:- M & D GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U31101UP1974PTC003937

Company & Directors' Information:- G J LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63011WB1993PTC058303

Company & Directors' Information:- V R GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45200WB2007PTC120797

Company & Directors' Information:- M H T C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Amalgamated] CIN = U63010MH1986PTC039498

Company & Directors' Information:- S I LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60200DL2010PTC198444

Company & Directors' Information:- M M GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29120WB1986PTC041280

Company & Directors' Information:- R V GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74990MH2009PTC195301

Company & Directors' Information:- M M C GLOBAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U11200MH2010PTC206910

Company & Directors' Information:- S R GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51109WB1997PTC084553

Company & Directors' Information:- H V GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U18101DL2000PTC103960

Company & Directors' Information:- R P GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74990MH2009PTC193409

Company & Directors' Information:- M S GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70100MH2008PTC213273

Company & Directors' Information:- R S V GLOBAL LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51909DL1994PLC059032

Company & Directors' Information:- A K R L LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MP2010PTC023291

Company & Directors' Information:- T P LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63011MH2007PTC177112

Company & Directors' Information:- G S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63011DL2004PTC129217

Company & Directors' Information:- S AND M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Dissolved] CIN = U63090MH1995PTC094109

Company & Directors' Information:- S K LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH2005PTC155143

Company & Directors' Information:- R G LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65921DL1996PTC082883

Company & Directors' Information:- C G LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60231DL2002PTC115537

Company & Directors' Information:- R AND Y LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH1996PTC103995

Company & Directors' Information:- B V C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U99999MH1975PTC018691

Company & Directors' Information:- G & U LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090TN2003PTC051159

Company & Directors' Information:- G M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090WB2011PTC164487

Company & Directors' Information:- R K LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U61200DL1996PTC079763

Company & Directors' Information:- H. B. LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63020KA2008PTC045769

Company & Directors' Information:- M T C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090KA2005PTC036019

Company & Directors' Information:- S R C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60221WB1997PTC083181

Company & Directors' Information:- N B GLOBAL (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U15122UP2012PTC051614

Company & Directors' Information:- S N LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63012CH2002PTC025625

Company & Directors' Information:- R K R LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000TN2013PTC092553

Company & Directors' Information:- D. H. LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090WB2011PTC168814

Company & Directors' Information:- R H LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090MH2001PTC131215

Company & Directors' Information:- S M R C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74900WB2013PTC198142

Company & Directors' Information:- S S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60231BR2008PTC013984

Company & Directors' Information:- N. L. LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000MH2008PTC189073

Company & Directors' Information:- G S A LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63000MH2011PTC220581

Company & Directors' Information:- N S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000WB2008PTC131437

Company & Directors' Information:- P M C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090WB2004PTC098686

Company & Directors' Information:- S B LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74140DL2000PTC107791

Company & Directors' Information:- C R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090DL2013PTC246885

Company & Directors' Information:- D AND S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63013KA2001PTC029150

Company & Directors' Information:- P N P LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74990MH2009PTC194269

Company & Directors' Information:- J AND S LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60231KL2020PTC065089

Company & Directors' Information:- TEAM LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74900TN2010PTC076962

Company & Directors' Information:- V B LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Converted to LLP] CIN = U63090MH2004PTC149795

Company & Directors' Information:- D S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U60200AS2011PTC010839

Company & Directors' Information:- S R V LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74900DL2009PTC194034

Company & Directors' Information:- S H LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60230TN2014PTC095531

Company & Directors' Information:- R. S. LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63012TN2009PTC072438

Company & Directors' Information:- V AND O LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090DL2007PTC167663

Company & Directors' Information:- S R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090DL2005PTC136137

Company & Directors' Information:- D G LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH2005PTC152748

Company & Directors' Information:- M. D. S. LOGISTICS PVT. LTD. [Active] CIN = U60231MH2007PTC169299

Company & Directors' Information:- S S M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U63090OR2010PTC012824

Company & Directors' Information:- J M R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60210TN2008PTC068595

Company & Directors' Information:- T A S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51506TN2005PTC057318

Company & Directors' Information:- L E LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000MH2004PTC145852

Company & Directors' Information:- A U M LOGISTICS (INDIA ) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63010MH2002PTC134538

Company & Directors' Information:- C N T LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63010MH2006PTC159091

Company & Directors' Information:- V LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH2003PTC139384

Company & Directors' Information:- A V LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH2004PTC144812

Company & Directors' Information:- X LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090MH2010PTC205666

Company & Directors' Information:- M & S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51311MH1992PTC065470

Company & Directors' Information:- H R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60200TG2008PTC061403

Company & Directors' Information:- D R R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63040TN2008PTC070065

Company & Directors' Information:- C M J LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U60210WB2007PTC120576

Company & Directors' Information:- J B T A LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63010WB2010PTC141971

Company & Directors' Information:- J B LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090WB2003PTC097362

Company & Directors' Information:- N A F LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090WB2011PTC161360

Company & Directors' Information:- N & N LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60220CH2007PTC030971

Company & Directors' Information:- S M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63013DL2004PTC124446

Company & Directors' Information:- B L LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090DL2004PTC125536

Company & Directors' Information:- S. N. V. G. LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63030MH2018PTC314140

Company & Directors' Information:- G L E LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U60231TN2007PTC062349

Company & Directors' Information:- Y S R LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090TN2003PTC050644

Company & Directors' Information:- A AND M LOGISTICS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090KL2013PTC034033

Company & Directors' Information:- G C M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63000DL2011PTC213317

Company & Directors' Information:- F L LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090KL2010PTC025364

Company & Directors' Information:- S P LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63030MH2003PTC142519

Company & Directors' Information:- G P LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH2003PTC138926

Company & Directors' Information:- J V S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090MH2005PTC153868

Company & Directors' Information:- R A M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U60231DL2005PTC139833

Company & Directors' Information:- M N S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60200PB2013PTC038116

Company & Directors' Information:- R S M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60200TN2010PTC074787

Company & Directors' Information:- B L J LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63011RJ2012PTC040594

Company & Directors' Information:- S E LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U61100MH2010PTC204955

Company & Directors' Information:- C S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090MH2005PTC155503

Company & Directors' Information:- B R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74900MH2009PTC195015

Company & Directors' Information:- H D LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74999MH2011PTC218898

Company & Directors' Information:- A M GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999MH2015PTC261061

Company & Directors' Information:- S A K LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63000TN2014PTC095779

Company & Directors' Information:- P A Q LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U63000TN2014PTC096416

Company & Directors' Information:- V-LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U62200TN2009PTC070829

Company & Directors' Information:- R V LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090TN2005PTC055384

Company & Directors' Information:- G R R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED. [Active] CIN = U63090TN2005PTC058118

Company & Directors' Information:- J & T LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090TN2009PTC072937

Company & Directors' Information:- T K LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090TN2011PTC080391

Company & Directors' Information:- G C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090TZ2001PTC009889

Company & Directors' Information:- L S A GLOBAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U74900TG2015PTC098308

Company & Directors' Information:- A R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090TG2002PTC038942

Company & Directors' Information:- D L LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090UP2013PTC055211

Company & Directors' Information:- D K LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090UP2015PTC070961

Company & Directors' Information:- P A LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090WB2014PTC200034

Company & Directors' Information:- M M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U64120WB2000PTC091576

Company & Directors' Information:- R L GLOBAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U52300HP2014PTC000764

Company & Directors' Information:- B 2 C LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63030CH2013PTC034416

Company & Directors' Information:- M. A. GLOBAL LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U60221DL2016PTC302148

Company & Directors' Information:- S R M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U60231DL2005PTC133618

Company & Directors' Information:- A P GLOBAL LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U60300DL2016PTC289555

Company & Directors' Information:- P. P LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999DL2010PTC211754

Company & Directors' Information:- J S B M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74120DL2009PTC194775

Company & Directors' Information:- D V LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000DL2011PTC217951

Company & Directors' Information:- V C S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63000DL2014PTC266904

Company & Directors' Information:- D 2 M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63000DL2015PTC285696

Company & Directors' Information:- H A LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63010DL2008PTC176475

Company & Directors' Information:- N D LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U63013DL2005PTC136061

Company & Directors' Information:- A J S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63030DL2010PTC210993

Company & Directors' Information:- V G S LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63030DL2012PTC232944

Company & Directors' Information:- S R A LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090DL2013PTC249529

Company & Directors' Information:- INDIA LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090DL2013PTC258271

Company & Directors' Information:- K. C. LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63090DL2017PTC317125

Company & Directors' Information:- T V R LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U60200AP2013PTC086516

Company & Directors' Information:- H M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74140HR2013PTC051146

Company & Directors' Information:- G R GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70102KA2013PTC069586

Company & Directors' Information:- 3-D LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63011KA2010PTC053124

Company & Directors' Information:- B & H LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U63040KA2015PTC081683

Company & Directors' Information:- A G M LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090KA2001PTC029780

Company & Directors' Information:- M H LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090KA2014PTC074933

Company & Directors' Information:- L K A LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63030KL2011PTC027769

Company & Directors' Information:- H & H LOGISTICS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U63090GJ2013PTC073405

Company & Directors' Information:- H. E. GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U72901GJ2016PTC092866

Company & Directors' Information:- E S K A Y LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U35914TN2000PTC045382

    Application No. ST/COD-92437/17, Appeal No. ST/86166/17 (Arising out of Order-in-Original No. 59-60/STV/SKD/2015-16, Dated: 13.01.2016 Passed by the Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-V) and Order No. M/90795/17

    Decided On, 15 November 2017

    At, Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal West Zonal Bench At Mumbai

    By, THE HONORABLE JUSTICE: RAMESH NAIR
    By, MEMBER AND THE HONORABLE JUSTICE: RAJU
    By, MEMBER

    For Petitioner: M. Raichandani, Advocate And For Respondents: Roopam Kapoor, Commissioner (A.R.)



Judgment Text


1. This condonation of delay application has been filed by M/s. Team Global Logistics Pvt. Ltd. Learned Counsel for the applicant argued that the impugned order-in-original was passed on 13.1.2016. Being aggrieved by the said order the applicant approach the Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai on 4.5.2016. The matter was listed for hearing before Hon'ble High Court on 22.8.2016, 29.08.2016, 19.09.2016, 26.09.2016, 10.10.2016, 17.10.2016, 24.10.2016, 21.11.2016, 28.11.2016, 05.12.2016, 19.12.2016. However, the same could not be heard on these dates. The matter was finally disposed of 30.3.2017 on the ground of alternate remedy. After disposal of the matter in the Hon'ble High Court the applicant consulted their Chartered Accountants, who in turn consulted legal Counsel regarding future course of action to be taken in the matter viz. whether to file appeal before Hon'ble Supreme Court or not. The applicant applying certifying copy of the order on 21.4.2017, thereafter they decided to file appeal before Tribunal. The applicant claim that provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, would apply to the facts of the present case and hence the period during which the writ/appeal pending before Hon'ble Bombay High Court should be excluded for calculating the period of limitation for filing the appeal of the cross-objection. In view of the above facts Ld. Counsel argued that the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned. In support of his assertion Ld. Counsel relied on the following decisions:

(i) Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag And Another Vs. MST. Katiji and Others : 1987 (28) E.L.T. 185 (S.C.)

(ii) Union of India Vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd : 2004 (166) E.L.T. 290 (S.C.)

(iii) J.M. Bhansali And Ors. The State of Madras And. Anr : AIR 1968 Mad 373. (1968) 1 MLJ 442. 1968 21 STC 411

(iv) Ashok Kumar Tiwari Vs. Commissioner of C.Ex. Allabahad : 2015 (37) STR 749 (Tri.-Del.)

(v) Sonia Overseas Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India : 2015 (316) E.L.T. 578 (P & H)

(vi) Commr. ofC.Ex., Visakhapatnam-II Vs. Cairn Energy India Pty. Ltd : 2015 (316) E.L.T. 612 (A.P.)

(vii) Jay Prabha Textile Printery Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise : 2015 (321) E.L.T. 412 (Guj.)

1.1 Ld. Counsel argued that in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag And Another Vs. MST Katiji and Others (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court has held that-

"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression sufficient causeemployed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner whichsubserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiable liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not -appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. Every days delay must be explaineddoes not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression sufficient cause. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides."

1.2 He further relied on Para-2 of the decision of Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of J.M. Bhansali and Ors. (supra) wherein it was held that-

"(2) We are unable to share the view of the Tribunal or the Appellate Asst. Commissioner that in the circumstances of these cases, sufficient cause was not shown. In deciding the question, the most relevant factor to be taken into account is whether the party concerned has bona fide prosecuted some other proceeding because of which delay has occurred in filing the appeal. It may be that, in selecting a particular remedy, the party may have been ill-advised. The test is not whether in law the other remedy prosecuted is legally correct and justifiable. There may however he cases where, ex facie, the remedy chosen by the assessees is unjustified and may show lack of bona fides. These are not such cases. There are no circumstances or facts in these case to assume that when the assessees invoked Article 226 of the Constitution and sought the assistance of this Court to quash the assessment orders, they acted otherwise than bona fide. We are inclined to think that they must have honestly believed, perhaps on advice, that they could get the relief they wanted in the writ petitions. Writ petitions are no doubt, not encouraged when alternative remedies are available. But the exercise of the discretion by the various High Courts in this matter has not been uniform, though certain propositions in regard to that matter may be considered to have got recently settled. We cannot as we think approach the question of sufficient cause from the result of the writ petitions either. No doubt there was a delay of about thirty days in filing the appeals even after the result of the writ petitions was known. But that, in the circumstances, is explainable. Apparently, they were waiting for copies of the orders of the High Court in the writ petitions. The long delay we are inclined to think, in filing the appeals was more due to the time taken by the pendency of the writ petitions in this Court."

1.3. He also relied on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Jay Prabha Textile Printery (supra) wherein it was held that-

"6. The applicant, thereafter, filed present Civil Application and Tax Appeal. The petition was disposed of on 1-10-2007 and Civil Application and Tax Appeal, were filed on or about 2-11-2007. Since the applicant was pursuing the legal remedy by way of Special Civil Application and considering the provisions contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, we are of the view that the applicant is prevented by sufficient cause for filing Tax Appeal before this Court. We, therefore, condone the delay of 265 days and allow this Civil Application."

2. Learned AR vehemently opposed the said COD application. He contended that -

(i) The appellant has given an undertaking that they have previously not filed any appeal, or writ petition or suit regarding the impugned order before any court or any other authority or any other Bench of the Tribunal. This is a mis statement as the appellant have themselves admitted that the delay is caused as they were pursuing the case in Mumbai High Court.

(ii) The COD application states that the delay of 12 months (not given in days) it factually is incorrect as the OIO of Commissioner is passed on 13.01.2016, whereas the appeal has been filed on 26.05.2017. The delay thus exceeds 16 months (more than 480 days)

(iii) The appeal has been filed in this Hon'ble Tribunal more than 55 days of passing of the order of the Hon'ble High Court. The grounds states that once the matter was disposed the appellants respondents consulted their CA who in turn consulted legal counsel regarding future course of action to be taken in the matter.The documents filed with the appeal shows that the Advocate before the Hon'ble High Court as well as this Hon'ble Tribunal is the same and thus the submission regarding consultation of CA cannot be accepted without factual evidence to the effect.

2.1. Ld. AR relied on the provisions of Section 14 of Limitation Act to argue the following.

(i) The appellants have sought shelter of Section 14 of Limitation Act, for filing this appeal and condoning the delay of more than 16 months. A perusal of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act shows that period spent by the appellant bona fide in the Court without jurisdictioncan be excluded from the period of limitation. The two important elements in Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act are (i) that the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, and (ii) the same should be prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(ii) He argued that both the above elements of due diligence and good faith are absent in the instant case.The appellants were well aware that the right forum to appeal in the instant case is this Tribunal but consciously decided to file a writ petition.The writwas filed to overcome the burden of pre deposit of 7.5% of duty confirmed required to be deposited as per Sec 83 of the Finance Act 1994. The appeal was filed with conscious knowledge that the High Court is not the appropriate forum to file an appeal against the confirmation of Service Tax demand. Further judgments of Hon'ble High Courts at Allahabad and Delhi in the case of -

(i) Ganesh Yadav Vs. UOI : 2015 (320) ELT 711(All)] and

(ii) Anjani Technoplast Vs. CC : 2015 (326) ELT 472(Del.)]

had already decided the issue of deposit of 7.5% / 10% duty under Sec 35 of the Central Excise Act, and they had already been reported. Subsequently, the Order of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Nimbus Communication Ltd. Vs. CST Mumbai-IV [2015 (44) STR 578 (BOM)] was also decided on 25.07.2016 (within 2 months of filing the appeal by the appellants) and reported. Despite, such clear orders, the appellants chose to take the chance and pursue their case with the Hon'ble High Court instead of coming to the correct forum which is this Hon'ble Tribunal. This correctly shows that the petition in the Hon'ble High Court was not "prosecuted in good faith".

2.2. Ld. AR argued that a duly diligent appellant, in any case, would take the liberty of filing simultaneous appeal in this Tribunal like in the case of Kim Steel Strips Pvt. Ltd.

2.3. LD. AR relied on various Judicial pronouncement by Hon'ble Supreme Court on the applicability of Limitation Act on Special Acts like Customs act, Finance Act, 1994 etc:-

(i) He argued that the issue of applicability of above two phrases of duly diligence and good faith in case of special Acts have been examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ketan V. Parekh Vs. Special Director, Dte. Of Enforcement : 2012 (275) ELT 3(SC)] held that good faith is sine qua non for invoking Sec 14 of Limitation Act, 1963. The Hon'ble Court held that as the appellants were conversant with various statutory provisions, considering their conduct, "by no stretch of imagination it can be said that they were bona fide prosecuting remedy before wrong forum.Rather, there was total absence of good faith which is sine qua non for invoking Sec 14 of Limitation Act".(para 23)

The detailed findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph nos. 19, 22, 23 and 26 were also brought out during the arguments.

(ii) He argued that in similar issue in the case of Patel Brothers Vs. State of Assam and Ors. [] Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the approach which is to be adopted by the Court is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude the operation of Limitation Act.

He argued that when the various judgments cited by Hon'ble Supreme Court are read harmoniously it emerges that the limitation prescribed in the special Acts are binding. In the case of Finance Act,1994, a time period is prescribed, but the time period can be relaxed on "sufficient cause"being shown.

(iii) Hon'ble Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises Vs. CCE Jamshedpur has categorically stated that "sufficient cause" is an expression which is found in various statutes. It, essentially, means as adequate or enough. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished for delay caused in taking steps. He argued that in the instant case, the explanation offered for the abnormal delay of more than 20 months, it appears that the appellant has categorically accepted that on receipt of order the same was immediately handed over to the consultant for filling the an appeal. If that is so, the plea that because of lack of experience in business there was delay does not stand to be reason. It was submitted that the appellants have not adduced any cogent reason why they preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble High court instead of the Tribunal.

2.4. Ld. AR relied on following Judicial pronouncements by various High courts:

"(i) He argued that Hon'ble Bombay High Court also examined the same issue specifically with respect to application of Sec 5 and Sec 14 of the Limitation Act in the case of Flemingo (DFS0P.ltdvsCommr of Customs (Appeals), Mumbai I. Specific reference was also brought about the findings of The Hon'ble Court, while examining the applicability of section 14(2) of Limitation Act. He argued that the Hon'ble court was scathing in its observations when it observed that "If the petitioner decides not to approach the appropriate, correct or right forum, but tries to bypass it by filing a writ petition and allows the time to run, then, it cannot request this court in its discretionary and equitable jurisdiction to set right a wrong, for which it is itself responsible". Further, it was submitted that findings of Para 46 is directly relevant and applicable in the instant case, wherein Hon'ble Court refused to exercise its power under writ jurisdiction.

(ii) He argued that the issue has also been examined by the Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi wherein the Hon'ble High Court dealing with the issue of "Chance taking petitioner" observed that "there is one more reason not to give benefit of Sec 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 is applicable only when the proceeding is bona fide in the Court without jurisdiction. This was with specific reference to the tendencies of those persons who are liable to make payment of tax+interest+penalty to take a chance before this Court.The Hon'ble Court categorically observed it ought to be kept in mind by this type chance taking petitioner that they should simultaneously prefer statutory appeals also"

2.5. Finally, he argued that,in the case of G. Masilamani Vs. CST Chennai, a Coordinate Bench at Madras of this Hon'ble Tribunal had, after examining the fact, stated that "if this case is leniently considered there shall be a bonus to the dilatory tactics and Revenue's interest shall be seriously prejudiced". The scope of "sufficient cause"can also be examined in light of the findings of the Tribunal in this judgment. He argued that the issue is whether sufficient cause has been demonstrated to justify the failure of filing the appeal within the period prescribed in the statute. The appellants have stated that they were bona fide prosecuting the case in high court and thus were entitled for benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was argued by him that there were two essential ingredients to enable the invoking of section 14 of Limitation Act: First, that there was a bona fide prosecution in a court of law which could not entertain it due to defect of jurisdiction. This element, he argued, was apparently missing in this case as the appellants were well aware that they were consciously prosecuting the case in the wrong forum. Secondly, he argued that, if there was due diligence, they would have filed an appeal simultaneously in this Tribunal (as observed by Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court in the case of Shiv Sahil Corporation). He argued that the observations of Hon'ble Mumbai high Court that the appellants cannot take recourse of their conscious decision to seek condonation of delay, appear to be directly applicable in this case. He argued that the appellants have not adduced any cogent reasons for establishing why they preferred an appeal before the High Court instead of the Tribunal.It was submitted that in light of the various judgments cited, the provision of Limitation Act will not be applicable in the instant case as the hurdle of "sufficient cause" has not been crossed.

2.6 He argued that the application of condonation of delay may accordingly be dismissed. Learned AR placed reliance on the following judgments:

(i) Ketan V. Parekh Vs. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2012 (276) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)

(ii) M/s. Patel Brothers Vs. State of Assam And Ors.

(iii) M/s. Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur

(iv) Vikas Shankar Joshi Vs. Addl Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax.

(v) Flemingo (Duty Free Shop) P. Ltd. Vs. Commr. ofCus. (Appeals), Mumbai-I : 2015 (315) E.L.T. 321 (Bom.)

(vi) M/s. Shiv Sahil Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India

He further relied on the Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions in the case Ketan Parekh (supra) wherein it was held that-

"18. The question whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be relied upon for excluding the time spent in prosecuting remedy before a wrong forum was considered by a two Judge Bench in State of Goa v. Western Builders (supra) in the context of the provisions contained in Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Bench referred to the provisions of the two Acts and observed :

There is no provision in the whole of the Act which prohibits discretion of the court. Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act if the party has been bonafidely prosecuting his remedy before the court which has no jurisdiction whether the period spent in that proceedings shall be excluded or not. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken us to the provisions of the Act of 1996: like Section 5, Section 8(1), Section 9, Section 11, sub-sections (4), (6), (9) and sub-section (3) of Section 14, Section 27, Sections 34, 36, 37, 39(2) and (4), Section 41, sub-section (2), Sections 42 and 43 and tried to emphasise with reference to the aforesaid sections that wherever the legislature wanted to give power to the court that has been incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further power should lie in the hands of the court so as to enable to exclude the period spent in prosecuting the remedy before other forum. It is true but at the same time there is no prohibition incorporated in the statute for curtailing the power of the court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Much depends upon the words used in the statute and not general principles applicable. By virtue of Section 43 of the Act of 1996, the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under the Act of 1996 and the provisions of the Limitation Act can only stand excluded to the extent wherever different period has been prescribed under the Act, 1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under Section 34, there is no reason why Section 14 of the Limitation Act (sic not) be read in the Act of 1996, which will advance the cause of justice. If the statute is silent and there is no specific prohibition then the statute should be interpreted which advances the cause of justice."

2.7 Learned AR further argued that the matter regarding mandatory nature of pre-deposit was cleared especially the courts at the material time had reportedly held that pre-deposit is mandatory. Ld. AR particularly relied on decision of Hon'ble High Courts in the following cases:

(i) Ganesh Yadav Vs. Union of India : 2015 (320) E.L.T. 711 (All.)

(ii) Anjani Technoplast Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Customs : 2015 (326) E.L.T. 472 (Del.)

(iii) Nimbus Communications Limited Vs. Commissioner of S.T. Mumbai-IV : 2016 (44) STR 578 (Bom.)

to assert that the reason for approaching the Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai for waiver of pre-deposit were not bonafide and genuine.

3. We have gone through the rival submissions. We find that the provisions pertaining to time limit for filing of appeal and for condonation of delay are contained in Section 35B(3), (4) & (5) which is reproduced below:

(3) Every appeal under this section shall be filed within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Commissioner of Central Excise, or, as the case may be, the other party preferring the appeal.

(4) On receipt of notice that an appeal has been preferred under this section, the party against whom the appeal has been preferred may, notwithstanding that he may not have appealed against such order or any part thereof, file, within forty-five days of the receipt of the notice, a memorandum of cross-objections verified in the prescribed manner against any part of the order appealed against and such memorandum shall be disposed of by the Appellate Tribunal as if it were an appeal presented within the time specified in sub-section (3).

(5) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.

It is seen that Tribunal has been granted the power to condone the delay if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period prescribed under Sub-Section 3 of Section 35B of Central Excise Act. It is also seen that no upper limit has been prescribed for condoning the delay in filing the appeal provided sufficient cause is shown for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period.

3.1.1. Examination of rival argument indicated that the applicant is relying on the case law wherein higher courts have held that the substantial justice should not be denied on procedural grounds and therefore the provision for condonation of delay should be considered liberally. Revenue on the other hand, has relied on the case law of higher courts where it has been held benefit of provisions of Limitation Act cannot be granted under Central Excise Act. Revenue has relied on various decisions which are discussed below:

(a) It has been argued that benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be extended if the applicants have deliberately delayed and have not acted in bonafide manner. In support of this assertion revenue has relied on the case of Ketan V. Parekh (supra). In the said case application for condonation of delay was filed beforeHon'ble High Court. Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act,1999 reads as follows:

"35. Appeal to High Court.Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order: Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order:" Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. Explanation.In this section "High Court"means -

(a) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and

(b) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain."

The section prescribes a normal period of limitation and an upper limit for condonation, and grounds for condonation, is also prescribed. It is seen that the said Section does not give unlimited powers to the Hon'ble High Court to condone the delay. In terms of proviso to Section 35 of FEMA, 1999, Hon Hon'ble High Court can condone the delay of upto 60 days. In these circumstances after examining Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, Hon'ble High Court came to the conclusion that period cannot be extended in terms of the said Sections of Limitation Act.

3.1.2 Ld. AR has relied on the decision of Honble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Patel Brothers Vs. State of Assam And Ors. -where the issue was elaborated in para 4 & 5 which is reproduced as under:

"4. Section 81 of the VAT Act also prescribes a limitation period of 60days within which such revision petition is to be preferred to HighCourt. Since there was a delay of 335 days in filing these revisionpetitions, these petitions were filed along with applications underSection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation ofdelay. The High Court has dismissed the applications forcondonation of delay holding that provisions of Section 5 of theLimitation Act, 1963 are not applicable. For this purpose, theHigh Court has referred to Section 84 of the VAT Act which makesprovisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to suchpetitions. On that basis, it is held by the High Court that sinceonly Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are made specifically applicable to these proceedings, by necessaryimplication Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded.

5. It was argued by Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing forthe appellant, that the approach of the High Court in dealing withthe provisions of VAT Act and applicability of Limitation Act, 1963to such proceedings was faulty inasmuch as the High Court didnot take note of and discussed other provisions of the VAT Actand also failed to give due weightage to Section 29(2) of theLimitation Act, 1963.In the first instance, he referred to Section 79 of the VAT Actwhich is a provision relating to appeals to the Appellate Authority.As per Section 79(1) of the VAT Act, appeal against the order ofthe taxing authority can be filed with the appellate authority within 60 days from the date of receipt of such order of the taxingauthority. Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the VAT Act empowersthe appellate authority to entertain the appeal even beyond 60days, provided it is presented within a further period of 180 days,if the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant wasprevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal withinthe stipulated period of 60 days."

It is seen thatSection 79(2) of the ASSAM VAT Act, 2003 prescribedis a normal period of limitation and an upper limit prescribed of 60 days for condonation of delay, and grounds for condonation were also prescribed.

3.1.3 Ld. AR has also relied on the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur -. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court was examining the condonation of delay in filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) under Central Excise Act. Section 35 of Central Excise Act reads as follows:

"35. APPEALS TO COMMISSIONER (APPEALS).

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise, may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) [hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the Commissioner (Appeals)] within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order :

Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.

(2) Every appeal under this section shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner."

It is seen that in this case as well Hon'ble Apex Court was concerned with condonation of delay where the statute itself provides is a normal period of limitation and an upper limit of condonation, and grounds thereof, were prescribed. Thereafter Hon'ble Apex Court held that Limitation Act is not applicable in these circumstances.

3.1.4. Ld. AR has also relied on decision of Honble Bombay High Court in the case of Vikas Shankar Joshi Vs. Addl. Commissioner of Central Excise,Customs & Service Tax RaigadCommissionerate. In this case also condonation of delay before Commissioner (Appeals), the appeal was being examined. The Hon'ble High Court observed that the benefit of Limitation Act, cannot be extended in these circumstances, and therefore refused to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed under the statue.

3.1.5. Ld. AR has also relied on decision of Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai in the case of Flemingo (Duty Free Shop) P. Ltd. Vs. Commr. of Cus. (Appeals), Mumbai-I : 2015 (315) E.L.T. 321 (Bom.) . He particularly relied on para 20 of the decision reads as follows:

"20. A bare perusal thereof would indicate that the Appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) ought to be filed within a period of 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order passed by an officer lower in rank to the Commissioner of Customs. That Appeal must be filed within 60 days. This period was substituted by the Finance Act, 2001 (14 of 2001) for the words within three months. By the Finance Act, 2001, the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 was substituted. The Commissioner was empowered to allow presentation of the Appeal within a further period of 30 days on recording his satisfaction that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the Appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days. Thus, the period of limitation is prescribed by sub-section (1) of Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. The proviso merely enables the Commissioner (Appeals) to allow presentation of such Appeal within a further period of 30 days. The proviso does not mean that the Appeal can be presented after 60 days. If it is presented beyond the period of 60 days but within the further period of 30 days as stipulated by the proviso, then, the Appellant has to satisfy the Commissioner (Appeals) [Appellate Authority] that there was sufficient cause which prevented him from presenting the Appeal within the period of 60 days. We do not find in the present case that the Appeal was presented within 60 days. It was not even presented thereafter within 30 days. The Petitioner/Appellant waited till 12th December, 2011 to present the Appeal. If the Petitioner waited for the outcome of a Writ Petition in this Court and in the meanwhile allowed the time to run, then, it has to blame itself."

It is seen that in the said case Hon'ble Bombay High Court was dealing with power of Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay under Section 128 of the Customs Act which reads as under:

"Section 128 in the Customs Act, 1962

128 Appeals to Commissioner (Appeals)].

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by an officer of customs lower in rank than aCommissioner of Customs may appeal to theCommissioner (Appeals) within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order:

Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.

(1A) The Commissioner (Appeals) may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of hearing of an appeal, grant time, from time to time, to the parties or any of them and adjourn the hearing of the appeal for reasons to be recorded in writing:

Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the appeal.

(2) Every appeal under this section shall be in such form and shall be verified in such manner as may be specified by rules made in this behalf."

It can be seen that in this case as well there is a normal period of limitation and an upper limit of condonation, and grounds for condonation, were prescribed by Customs Act.Therefore, without invoking the Limitation Act, condonation could not have been granted

3.1.6 Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand in the case of M/s. Shiv Sahil Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India &Ors. -was dealing with condonation of delay in filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals).

3.2 It is seen that all the case laws cited by the Revenue, the decisions are in respect of provisions of lawwhich prescribe not only a normal period of limitation but also an upper limit of condonation and grounds for granting condonation. Following are the provisions examined in the case law cited.

3.2.1 In case of appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, the provisions reads as follows:

"35. APPEALS TO COMMISSIONER (APPEALS).

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise, may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) [hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the Commissioner (Appeals)] within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order :

Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.

(2) Every appeal under this section shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner."

In case of Appeals filed before Commissioner of Customs under Section 128A prescribed a upper limit of 60 days the said Section reads as follows:

"128 Appeals to Commissioner (Appeals)].

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by an officer of customs lower in rank than aCommissioner of Customs may appeal to theCommissioner (Appeals) within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order:

Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.

(1A) The Commissioner (Appeals) may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of hearing of an appeal, grant time, from time to time, to the parties or any of them and adjourn the hearing of the appeal for reasons to be recorded in writing:

Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the appeal.

(2) Every appeal under this section shall be in such form and shall be verified in such manner as may be specified by rules made in this behalf."

3.2.3 In case of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 Section 35 prescribed the time period for filing appeal to High Court the Section reads as follows:

"35. Appeal to High Court.Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order: Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of such order:" Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. Explanation.In this section High Courtmeans

(a) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and

(b) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain."

3.2.4 Similarly in the case of Assam Vat Act, 2003 Section 79(2) empowers appellate authority to condone the delay of upto 180 days beyond the statutory time period by filing appeal of 60 days (para 5 of the order of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Patel Brothers).

3.3 It is seen that unless, it is permissible to invoke provisions of the law of Limitation, it is not possible to grant condonation of delay beyond the limits prescribed in these provisions as an upper limit for condonation has been prescribed. However it is seen that the Honble Apex Court has in the case of Ketan V. Parekh : 2012 (275) ELT 3 (SC) has interpreted Section 29(2) of the Act and observed as follows:

"12. In Hukumdev NarainYadav v. LalitNarain Mishra : 1974 (2) SCC 133], this Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in the context of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It was argued that the words expressly excluded appearing in Section 29(2) would mean that there must be an explicit mention in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. While rejecting the argument, the three-Judge Bench observed:

'what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.'

(emphasis supplied)

13. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Company (supra), this Court considered the question whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for condonation of delay in filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two-Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in VidyacharanShukla v. KhubchandBaghel : AIR 1964 SC 1099], HukumdevNarainYadav v. LalitNarain Mishra (supra), Mangu Ram v. MCD : 1976 (1) SCC 392], Patel NaranbhaiMarghabhai v. DhulabhaiGalbabhai : JT 1992 (4) SC 381 : 1992 (4) SCC 264] and held:

As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are `but not thereafterused in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase `but not thereafterwholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award

`in accordance withsub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application `in accordance withthat sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that:

`36. Enforcement.Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.

This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to `proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow(Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the courts powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

14. In Singh Enterprises v. CCE (supra), the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is parimateria to Section 35 of the Act and observed:

The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short `the Limitation Act) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 daystime can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 daysperiod.

15. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others (supra), a three-Judge Bench again considered Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. J.M. Panchal, J., speaking for himself and Balakrishnan, C.J., referred to the relevant provisions and observed:

When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up to specified time-limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the application for setting aside the award should be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

16. In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd. (supra), another three-Judge Bench considered the question whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for condonation of delay in filing an appeal or reference to the High Court, referred to the judgments in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (supra), Singh Enterprises v. CCE (supra) and observed-

As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.

17. In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (supra), a two-Judge Bench interpreted Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which is substantially similar to Section 35 of the Act and observed:

Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression within a further period of not exceeding 60 daysin the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days.

The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction.

It is thus evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law.

17.1. The Court then referred to some of the precedents and held:

In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the obje

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ct of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory." It is seen that Honble Apex Court has interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, byobserving that wherever the law prescribed a complete code prescribing time limit as well as power of condonation like an upper limit for condonation of delay or grounds of condonation, the law of limitation cannot be invoked to by-pass the same. 5. Thus in the instant case laws of limitation cannot be invoked as we are dealing with a complete code prescribed under Central Excise Act, where not only the period of limitation is prescribed but also the grounds on which condonation can be granted are prescribed. However it is seen that, as against the provisions examined in para 4 above, there is no upper limit for period of condonation in the instant case. Thus there is no necessity to invoke the provisions of the Limitation Act, so long as the reasons of delay are covered by the provisions of law. The provisions pertaining to time limit for filing of appeal before CESTAT and for condonation of delay are contained in Section 35B(3), (4) & (5) which is reproduced below: "(3) Every appeal under this section shall be filed within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Commissioner of Central Excise, or, as the case may be, the other party preferring the appeal. (4) the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. It is apparent that so long as the appellants are able to show that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within period prescribed under section 35B(3). 4. Now we come to the issue of reasonable cause in the instant case the appellants preferred writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai and writ petition was disposed of on 30.3.2017 and certified copy of the said order was applied for as 21.4.2017 and received by the appellant on 27.4.2017. The appeal before Tribunal was filed on 26.5.2017. In these circumstances we need to assess whether there was a reasonable cause for delay. It is seen that Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai has while disposing the writ observed as follows: "2. We do not think that the conditions imposed by the statute are either excessive or arbitrary requiring our interference in writ jurisdiction particularly in the absence of any material in that behalf. It is inconceivable that an assessee approaches this Court in writ jurisdiction and can avoid filing of an appeal only on such a plea as is projected, namely, a pre-deposit of 7.5% of the tax to avail of his right of appeal. 3. The writ petition is misconceived and dismissed on the ground that there is an alternate and equally efficacious remedy available to the petitioner." Even Hon'ble High Court has described their petition as 'misconceived'while dismissing it. 4.1. Ld. AR argued that the applicant did not approach Hon'ble High Court with bonafide reasons. He argued that the intention was to by-pass the Tribunal. He has argued that the applicant had approached the Hon'ble High Court for waiver of pre-deposit under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act. He pointed out that the following decision of various High Courts on same issue were available at the material time. (i) Ganesh Yadav Vs. Union of India : 2015 (320) ELT 711 (All.) (ii) Anjani Technoplast Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Customs : 2015 (326) ELT 472 (Del.) (iii) Nimbus communications Ltd. Vs. CST, Mumbai-IV : 2016 (44) STR 578 (Bom.) He argued that it is apparent that the Hon'ble Courts at the material time had a clear view that under Section 35F of the Act, deposit is mandatory and cannot be waived. He argued that in these circumstances the applicants approach to Hon'ble High Court was not bona fide, but only intended to delay the matter. 4.2. In the above circumstances when various High Courts had taken a clear stand on the issue the appellants approach to Hon'ble High Court on the same issue of pre-deposit was not with clean hands. Even after the decision of Hon'ble High Court was received the appellants delayed the filing of appeal for a long time. This shows the callous approach. The grounds cited of condonation are as follows: "Once the matter was disposed the applicant-respondent consulted their chartered accountant who in turn consulted legal counsel regarding future course of action to be taken in the matter viz. whether to file appeal before the Honorable Supreme Court or not. During such time, the applicant applied for certified copy of the order on 21.04.2017 which was received on 27.04.2017. After internal discussions/deliberations, it was decided that an appeal be filed against the impugned order before this Honorable Court along with application for condonation of delay." Hon'ble High Court disposed off the petition on 30.3.2017 but the appellants applied for copy of order after 21 days on 21.4.2017. The copy of order was received on 27.4.2017 but the appeal was filed on 26.5.2017 almost a month after receipt of order. When the matter has been agitated before Hon'ble High Court for over a year it is obvious that the defense of the appellants should have been ready and immediately as decision of Hon'ble High Court the appellants should have filed the appeal before Tribunal. In these circumstances we are unable to take a liberal approach. The application is therefore dismissed.
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