w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n



State of Kerala, Represented by The Additional Chief Secretary To Government, Home & Vigilance Department, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram & Others v/s P. Pradeepkumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Records Bureau, Office of the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, Residing at Cheruvaickal, Sreekaryaym, Thiruvananthapuram


Company & Directors' Information:- AT HOME INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17211DL2001PTC112255

Company & Directors' Information:- V HOME PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL2001PTC109331

Company & Directors' Information:- G. P. HOME PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U70102MH2011PTC213056

    OP(KAT). No. 124 of 2020

    Decided On, 19 June 2020

    At, High Court of Kerala

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. SHAFFIQUE & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P. GOPINATH

    For the Petitioners: P.N. Santhosh, Advocate. For the Respondent: R1, S.P. Aravindakshan Pillay, N. Santha, V. Varghese, Peter Jose Christo, S.A. Anand, K.N. Remya, L. Annapoorna, V.K. Vishnu, Abhirami K. Uday, Advocates.



Judgment Text


Shaffique, J.

1. The State and its officers have preferred this original petition challenging order dated 23/1/2020 in OA No.2057/2018. By the impugned order, the Tribunal has set aside the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the petitioners against the respondent herein.

2. The short facts of the case would disclose that the respondent herein while working as Circle Inspector of Police, Vellarada was suspended from service by order dated 28/2/2006 as he was involved in a case relating to receipt of illegal gratification. The case originated on account of a trap at the instance of the State Vigilance Department. Final report was filed by the Vigilance before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram and after conducting trial, the delinquent officer was dismissed from service w.e.f. 4/10/2011. While the vigilance case was pending, the delinquent officer was reinstated in service on 19/8/2007 and he was promoted as Dy.S.P. as per order dated 8/7/2009. After the judgment dated 20/4/2011 of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, the delinquent officer was suspended from service as per order dated 4/10/2011 and later he was dismissed as per order dated 20/4/2017 w.e.f. 4/10/2011. Challenging the judgment of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, the officer filed Crl.Appeal No.746/2011 before the High Court and by judgment dated 22/8/2017, High Court allowed his appeal and he was acquitted from all the charges. Pursuant to the said judgment, he was reinstated in service on 27/3/2018. However by order dated 14/9/2018, the disciplinary authority directed disciplinary action to be taken against the respondent. According to the delinquent officer, the incident had taken place 12 years ago and the present enquiry had been ordered to harass him. He contended that his probation has not been declared and he was due to be promoted as Superintendent of Police. The respondent therefore sought for quashing Annexure A14 order by which disciplinary action had been initiated against him.

3. The petitioners herein, State and its officers, supported their stand in the matter inter alia contending that there is no bar in taking departmental proceedings and criminal action simultaneously. In so far as in the present case, the delinquent officer was dismissed from service on a finding by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, no departmental action was contemplated. However, when he is acquitted from the charges levelled against him by an order passed by the High Court, there is no legal bar in proceeding with the disciplinary action.

4. The Tribunal passed the impugned order after arriving at a conclusion that the High Court has acquitted the delinquent officer from the charges levelled against him in the absence of sufficient evidence. Further, the grounds mentioned in Annexure A14 order that the respondent had committed grave irresponsibility, indiscipline and abused his official position has not been indicated. It is also found that the materials produced in the OA do not show that there are any facts or circumstances other than those considered by the trial Court and the High Court on which disciplinary action had been taken against the applicant. It is also found that on account of passage of time of more than 12 years, no effective enquiry could be conducted in the matter.

5. While impugning the aforesaid order, learned Government Pleader placed reliance on several judgments of the Apex Court and this Court which are as under:-

(i) Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Others [(1988) 4 SCC 319].

(ii) State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena & Others [(1996) 6 SCC 417]

(iii) Capt.M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Another [(1999) 3 SCC 679]

(iv) Vijayan v. Syndicate Bank (2001 (3) KLT 702)

(v) Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs v. Tahir Ali Khan Tyagi (JT 2002 Suppl 1 SC 520)

(vi) Union of India & Others v. Sitaram Mishra & Another (Civil Appeal No.6183/2010)

(vii) Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao [(2012) 1 SCC 442]

(viii) Deputy Inspector General of Police & Another v. S. Samuthiram [(2013) 1 SCC 598]

(ix) Stanzen Toyotetsu India Private Limited v. Girish v. & Others [(2014) 3 SCC 636]

(x) State Bank of India & Others v. Neelam Nag & Another [(2016) 9 SCC 491].

6. It is submitted that departmental action can be initiated at any time subject to the decision being taken by the disciplinary authority. It is argued that this is a case in which a vigilance enquiry was going on and a final report was filed before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special judge. At that time, it was felt that disciplinary action would cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in taking his defence in the criminal case. Therefore, he was kept under suspension and later reinstated in service while the matter was pending before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special judge. He was convicted and thereafter his acquittal came only when there was interference by the High Court. Since departmental action was not taken initially, nothing prevents the disciplinary authority to take disciplinary action after culmination of the criminal proceedings before Court. Learned Government Pleader argued that in so far as the delinquent officer was convicted by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, there was no necessity for conducting a separate departmental enquiry and departmental action was initiated only when it was later found that he was not guilty of the offences alleged. It is pointed out that in the light of the judgments relied upon, there is no legal bar in initiating departmental action.

7. Sri.S.P.Aravindakshan Pillay, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/delinquent officer submits that this is a case in which attempts are being made to victimize the respondent. He had already lost his opportunity for due promotion which he was entitled. Under normal circumstances, parallel proceedings can be taken against any delinquent officer for the alleged misconduct and after completion of the criminal case, orders could have been passed by the disciplinary authority on conviction. But this is a case in which the disciplinary authority kept quiet for a considerably long period without initiating any disciplinary action and it is only when the High Court had acquitted the delinquent officer of all charges levelled against him on a clear finding that there was no evidence to implicate the respondent, that the disciplinary authority have initiated the aforesaid action. It is submitted that there is absolutely no evidence to prove the allegations against the respondent. The entire evidence adduced by the prosecution before the Special Judge had been considered by the High Court and on appreciation of the evidence, the High Court had come to a conclusion that the charges levelled against the respondent have not been proved. Under such circumstances, when the very same material is relied upon by the disciplinary authority to take disciplinary action, it would virtually amount to harassing the respondent and therefore the Tribunal having already arrived at a conclusion based on the factual circumstances involved in the matter, this Court may not interfere in the case.

8. The principle of law with reference to deferring disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of criminal case had been well settled. The Apex Court in Kusheshwar Dubey's case (supra) held that there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In State of Rajasthan's case (supra), the Apex Court while reiterating the above view has made specific reference to the approach and the objective in criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings and held that it is altogether distinct and different. Paragraph 17 is relevant, which reads as under:-

“17. There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Penal Code, 1860, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed.”

9. In Capt.M.Paul Anthony's case (supra) while laying down the very same proposition, the Apex Court held that while a criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings can proceed simultaneously, the only exception would be that the department proceedings and criminal case are based on the same set of facts, and evidence in both the proceedings is common and the law has been reiterated at paragraph 22 which reads as under;

“22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are:

(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.”

10. In Vijayan's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court while considering the question whether a disciplinary proceedings can be initiated when there is delay in the conduct of criminal prosecution, held that the employer is not denuded of the power to take disciplinary action even if the time-limit for launching the prosecution is over. It was held at paragraph 7 as under:-

“7. Now it is settled law that albiet on same set of facts, criminal case and disciplinary proceedings operate on different plains. While the purpose of the first is to punish the guilty, the second is meant to “keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements”. Power of disciplinary action is wielded to ensure the maintenance of purity and morale of the administration. So, even after acquittal on technical grounds by a criminal court, the delinquent employee can be proceeded against in departmental proceedings. The decisions of this court in Spadigam v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 1047), K. Babu v. Union Bank of India (1986 KLT 706), Bhimsen v. Bank of India (1995 (2) KLT SN 73) and Sr. Supdt. of Post Offices v. Gopalan (1999 (2) KLJ SN 14) support this legal position. The Supreme Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India (1992 (4) SCC 711) has held as follows:

“So far the first point is concerned, namely whether the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued in the face of the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case, the plea has no substance whatsoever and does not merit a detailed consideration. The nature and scope and a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding.”

Again, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sithana (1997 (4) SCC 383) has reiterated that the acquittal by a criminal court will not preclude the competent authority from deciding to take disciplinary action against the delinquent employee.”

11. In Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (supra), the Apex Court while considering the question relating to whether a departmental proceeding could be initiated after acquittal in the criminal proceeding, held that departmental proceedings and criminal proceeding can run simultaneously and departmental proceeding can also be initiated even after acquittal in a criminal proceeding particularly when the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is completely different from the standard of proof that is required to prove the delinquency of a government servant in a departmental proceeding. In a criminal proceeding, the standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt whereas in departmental proceedings, the preponderance of probability will establish the alleged misconduct.

12. In Civil Appeal No. 6183/2010 decided by Apex Court on 11/7/2019, it was held that acquittal in a criminal case was not a ground for setting aside the penalty which was imposed in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. That was a case in which a criminal case was charged against a person for firing a bullet which resulted in death of a co-employee. He was acquitted of the charges by the criminal Court. It was found that the charge of misconduct was on the ground of negligence of the delinquent officer in handling his weapon and his failure to comply with the departmental instructions, and in regard to the manner in which the weapon should be handled.

13. We do not want to exhaustively deal with the other judgments cited by the learned Government Pleader as the proposition laid down is substantially the same. The first question to be considered is whether there is any delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in initiating disciplinary action against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary action against the members of police force is being conducted in accordance with the Kerala Police Department Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Rule 10 specifically deals with matters pending before a Court, which reads as under:-

“10. Departmental Inquiry regarding matters before a court.

(a) Final orders in a departmental inquiry, which is subjudice, shall be issued only after the matter has been disposed of in Court.”

It is therefore not in dispute that the department could have initiated departmental proceedings pending a criminal case. But Rule 10 clearly specifies that final orders in departmental proceedings shall be issued only after the matter has been disposed of by the Court.

14. In the case on hand, the Vigilance Department had charged the delinquent officer for having received illegal gratification on the basis of a trap conducted by the Vigilance Department. It seems that when the Vigilance Department was proceeding with the prosecution, though the officer was initially placed under suspension, he was reinstated in service and he was given the due promotion. However, when he was convicted by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, the delinquent officer was initially suspended and later dismissed from service. According to the learned Government Pleader, further disciplinary action was not contemplated as the delinquent officer was already dismissed from service. But after the order of acquittal by the Appellate Court within one year, disciplinary action was taken against the delinquent officer.

15. Since this is a case of trap of the officer concerned, necessarily the evidence that is forthcoming in the case will be that of the trap and the surrounding circumstances relating to the demand and the recovery of money from the officer concerned. It is settled law that even if the disciplinary action has been initiated based on the very same set of facts, the distinction which is usually drawn between departmental proceeding and criminal case is on the basis of appreciation of evidence and burden of proof. In the case on hand, memo of charges was not issued while the criminal case was pending and it came to be issued only after the acquittal in the criminal case. The question is whether initiation of a disciplinary proceeding after acquittal in a criminal case is bad in law. Apparently, there is no legal bar in the disciplinary authority proceeding with the disciplinary action after acquittal of the delinquent officer by a criminal Court.

16. The Tribunal placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in A.P.Augustian v. Superintendent of Post Offices, Alwaye [1985 (1) ILR (Ker) 643] wherein this Court observed that when there is a delay of 2 years after the incident, it may not be possible for an officer to defend himself effectively by adducing evidence in regard to matters which are alleged to have occurred over 2 years ago and in respect of which he has not yet been informed of the charges and nature of evidence relied on against him. Hence, it was held that, no fair and effective enquiry could be conducted unless the disciplinary action commences within a reasonable time after the incident. The above judgment came to be delivered on its own facts where an employee was kept under suspension for more than 2 years without initiating any action, which is not the case here.

17. The Apex Court in Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (supra) held that initiation of departmental proceedings after acquittal in a criminal case is not illegal. In fact, the Tribunal proceeded to distinguish the judgment of the Apex Court on facts and proceeded to arrive at a conclusion that the grounds on which the memo of charges had been framed have not been specifically detailed. This finding, according to us, cannot be sustained. The memo of charges had been produced as Ext.R1(a). After referring to the incident of trap, the allegation is that the action of the delinquent officer amounts to corruption, gross dereliction of duty, and negligence attached to the office of the officer concerned. The grounds had been specifically mentioned as the incident of trap and receipt of illegal gratification. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that that there are no grounds to justify the memo of charges cannot be sustained. Still further, the Tribunal proceeds to state that there are no facts or circumstances other than those considered by the trial Court and the High Court. But as held by the Apex Court in a long line of judgments, the manner of appreciation of evidence by a criminal court is totally different from appreciation of evidence by a disciplinary authority. That apart, the disciplinary authority is not considering the incident of trap alone, it considers all other allegations of misconduct mentioned in the memo of charges. Hence, merely because the delinquent officer was acquitted by the criminal court does not debar the disciplinary authority from taking disciplinary action, even if it is on the very same set of facts.

18. The next ground of defence is passage of time. As already stated, the delinquent officer was dismissed from service pursuant to conviction by a criminal court and it is thereafter by judgment dated 22/8/2017 in Crl.Appeal No.746/2011 that he was acquitted. Though the department had taken up the matter before the Apex Court, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. By order dated 14/9/2018, the Government opined that in so far as the acquittal was not honorable and it is based on technical grounds, and since the Apex Court did not interfere with the judgment of the High Court after examining the matter, it was decided to initiate disciplinary action. It is pursuant to the aforesaid direction that the memo of charges had been issued.

19. The Apex Court in Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan [(2007) 9 SCC 86] while considering a question whether long delay by itself would be a sufficient ground for not directing initiation of departmental proceedings held that if there exists satisfactory explanation for the delay, the same may not be a bar in directing initiation of fresh proceedings. Reference was made to the judgments of the Apex Court in P.D.Agrawal v. State Bank of India [(2006) 8 SCC 776] and also M.V.Bijlani v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 88] as well. It was held at paragraphs 22 to 24 as under:-

“22. A question as to whether a long delay by itself would be a sufficient ground for not directing initiation of a departmental proceeding came up for consideration before this Court in P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India wherein the doctrine of prejudice was considered stating that if there exists a satisfactory explanation for delay, same may not be a bar in directing initiation of a fresh proceedings. We, however, are not obliviou

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s that in a different situation, this Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India took the factor in regard to delay in initiating departmental proceedings as one of the relevant factors amongst others to determine the question as to whether a misconduct has been proved or not. 23. The instant case is not one where we can ignore the gravity of the offence. It is also not a case where the respondents have pleaded prejudice or brought sufficient materials on records so as to enable this Court to arrive at a finding that no evidence would be available. If departmental proceeding is directed to be initiated then the respondent would not be in a position to adduce any evidence in support of defence, because of passage of time. 24. We, therefore are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be met if liberty is granted to the appellant herein to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondents whereafter the appellants may pass appropriate order in accordance with law. The impugned judgment is set aside.” 20. In the case on hand, there is sufficient explanation on the part of the Government in initiating disciplinary action as the delinquent officer was acquitted only on 22/8/2017 while deciding Crl.Appeal No.746/2011. A Special Leave Petition filed by the Government challenging the said order also came to be dismissed. It is thereafter that steps were taken on 14/9/2018 to initiate disciplinary action. 21. The question is whether the delinquent officer will be in a position to adduce any evidence supporting his defence on account of passage of time. In fact, no such ground was taken before the Tribunal that the delay will prejudice him in any manner and therefore, when there is sufficient justification for the delay in initiating disciplinary action, Tribunal was not justified in setting aside the disciplinary action. 22. We are of the view that the reasons stated by the Tribunal for setting aside the disciplinary action against the respondent cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the Tribunal. The Original petition is therefore allowed setting aside the order in OA No.2057/2018 of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal. The disciplinary action against the respondent shall be completed as expeditiously as possible, and not later than 6 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
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03-07-2020 Makuko Chukwuka Muolokwo Versus The State of Karnataka, Represented by its Secretary Home Department, Bengaluru & Others High Court of Karnataka
02-07-2020 Vettaiyan Versus The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition & Excise Department, Secretariat, Chennai & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
02-07-2020 Esakkimuthu Versus The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, State of Tamil Nadu, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department, Chennai & Others. Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
01-07-2020 Sulochani Versus State of Tamil Nadu Rep.by Additional Chief Secretary to Government Government of Tamil Nadu Home, Prohibition & Excise Department Chennai & Others Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
01-07-2020 V. Vijayakumarasamy Versus The Government of Tamil Nadu represented by The Principal Secretary to Government Home (Transport II) Department, Secretariat, Chennai & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
01-07-2020 R. Thangam Versus The Principal Secretary to Government, Home Department (Police IV) & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
30-06-2020 Kamala Versus The State represented by its: The Secretary to Government (Home) Prohibition & Excise Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
30-06-2020 Dhanalakshmi Versus The Additional Chief Secretary to the Government Home, Prohibition and Excise Department Secretariat, Chennai. Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
29-06-2020 R. Sampath Versus Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, rep. by its Secretary, New Delhi & Others High Court of for the State of Telangana
29-06-2020 Malar Versus The Principal Secretary to Government (Home), Prohibition & Excise Department, Government of Tamilnadu, Chennai & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
25-06-2020 India Pentecostal Church of God, Represented by Its General President, Pastor (Dr.) T. Valson Abraham & Another Versus Government of India, Represented by Its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi & Others High Court of Kerala
25-06-2020 Sintu Kumar Versus State of Bihar Through Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar, Patna & Others High Court of Judicature at Patna
22-06-2020 Vemuri Swamy Naidu Versus The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat, Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District & Others High Court of for the State of Telangana
18-06-2020 Bhawan Singh Garbyal & Another Versus State of U.P. Through Addl. Chief Secy. Home & Others High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Lucknow Bench
16-06-2020 Jitendra Mohan Singh Versus State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home & Others High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Lucknow Bench
12-06-2020 P.P. Ramachandra Kaimal Versus State of Kerala, Represented by Secretary To Government, Department of Home, Kerala Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram & Others High Court of Kerala
11-06-2020 J. Antony Jayakumar Versus The State of Tamil Nadu rep. by Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Department of Home (Prison IV), Chennai & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
04-06-2020 M. Sujatha Versus State represented by the Secretary to Government Department of Home & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
04-06-2020 Surya Versus The State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department, Chennai & Others Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
03-06-2020 P. Murugesan Versus State of Tamil Nadu rep. By its Secretary to Government, Home (Police) Department, Chennai & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
02-06-2020 Nayee Soch Society (Regd.) Versus Ministry of Home Affairs & Others High Court of Delhi
02-06-2020 Balraj Versus State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by the Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department, Chennai & Others Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
29-05-2020 Vijay Ganesh @ Vijay @ Kurangu Vijay Versus State of Tamil Nadu, Rep. by the Principal Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise (IX) Department & Others Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
26-05-2020 L. Jayalakshmi Versus The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department, Secretariat, Chennai & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
19-05-2020 Brij Kishore Dwivedi Versus Union of India, represented by and through the Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi in the Ministry of Home Affairs, South Block, New Delhi & Others High Court of Tripura
18-05-2020 RM. Swamy Versus Government of India, Rep. by its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
15-05-2020 Parameshwaran Versus The Home Secretary (Prison),Secretariat, Chennai & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
14-05-2020 Ramakanta Das & Others Versus The State of Tripura Represented by the Secretary, Government of Tripura, Home Department, Agartala High Court of Tripura
14-05-2020 Rakesh Versus State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of Home, Secretariat, Rajasthan, Jaipur High Court of Rajasthan Jaipur Bench
12-05-2020 Sheik Madhar Versus The State of Tamil Nadu, Rep.by its Principal Secretary to the Government, Home Prohibition & Exercise Department, Chennai & Others Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
11-05-2020 Allu Srinivasa Rao Versus State of Telangana represented by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad & Others High Court of for the State of Telangana
08-05-2020 Sandip Madhu Nair Versus State, thr Home Deptt & Others In the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur
07-05-2020 Asa Uma Farooq Versus Union of India, through its its Secrtary, Ministry of Home Afairs, Government of India, New Delhi & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
05-05-2020 R. Sreedhar Versus The Principal Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Home Department, Chief Secretariat, Chennai & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
04-05-2020 A. Palanisamy @ Palaniappan Versus The Home Secretary (Prison IV) Home Department, Secretariat, Chennai & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
29-04-2020 AM (Zimbabwe) Versus Secretary of State for the Home Department United Kingdom Supreme Court
28-04-2020 HRT Builders, rep. by its Managing Partner Thondepu Ratna Srinivas Versus State of A.P. rep by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Velagapudi & Another High Court of Andhra Pradesh
21-04-2020 A. Mallikarjuna Versus Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, Disaster Management Division, Represented by its Secretary & Others High Court of Karnataka
21-04-2020 Deodutta Gangadhar Marathe Versus The State of Maharashtra through Secretary, Department of Home, Mantralaya & Others High Court of Judicature at Bombay
17-04-2020 Santhosha Nanban Home for Boys, Rep by its Superintendent Dorothy Marry Versus Union of India, Rep by The Chief Secretary to Government, Government of Puducherry, Chief Secretariat, Puducherry & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras