Heard Mr. Raj Nandan Sahay, learned senior counsel for the petitioner assisted by learned counsel, Mr. Yashvardhan, Mr. Sreenu Garapatiand Mr. Sarvendra Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent- State as well as Mr. Krishna Murari, learned counsel for the respondent-JEPC.These writ petitions have been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard.In W.P.(S) No.5870 of 2016, the petitioner has prayed for grant of revised pay scale w.e.f. 07.09.2012 in view of memo no.1836 dated 07.09.2012 and in W.P.(S) No.2430 of 2019, the petitioner has challenged the termination order. By way of earlier order, both the writ petitions were heard together that is why today argument has been advanced in both the writ petitions and have been heard on merit.Mr. Raj Nandan Sahay, learned senior counsel for the petitioner at the outset pointed out that 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002 made education a fundamental right for children under Article 21A of Constitution of India. He submits that National Policy of Education has been reiterated in the National Policy of Education in the year 1986. Pursuant thereto, Government of India in corroboration with State Government came out with the scheme Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. Jharkhand Education Council is the implementing agency for Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. So far as State of Jharkhand is concerned, under the Sarva Shikash Abhiyan there is national programme known as National Programme for education of girls at elementary level that is made for education of under privileged/disadvantage girls from Class I to VIII. Under the aforesaid programme, District Gender Coordinator are required to be appointed. The Jharkhand Education Project Council through letter no.15.03.2005 instructed the District Collector, Bokaro to initiate the process for appointment of District Gender Coordinator and appoint them. The State Project Director informed all the concerned officials of the JEPC at the District level to conclude the appointment process of District Gender Coordinator by 15.05.2005. Pursuant thereto the petitioner was appointed on the said post by appointment letter dated 01.02.2009. The petitioner was appointed as District Gender Coordinator for the last two years and on contractual basis. The petitioner’s services has been terminated by order dated 11.04.2018. Aggrieved with this, the petitioner has preferred W.P.(S) No.2430 of 2018.Mr. Raj Nandan Sahay, learned senior counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned order on the ground that language of the impugned order is stigmatic in nature. He submits that there is an allegation of fraudulently obtaining appointment and that is why it is stigmatic and in that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot sustain in the eye of law. Mr. Sahay took the Court to the impugned order repeatedly and argued that in the impugned order it has been stated that in the year 2013-14, the said scheme was already concluded, however, the petitioner was allowed to work till impugned order has been passed which shows that there is no concealment on behalf of petitioner. Mr. Sahay relied on the fundamentals of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. Mr. Sahay further relied in the case of Deoghar Versus Miss Manju Modak & Others reported in (2006) 2 JLJR (HC) particularly para 5 which is quoted hereinbelow:-“In our view, in any case where it appears to the Court that the order is violative of the principles of natural justice enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution then such order of the authority can be annulled.”He further relied in the case of Munni Kumari Versus The State of Jharkhand & Others reported in 2014(3) AJR 331 He also relied in the case of Hemanti Topno Versus State of Jharkhand & Others reported in 2010(3) AIR JHAR R 103. Relying on these judgments, Mr. Sahay submits that the impugned order has been passed without following the principles of natural justice. He further submits that no show cause notice has been issued against the petitioner and the impugned order has been passed. By way of referring Annexure-A of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of State, he submits that this is letter of the year 2007 wherein appointment of the petitioner was made in the year 2009. He submits that by way of Annexure-A action against the petitioner has been taken. He submits that if the contention of the respondents are correct that in the year 2007 appointment was stayed, is accepted, then it is for the State to disclose. The appointment of the petitioner was made in the year 2009. The petitioner has not concealed anything. If any action is taken against the petitioner, the principles of natural justice following with the show cause was required to be followed which has not been done in the case of petitioner. Mr. Sahay submits that after Coordinator the petitioner was converted into the post of In-Charge.Mr. Krishna Murari, learned counsel for the respondent-JEPC submits that the petitioner was never appointed as In-charge of Girl’s Education Section. By way of referring para 26 of the writ petition, he submits that neither the petitioner has applied nor in any para of the writ petition is mentioned that the petitioner was asked to work as Incharge Girls Education. He refers to Annexure-B of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-State of Jharkhand and submits that the petitioner was heard and thereafter the impugned order has been passed. He submits that in view of Annexure-B to the counter affidavit of respondent-State of Jharkhand, principles of natural justice has been followed. He further submits that Annexure-B is the basic order and this order has not been challenged by the petitioner and only consequential order contained in Annexure-6 to the writ petition, has been challenged and the writ is fit to be dismissed. He relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Edukanti Kistamma v. S. Venkatareddy reported in (2010) 1 SCC 756 particularly para 22 which is quoted hereinbelow:“22. It is a settled legal proposition that challenge to consequential order without challenging the basic order/statutory provision on the basis of which the order has been passed cannot be entertained. Therefore, it is a legal obligation on the part of the party to challenge the basic order and only if the same is found to be wrong, consequential order may be examined (vide P. Chitharanja Menon v. A. Balakrishnan; H.V. Pardasani v. Union of India; and Govt. of Maharashtra v. Deokar’s Distillery”.He submits that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as the basic order has not been challenged. By way of referring this judgment, he submits that only the consequential order challenged and basic order has not been challenged. Thus, the writ petition itself is not maintainable. He draws the attention of this Court towards Annexure-4 to the writ petition which is appointment letter of the petitioner. By way of referring several Clauses of the said order, he submits that the petitioner was contractual employee and there is no rule or statutory provision for regulation of services of the petitioner. By way of referring Clause 8 of the said document, he submits that it is clearly stated that if the work is not satisfactory, the term of the petitioner can be terminated by way of providing one month notice. He further refers the impugned order and submits that there is not stigma on the petitioner. He submits that language of the impugned order clearly shows that the appointment of the petitioner has been made pursuant to certain concealment. He submits that language does not mean that concealment allegation against the petitioner. He further submits that the petitioner has got no right to continuing in service in view of the fact that the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis. He submits that there are three ingredients for consequential reliefs of reinstatement which has not been fulfilled by the petitioner in the case in hand. To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of State Bank of India& Others Versus S.N. Goyal reported in (2008) 8 SCC 92 particularly para 17 which is quoted hereinbelow:-“17. Where the relationship of master and servant is purely contractual, it is well settled that a contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable, having regard to the bar contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Even if the termination of the contract of employment (by dismissal or otherwise) is found to be illegal or in breach, the remedy of the employee is only to seek damages and not specific performance. Courts will neither declare such termination to be a nullity nor declare that the contract of employment subsists nor grant the consequential relief of reinstatement. The three well-recognised exceptions to this rule are:(i) where a civil servant is removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India (or any law made under Article 309);(ii) where a workman having the protection of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is wrongly terminated from service; and(iii) where an employee of a statutory body is terminated from service in breach or violation of any mandatory provision of a statute or statutory rules.There is thus a clear distinction between public employment governed by statutory rules and private employment governed purely by contract. The test for deciding the nature of relief—damages or reinstatement with consequential reliefs—is whether the employment is governed purely by contract or by a statute or statutory rules. Even where the employer is a statutory body, where the relationship is purely governed by contract with no element of statutory governance, the contract of personal service will not be specifically enforceable. Conversely, where the employer is a non-statutory body, but the employment is governed by a statute or statutory rules, a declaration that the termination is null and void and that the employee should be reinstated can be granted by courts. (Vide S.B. Dutt(Dr.) v. University of Delhi, U.P. Warehousing Corpn. v. Chandra Kiran Tyag, Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain, J. Tiwariv. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandirand Dipak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instruction.).”He further submits that it is well settled principle that if the scheme came to an end, the service remain co-terminus. To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Bijay Kumar Pandey Versus Ranchi University through its Vice Chancellor/Registrar & Others reported in(2019) 3 JBCJ 199 (HC)particularly para 13 which is quoted hereinbelow:-“13. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka And Others v. Umadevi (3) And Others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 especially in paragraph nos. 43 and 47 as under:“43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as “litigious employment” in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” (Emphasis supplied).In view of these facts, the prayer for reinstatement is hereby, rejected.”On the same point he also relied in the case of Regional Gurbachan Lal v. Regional Engineering College, Kurukshetra & Others reported in (2007) 11 SCC 102particularly para 27, 28 and 29 which is quoted hereinbelow:-“27. Reliance can be placed on U.P. Land Development Corpn.v. Amar Singh in which this Court clearly observed as follows: (SCC p. 395, para 11)“11. In clear and certain terms it is stated that when the project comes to a close, the employees who are working in the project will not get any vested right. In other words, once the project comes to an end, services of the employees also come to an end. The other decisions cited by the learned counsel more or less are to the same effect.”28. In State of H.P.v. Nodha Ram this Court while dealing with the case of a temporary employee appointed on the basis of a project which had been closed down observed as under: [SCC (L&S) pp. 478-79, para 4]“4. It is seen that when the project is completed and closed due to non-availability of funds, the employees have to go along with its closure. The High Court was not right in giving the direction to regularise them or to continue them in other places. No vested right is created in temporary employment. Directions cannot be given to regularise their services in the absence of any existing vacancies nor can directions be given to the State to create posts in a non-existent establishment. The Court would adopt pragmatic approach in giving directions. The directions would amount to creating of posts and continuing them despite non-availability of the work. We are of the considered view that the directions issued by the High Court are absolutely illegal warranting our interference. The order of the High Court is, therefore, set aside.”(emphasis supplied)29. Similarly in Mahendra L. Jainv. Indore Development Authority it has also been held that the employees employed for the purpose of a scheme which has been subsequently closed down do not acquire any vested right or enforceable legal right to continue with the scheme nor could such employees approach the court for a declaration to continue with the scheme after the project was over.”He submits that the employee employed for the purpose of a scheme which has been subsequently closed down, do not acquire any vested right or enforceable right to continue with the scheme.In these cases learned counsel, Mr. Sarvendra Kumarand Mr. Sreenu Garapati, S.C. III appeared on behalf of respondent-State and they adopted the argument of learned counsel, Mr. Krishna Murari. They submit that the State has got limited role in the writ petitions.Mr. Sahay, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in reply to the Annexure-B to the counter affidavit with regard to honorarium and Annexure-B herein was not made on the point of termination.Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record and in the light of submission of learned counsel for the parties, the Court has perused the appointment letter of the petitioner contained in Annexure-4, page 38 of the writ petition. The appointment letter clearly suggests that the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis. Several Clauses has been incorporated therein which suggests that no right is vested to the petitioner for continuing on that post. The scheme in question has already been closed w.e.f. financial year 2013-14 and considering this aspect of the matter, the services of the petitioner has been terminated by the impugned order. The appointment letter suggests that Clause 8 of the said appointment letter for the services of the petitioner is not satisfactory, the contract services can be terminated by way of providing one month notice. However, in spite of closure of scheme in the financial year 2013-14, the petitioner was allowed to work till the impugned order has been passed that does not mean that the petitioner is entitled to continue on the said post. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus T. Mohammed Raisuli Hassan reported in (1993) 1 SCC 553. Paragraph nos.4 and 5 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:“4. Admittedly, there was no statutory rule requiring one month’s notice for termination by the appellant of the service of the respondent. It is only the term of appointment order, which stipulated for one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu thereof by either side to bring an end to the service of the respondent, which is made the basis for claiming invalidation of termination. That term contained in clause 10 of the appointment order reads:“10. This appointment is liable to be terminated at any time by giving one month’s notice, in writing, on either side, or a month’s salary in lieu of notice, without assigning any reason. Breach of this condition, will entitle the company to recover from you one month’s salary in lieu of notice.”5. When the above term in the clause relating to the condition of service of the respondent with the appellant is seen as a whole, there is nothing to indicate or suggest, even remotely, that non-service of one month’s notice as a condition precedent for termination of the respondent’s service would result in vitiation or invalidation of termination, if effected. On the contrary, the second part of the term contained in the clause, “breach of this condition, will entitle the company to recover from you one month’s salary in lieu of notice” makes it obvious that the same would be the consequence if there was a breach of condition on the part of the company in the matter of service of one month’s notice before termination of the respondent’s service. Hence, we are constrained to hold that the non-service of one month’s notice in writing by the appellant to the respondent before terminating the latter’s service did not invalidate or vitiate such termination. From this, it follows that courts below had misread the said clause, by which either party was required to serve notice for putting an end to service of the respondent and consequently committed an apparent error in taking the view that non-service of one month’s prior notice to the respondent had vitiated the termination of his service.”The Hon’ble Supreme Court has given his opinion that non-service of one month’s notice as a condition precedent for termination of petitioner’s service would result in vitiation or invalidation of termination, if effected. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that non-service of notice did not invalidate or vitiate such termination.On perusal of impugned order, the Court finds that there is no allegation against the petitioner that the petitioner has obtained employment by way of any concealment. Thus, it cannot be said the impugned order is stigmatic in nature. The scheme in question has already been came to an end in the financial year 2013-14 that has been noted in the impugned order. Thus, the judgment relied by Mr. Sahay, learned senior counsel for the petitioner on the ground of stigmatic, is not helping the case of the petitioner. So far the argument of Mr. Sahay with regard to principle of natural justice is concerned, that will not apply as straitjacket formula. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered this aspect of the matter in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519, at paragraphs 30 and 39 held as under:“30. Wade also emphasises that principles of natural justice operate as implied mandatory requirements, non-observance of which invalidates the exercise of power.“39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasising that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason—perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling—it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”—meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker—then no legal duty to supply a hearing arises. Such an approach was endorsed by Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., who said that: (WLR p. 1595 : All ER p. 1294)“… A breach of procedure … cannot give [rise to] a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in vain.”Relying on these comments, Brandon L.J. opined in Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority that:“… no one can complain of not being given an opportunity to make representations if such an opportunity would have availed him nothing.”In such situations, fair procedures appear to serve no purpose since the “right” result can be secured without according such treatment to the individual.It is provision of law that Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. Versus Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P & Others reported in (2004) 4 SCC 281, at paragraph 64, the Hon'ble Court held as under:“64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach o
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f statutory procedure prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by the holder of lands and some other transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did not permit transfers of land without permission of the State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal question all affected parties have got full opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we, therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”In view of these two judgments, even if the contention of learned senior counsel for the petitioner is accepted by the Court that the principle of nature justice is not followed and the matter is remitted back to the respondent-State, that will be futile exercise as in the case in hand, there is no possibility of any change in the decision of case on merit. The services of the petitioner was not being governed by any statutory rule and it was purely on contract and was required to be governed by the appointment letter which is contained in Annexure-4.So far W.P.(S) No.5870 of 2016 is concerned, the petitioner has prayed for payment of revised pay scale of the petitioner w.e.f. 07.09.2012 by letter dated 07.09.2012 contained in Annexure-6, it has been disclosed by the Principal Secretary, Human Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand that 50% increment is meant for the persons who are working on the Management Head of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. Inadvertently, the said amount was paid to the petitioner for three months which has been recovered by the Management Head of JEPC that has been pointed by letter dated 07.09.2012 (Annexure-6) and there months’ recovery has been made by the respondents. The said recovery order is not under challenge in this writ petition.In view of letter dated 07.09.2012, the prayer cannot be exceeded. Had the recovery order was under challenge, the matter would have been otherwise in view of the fact that any payment if not obtained by fraudulent method, the recovery cannot be allowed. However, that order is not under challenge in this writ petition. No positive order with regard to recovery can be passed in the writ petition.As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion, no relief can be extended to the petitioner.Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed.