w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n



Raju @ Rajendra v/s State of U.P.


Company & Directors' Information:- RAJENDRA LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U99999KA1943PLC000306

Company & Directors' Information:- RAJENDRA CORPORATION PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17219TZ1948PTC000161

    Criminal Appeal No. 1938 of 1993

    Decided On, 03 September 2019

    At, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR-IX

    For the Appellant: V.K. Chaturvedi, Anita Singh, Prem Babu Verma, Advocates. For the Respondent: A.G.A.



Judgment Text

Manoj Misra, J.

1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 03.11.1993 passed by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Agra in S.T. No.299 of 1990 (State Vs. Raju alias Rajendra) whereby the appellant Raju @ Rajendra has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.

2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as under:

3. Lala Ram (PW-1) father of Mukesh (the deceased) lodged first information report (FIR) on 01.05.1990 at 11.30 pm (Case Crime No.48 of 1990) at P.S. Madan Mohan Gate, District Agra, alleging that, at about 10 pm, when the informant was inside his house and his son Mukesh (the deceased) and his younger brother Nand Kishor (PW-3) were sleeping at the door of the house, he heard cries; upon which, he rushed to the spot and saw Raju alias Rajendra son of Gauri Shanker (the appellant) running away in the lane, just in front of his house, with a blood stained knife in his hand and his son Mukesh (the deceased) lying injured and under the care of informant's brother Nand Kishor (PW-3) and neighbour Jaggo Lal (PW-2). The incident was allegedly witnessed in the light of a bulb lit just outside informant's house. The FIR further alleges that Nand Kishor (PW-3) and Jaggo Lal (PW-2) informed the informant that Raju (the appellant) had assaulted Mukesh (the deceased) with knife and ran away. FIR also alleges that upon hearing cries, informant's son Dilip (not examined) and other neighbours including Bangali son of Babu Ram (not examined) arrived at the spot. It is alleged that they all took the deceased to the emergency ward where the doctor declared him dead. The motive for the crime disclosed in the FIR was that on 29.04.1990 some altercation had taken place between the accused and the deceased at the time of marriage in the house of Taro Maharaj (not examined) in connection with which the accused had threatened the deceased. Thereafter, a day before the incident also, Raju (appellant) had come with boys of the locality and had extended threats to Mukesh (the deceased). In the first information report it was stated that the body of Mukesh (deceased) was lying at S.N. Hospital.

4. Upon lodging of the FIR, the police swung into action. After preparing the inquest report at the hospital, on 02.05.1990, blood soaked earth was taken from the spot; portion of the blood stained cot was collected; blood stained pillow and pillow cover was collected; and, on 04.05.1990, recovery of blood stained knife was made on the pointing out of the accused. The postmortem report revealed two incised wounds. One on the upper region of the chest and the other on the stomach region. As per report, death was caused due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of anti mortem injuries. The postmortem was conducted on 02.05.1990 at 2.30 pm and as per the doctor's opinion, the death could have occurred about half a day before. After conducting investigation charge sheet was submitted and the case was committed to the court of sessions. Charge of an offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC was framed against the accused-appellant who pleaded not guilty.

5. In the trial, three eye witnesses of the incident were examined, namely, Lala Ram (PW-1); Jaggo Lal (PW-2) and Nand Kishor (PW-3). PW-1 - Lala Ram reiterated what was stated in the first information report and disclosed about existence of light at the time of incident. He also stated that the first information report was scribed by his son-in-law Vijay (PW-4) on his dictation and, thereafter, lodged at the police station. He proved the first information report which was marked Exhibit 1. He disclosed that, on 29.04.1990, at the time of marriage in the locality, there had been altercation between Mukesh (the deceased) and Raju (the appellant) and, though, upon intervention, on that day, the situation was calmed down but, on the next day as well as on the third day, Raju (the appellant) had extended threat of life to the deceased. In his cross examination, he disclosed that his house stood in the name of his father and that he has an electricity connection as well as an electricity meter. He stated that when he came out upon hearing the cries, he saw Raju (the appellant) running away in the lane. He also disclosed that, on that day, Mukesh (the deceased) had eaten his food between 4 pm & 5 pm. He stated that Mukesh used to sleep outside at the door of the house where there was a bulb and just below it, Mukesh's (deceased's) cot was there. He denied the suggestion that there was no light or that he had no valid electricity connection. He stated that in Taro's daughter's wedding, he was present. He stated that Raju (the appellant) had been demanding money from his younger son Raju (not examined) though he was not aware as to for what purpose money was being demanded. Upon suggestion that money was being demanded in connection with betel shop dues, he stated that the appellant - Raju does not have a betel shop though his father Gauri has one. He denied the suggestion that his son Raju (not examined) had betel shop dues payable. He stated that in the altercation that had taken place during marriage, he had intervened. He denied the suggestion that the incident had occurred under the influence of liquor. He denied the suggestion that somebody else had inflicted knife injury to his son. He also denied the suggestion that he had made false implication on account of enmity.

6. PW-2 - Jaggo Lal stated that in the night of the incident, he was sleeping at the Chabutra just outside his house and near him, the deceased (Mukesh) and Nand Kishor were sleeping. He stated that upon hearing cries, he and Nand Kishor woke up and saw Raju alias Rajendra (the appellant) inflicting knife blow on the stomach of the deceased (Mukesh). He stated that on hearing cries, Dilip (not examined) and Lala Ram (PW-1) had arrived. He stated that Mukesh raised alarm when he was inflicted knife blow on the neck and thereafter second knife blow was inflicted on the stomach. He stated that he saw Raju alias Rajendra (the appellant) inflicting knife blow in the light of a bulb, which was lit just outside the house of PW-1 (Lala Ram). He also stated that after inflicting knife blows, Raju ran away with the knife. In his cross examination, PW-2 stated that his house is situated just in front of the house of Lala Ram (PW-1) and, in between, there is a narrow lane about four hands wide. He stated that in front of his house, there is a Chabutra which is just 2 paces from his house and this Chabutra is about 3 paces wide and 3 paces long. He stated that he was lying on the Chabutara with no cot laid there. He stated that his feet were towards the house of Lala Ram. He stated that Mukesh (the deceased) was sleeping on the cot placed in the lane just in front of his house. He disclosed that the bulb was placed just above the door on the wall of the house though he was not aware about the wattage of the bulb. He stated that Lala Ram is his neighbour and not a relative. He denied the suggestion that he was sleeping at the time of the incident. He stated that, in fact, he was awake. He stated that at the Chabutara, he was alone and there was no one else. He denied the suggestion that at the Chabutara Nand Kishor was sleeping. He stated that Nand Kishor's cot was just adjacent to the cot of the deceased (Mukesh), which was just 2 paces away from the wall of the house of Lala Ram. He also stated that Raju's house is just 10-11 paces away. He also disclosed that next to the house of Lala Ram, there are houses of Bangali and Ninnu. He stated that upon hearing the noise, members of the locality also arrived but before that, Raju had escaped. He disclosed that he had not gone to the hospital with Mukesh (the deceased). He denied the suggestion that he was cousin of Lala Ram. He denied the suggestion that he had not seen the incident.

7. PW-3 -Nand Kishor stated that on the night of the incident, he was sleeping in a cot just next to the cot of the deceased. Near them, his neighbour Jaggo Lal (PW2) was also sleeping. He stated that he woke up on hearing the cry of Mukesh. He saw Gauri's son Raju alias Rajendra (the appellant) inflicting knife blow on Mukesh. He saw Raju inflicting knife blow around the neck and, thereafter, second knife blow on the stomach region. He stated that upon hearing the noise, his brother Lala Ram (PW-1), Dilip, Jaggo Lal (PW-2) and Bangali had arrived. He stated that he saw the appellant Raju in the light of bulb which was lit at the door of Lala Ram's house. He stated that there was also a bulb in the lane. He stated that there was sufficient light. He stated that after inflicting knife blows, the accused-appellant had escaped. He stated that Mukesh was thereafter rushed to the emergency ward of the hospital where he was declared dead. He narrated the incident that occurred during the course of marriage of Taro Maharaj's daughter. He stated that in that incident, there was an altercation between the accused - Raju and the deceased-Mukesh. He stated that 2-3 days later, Raju (the appellant) had extended threat of life to the deceased. In his cross examination, he disclosed that his cot lay just next to the cot of Mukesh (the deceased) and that the Chabutra of Jaggo Lal is just 3-4 paces away from where the cots were. He stated that Jaggo Lal was sleeping on the floor of his Chabutra. He stated that Lala Ram is his real brother and he resides in the same house. He stated that in the lane, there is tiled house of Bangali, which is just about 8 paces away, where also there was a bulb lit on the night of the incident. He stated that there was another bulb at the door of Lala Ram. He stated that he was not aware about the wattage of those two bulbs. Upon being questioned as to who pays for the electricity bill, he stated that the electricity bill is paid by his brother. He denied the suggestion that there was no electricity connection in the house. He also denied the suggestion that there was no electricity bulb at the place. He stated that upon hearing the commotion and seeing people come, Raju escaped and could not be apprehended on the spot. He stated that he did not go to the hospital with Mukesh. He denied the suggestion that he had not witnessed the incident and was giving testimony only because he was brother of Lala Ram.

8. PW-4- Vijay Singh, son-in-law of the informant (Lala Ram), deposed that he was the person who scribed the FIR on the dictation of his father-in-law Lala Ram. He stated that he had arrived at the emergency ward of the hospital. He proved the written report, which was marked exhibit-1. He denied the suggestion that the report was prepared as per the suggestion of the Inspector.

9. PW-5- Sri O.P. Kalra, Sub Inspector. He stated that on the date when the first information report was lodged, he was S.O., P.S. Madan Mohan Gate, Agra; that the case was registered at the police station in his presence; and he had investigated the matter. He stated that he had visited the spot and prepared site plan (Ex-3). He proved the inquest memo (Ex-2). He stated that he collected blood soiled earth as well as blood stained pillow and blood stained cot, which were marked exhibits 4 to 6. He stated that members of the public had arrested Raju on 04.05.1990 and on his pointing out, he had recovered blood stained knife of which Fard (Ex-7) was prepared. He proved preparation and submission of the charge sheet (Ex-9). In nutshell he proved the various steps taken during the course of investigation.

10. PW-6 -Dr. R.K. Yadav proved that the postmortem was conducted on 02.05.1990 at 2.30 pm. He proved the postmortem report (Ex-12) . He stated that there were two anti-mortem injuries. One was incised wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm x cavity deep on the left side chest and the other was incised wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm x cavity deep on the left side of stomach just 9 cm above from navel region at 11 O'clock position. He stated that upon internal examination, left lung membrane and lung were found ruptured. Likewise, membrane of stomach was also found ruptured with blood in the cavity. He stated that the death was on account of shock and haemorrhage. He stated that the injuries were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. He stated that he could not tell with certainty as to when death could have occurred. He, however, stated that the deceased might have had his meals about 6-8 hours before his death. He stated that according to the medical college/police record, the deceased was brought to the hospital at 10.50 pm.

11. After closure of prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused-appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded in which he denied the prosecution case and claimed that he has been falsely implicated on account of enmity.

12. The trial court after assessing the evidence led before it came to the conclusion that the prosecution was successful in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond doubt; that the prosecution case was supported not only by the family members of the deceased, whose presence on the spot was natural, but also by the testimony of an independent witness, namely, Jaggo Lal, who was just few paces away from the place of the incident at the time of occurrence and who deposed that in the light of a bulb he saw the accused inflicting knife blows on the deceased. The trial court found that the spot where the incident occurred was duly proved by material exhibits such as blood soaked earth; blood drenched cot; and the site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer. The trial court found that the prosecution case was consistent with the medical evidence which disclosed that the deceased had sustained incised wound injuries on the upper region of the chest and stomach. Hence, it recorded conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under section 302 IPC.

13. After convicting the accused, the trial court heard the accused on the question of sentence and upon finding that the accused had been convicted for an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, awarded life sentence.

14. We have heard Ms. Anita Singh for the appellant; and Sri Deepak Mishra, learned A.G.A., for the State.

15. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the prosecution was not successful in establishing the guilt of the appellant for the following reasons:- (a) that the incident occurred in the darkness of the night when, admittedly, the witnesses were sleeping and, according to their own claim, they woke up on hearing cries and, therefore, it cannot be said that they saw as to who inflicted the injuries that caused the death of the deceased; (b) that the source of light at the place of occurrence was not duly established as no document was produced to prove that informant's house had an electricity connection in respect of which electricity bills were paid; (c) that the alleged recovery of the assault weapon (knife) was not proved, inasmuch as, the knife was not produced in court as a material exhibit and, otherwise also, the witness of the recovery other than the Investigating Officer was not examined; (d) that several other persons, who are stated to have arrived at the spot upon hearing commotion, were not produced by the prosecution; (e) that the motive shown for the alleged crime was not strong enough to warrant an act of murder; and (f) that the Panch witnesses were not examined.

16. Per contra, Sri Deepak Mishra, learned A.G.A., submitted that the place of the incident was duly proved by the witnesses of fact as well as by the Investigating Officer who had visited the spot and had collected the blood soaked earth; pieces of blood drenched cot; blood drenched pillow; and blood drenched pillow cover and had also prepared a site plan showing that the incident had occurred just at the door of the informant's house where the deceased was sleeping in a cot next to the cot of his uncle (PW-3) and in front of the Chabutra of Jaggo Lal (PW-2) who had also witnessed the incident. He stated that the distance between the place where the deceased was sleeping and the place where Jaggo Lal (PW-2) was sleeping was hardly three paces and, therefore, as there were two knife blows inflicted, it was very much possible that upon victim's cry, on receipt of the first knife blow, the other two persons, who were sleeping in close proximity, would wake up and witness infliction of the second knife blow. He submitted that since PW-2 is an independent witness and he disclosed that he was at the spot when the incident occurred and had seen the accused inflicting knife blow, there is no reason to disbelieve his testimony and, otherwise also, the evidence led by the prosecution is consistent and unblemished. He submitted that merely because the material exhibit (knife) was not produced in court it would not render the prosecution case unbelievable as it was based on ocular evidence which was unblemished and consistent with the medical evidence. He, therefore, submitted that the appellant has rightly been convicted.

17. We have carefully perused the record and have considered the rival submissions.

18. Upon perusal of the record, we find that by producing material exhibits such as blood soaked earth; plain earth, blood stained pieces of cot; blood stained pillow cover; blood stained pillow; and oral evidence of the eyewitnesses as well as the investigation officer, who had also prepared the site plan, in absence of suggestion that the incident occurred at some other place, it was fully established that the occurrence was at the door of the house of the informant which was situated just in front of the Chabutra of Jaggo Lal (PW-2) at a distance of just about three paces.

19. The postmortem report established that there were two incised wounds, cavity deep, on the body of the deceased. One was on the left side chest region and the other was on the left side of stomach region. Nothing abnormal was detected with respect to Larynx, Pharynx, Trachea and Oesophagus. Thus, it could be assumed that, upon receipt of first incised wound on the chest, the deceased was in a position to raise alarm. Under the circumstances, it was probable that upon infliction of the first wound, the deceased raised an alarm which woke up the other two persons, sleeping nearby, to witness the incident. The postmortem was duly proved by the doctor who appeared as PW-6. He stated that he conducted the postmortem on 02.05.1990, at 2.30 pm. He also proved that from the medical college /police record it appears that the deceased was brought to the hospital at 10.50 pm on 01.05.1990. He stated that the deceased could have had his food 6-8 hours before he was inflicted injuries which matches with the statement of PW-1, who, in his cross examination, had stated that the deceased must have had his food in between 4 pm and 5 pm. The lodging of the FIR was duly proved by PW-1 (Lala Ram); the investigation, preparation of the Panchnama; collection of blood soaked earth; plain earth; pillow; pieces of blood drenched cot were duly proved by PW-5 (Investigating Officer) who also proved the preparation of site plan. The inquest was conducted at the hospital at about 11.30 pm which was proved by the Investigating Officer (PW-5) and was marked exhibit Ka-2. He disclosed that the information on the basis of which inquest was conducted was received from Lala Ram. Although there is overwriting in the digits "11.30" but the digits are also written in the brackets as 23.30 over which there is no overwriting.

20. From the above evidence, the place; the time of occurrence; and the lodging of the first information report is duly established. As the first information report had come into existence at the time of inquest, which was conducted at about 11.30 pm (night), it is clear that the first information report was promptly lodged as is established from the chik FIR which has been proved by the Investigating Officer.

21. Once the place and time of the occurrence has been proved, we have to examine the reliability of the testimony of the eye witnesses to find out whether they have truthfully deposed about the incident.

22. From the statement of PW-1 it appears that he was inside the house and upon hearing cries he rushed outside to find out his son lying injured on the cot and the appellant-Raju running away with a blood stained knife in his hand. He proved the presence of his neighbour Jaggo Lal (PW-2); and his brother Nand Kishor (PW-3) at the place of occurrence. He proved the existence of the source of light by stating that at the door of his house, there was a bulb lit. He stated that in the light of that bulb as also other bulbs, he could see what he saw. He stated that he had rushed his son to the emergency ward of the hospital where the doctors declared him dead. He disclosed about the time of the incident as between 10 pm and 10.15 pm. He stated that the first information report was scribed at the hospital by his son-in-law Vijay (PW-4) upon his instruction. He also disclosed about the motive for the crime by stating that, on 29.04.1990, in a marriage procession, there had been an altercation between Mukesh (the deceased) and Raju (the appellant) and that in connection therewith, threats were extended to the deceased by the accused-appellant. In his cross examination, on a question put to him with regards to the existence of source of light, he stated that there existed a bulb and that he had a valid electricity connection. No question or suggestion was put to him that there was no supply of electricity in the locality where the incident took place. In his cross examination, PW-1 refuted the suggestion that he had not seen the incident. On the basis of his deposition, even if we hold that PW-1 did not see the actual infliction of injuries, he is reliable and trustworthy in so far as his statement relates to the motive for the crime; the time and place of occurrence; and as to the presence of the other two witnesses on the spot.

23. In so far as PW-2 - Jaggo Lal is concerned, he stated that on the date of the incident in between 10 pm to 10.15 pm he was lying at the Chabutra of his house, just in front of the place where the deceased (Mukesh) and Nand Kishor were sleeping. He stated that he heard a cry/shriek, upon which, he woke up and saw Raju (the appellant) inflicting a knife blow on the stomach of the deceased. He stated that upon hearing the commotion, Dilip; Lala Ram; and other neighbours also arrived. He stated that the deceased cried on being inflicted with wound on the neck region and thereafter wound was inflicted in the stomach region. He stated that he saw the accused-appellant inflicting knife injury in the light of the bulb. He stated that there was a bulb lit at the outer wall of the house of Lala Ram and Nand Kishor. He stated that after inflicting knife injury, Raju (appellant) ran away towards his house. In his cross examination, he stated that his house is just in front of the house of Lala Ram (informant) and, in between, there is a four hands wide lane (Gali). He stated that in front of his house, just two paces away, there is his Chabutara which is about three paces wide and three paces long. He stated that he was lying on this Chabutara at the time of the incident. He stated that when he was lying there, his feet were towards the house of Lala Ram; and Mukesh (the deceased) was sleeping on a cot in the lane which was in between the two houses. He stated that the bulb lit was fixed on a holder which was on the wall of Lala Ram. He denied the suggestion that he had any relations with Lala Ram. We find that he qualifies as an independent witness whose presence is disclosed in the FIR also. Further, no suggestion was made to him that he has enmity with the accused-appellant. His testimony has been consistent throughout and has not been shaken by the cross examination.

24. PW-3 - Nand Kishor stated that he was sleeping on a separate cot next to the deceased and that he saw the accused-appellant inflicting knife blows on the neck and stomach region of the deceased. He also disclosed about the existence of bulb and source of light. He disclosed that an incident of altercation between Raju (accused-appellant) and Mukesh (the deceased) had occurred during the course of marriage of the daughter of Taro Mahraj, which took place few days before the incident. He also disclosed that threat was extended to the deceased by the accused-appellant. In his cross examination, nothing substantial came out. We are of the view that though he may be a relative of the informant and as such an interested witness but his presence is natural at the spot and is also proved by independent witness (PW-2).

25. PW-4 -Vijay had disclosed that he had written the first information report, which was marked exhibit 1, on the instruction of his father-in-law (Lala Ram) given at the hospital. PW-5 - O.P. Kalra proved conducting of investigation. He proved the site plan and established the place of occurrence by proving recovery of blood soaked earth and plain earth as also blood stained pillow and pieces of blood drenched cot which were exhibited. PW-6 - Dr. R.K. Yadav proved the postmortem of the deceased and confirmed existence of two anti mortem incised wound injuries which are consistent with the ocular evidence. He also proved that from the medical college /police record it appears that the deceased was brought there at about 10.50 pm.

26. When we proceed to analyze the evidence, we find that the witnesses have proved the place of occurrence; the time of occurrence; and the source of light at the time of incident. No suggestion was put to the witnesses that at the place where occurrence took place, there was no supply of electricity or that the electricity was not being supplied at the time of occurrence. The existence of bulb at the wall of the house of the informant is quite natural. It is also natural that the bulb remained lit as in summer months, to ward off heat, house inmates sleep outside. Moreover there is no suggestion that the parties were affluent, having the facility of cooler/ air conditioner etc, and, therefore would not sleep outside. The place of occurrence was established by collection of plain earth and blood soaked earth as also by collection of pieces of blood drenched cot and blood stained pillow. No suggestion was put to Jaggo Lal (PW-2) that he had any motive to falsely implicate the accused-appellant. The testimony of Jaggo Lal is clear and consistent and it demonstrates that he was there at the place and time of the occurrence and he heard cry of the deceased which invited his attention towards the deceased to enable him to witness infliction of knife blow by the appellant on the stomach of the deceased. As the injury was not such which severed vocal chord etc raising of alarm on receipt of first injury was quite natural thereby giving sufficient opportunity to the witnesses to witness infliction of the second blow even if they were sleeping when the first blow was inflicted. Further, the testimony of the witnesses is consistent with each other. The prosecution thus succeeded in not only proving the act of crime by the appellant but also the motive for the crime by disclosing that on 29.04.1990 there had been altercation between the deceased and the accused in connection with which threats were extended. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the witnesses were sleeping at the time of incident and could not have witnessed the incident is not acceptable because there were two injuries inflicted on the body of the deceased and therefore it was highly probable that upon receipt of first blow the deceased would have raised an alarm thereby stirring up the persons sleeping near him to enable them to witness the second blow, as is the testimony of the eye witnesses examined by the prosecution.

27. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the source of light was not proved as the electricity connection papers were not proved is also not acceptable because it is not the case of the defence that there was no supply of electricity in the locality. Otherwise, the existence of the bulb has been established by oral testimony and is also shown in the site plan prepared during the course of investigation. Moreover, Lala Ram (PW-1) has also specifically stated that he had an electricity connection. Under the circumstances, non proving of electricity connection papers would not be fatal to the prosecution case. More so, when an independent witness has in his testimony disclosed that an electricity bulb was lit and nothing has come from his cross examination to suggest that he had any motive to falsely implicate the accused-appellant.

28. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there had been no production of the recovered knife before the court and therefore there was a serious lacuna in the prosecution case rendering the conviction bad in law is not acceptable for the reason that it is well settled legal position that if the prosecution case is established by ocular evidence, which is reliable and consistent with the medical evidence, latches on the part of the investigating agency would not be sufficient to acquit the accused and discard the prosecution case which is otherwise proved by reliable oral testimony. In this context, regard be had to decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sanjeev Kumar Gupta Vs. State of U.P.: (2015) 11 SCC 69 wherein it was held that even if the investigation suffers from certain flaws such as non-recovery of the weapon used by the accused appellants and other material, the entire prosecution case cannot be brushed aside when it is proved by ocular evidence and corroborated by medical evidence. Similar view has been taken earlier by the Apex Court in the case of Amit Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 4 SCC 107.

29. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution has failed to examine other witnesses that had arrived on the spot and, therefore, the benefit must go to the accused-appellant is also not worthy of acceptance because it is not the quantity of the evidence but the quality of the evidence that is to be considered. (Govindaraju alias Govinda Vs. State: (2012) 4 SCC 722). The prosecution had examined three eye witnesses. First was the informant, who was a resident of the same house where the incident occurred. He deposed about hearing the cry of the deceased upon receipt of knife blow and accused-appellant running away with blood stained knife. The second witness (PW-2) is a person who was lying on his Chabutra just few paces away in front of the place where the deceased was lying. He disclosed that upon hearing cry from the deceased, he woke up and saw the appellant inflicting knife blow on the stomach region of the deceased. The third witness (PW-3) is a person who was an inmate of the same house at the door of which the deceased slept and the said witness was sleeping just next to the deceased. These three witnesses were consistent in their stand and their presence at the spot could not be doubted by the questions put to them in the cross examination.

30. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that Panch witnesses were not examined and, therefore, prosecution failed to prove its case is also worthy of rejection because the preparation of the Fard etc. was proved by the Investigating Officer and no such question was put to him to suggest that he had not been a witness to its preparation.

31. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has been successful in establishing the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond the pale of doubt and that there exists a ring of truth in the prosecution story, therefore, we uphold the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

32. At this stage, the learned counsel for the appellant invited attention of the Court to the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 CrPC, wherein he had disclosed his age as about 18 years, to raise a claim for the benefit of juvenility. It was urged that the previous bench, upon noticing the said aspect, had allowed the appellant to set up the plea of juvenility. In that regard, attention of the Court was invited to order dated 07.03.2017, which is extracted below:-

"Heard Kumari Anita Singh, learned counsel for the appellant.

It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that since the age of the appellant- Raju @ Rajendra mentioned in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is about 18 years, he must have positively been juvenile on the date of the incident.

Learned counsel for the appellant prays for and is allowed two weeks' time to move an application under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

List this appeal on 30.3.2017."

33. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that pursuant to the above order, an application was filed on 30.03.2017 to decide the appeal of the appellant as a juvenile in conflict with law. This application was supported by an affidavit in which Class-2 Transfer Certificate of the appellant issued by Headmistress of Mahatma Gandhi Junior High School, Agra, disclosing the date of birth of appellant as 06.11.1974, was enclosed along with an Election Voter ID Card disclosing the year of birth of the appellant as 1974. It was contended that from the above material it is ascertainable that on the date of commission of the crime, that is 01.05.1990, the appellant was below 16 years in age and therefore was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 as well as the subsequent Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

34. On the aforesaid application, on 17.07.2017, the previous Bench of this Court had passed the following order:-

"This application u/s 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 has been filed on behalf of the appellant Raju @ Rajendra with the prayer to declare him juvenile in conflict with law.

The application is supported by an affidavit of one Pramod Kumar, S/O Sri Nem Singh, presently posted as Sub-Inspector of police at P.S.- Madan Mohan Gate, District- Agra.

It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that age of the appellant Raju @ Rajendra mentioned in his statement recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. was about 18 years. Moreover, it is apparent from the perusal of the Scholar's Register & Transfer Certificate issued by the Principal of Mahatma Gandhi Junior High School Baah, District- Agra that the date of birth of the appellant Raju @ Rajendra is 06.11.1974 and hence the appellant on the date of incident i.e. 01.05.1990, was minor and as such it should be declared that he was juvenile in conflict with law on the date of occurrence.

Per contra Sri J.K. Upadhyay, learned AGA submitted that the Scholar's Register & Transfer Certificate of the appellant Raju @ Rajendra, brought on record as Annexure No.1 to the affidavit accompanying the application u/s 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, upon enquiry was found to be true.

After having heard the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the said issue should be examined by the concerned Juvenile Justice Board after giving notice to the complainant.

In view of the above, we remit this matter to the District & Sessions Judge, Agra with the direction to him to refer the appellant's claim for being declared juvenile in conflict with law to the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra within a week from the date of receipt of this order and the application u/s 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000. He shall further ensure that the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra adjudicates upon the appellant's claim for being declared juvenile in conflict with law within two months from the date of such reference after hearing the informant.

The report/ order of the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra shall be placed before this Court on the next date fixed.

List this appeal after six weeks.

Office is directed to communicate this order and transmit the complete record of the application u/s 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 moved by the appellant Raju @ Rajendra to the District & Sessions Judge, Agra within a week from today. "

35. Pursuant to the above order, the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra submitted its report dated 16.09.2017 stating that the appellant - Raju alias Rajendra was juvenile at the time of the incident and was aged 15 years 5 months and 25 days.

36. By order dated 04.10.2017, photostat copy of the report, dated 16.09.2017, was directed to be supplied to the learned A.G.A., to solicit an objection, if any.

37. Pursuant to the above order, a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State. Thereafter, by order dated 16.07.2018, office was directed to call for the records from the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra relating to the claim of juvenility set up by the appellant. Pursuant to which, the record of the Board has been placed before us.

38. From a perusal of the record it appears that the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra while conducting inquiry on the claim of juvenility had issued notice to the informant (Lala Ram). Pursuant to which, his son Dilip had appeared as a witness and his statement was recorded on 16.09.2017. Dilip disclosed that his father Lala Ram is no more alive. In respect of the appellant's claim of juvenility, Dilip stated that he has no documentary evidence as regards the age of the appellant on the date of the incident but, according to his estimate, the appellant must have been 18-19 years old at the time of the incident. He further stated that, according to his estimate, the appellant must be 40 years old now. In his cross examination, he stated that he has done guesswork regarding the age of the appellant being 18-19 years old at the time of the incident though it may be one or two years less or more. The Board considered the statement of the appellant also. He had stated that he was born in the year 1974 and had studied up to Class-2. In his cross examination, he stated that except for Mahatma Gandhi Junior High School, he studied in no other school. He stated that he has one daughter and two sons. He stated that his elder daughter is aged about 19 years, born in 1996. He stated that he was married in the year 1995. He also stated that he remained in jail for a period of about 10 months.

39. In the inquiry, the statement of Nutan Mittal, Assistant Principal of Mahatma Gandhi Junior High School was also recorded. She had produced the scholar register of the institution. She stated that in the scholar register, the name of the appellant is entered at Sl. No.1463. The date of birth entered in the scholar register is 06.11.1974. She stated that as per the scholar register, the concerned student (appellant) took admission in Class-1 on 20.05.1982 and passed out Class-2 on 20.05.1984. She proved the Transfer Certificate which disclosed the date of birth of the appellant as 06.11.1974. She was crossed examined by the Assistant Prosecuting Officer.

40. After recording the statement of the witnesses, the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra came to a definite conclusion that the date of birth of the appellant was 06.11.1974 and that on the date of the incident, that is 01.05.1990, the appellant was aged 15 years 5 months and 25 days and, as such, a juvenile under the provisions of Section 2(h) of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.

41. Upon being called upon by the Court to submit an objection to the report submitted by the Juvenile Justice Board, a counter affidavit has been filed by Sri Krishna Upadhyay, Sub-Inspector, Police Station Madan Mohan Gate, District Agra. In paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit, dated 04th December, 2017, it has been stated as follows:-

"That in compliance of the order passed by this Court the deponent verified the aforesaid Scholar's register & Transfer Certificate Form from the office of Basic Shiksha Adhikari Agra in which the name of the appellant is mentioned at serial no. 1436 in which the date of birth of the appellant is recorded as 06.11.1974, the deponent has also verified the aforesaid date of birth from the institution namely Mahatma Gandhi Junior High School B.M. Khan Agra, in which the aforesaid date of birth is mentioned. A copy of the Scholar's Register & Transfer Certificate Form verified by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari Agra along with certificate issued by the Principal of institution are collectively being filed and marked herewith as Annexure no.CA-1 to this affidavit."

42. A perusal of Annexure 1 to the counter affidavit would reveal that in the Scholar's Register & Transfer Certificate Form of Mahatma Gandhi Junior High School, Agra the name of Rajendra alias Raju son of Gauri Shanker is entered at Sl. No.1463 disclosing his date of birth as 06.11.1974. The date of admission is 03.07.1981 and date of passing out is 30.06.1983.

43. During the course of arguments, the learned A.G.A. could not demonstrate before us that victim's family had questioned the report of the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra declaring the appellant juvenile, that is aged 15 years 5 months and 25 days, on the date of the incident. Even before us, in this appeal, no objection has been taken to the above report by any member of the victim's family.

44. As the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra had conducted an inquiry to determine the age of the appellant at the time of the incident and, after giving opportunity of hearing to the members of the victim's family, on the basis of date of birth recorded in educational certificate, had come to a definite conclusion that the appellant was 15 years 5 months and 25 days old at the time of the incident, we accept the report and hold that the appellant was a juvenile, as defined by Section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986; Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000; and Section 2(35) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, on the date of the incident.

45. It is well settled legal principle that the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage including the appellate stage. In the case of Jitendra Singh alias Babbu Singh Vs. State of U.P. (2013) 11 SCC 193 the incident had occurred on the midnight of 23.05.1988/24.05.1988. The allegation was that the accused-appellant had set his wife on fire for dowry. The appellant was convicted under Section 304-B IPC as also under Section 498-A IPC. The conviction and sentence was challenged in criminal appeal before the High Court, which was dismissed. Against the judgment and order passed by the High Court, the appellant went in appeal before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the proceedings, the appellant filed a petition raising additional grounds including that on the date of commission of the offence, he was a juvenile or child within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. According to the appellant, his date of birth was 31.08.1974 and, therefore, when the offence took place, he was aged about 14 years. On the application claiming juvenility, a report was called. After receiving objections, the court came to a definite conclusion that the appellant was about 17 years old when the incident had occurred. The question that arose for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the conviction of the appellant could be sustained on merits and, if so, what was the sentence that could be awarded to the appellant. The Apex Court upheld the conviction and, on the question of sentence, by taking into account the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, held as follows:-

"31. In the present case, the offence was committed by the appellant when the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force. Therefore, only the ''punishments' not greater than those postulated by the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 ought to be awarded to him. This is the requirement of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. The ''punishments' provided under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 are given in Section 21 thereof and they read as follows:

"21. Orders that may be passed regarding delinquent juveniles.--(1) Where a Juvenile Court is satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed an offence, then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Juvenile Court may, if it so thinks fit,--

(a) allow the juvenile to go home after advice or admonition;

(b) direct the juvenile to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any parent, guardian or other fit person, on such parent, guardian or other fit person executing a bond, with or without surety as that Court may require, for the good behaviour and well-being of the juvenile for any period not exceeding three years;

(c) direct the juvenile to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any fit institution for the good behaviour and well-being of the juvenile for any period not exceeding three years;

(d) make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home,--

(i) in the case of a boy over fourteen years of age or of a girl over sixteen years of age, for a period of not less than three years;

(ii) in the case of any other juvenile, for the period until he ceases to be a juvenile:

Provided that .......

Provided further that .........

(e) order the juvenile to pay a fine if he is over fourteen years of age and earns money.

(2) Where an order under clause (b), clause (c) or clause (e) of sub- section (1) is made, the Juvenile Court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the juvenile and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition make an order that the delinquent juvenile shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not exceeding three years, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the delinquent juvenile:

Provided that ........

(3) -(4)"

32. A perusal of the ''punishments' provided for under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature of the offence committed by the appellant, advising or admonishing him [clause (a)] is hardly a ''punishment' that can be awarded since it is not at all commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Similarly, considering his age of about 40 years, it is completely illusory to expect the appellant to be released on probation of good conduct, to be placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit person [clause (b)]. For the same reason, the appellant cannot be released on probation of good conduct under the care of a fit institution [clause (c)] nor can he be sent to a special home under Section 10 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 which is intended to be for the rehabilitation and reformation of delinquent juveniles [clause (d)]. The only realistic punishment that can possibly be awarded to the appellant on the facts of this case is to require him to pay a fine under clause (e) of Section 21(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.

33. While dealing with the case of the appellant under IPC, the fine imposed upon him is only Rs.100/-. This is ex facie inadequate punishment considering the fact that Asha Devi suffered a dowry death.

34. Recently, one of us (T.S. Thakur, J.) had occasion to deal with the issue of compensation to the victim of a crime. An illuminating and detailed discussion in this regard is to be found in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 6 SCC 770. Following the view taken therein read with the provisions of Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 the appropriate course of action in the present case would be to remand the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 for determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of Asha Devi."

46. After holding as above, in paragraphs 57 to 60 of the report, the Apex Court concluded as follows:-

"57. The appellant was a juvenile on the date of the occurrence of the incident. His case has been examined on merits and his conviction is upheld. The only possible and realistic sentence that can be awarded to him is the imposition of a fine. The existing fine of Rs.100/- is grossly inadequate. To this extent, the punishment awarded to the appellant is set aside. The issue of the quantum of fine to be imposed on the appellant is remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board. The jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board is also enjoined to examine the compensation to be awarded, if any, to the family of Asha Devi in terms of the decision of this Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad.

58. Keeping in mind our domestic law and our international obligations, it is directed that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to arrest and the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 being the law of the land, should be scrupulously followed by the concerned authorities in respect of juveniles in conflict with law.

59. It is also directed that whenever an accused, who physically appears to be a juvenile, is produced before a Magistrate, he or she should form a prima facie opinion on the juvenility of the accused and record it. If any doubt persists, the Magistrate should conduct an age inquiry as required by Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to determine the juvenility or otherwise of the accused person. In this regard, it is better to err on the side of caution in the first instance rather than have the entire proceedings reopened or vitiated at a subsequent stage or a guilty person go unpunished only because he or she is found to be a juvenile on the date of occurrence of the incident.

60. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 for determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of Asha Devi. Of course, in arriving at its conclusions, the said Board will take into consideration the facts of the case as also the fact that the appellant has undergone some period of incarceration."

47. While agreeing with the above conclusion, Hon'ble T.S. Thakur, J., while supplementing the judgment, in paragraphs 85 and 86 of the judgment, as per report, concluded as follows:-

"85. In the totality of the above circumstances, there is no reason why the conviction of the appellant should be interfered with, simply because he is under the 2000 Act a juvenile entitled to the benefit of being referred to the Board for an order under Section 15 of the said Act. There is no gainsaying that even if the appellant had been less than sixteen years of age, on the date of the occurrence, he would have been referred for trial to the Juvenile Court in terms of Section 8 of the 1986 Act. The Juvenile Court would then hold a trial and record a conviction or acquittal depending upon the evidence adduced before it. In an ideal situation a case filed before an ordinary Criminal Court when referred to the Board or Juvenile Court may culminate in a conviction at the hands of the Board also. But law does not countenance a situation where a full-fledged trial and even an appeal ends in a conviction of the accused but the same is set aside without providing for a trial by the Board.

86. With the above observations, I agree with the Order proposed by brother Lokur, J."

48. The aforesaid decision of the Apex Court was rendered at the time when the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 was in force. In the instant case, the claim of juvenility was raised after the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 had come into force with effect from 15.01.2016.

49.

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The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short Act, 2015) enables raising of a claim before any court even after final disposal of the case and such a claim is to be determined in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules made thereunder even if the person has ceased to be a child on or before the date of commencement of the Act. 50. By order of this Court, an inquiry was held by the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra and the appellant has been found to be aged below 16 years and, therefore, is a child in conflict with law even as per the provisions of the Act, 2015. Therefore, even if we deal with the appellant as per the provisions of the Act, 2015, the orders that could be passed regarding child found to be in conflict with law are those which have been provided in Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Section 18 is extracted below:- "18. Orders regarding child found to be in conflict with law.- 1. Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child irrespective of age has committed a petty offence, or a serious offence, or a child below the age of sixteen years has committed a heinous offence, then, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, and based on the nature of offence, specific need for supervision or intervention, circumstances as brought out in the social investigation report and past conduct of the child, the Board may, if it so thinks fit,-- a. allow the child to go home after advice or admonition by following appropriate inquiry and counselling to such child and to his parents or the guardian; b. direct the child to participate in group counselling and similar activities; c. order the child to perform community service under the supervision of an organisation or institution, or a specified person, persons or group of persons identified by the Board; d. order the child or parents or the guardian of the child to pay fine: Provided that, in case the child is working, it may be ensured that the provisions of any labour law for the time being in force are not violated; e. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit person, on such parent, guardian or fit person executing a bond, with or without surety, as the Board may require, for the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years; f. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care and supervision of any fit facility for ensuring the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years; g. direct the child to be sent to a special home, for such period, not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit, for providing reformative services including education, skill development, counselling, behaviour modification therapy, and psychiatric support during the period of stay in the special home: Provided that if the conduct and behaviour of the child has been such that, it would not be in the child's interest, or in the interest of other children housed in a special home, the Board may send such child to the place of safety. 2. If an order is passed under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1), the Board may, in addition pass orders to-- i. attend school; or ii. attend a vocational training centre; or iii. attend a therapeutic centre; or iv. prohibit the child from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a specified place; or v. undergo a de-addiction programme. 3. Where the Board after preliminary assessment under section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of the said child as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences." 51. When we compare the provisions of Section 21 of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 with the provisions of Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, we find that there exist similar provisions for orders that could be passed in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law including direction to pay fine. Hence, by applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in Jitendra Singh's case (Supra) and by keeping in mind the provisions of Section 18(1) (d) of the Act, 2015, we are of the view that the appropriate punishment that ought to be awarded to the appellant, who was a juvenile on the date of the incident, would be 'fine'. We find that the court below while convicting the appellant has not awarded any fine. As to what quantum of fine is to be awarded can appropriately be determined by the Juvenile Justice Board after giving opportunity of hearing to the appellant in the light of the observations contained in the judgment of the Apex Court in Jitendra Singh's case (Supra). Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is upheld. However, the punishment awarded to the appellant by the court below is set aside. The appellant who is on bail need not surrender. The sureties are discharged. The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 for determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of the victim, as per the law. The appellant shall cooperate in the proceedings in that regard and shall put in appearance before the Juvenile Justice Board, Agra by or before 15th October, 2019. 52. Let the record of the court below as well as the record of Juvenile Justice Board, Agra be sent back.
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02-01-2019 Rajendra Prasad Rao Versus Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, Dhurwa, Ranchi High Court of Jharkhand
12-12-2018 Sant Shankar Maharaj Ashram Trust, Pimpalkhuta, through its Secretary, Rajendra Versus State of Maharashtra, through Secretary Social Justice & Special Assistance Department & Others In the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur
12-12-2018 Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik Versus State of Maharashtra Supreme Court of India
07-12-2018 State Transport Co-op. Credit Society Ltd. Versus Rajendra Sudhakar Mahalpure High Court of Judicature at Bombay
29-11-2018 Rajendra Ramakant Vedpathak Versus Tarvidersingh Harbansingh Popali & Others High Court of Judicature at Bombay
02-11-2018 Rajendra Kumar Versus State of Rajasthan High Court of Rajasthan Jodhpur Bench
01-11-2018 M/s. RA Chem Pharma Limited, Rep. by its Managing Director, J. Rajendra Rao & Another Versus State of A.P. Rep. by the Public Prosecutor & Others High Court of Andhra Pradesh
01-11-2018 Rajendra Prasad Singh & Others Versus The State of Bihar & Others High Court of Judicature at Patna
30-10-2018 Shrikant & Rajendra Vilas Choudhary Versus The State of Maharashtra High Court of Judicature at Bombay
26-10-2018 Jonnalgadda Rajendra Prasad/Edukondalur RP & Others Versus Sri Yogananda Lakshmi Narasimhaswami Vari Temple, Rep. by its Single Trustee-cum-hereditary Archaka, Parasaram Lakshmi Vara Prasad, Avanigadda In the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad
23-10-2018 Rajendra Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh Supreme Court of India
19-10-2018 Kallinath Shivyogi Dhange Versus Rajendra @ Apparao Mdhukarrao Vedpathak & Others In the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad
10-10-2018 Pankaj @ Pintu Rajendra Marve Versus State of Maharashtra In the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur
08-10-2018 A. Rajendra & Others Versus The State, Represented by The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tiruchendur & Others Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
20-09-2018 Rajendra Singh Versus State of U.P. & Others High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
14-09-2018 Hemant Kumar Jalan & Others Versus Rajendra Bajoria & Others High Court of Judicature at Calcutta
10-09-2018 Khomdram Rajendra Singh Versus The Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Telecommunication, New Delhi & Others Central Administrative Tribunal Guwahati Bench Guwahati
07-09-2018 Rajendra Dagdulal Bafna & Others Versus The State of Maharashtra & Another In the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad
05-09-2018 Shivaraj V/S Rajendra and Others. Supreme Court of India