w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n



Poonam Roofing Products Pvt. Ltd V/S Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III


Company & Directors' Information:- P P PRODUCTS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U32305WB1991PTC051091

Company & Directors' Information:- POONAM ROOFING PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U26953MH1983PTC031370

Company & Directors' Information:- POONAM AND COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U99999DL1975PTC007851

    Appeal Nos. ST/85557, 85558/14 (Arising out of Order-in-Appeal No. Pun-Excus-003-APP-302-303-13-14 dated 01.11.2013 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), Pune-III)

    Decided On, 31 January 2018

    At, Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal West Zonal Bench At Mumbai

    By, THE HONORABLE JUSTICE: RAMESH NAIR
    By, MEMBER AND THE HONORABLE JUSTICE: RAJU
    By, MEMBER

    For Petitioner: Bharat Raichandani, Advocate And For Respondents: Dilip Shinde, Asstt. Commr. (AR)



Judgment Text


1. These appeals have been filed by M/s. Poonam Roofing Products Pvt. Ltd. against confirmation of demand of Service Tax along with interest and imposition of penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

2. Learned Counsel for the appellant pointing out that 2 show-cause notices were issued to them for the period October, 2005 to March, 2010 issued on 29.3.2011 and for the period April, 2010 to March, 2011 issued on 19.10.2011. Learned Counsel pointed out that they are the owners of brand name SWASTIK and had entered into an agreement with M/s. New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. for permitting them to use the said trade name. As per the agreement, the appellants were charging 0.01% of the value of the sale of the goods from M/s. New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. He pointed out that Revenue has treated this amount as a consideration for the taxable service provided under Intellectual Property Service and demanded Service Tax on the same. Learned Counsel argued that they have paid VAT on this receipt treating brand name as goods. Learned Counsel further pointed out that under the VAT Laws, brand name is treated as goods and therefore, transfer of right to use of goods is taxable under VAT. He argued that since they have paid the VAT, there cannot be any leviability of Service Tax.

2.1 Learned Counsel relied on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai in case of Tata Sons Ltd. & Another Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Another

2015-TIOL-345-HC-MUM-CT. He argued that in the said case in almost identical circumstances, it has been held that on the transactions of transfer of right to use trade mark or brand name, VAT is payable. Learned Counsel also relied on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai in case of Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India : 2016 (44) STR 161 (Bom), wherein Hon'ble High Court has held as under:-

38. We must note that Mr. Venkatramans submission that the BSNL test must always be present in each and every case for a transaction to be considered a transfer of the right to use goods is overbroad. We do not think that in BSNL the Supreme Court intended to prescribe a test of global or universal application without regard to individual circumstances. The judgment of the Supreme Court (in Paragraph 90) notes the factual aspects. Therefore, the entire infrastructure, instruments, appliances and exchange remained in the physical control and possession of the petitioner at all times and there was neither any physical transfer of such goods nor any transfer of the right to use such equipment or apparatuses. One of the issues that arose for consideration was whether there was any transfer of the right to use goods by providing access or a telephone connection by the telephone service provider to a subscriber. This BSNL test, was, therefore, set out in these circumstances. The Court had no occasion to consider its applicability to intangible property like intellectual property. This is how BSNL has been interpreted by us in Tata Sons. We think that this interpretation is correct. In any case, it binds us. The Kerala High Court in Malabar Gold, in Paragraph 35, took a contrary view. It took the BSNL twin test to be applicable as a general proposition, i.e., one that admits of no variance. As discussed above, we do not think this can ever be the a correct reading of BSNL.

In para 38 captured above, Hon'ble High Court was responding to the argument presented in para 27 of the said decision, which read as follows:-

27. Mr. Venkatraman concludes his summation of the law on the transfer of the right to use goods by relying on the Supreme Court decision in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Union of India : 2006 (2) S.T.R. 161 (S.C.). In his separate but concurrent judgment, Lakshmanan J listed the five attributes that must be present for a transaction to qualify as a transfer of the right use goods. Most pertinent, Mr. Venkatraman says, are Attributes 4 and 5. He refers to these two collectively as the BSNL twin test. Paragraph 91 lists these attributes as follows:

To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right

91. to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available for delivery;

b. There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c. The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods - consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licences required therefore should be available to the transferee;

d. For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor-this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute - viz. a transfer of the right to use and not merely a licence to use the goods;

e. Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

(Emphasis added)

2.2 Learned Counsel also relied on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in case of Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd : 2013-TIOL-512-HC-KERALA-ST, wherein Hon'ble High Court of Kerala differed with the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in case of Tata Sons (supra) and held that franchise agreement considered in that case will not attract the provisions of Kerala Value Added Tax (KVAT) Act. Earlier a Single Judge Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in its order reported in 2012-TIOL-1032-HC-KER-VAT had held that royalty received by the dealer in the said case is exigible to tax under Section 6(1)(c) of the KVAT Act. Learned Counsel pointed out that the decision of jurisdictional High Court in the case of Tata Sons (supra) would be binding on the Tribunal even though the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala has differed with the same.

2.3 Learned Counsel took us through the provisions of the agreement. The terms of the agreement were as follows:-

Company hereby confirms to use of trademark namely Swastik on the following terms and conditions:-

1. You have agreed to permit us for our use of trademark namely Swastik in manufacturing, selling, marketing and other allied business activities for a period of ten years commencing from 1st January 2006.

2. A company will pay a license fee for use of trademark @ 0.1% of its sales.

3. The company shall pay the monthly license fee regularly on or before 15th day of succeeding month subject to tax deduction at source.

4. During the term of license, New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. shall use the trademark for its own business activities and shall not assign the trademark to any other party.

5. These understandings are for a period ten years, which may be renewed for further period on such terms and conditions as mutually agreed by both of us. Anyone of us shall be entitled to terminate this understanding by giving the notice to other party for the period not less than three months.

6. The Company shall be entitled to use the said trademark for the purpose of lawful business and shall not use the trademark for any other purpose, than explicitly stated in this letter.

7. You shall not permit to any other party for use of trademark Swastik during the period of licensing arrangement with us without our prior consent in writing.

In the token of your acceptance of conditions of this letter, please sign and return duplicate copy of this letter for our record.

2.4 Learned Counsel further pointed out that in terms of Trade Mark Act if the trade mark is not renewed then the same is available for anybody to use after expiry of 10 years. He pointed out that tenure of this agreement was also 10 years. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the impugned order does not give any reason for imposition of penalty and is silent and non-speaking in that aspect.

3. Learned AR relies on the impugned order. Learned AR pointed out that decision of Hon'ble High Court in the case of Tata Sons Ltd. (supra) pertains to the period 2001-02 and during the said period, there was no taxable service under the head of IPR and therefore, the provisions of Finance Act, 1994 were not before the Hon'ble High Court. Learned AR relied on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Mc. Donalds India Pvt. Ltd: 2017 (5) GSTL 120 (Del). In the said case, relying on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in the case of Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held as follows:-

45. Likewise, the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. : [2002] 126 S.T.C. 114 (S.C.) upheld the Andhra Pradesh High Courts decision that the essence of transfer is passage of control over the economic benefits of property which results in terminating rights and other relations in one entity and creating them in another. A similar decision was made in Malabar Gold Private Ltd. v. CTO : (2013) 63 VST 496 : 2013 (32) S.T.R. 3 (Ker.), where a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court considered the nature of the franchise agreement as well as the scope of the expression transfer of right to use the goods.... The High Court concluded that the tests laid down in the BSNL (supra) case were squarely applicable, that there were no goods which were deliverable at any stage and there was no transfer of right to use any trademark.

46. For a transfer of the right to use goods to be effective, such transfer of right should be one that the transferee can exercise in exclusion of others; which is not the case in the present appeals and petitions, as the franchise agreement only grants a non-exclusive right, retaining the franchisors right to transfer the composite bunch of services to other parties, apart from it retaining ownership to the same. The ownership in the trademark, logo, service marks, and brand name is solely vested in appellant and the petitioners and has not been transferred; as is clearly manifested in the various clauses of the franchise agreements. The appellant and the petitioners grant a non-exclusive license to the franchisees, which can be revoked upon non-compliance of the terms and conditions as stipulated in their franchise arrangement. Clearly, this does not amount to a transfer of the right to use goods.

47. The peculiarity of intangibles or incorporeal property, of the kind this Court has to deal with, i.e. intellectual property, is that unlike real property, its boundaries are unset. These rights are only real and effective to the extent they enable the owner or transferee to keep out from use those who are not permitted to do so. In other words, the nature of intellectual property and the remedies provided for their enforcement, hinge upon the right to exclude others from using it. The distinctiveness of a mark, earned through dint of continuous use and brand building, results in the trademark which is classically known as a badge of origin that assures the user of the products the constancy of the quality associated with it. Only ensuring that others who do not own it are prevented from using or appropriating it ensures its enforcement. In the case of the franchise agreements involved in the present case, none of the franchisees or in the case of the trademark licensee (or in GSK's petition the trademark licensee), are empowered to safeguard violation of the mark, through enforcement mechanisms, such as filing suits for injunction or damages. This underlines that the most important attribute of ownership or transfer (even in the most evanescent sense) is absent. Furthermore, by reason of Section 48 of the Trade Marks Act, the utilization of the mark by the franchisee/licensee would accrue to the trademark owner. Therefore, the reputation or brand building which accrues on account of increased volume of business because of the franchise/licensing arrangement, continues to be with the owner. No brand building or brand benefit accrues or arises to the franchisee/licensee. 48. From the above analysis, what irrefutably follows is that the franchise agreements in the three cases (and trade mark licensing agreement in GSK's petition) permit a limited right to use the composite system of the respective businesses of the appellant and the petitioners to the franchisors/licensee, and the dominant intention, as well as the specific provisions arising from the franchise agreements are not of a transfer of the right to use goods.

3.1 Learned AR pointed out that even in this case there is no exclusive right to use the said trade mark in favour of New Sahyadri Industries Pvt. Ltd. Learned AR also relied on the decision in the case of Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India : 2016 (44) STR 161 (Bom). He pointed out that in the said case, there were two appeals considered. While in case of Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd., the decision was against the Revenue but in case of M/s. Subway, the decision was in favour of Revenue. He particularly relied on the following paragraphs of the said decision:-

57. Mr. Shroffs argument on behalf of Subway is that the franchise agreement is not one for sale or transfer of right to use but merely permits the franchisee to display certain marks and to use certain technologies and methods in preparing the salads and sandwiches for sale. Therefore, he submits, it is liable to be taxed as a service, which Subway has been paying in any case. He adopts virtually all of Mr. Venkatramans arguments. Mr. Shroff also refers to the cases of Tata Sons. He relies on these cases to urge that in Subways case, all that is granted is a permissive use. The franchisee under the agreement obtains a mere permission to display the name Subway in a particular fashion, along with other services.

58. Mr. Shroff formulates his case on several distinct grounds. First, the franchisee is entitled to display the name Subway only for a limited period of time as stipulated in the agreement. After the expiry of this period of time, as provided in Clauses 8 and 8(g) of the Franchise Agreement, Mr. Shroff submits, and we agree with him, all the rights of the franchisee are terminated. A breach of the agreement also results in potential termination at the option of Subway. Second, Mr. Shroff argues that the franchisee cannot sub-franchise the mere permission it obtains under the agreement on account of the prohibition in Clause 9(a) of the agreement. Third, there is no territorial restriction or competition restriction of any kind placed on Subway. It is entitled to enter into as many or as few franchisee agreements as it wants, even simultaneously, and it can on its own directly compete with its franchisees too.

69. We believe that Mr. Shroff is correct when he says that the agreement between Subway and its franchisees is not a sale, but is in fact a bare permission to use. It is, therefore, subject only to service tax. In our opinion, the fact that the agreement between Subway and its franchisee is limited to the precise period of time stipulated in the agreement is vital to Subways case. At the end of the period of the agreement, or before in case there was any breach of its terms, the right of the franchisee to display the mark Subway and its trade dress, and all other permissions would also end. This is what sets this agreement apart from the case of Monsanto and its sub-licensee. There, the seed companies could do as they pleased with the seeds; they could alienate or even destroy them. In Subways case, there are set terms provided by the agreement which have to be followed. A breach of these would result in termination of the agreement. We believe that there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the franchisees. In fact, this agreement is a classic example of permissive use. It can be nothing else. For all the reasons in law and fact that the sub-licensing of technology in Monsanto is held to be a transfer of right to use, this franchising agreement must be held to be permissive use.

70. We do not mean to suggest that every franchise agreement will necessarily fall outside the purview of the amended MVAT Act. There is conceivably a class of franchise agreements that would have all the incidents of a sale or a deemed sale (i.e., a transfer of the right to use). Blacks Law Dictionary defines a franchise, in the context of a commercial transaction as (Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Ed.):

The sole right granted by the owner of a trade mark or a trade name to engage in business or to sell a good or service in a certain area.

74. In our opinion, the mere inclusion of franchises under the MVAT Act would not automatically make all franchise agreements liable to sales tax. What must be looked at is the real nature of the transaction and the actual intention of the parties. The agreement must be considered holistically, and effect must be given to the contracting parties intentions. The label or description of the document is irrelevant. An agreement styled as a franchise might, on a proper examination, turn out to be nothing more than a mere licence (as in Subways case). On the other hand, an agreement that calls itself a licence might actually be a franchise. If, in a given case, a franchise agreement is effectively nothing more than a mere permissive use, it cannot be made liable to VAT. It would be a service, and hence liable to service tax. When interpreting a taxing statute, or for that matter any statute, full effect must be given to the words used by the Legislature. This, however, does not mean that this principle must be stretched to a point which leads to an absurd result, or one that was not contemplated by the Legislature. The Legislature is presumed to know the law and to have acted in accordance with it. We, therefore, do not think that the Legislature intended for this Notification to have such a sweeping effect as to bring all franchise agreements within the ambit of the MVAT Act. Presumably, what the Legislature intended was to be included only those franchise agreements that involved a transfer of the right to use or some other aspect of a deemed sale as defined under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution. As discussed above, we find that Subways franchise agreement grants to the franchisee nothing more than mere permissive use of defined intangible rights. It is, therefore, a service, and is not amenable to VAT. We also hasten to clarify that we are not determining whether any particular kind of arrangement is or is not a franchise. Any examples, we have given are merely illustrative, and not binding or final findings.

4. We have gone through the rival submissions. We find that Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai in case of Mahyco Monsanto (supra) has clearly held as under:-

74. In our opinion, the mere inclusion of franchises under the MVAT Act would not automatically make all franchise agreements liable to sales tax. What must be looked at is the real nature of the transaction and the actual intention of the parties. The agreement must be considered holistically, and effect must be given to the contracting parties intentions. The label or description of the document is irrelevant. An agreement styled as a franchise might, on a proper examination, turn out to be nothing more than a mere licence (as in Subways case). On the other hand, an agreement that calls itself a licence might actually be a franchise. If, in a given case, a franchise agreement is effectively nothing more than a mere permissive use, it cannot be made liable to VAT. It would be a service, and hence liable to service tax. When interpreting a taxing statute, or for that matter any statute, full effect must be given to the words used by the Legislature. This, however, does not mean that this principle must be stretched to a point which leads to an absurd result, or one that was not contemplated by the Legislature. The Legislature is presumed to know the law and to have acted in accordance with it. We, therefore, do not think that the Legislature intended for this Notification to have such a sweeping effect as to bring all franchise agreements within the ambit of the MVAT Act. Presumably, what the Legislature intended was to be included only those franchise agreements that involved a transfer of the right to use or some other aspect of a deemed sale as defined under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution. As discussed above, we find that Subways franchise agreement grants to the franchisee nothing more than mere permissive use of defined intangible rights. It is, therefore, a service, and is not amenable to VAT. We also hasten to clarify that we are not determining whether any particular kind of arrangement is or is not a franchise. Any examples, we have given are merely illustrative, and not binding or final findings.
It is apparent from the above decision that the terms of agreement need to be examined in each case before the decision regarding leviability of VAT or Service Tax can be taken. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of BSNL : 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) had prescribed the following test:-

91. To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available for delivery;

b. There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c. The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods-consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee;

d. For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute - viz. a transfer of the right to use and not merely a licence to use the goods;

e. Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

4.1 Learned Counsel for the appellant have argued that in case of Tata Sons (Supra), Hon'ble High Court had not applied the test laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court by observing as follows: -

51. It is in relation to such a controversy that the observations, findings and conclusions must be confined. We do not see as to how they can be extended and in the facts and circumstances of the present case to the enactment that we are dealing with. Going by the plain and unambiguous language of the Act of 1985 we cannot read into it the element of exclusivity and a transfer contemplated therein to be unconditional. Therefore the tests in para (d) and (e) cannot be read in the Act of 1985.
It is seen that in the said case, Hon'ble High Court order was concerned with leviability of Sales Tax under Maharashtra Sales Tax (on Transfer of Right to use any goods for any purpose) Act, 1985 With respect to the test prescribed, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows: -

38. We must note that Mr. Venkatramans submission that the BSNL test must always be present in each and every case for a transaction to be considered a transfer of the right to use goods is overbroad. We do not think that in BSNL the Supreme Court intended to prescribe a test of global or universal application without regard to individual circumstances. The judgment of the Supreme Court (in Paragraph 90) notes the factual aspects. Therefore, the entire infrastructure, instruments, appliances and exchange remained in the physical control and possession of the petitioner at all times and there was neither any physical transfer of such goods nor any transfer of the right to use such equipment or apparatuses. One of the issues that arose for consideration was whether there was any transfer of the right to use goods by providing access or a telephone connection by the telephone service provider to a subscriber. This BSNL test, was, therefore, set out in these circumstances. The Court had no occasion to consider its applicability to intangible property like intellectual property. This is how BSNL has been interpreted by us in Tata Sons. We think that this interpretation is correct. In any case, it binds us. The Kerala High Court in Malabar Gold, in Paragraph 35, took a contrary view. It took the BSNL twin test to be applicable as a general proposition, i.e., one that admits of no variance. As discussed above, we do not think this can ever be the a correct reading of BSNL.
4.2 From the above discussions, it is apparent that there are no universal tests for testing of levy of Sales Tax or Service Tax and each contract is to be examined with respect to its own terms. In this regard, the facts in the case of Mahyco Monsanto (supra) were as follows:-

11. The Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9175 of 2015, Monsanto India, is a joint venture company of Monsanto Investment India Private Limited (MIIPL) and the Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Monsanto India develops and commercializes insect-resistant hybrid cottonseeds using a proprietary Bollgard technology, one that is licensed to Monsanto India by Monsanto USA through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Monsanto Holdings Private Limited (MHPL). This technology is further sub-licensed by Monsanto India to various seed companies on a non-exclusive and non-transferable basis to use, test, produce and sell genetically modified hybrid cotton planting seeds. In return for this technology, Monsanto India receives trait fees based on the number of packets of seeds sold by the sub-licensees. These sub-licensing agreements, with almost 40 seed companies, are the transactions in question. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the Monsanto Writ Petition are the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra respectively. Respondent No. 3 is the Principal Commissioner of Service Tax. Respondent No. 4 is the Commissioner of Sales Tax.

12. The Monsanto Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, brings a challenge to Entry 39 of Schedule C to the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (the MVAT Act); the definitions under Section 65(105)(zzr), 65(55a) and 65(55b) of the Finance Act, 1994; and sub-clause (c) of Section 66E of the Finance Act, 1994. The challenge is on two grounds. First, that these are ultra vires Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 265 of the Constitution of India. Second, that the exercise of power of the Respondent No. 1 under Entry 54 of List II of the Constitution is ultra vires; it encroaches on the power vested exclusively in the Union under Entry 97 of List I.

13. The principal question of this dispute is whether these agreements whereby the Monsanto technology is granted by the Petitioner to the seed companies amounts to mere permissive use and, therefore, a service under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 (Finance Act) read with Entry 97 of List I of the Constitution, or whether it is a deemed sale in the nature of transfer of right to use goods under clause (b)(iv) of the Explanation to Section 2(24) of the MVAT Act read with Article 366(29A)(d) and Entry 54 of List II of the Constitution.

14. A brief background of the Monsanto technology and business structure is necessary. Bacillus Thuringlensis (BT) is a naturally occurring bacterium that produces proteins that kill specific insects. Using biotechnology, Monsanto USA introduces a specific BT gene into the cotton genome. This produces a toxin protein in the cotton seed sufficient to kill specific insects, viz., boll weevils or bollworms. These Bollgard cotton seeds, called the donor seeds, containing the BT gene were initially imported by MHPL in India from Monsanto USA. MHPL also uses these seeds to produce more donor seeds in its facilities, and licences the technology to Monsanto India in return for a 16.5% royalty on the latters turnover. The process thereafter is as follows. Monsanto India enters into sub-licensing agreements with other seed companies through which it claims to grant permissive use of the technology via donor seeds. A sample of such sub-licensing agreement is annexed (Monsanto Petition, Exhibit D, pp. 44-69.). Monsanto India delivers fifty sample BT donor seeds to the seed companies for BT cotton hybrid production, along with the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) manual prepared by Monsanto USA. The seed companies produce or generate additional donor seeds from these given seeds. Monsanto India provides initial training to the seed companies to assist them in using the donor seeds and developing foundation seeds, which will enable them to eventually produce BT cotton hybrids. Monsanto India thereafter provides training to the seed companies to carry out the Zygosity Test, which tests the execution of the breeding plan. The sub-licensees, at the end of this process, are required to undertake regulatory trials to obtain the relevant approvals from the various institutes such as the Institutional Biosafety Committee of the Department of Biotechnology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Environment, Genetic Engineering Advisory Committee (GEAC) and others responsible. These approvals need certificates of validation and test reports, which are provided by Monsanto India. Once such approval is obtained from the GEAC, each sub-licensee can produce BT cotton hybrid seeds. These BT cotton hybrid seeds are then sold to farmers.

15. At present, the technologies licensed are Bollgard? I (BG I) and Bollgard II (BG II). The agreement provides for a few restrictions on the seed companies : the technology is non-transferable, non-exclusive, and cannot be assigned except in the manner provided in the agreement. The seed companies cannot grant further sub-licences, and the sub-licensee is not permitted to reverse engineer, modify or use the BT gene without the prior consent of Monsanto India. Under the agreement, Monsanto India has also to provide training to produce hybrids at various stages, apart from assisting the seed companies in obtaining the required approvals and conducting Zygosity Tests. This training includes classroom training and sharing of protocols. Under the sub-licensing agreement, Monsanto India receives consideration from the seed companies in the form of a one-time fixed fee and a recurring variable based on the sale of the genetically modified seeds; in essence, a trait fee.

4.3 The terms of agreement were examined in para 40 and 42 of the said decision, where Hon'ble High Court has observed as follows:-

40. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with Mr. Sonpal when he says that this is a case of a transfer of the right to use goods. He points out certain clauses in the Monsanto Indias sub-licence agreement which, in our opinion, further substantiate this. Clause 1.1 defines Cotton Proprietary Germplasm to mean proprietary hybrid cotton parent lines developed or owned by the sub-licensee during the term of the agreement. The word owned implies that a sale has taken place. The term of the agreement, as provided under Clause 9.1, is for an initial period of ten years and is further renewable in increments of five years by mutual consent of both parties, unless it is otherwise terminated earlier. What happens after the expiry or termination of the agreement is most interesting. Under Clause 9.4, the sub-licensee is not bound to return to Monsanto India any portion of the initial fifty seeds given under the agreement, nor any additional donor seeds the sub-licensee may have produced. The control (and ownership) of the Bollgard Technology contained in those initial fifty donor seeds, as also in the additional donor seeds produced by the sub-licensee is with the sub-licensee. Monsanto India has nothing whatsoever to do with this portion of the technology. The only restriction appears to be on the sale of the GMO cotton planting seeds. The sub-licensee is given a two-years window to sell or otherwise dispose of any remaining GMO planting seeds. After this period, Monsanto India has the option of requiring the sub-licensee to sell these planting seeds to Monsanto India itself or to dispose of them for non-planting purposes. This clause makes it evident that the ownership of even the planting seeds is with the sub-licensee. Clause 2.5(d) then provides that Monsanto India can further sub-licence the Bollgard Technology to a maximum of three other companies in the same territory as that of the original sub-licensee. For additional transfers, Monsanto India would have to first consult the sub-licensee. Mr. Sonpal rightly states that this suggests that a transfer of the right has, in fact, taken place; and, even on Mr. Venkatramans own illustrations, this case would not fall within the third illustration, but within the second and perhaps even the first. The degree of territorial exclusion is surely irrelevant; the question is whether or not there is any exclusivity. If it were mere permissive use, there would be no question of the Monsanto India having to first consult the sub-licensee before effecting further transfers. Further, under Clause 7.1 the sub-licensee can assign the agreement and its rights and obligations under it to its wholly-owned subsidiaries without Monsanto Indias permission. Mr. Sonpal rightly says that this can never happen in a case of a permissive use. In law, a wholly-owned subsidiary is a distinct legal entity. In a case of service or permissive use, a person can never assign the goods or rights to a third person.

41. At this stage, we find that a parallel to practical, everyday examples would be useful. Take, for instance, the example of when one buys a book from Amazon for their Kindle device. In this case, Amazon can transfer the intellectual property of the book to multiple other users simultaneously, but each single transaction would still be a sale. This would also be true of the example of a music CD. The CD is the medium by which the intellectual property, viz. the songs, passes to the buyer. The manufacturer can sell it to an end-user or to an intermediate retailer. The same song can be put on countless CDs. This too is a sale. When one buys a car, one buys the technology that is contained in the body of the car; the body is just the medium. On ITunes, when one buys a song, the song is transferred into a format which is accessible to the buyer, a proprietary format that needs a special device or software. Yet it is a sale. Limitless ITunes users can buy the song simultaneously. This is a sale to each of them. In the case of CD containing software, say for example Microsoft Word, the medium would again be the CD holding the intellectual property, which would be the software technology. This would also be a sale, despite the fact that this same software technology could be put on unlimited number of CDs and sold to multiple users simultaneously. Effective control of that particular software on that one CD is passed to the buyer. The buyer could use it, alienate it, destroy it, and do anything at all that he likes with it. If he made illicit copies of it, this would constitute infringement; and that in itself would not make the transfer of the software on a CD a service. Even if the buyer transferred this non-transferable software, it would amount to a breach of contract provided in the CD package, just as it would under Monsanto Indias sub-licensing agreement. However, this does not do anything to disqualify the transaction itself from being a sale. These are all sales.

42. In our opinion, the most fundamental aspect of permissive use of goods is that at the end of the period for which the use is granted, the goods must be returned to the transferor. Let us consider this in the context of a car hire service, a book library service, Amazon Kindle Unlimited and ITunes Radio. When a car is taken on hire, a fee is paid and the car can be used for a certain period of time. During this time, the person renting the car can only use it. He cannot part with it and certainly cannot destroy it. Once the period of hire comes to an end, the car must be returned to the transferor. Therefore, the effective control over the car remains with the transferor. Likewise, in the case of a book library, the books must be returned to the library. With the Kindle Unlimited, one must pay a subscription fee to gain access to an unlimited number of books in the proprietary AZW format. When the subscription expires, all the books are repossessed. ITunes Radio too is a similar concept. A subscription fee is paid, which allows access to music. Once this expires, access to the music is denied. These, in our opinion, are cases of permissive use. The Monsanto India sub-licensing transaction could only be a service in one circumstance, i.e., if the seed companies gave Monsanto India a bag of seeds to mutate and improve with the Bollgard Technology which would, thereafter, be returned to the seed companies. That might perhaps be a service.

In this context, the Hon'ble High Court held that the transactions undertaken by Mahyco Monsanto were in the nature of sale.

4.4 In case of Subway, the facts before Hon'ble High Court were as follows:-

55. A brief description of Subways business is this Subway was granted a non-exclusive sub-license by Subway International B.V. (SIBV), a Dutch Limited Liability Corporation to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY-branded restaurants in India. This non-exclusive license was granted to SIBV itself by Subway Systems International Ansalt, which in turn was granted such a license by Doctors Associates Inc., an entity that owns the proprietary system for setting up and operating these restaurants. These restaurants serve sandwiches and salads under the service mark SUBWAY. The agreement includes not only the trade mark SUBWAY, but also associated confidential information and goodwill, such as policies, forms, recipes, trade secrets and the like. Typically, Subway enters into franchise agreements with third parties, under which it provides specified services to the franchisee. In return, the franchisee undertakes to carry on the business of operating sandwich shops in Subways name. The agreement only provides for a very limited representational or display right, and the franchisee cannot transfer or assign these exclusive rights to any third person. Subway also reserves the right to compete with these franchisees in the agreement. Under this agreement, Subway receives two kinds of consideration, one being a one-time franchisee fee which is paid when the agreement is signed; and the second is a royalty fee paid weekly by the franchisee on the basis of its weekly turnover. A sample franchise agreement is annexed (Subway Petition, Exhibit A, pp. 30-49). Under these agreements, the franchisees have not more than a right to display Subways intellectual property in the form of marks and logos, and a mere right to use such confidential information as Subway discloses and as prescribed by the franchise agreement.
Learned Counsel for M/s. Subway elaborated the terms of contract in his own words as follows:-

58. Mr. Shroff formulates his case on several distinct grounds. First, the franchisee is entitled to display the name Subway only for a limited period of time as stipulated in the agreement. After the expiry of this period of time, as provided in Clauses 8 and 8(g) of the Franchise Agreement, Mr. Shroff submits, and we agree with him, all the rights of the franchisee are terminated. A breach of the agreement also results in potential termination at the option of Subway. Second, Mr. Shroff argues that the franchisee cannot sub-franchise the mere permission it obtains under the agreement on account of the prohibition in Clause 9(a) of the agreement. Third, there is no territorial restriction or competition restriction of any kind placed on Subway. It is entitled to enter into as many or as few franchisee agreements as it wants, even simultaneously, and it can on its own directly compete with its franchisees too.
After analyzing the aforesaid facts, Hon'ble High Court has observed as follows:-

69. We believe that Mr. Shroff is correct when he says that the agreement between Subway and its franchisees is not a sale, but is in fact a bare permission to use. It is, therefore, subject only to service tax. In our opinion, the fact that the agreement between Subway and its franchisee is limited to the precise period of time stipulated in the agreement is vital to Subways case. At the end of the period of the agreement, or before in case there was any breach of its terms, the right of the franchisee to display the mark Subway and its trade dress, and all other permissions would also end. This is what sets this agreement apart from the case of Monsanto and its sub-licensee. There, the seed companies could do as they pleased with the seeds; they could alienate or even destroy them. In Subways case, there are set terms provided by the agreement which have to be followed. A breach of these would result in termination of the agreement. We believe that there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the franchisees. In fact, this agreement is a classic example of permissive use. It can be nothing else. For all the reasons in law and fact that the sub-licensing of technology in Monsanto is held to be a transfer of right to use, this franchising agreement must be held to be permissive use.

72. We find, on facts, that the Subway franchise does not meet these tests. There is no such exclusivity. The agreement itself says that Subway may itself open and operate its own outlets in direct competition with the franchisee [Subway Petition, Clause 11(1) of the Agreement, p. 46]. The agreements themselves expressly contemplate that Subway may create further franchisees in the very area in which these franchisees operate [Subway Petition, Clause 11(1) of the Agreement, p. 46]. The franchisee cannot unilaterally sub-franchise [Subway Petition, Clause 9 of the Agreement, p. 42.]; if it could do without Subways prior permission or leave, then the consideration might be wholly different and it may then be possible to say that there is a transfer of the right to use. We find that the right of transferability is extremely restricted and is impossible without Subway control throughout. Similarly, if there is no requirement of having to cease display and use [Subway Petition, Clause 8(e) of the Agreement, p. 41], or return the intangible property at the end of the franchise agreements term [Subway Petition, Clauses 8(e) and (j) of the Agreement, p. 41.], then the transaction might arguably be a sale. Exercises in co-branding or sub-branding, where one party franchises its mark on a territorially-restricted basis and allows the franchisee to combine it with its own or other marks may also well have an element of sale. Similarly, where a dealership for, say, automobiles, has a territorial exclusivity, then it may amount to a franchise. The Subway franchise model has none of these elements. The so-called system is controlled by Subway and it is exclusive to Subway. At the end of the franchise term, it cannot be used. Some (though not all) of the ingredients-breads, salad dressings and other key items - are to be sourced from Subway or Subway-authorised vendors and nowhere else. This gives Subway deep and pervasive control and dominion over the franchisees daily operations, without, at the same time, ceding to the franchisee the slightest hint or latitude in what it may do with the permitted marks and technology. This is, therefore, diametrically opposed to the Monsanto model, for Monsanto India has no control whatever in what its licensee does with the BT-infused donor seeds; that licensee may choose not to use them at all. There is also no question of any return or cessation to Monsanto India. Thus, viewed from any perspective, and on the facts of the case, we are unable to hold that the Subway franchise agreements have any of the necessary elements of a sale or a deemed sale.

74. In our opinion, the mere inclusion of franchises under the MVAT Act would not automatically make all franchise agreements liable to sales tax. What must be looked at is the real nature of the transaction and the actual intention of the parties. The agreement must be considered holistically, and effect must be given to the contracting parties intentions. The label or description of the document is irrelevant. An agreement styled as a franchise might, on a proper examination, turn out to be nothing more than a mere licence (as in Subways case). On the other hand, an agreement that calls itself a licence might actually be a franchise. If, in a given case, a franchise agreement is effectively nothing more than a mere permissive use, it cannot be made liable to VAT. It would be a service, and hence liable to service tax. When interpreting a taxing statute, or for that matter any statute, full effect must be given to the words used by the Legislature. This, however, does not mean that this principle must be stretched to a point which leads to an absurd result, or one that was not contemplated by the Legislature. The Legislature is presumed to know the law and to have acted in accordance with it. We, therefore, do not think that the Legislature intended for this Notification to have such a sweeping effect as to bring all franchise agreements within the ambit of the MVAT Act. Presumably, what the Legislature intended was to be included only those franchise agreements that involved a transfer of the right to use or some other aspect of a deemed sale as defined under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution. As discussed above, we find that Subways franchise agreement grants to the franchisee nothing more than mere permissive use of defined intangible rights. It is, therefore, a service, and is not amenable to VAT. We also hasten to clarify that we are not determining whether any particular kind of arrangement is or is not a franchise. Any examples, we have given a

Please Login To View The Full Judgment!

re merely illustrative, and not binding or final findings. 4.5 In view of the above decision, we examined the terms of the contract in the appellants case. The agreement reads as follows:- Company hereby confirms to use of trademark namely Swastik on the following terms and conditions:- 1. You have agreed to permit us for our use of trademark namely Swastik in manufacturing, selling, marketing and other allied business activities for a period of ten years commencing from 1st January 2006. 2. A company will pay a license fee for use of trademark @ 0.1% of its sales. 3. The company shall pay the monthly license fee regularly on or before 15th day of succeeding month subject to tax deduction at source. 4. During the term of license, New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. shall use the trademark for its own business activities and shall not assign the trademark to any other party. 5. These understandings are for a period ten years, which may be renewed for further period on such terms and conditions as mutually agreed by both of us. Anyone of us shall be entitled to terminate this understanding by giving the notice to other party for the period not less than three months. 6. The Company shall be entitled to use the said trademark for the purpose of lawful business and shall not use the trademark for any other purpose, than explicitly stated in this letter. 7. You shall not permit to any other party for use of trademark Swastik during the period of licensing arrangement with us without our prior consent in writing. In the token of your acceptance of conditions of this letter, please sign and return duplicate copy of this letter for our record. It is apparent from the agreement that, (i) No exclusive right to use the trade mark Swastik has been given to M/s. New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. The appellants are free to give this trade mark to other even in the same territory. (ii) M/s. New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. are not free to permit use of the trade mark to anybody else i.e. they cannot sub-license. If M/s. New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. wish to permit to any other support for use then they have to seek permission of the appellant. The trade mark cannot be assigned to anybody by M/s. New Sahyadri Industries Ltd. While the agreement is for a period of 10 years, both parties have option to terminate the agreement by giving the notice of three months. 4.6 In the above circumstances, it is apparent that the agreement is very similar to the agreement examined by Hon'ble High Court in respect of M/s. Subway in the decision reported in case of Mahyco Monsanto (supra). The agreement in the instant case is an agreement of permissive use of the trade mark Swastik and no transfer of right to use of the said trade mark. 4.7 In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in argument of the appellant that the said transaction is not liable to Service Tax under Finance Act, 1994. 4.8 Learned Counsel has further argued that they have paid VAT and therefore, no Service Tax can be demanded. It is not in the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to adjudicate on the leviability of VAT or otherwise. This Tribunal is competent to adjudge regarding leviability of Service Tax under the Finance Act, 1994 only. In these circumstances, in so far as the payment of VAT is concerned, the appellant may approach the appropriate authority. 4.9 Learned Counsel has further argued that the impugned order does not give any findings with respect to imposition of penalties. We find that the Commissioner (Appeals) in his order as observed as under:- 18. The appellant have contended that they had not suppressed the facts from the department, when they had produced all the documents before the investigating officers and the demand in the initial case (Appeal No. 191/2013) is hit by time limitation. I find that the appellant had obtained registration under the category of Intellectual Property Service only on 25.6.2007 and were filing Nil returns against this service. During auditing of the records of the appellant, the Department came to know that the appellant was not discharging their Service Tax liability on this service. It is a fact that in their Service Tax-3 returns for the relevant period, the Appellant had willfully mis-stated that they have received zero amount towards provision of this service. The appellants contention that the impugned services were non-taxable is not legally correct, as already concluded above. Thus, willful mis-statement on the part of the appellant stands established and thus extended period has been correctly invoked in the initial case (appeal No. 191/2013). 4.10 In so far as the invocation of extended period is concerned, we find that the elements for imposing the penalty are identical to those necessary to invoke the extended period of limitation. In these circumstances, no separate specific findings are needed for imposition of penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. 5. The appeals are consequently dismissed.
O R







Judgements of Similar Parties

14-05-2020 Horlicks Limited & Another Versus Zydus Wellness Products Limited High Court of Delhi
13-03-2020 Sheetal Medicare Products Pvt. Ltd., Maharashtra Versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Maharashtra & Another National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission NCDRC
06-03-2020 Poonam Devi & Others Versus Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Supreme Court of India
05-03-2020 Bimalkumar Manubhai Savalia Shareholder and Director of M/s Radheshyam Agro Products Pvt. Ltd, At-Sajiyavadar, Taluka: Amreli District: Amreli Versus Bank of India, Gujarat & Others National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
03-03-2020 Uday Prakash Mishra Versus Poonam Mishra & Others High Court of Judicature at Patna
02-03-2020 In The Matter of:Living Consumer Products Private Limited Through its duly Authorized Signatory Jaideep Hotha Versus Play Games 24x7 Private Limited Through its duly Authorized Signatory Prabhu Vijayakumar National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
24-02-2020 Roche Products (India) Private Limited & Others Versus Cadila Healthcare Limited & Others High Court of Delhi
13-02-2020 Commissioner, Commercial Taxes U.P. Lucknow Versus M/s. Narain Vegetable Products Sitapur High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Lucknow Bench
05-02-2020 State Bank of India V/S Suvarnasari Venkateshwara Food Products and Others. Debts Recovery Tribunal Nagpur
04-02-2020 Sameera @ ParutheekuzhiyilSameera, Proprietor Versus Reghu, Proprietor, Metro Paper Products, Athanikkal, Malappuram now Proprietor, Malappuram Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Thiruvananthapuram
24-01-2020 M/s. C.C.L. Products (India) Ltd., Rep., by its Executive Chairman, Challarajendra Prasad & Others Versus The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep., by its Public Prosecutor & Another High Court of Andhra Pradesh
21-01-2020 Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Versus Pre-Stress Products (India) High Court of Judicature at Bombay
17-01-2020 Morzaria Products LLP Versus Marvel Omega Builders Pvt. Ltd. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission NCDRC
13-01-2020 Branch Manager, HDFC Ergo GIC Ltd. & Dist. Bhopal & Others Versus Poonam Singh Sisodiya & Others Madya Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Bhopal
19-12-2019 The Management of Roca Bathroom Products Private Limited Ranipet Versus Ranipet Labour Union Rep. by its Secretary, S. Nagarajan Ranipet Vellore District & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
02-12-2019 Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Ltd., by its Managing Director Versus M/s. Kerala Agro Seeds, Represented by its Proprietor, Martin Paul High Court of Karnataka
21-11-2019 Punjab & Sind Bank Versus M/s. Indo Foreign Commercial Agency Products Private Limited & Others High Court of Delhi
21-11-2019 S. Kannan Versus The Management, Hatson Agro Products Limited, Chennai & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
18-11-2019 M/s. Renowned Auto Products Manufacturers Limited., now known as M/s. Tenneco Automotive India Pvt., Ltd., Rep. by its Director, J. Ambrose, Hosur & Another Versus The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Salem & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
15-11-2019 Poonam Sudan & Another Versus Union of India & Others High Court of Delhi
13-11-2019 M/s. Renowned Auto Products Manufacturers Ltd., Now known as M/s.Tenneco Automotive India Pvt. Ltd., Rep., by its Director, Ambrose, Tamil Nadu Versus The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Salem & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
13-11-2019 Shaji B. John, Kings International Ltd., Quilon & Others Versus The Marine Products Exports Development Authority, Cochin, Represented by Its Secretary, Dr. G. Santhanakrishnan High Court of Kerala
05-11-2019 Poonam Kumari & Others Versus State of Bihar High Court of Judicature at Patna
01-11-2019 Premier Marine Products, Represented by its Authoritsed Signatory, Abdul Razzak Ganj Versus The Assistant Commissioner (CT) (Additional), Thiruvanmiyur Assessment Circle, Chennai High Court of Judicature at Madras
29-10-2019 Poonam Versus Bhupender High Court of Punjab and Haryana
25-10-2019 The Management of Roca Bathroom Products Private Limited, Rep., by its Factory Manager, Ranipet, Vellore District Versus Ranipet Labour Union, Rep., by its Secretary, Shri S.Nagarajan, Ranipet, Vellore District & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
21-10-2019 S. Ravi & Others Versus Dev Anand Vijayan, Executive Director, The Management of Sri Karthikeya Spinning & Weaving Mills Pvt. Ltd., Formerly known as Perur Engineering Products, Coimbatore High Court of Judicature at Madras
14-10-2019 Inspira IT Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. High Court of Judicature at Bombay
10-10-2019 Manipal Soubhagya Nidhi Ltd. & Others Versus Ramesh Prabhu Through Polymer Products & Others High Court of Judicature at Bombay
24-09-2019 M/s. I.N. Agrovet Products & Another Versus The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Member Secretary, Pollution Control Board, Sanath Nagar, Hyderabad & Others High Court of for the State of Telangana
20-09-2019 Dr. Writer's Food Products Pvt. Ltd. & Others Versus The Cosmos Co-operative Bank Limited High Court of Judicature at Bombay
20-09-2019 M/s. Citrex Products Ltd., Anna Nagar, Chennai & Others Versus V. Rajendran & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
16-09-2019 Pentafour Products Limited, Valasaravakkam, Represented by its Chairman & Managing Director, V. Ramakrishnan Versus The Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Chennai & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
28-08-2019 S. Selvam Versus The Managing Director, Vellore T.V. Malai Co-operative Milk Products Union Ltd., Sathuvachari, Vellore & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
28-08-2019 Vesta Building Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus Balasaeb Kashinath Rasal & Others High Court of Judicature at Bombay
22-08-2019 Union of India & Others Versus BGP Products Operations GMBH And Hagene Immermatt Weg. & Others Supreme Court of India
19-08-2019 Poonam Mishra & Others Versus Veena Mishra & Others High Court of Chhattisgarh
25-07-2019 M/s. KOG - KTV Food products (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Others Versus The Registrar of Companies, Chennai National Company Law Tribunal Chennai
17-07-2019 M/s. Aditya Auto Products & Engineering India Pvt. Ltd., Represented by its Head-HR Ramesh Pai Versus M/s. Aditya Auto Products (NTTF), Rep. by its Secretary & Others High Court of Karnataka
31-05-2019 The District Single Window Clearance Board, The District Industries Centre, Palakkad, Represented by Its Convenor Versus M/s. Gayathri Rock Products, Palakkad, Represented by Its Managing Partner P.P. Vincent & Others High Court of Kerala
29-05-2019 Riverview Jute Products Pvt. Ltd.(SSI Unit) Versus Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. West Bengal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Kolkata
17-05-2019 M/s. Brandavan Food Products (A company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956), Chhattisgarh & Others Versus Commissioner (Appeals), Central & State Goods and Service Tax Raipur Commissionerate Central GST Building, Chhattisgarh & Another High Court of Chhattisgarh
16-05-2019 M/s National Printers, proprietor Apex Products Private Limited through its Director Sri Krishnan Kant Kedia Versus The State of Jharkhand, through its Principal Secretary, HRD-cum-State Project Director, Jharkhand Education Project Council & Others High Court of Jharkhand
30-04-2019 Poonam Bai Versus State of Chhattisgarh Supreme Court of India
18-04-2019 Poonam Agarwal & Another Versus State of Maharashtra & Another High Court of Judicature at Bombay
02-04-2019 M/s. Swastika Steel & Allied Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus CCE, Kol-II Customs Excise amp Service Tax Appellate Tribunal East Regional Bench Kolkata
29-03-2019 The Management of Godrej Consumer Products Ltd, Kolkata & Another Versus The State of Assam Others High Court of Gauhati
14-03-2019 Amrit Food Products Represented by its Partners Sunit Kr Jalan And Sushil Kumar Jalan Versus Assam State Electricity Board, Represented by its Chairman High Court of Gauhati
12-03-2019 In the Matter of: M/s. Midas Safety Products Private Limited & Others National Company Law Tribunal Chennai
21-02-2019 Appu Food Products rep. by its Authorised Signatory P. Uma Maheshwari & Others Versus The State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Principal Secretary to Government, Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme (SW.4-3) Dept., Fort St. George, Chennai & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
06-02-2019 Kurlon Ltd. Versus Panama Poly Products Pvt Ltd. High Court of Delhi
01-02-2019 M/s. Manidhari Air Products Versus Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. & Another In the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur
30-01-2019 M/s. Ashodaya Cement Products, Rep. by its Partner G. Harish & Others Versus Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Ltd., Rep. by Managing Director & Others High Court of Karnataka
21-01-2019 M/s. Active Char Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus M/s. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Others Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Thiruvananthapuram
18-01-2019 Carista Herbal Products(P) Ltd, Represented by its Manager, Accounts Finance, Pondicherry Versus The Commissioner of Central Excise Beach Road, Pondicherry & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
16-01-2019 Tecumseh Products India Versus Acit, Circle-2(2), Hyd Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad
11-01-2019 BILT Graphic Paper Products Ltd. & Others Versus The State of Maharashtra, through Secretary, Department of Irrigation & Others In the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur
03-01-2019 M/s. Krishna Modern Rice Mill, Pondicherry Versus Puducherry Agro Products & Another High Court of Judicature at Madras
02-01-2019 Penguin Agro Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus Union of India & Another High Court of Judicature at Calcutta
11-12-2018 Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi & Others Versus M/s. Nellai Concrete Products, and Constructions Co. Pvt. Ltd., Rep. by its Managing Director, Chennai High Court of Judicature at Madras
10-12-2018 Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. V/S Poonam Gupta and Others. Supreme Court of India
06-12-2018 M/s. Thirumala Milk Products (P) Ltd., Represented by its General Manager, Easwarababu Kolli Versus Ch. Kishore & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
05-12-2018 Aditya Auto Products & Engineering India Pvt Ltd. Versus Aditya Auto Products (Nttf) Employees Union High Court of Karnataka
31-10-2018 Kwality Agro Products, rep. by its Proprietor K. Srinivasa Rao & Another Versus Canara Bank, rep. by its Branch Manager/Authorized Officer & Others In the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad
11-10-2018 M/s. Taruni Diary Products Pvt. Ltd. rep. by its Managing Director & Another Versus A.P. State Financial Corporation, Hyderabad & Another In the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad
05-10-2018 The Dy.Cit., Circle-1(1) Versus Banco Products (India) Ltd Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Ahmedabad
05-10-2018 M/s. Kar Agro Products LLP Versus The Income Tax Officer Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Ahmedabad
04-10-2018 Tamil Nadu Consumer Products Distributors Association - Informant Versus Fangs Technology Private Limited & Others Competition Commission of India
20-09-2018 Poonam Bhardwaj Versus Ashish Abrol High Court of Delhi
18-09-2018 Poonam Versus Pon Vidyashram Group of CBSE Schools, Represented by its Chairman High Court of Judicature at Madras
18-09-2018 Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. Versus Inspira IT Products Pvt.Ltd. High Court of Judicature at Bombay
14-09-2018 M/s. S.P.P. Foods Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus M/s. Hannu Marketing High Court of Delhi
14-09-2018 Prime Comfort Products Private Limited Versus Lal Bahadur Trading as Sulakshmi Enterprises High Court of Delhi
11-09-2018 M/s. A.K. Paper Products Pvt Ltd, Represented by its Director, Hyderabad Versus The Chairman, Central Board of Excise & Customs Department of Revenue, New Delhi & Others High Court of Judicature at Madras
06-09-2018 State of Kerala, Rep. by Deputy Commissioner (Law), Commercial Taxes, Ernakulam Versus Joemon Rajan, Mangaly Rock Products, Angamaly High Court of Kerala
06-09-2018 M/s. Dia Health Foods Pvt. Ltd., State of Punjab & Others Versus M/s. Diabliss Consumer Products Pvt. Ltd., Rep by its Managing Director VR. Ramanathan High Court of Judicature at Madras
16-08-2018 Poonam Agarwal & Others Versus Pooja Construction Company Limited & Others High Court of Judicature at Calcutta
14-08-2018 Poonam (Now Deceased) through Lrs Versus Pradeep Tyagi High Court of Delhi
10-08-2018 M/s. B.R. Fabrications Versus Shakti Food Products High Court of Delhi
09-08-2018 Poonam Bhalla, Faridabad Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Sector 15, Circle-II Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Delhi
07-08-2018 Kavveri Telecom Products Limited Versus C.C-Bangalore-CUS Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal South Zonal Bench At Bangalore
07-08-2018 M/s. Mukesh & Co. Tobacco Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission NCDRC
02-08-2018 M/s. Sharada Flour Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus M/s. Dhanlaxmi Bank Ltd. High Court of Kerala
01-08-2018 Poonam Dobriyal Versus ONGC & Others High Court of Uttarakhand
24-07-2018 Vijay Prestressed Products Pvt. Ltd V/S CCT, Visakhapatnam - G.S.T. Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal Regional Bench, Allahabad
20-07-2018 Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd. & Another Versus Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. & Another Supreme Court of India
19-07-2018 Shree Finance, Rep. by its Proprietor, Poonam Chnad, Rep. by its Power agent Mukesh Versus S.M. Haneefa High Court of Judicature at Madras
16-07-2018 Rohan Packaging Products Ltd. Versus Lakhmichand Gidwani NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (NEW DELHI)
13-07-2018 Mahindra Engg. & Chemical Products Ltd. Versus Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-I Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal West Zonal Bench At Mumbai
12-07-2018 S. Arumugam Versus Pondicherry Agricultural Products, Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd (PAPSCO), Represented by the Managing Director, Pondicherry High Court of Judicature at Madras
06-07-2018 Classic Tobacco Products V/S CCE, Jaipur Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal New Delhi
06-07-2018 Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai-IV V/S Harts Cocoa Products Pvt. Ltd. Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal South Zonal Bench At Chennai
04-07-2018 A.M. Products V/S C.C.E., & S.T., Jaipur Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal New Delhi
02-07-2018 Balaji Industrial Products Limited Versus AIA Engineering Limited High Court of Rajasthan Jaipur Bench
13-06-2018 Roots Auto Products Pvt. Ltd V/S CCE, Coimbatore Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal South Zonal Bench At Chennai
11-06-2018 M/s. NPS Tech Molds Pvt. Ltd. Versus M/s. Vishal Precision Products Pvt. Ltd. High Court of Judicature at Madras
06-06-2018 The Commercial Tax Officer-I, Wadakkancherry & Another Versus C.R. Varghese, M/s. Global Rubber Products, Kumblangad, Thrissur District High Court of Kerala
05-06-2018 A.V. Agro Products Ltd. and Others V/S Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Delhi-I Customs Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal New Delhi
31-05-2018 Poonam Rani & Others Versus Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Labour & Employment, New Delhi & Others Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench New Delhi
30-05-2018 Poonam Sharma & Others Versus Union of India & Others High Court of Delhi


LawyerServices is a Premium Legal Tech solution.


Lawyers, Law Firms, Government Departments and Corporates rely on us for, Workflow Automation, Data Aggregation, Timely Updates, Case Management, Intelligent Research, Latest Legal Data Updates and a LOT more!

If you are a legal professional, CONTACT US, in order to see how our UNIQUE solution can benefit your organization.

Features Intro Close Box