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Nagesh Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. v/s Ajay Kumar Chaturvedi & Others

    Crl.Revision No.2056 of 2010.

    Decided On, 28 September 2010

    At, High Court of Punjab and Haryana

    By, THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY

    For the Petitioner: Ajay Kumar Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondent: None.



Judgment Text

Daya Chaudhary, J.

The present revision petition has been filed against order dated 23.4.2010 passed by Addl. Sessions Judge,-III, Bhiwani vide which the summoning order dated 6.10.2008 passed by SDJM, Charkhi Dadri has been set aside and revision was allowed on the ground that the trial Court was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the Act').

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani is contrary to law and record as the cheque was presented in the Bank at Charkhi Dadri and it was dishonoured by the bank at Charkhi Dadri and, therefore, the Court at Charkhi Dadri was having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Learned counsel further submits that since inception of centralized banking services, all branches of nationalized banks are making payments and receiving deposits of all account-holders throughout the country and in view of the prevalent system, it cannot be said that an account-holder is having account in one branch only. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that wrong finding has been given by learned Additional Sessions Judge by stating that the amount was to be credited by Bank at Mayur Vihar, New Delhi because of centralized banking services and transaction on internet, every branch of the bank is considered as a local branch for the purpose of deposit.

3. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and have also gone through the orders passed by courts below.

4. In this case a complaint was filed by the complainant against the respondents under Section 138 of the Act as a cheque bearing No.150860 dated 1.11.2007 issued by the respondents in favour of the complainant for an amount of Rs. 15 lacs was dishonoured vide memo dated 15.2.2008 which was deposited in State Bank of Patiala at Charkhi Dadri on 14.2.2008. The same was again deposited on 12.4.2008 and again also it was dishonoured vide memo dated 15.4.2008. A legal notice was sent on 8.5.2008 but no payment of the said amount was made. A complaint was filed by the complainant against the respondents. After recording preliminary evidence, the Illaqa Magistrate Charkhi Dadri summoned the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act vide order dated 6.12.2008. The accused-respondents challenged the summoning order by way of filing criminal revision before the Revisional Court which was allowed and summoning order was set aside by holding that the Court at Charkhi Dadri was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138 of the Act and a direction was issued to the trial Court to return the complaint to the complainant and opportunity was granted to collect the same and to present it before the appropriate Court of competent jurisdiction at Delhi within a period of three weeks.

5. The revision petition has been filed by the complainant against the impugned order passed in criminal revision No.60 of 2010 by raising all the arguments as mentioned above.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not able to explain how the revision is maintainable against the order passed in the revision petition but argued the matter on merits. Since the petitioner has already availed the remedy of revision and second revision is not maintainable as it has been held by the Apex Court in Krishanan v. Krishnaveni 1997(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 724 as under:

" The inherent power of the High Court is not one conferred by the Code but one which the High Court already has in it and which is preserved by the Code. The object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings..........."

7. The said view has been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in later decisions also.

8. So far as the decision in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab 1996(1) RCR (Crl.) 464, is concerned, there it was held that the second revision petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not maintainable as disputed questions of fact were involved in the case. In Deepti v. Akil Raj, 1995(3) RCR (Crl.) 638, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court could not interfere simply on the basis of the statement of the State Govt. as there was sufficient material on record to frame charge against the accused under Section 498-A IPC. In Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, 2001 (4) RCR (Crl.) 312, the order, whereby the cognizance taken by the Magistrate was set aside by the High Court, was challenged in the Apex Court and it was held that since the revision petition filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C. had been rejected by the High Court then the aggrieved party had no right to file a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer for quashing the same order.

9. In Prasanta Kumar v. The State of West Bengal, (2001) CCR 245 (SC) : II (2001) SLT 236 : AIR 2003 SC 4412, the Apex Court had declined to entertain a petition under Section 482/401 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the second revision petition was not maintainable.

10. In view of the facts and law position as mentioned above, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out that the present case is such where there is an abuse of the process of the Court or miscarriage of justice has been done and interferenc

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e is required. The Court can interfere if there is a failure of justice and misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure. No doubt, the Court is not expected to be a mere silent spectator where criminal prosecution is an abuse of the process of the Court but in the present case, nothing has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show that it is a case of either misuse of the process of the Court or miscarriage of justice in any manner. 11. In view of the observations made above, the petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed being not maintainable. Revision dismissed.
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