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M/s. Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd v/s State of U.P. Thr. Addl. Chief Secy. Infra.& Industrial Dev & Another

    Misc. Single No. 27631 of 2021

    Decided On, 26 November 2021

    At, High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Lucknow Bench

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH LAVANIA

    For the Petitioner: Abhishek Khare, Apoorva Tewari, Advocates. For the Respondents: C.S.C., Waseeq Uddin Ahmed, Advocate.



Judgment Text

Heard Sri Apoorva Tewari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri Devendra Mohan Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for opposite party no. 1 and Sri Waseeq Uddin Ahmed, learned Counsel for opposite party no. 2.

The petitioner by means of present petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India has sought the following main reliefs:-

"a) To issue an appropriate order or direction commanding the respondent no. 1 to decide the revision of the petitioner preferred under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 read with Section 12 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 expeditiously within a fixed reasonable period of time:

b) To issue an appropriate order or direction commanding the respondent no. 2 not to take any coercive measures against the petitioner pursuant to recovery certificate dated 12.09.2019 during the pendency of revision before the respondent no. 1:"

At the very outset, on pointing out regarding the defect as pointed out by the Registry of this Court, which is to the effect that the present petition for relief(s) sought is cognizable by the Division Bench of this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri Apoorva Tewari, submitted that present petition for the main relief(s) quoted above, is maintainable before this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India. Elaborating his argument he submitted that being aggrieved by the order of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority dated 06.03.2018 and recovery certificate dated 12.09.2019, the revision petition was filed under Section 41(3) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 {in short "Act of 1973"} read with Section 12 of U.P. Industrial Development Area Act, 1976 {in short "Act of 1976"}.

He further submitted that it appears from the language of Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973 that the State functions as Quasi Judiciary Authority and being so is covered under expression "Tribunal". In support of his submission he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Versus P.N.Sharma and Another reported in AIR 1965 SC 1595. Paragraphs on which reliance has been placed are quoted hereinunder:-

"9. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the courts one common characteristic; both the courts and the tribunals are "constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions", (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh [(1955) 1 SCR 267 at p. 272] ). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State.

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25. It would thus be seen that in dealing with the question as to whether Respondent 2, while it exercises its appellate power under Rule 6(6), is a tribunal under Article 136(1), we must enquire whether Respondent 2 has been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between parties and determine them on the merits fairly and objectively. That is the test which has been consistently applied by this Court in considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a tribunal under Article 136(1). Before we proceed to apply this test to Respondent 2's status under Rule 6(6), we think it is necessary to advert to one aspect of the matter which sometimes creates some confusion.

26. We have referred to the three essential attributes of a sovereign State and indicated that one of these attributes is the legislative power and legislative function of the State, and we have also seen that in determining the status of an authority dealing with disputes, we have to enquire whether the power conferred on the said authority or body can be said to be judicial power conferred on it by the State by means of a statute or statutory rule. The use of the expression "judicial power" in this context proceeds on the well-recognised concept of political science that along with legislative and executive powers, judicial power vests in a sovereign State. In countries where rigid separation of powers has been effected by written Constitutions, the position is very different. Take, for instance, the Australian Constitution. Section 71 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (63 & 64 Vict. Chapter 12) provides that the judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than two, as Parliament prescribes. It is clear that the scheme of Sections 71 to 80 which form part of Chapter III of the said Constitution, is that the judicial power of the State can be conferred only on courts recognised by the provisions of the said Chapter. In other words, it is not competent to the legislature in Australia to confer judicial power properly so-called on any body or authority other than or apart from the courts recognised by Chapter III and so, the use of the expression "judicial power" or its conferment in regard to tribunals which are not courts properly so-called, would under the Australian Constitution be wholly inappropriate. If any tribunals other than courts are established and power is given to them to deal with and decide special disputes between the parties, the power which such tribunals would exercise cannot be described as judicial power, but would have to be called quasi-judicial power.

27. This technical aspect of the matter which is present under the Constitutions based on rigid separation of powers, should not be ignored when we are dealing with the question posed under Article 136(1) of our Constitution under our Constitution, there is no rigid separation of powers as under the Australian Constitution; and so, it would not be constitutionally inappropriate or improper to say that judicial power of the State can be conferred on the hierarchy of courts established under the Constitution as well as on tribunals which are not courts strictly so-called. Indeed, the fact that Article 136(1) refers to courts and tribunals and makes the determination, sentence or order passed by them subject to appeal to this Court by special leave, shows that our Constitution assumes that judicial power of the State can be vested in and exercised by both courts and tribunals alike. We have already seen that the function discharged by courts and tribunals mentioned in Article 136(1) is essentially the same, though the nature of the questions entrusted to their jurisdiction, the procedure required to be followed by them, and the extent and character of their powers may be different.

28. As a result of the rigid separation of powers on which the Australian Constitution is based, questions which arise for decision of courts in Australia take a very different form. Let us refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Shell Company of Australia, Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931 AC 275] by way of illustration. In that case, the Privy Council had to consider whether the Board of Review created by Section 41 of the Federal Income Tax Assessment Act, 1922-1925, to review the decisions of the Commissioner of Taxation, and whose members are to hold office for seven years, is a court exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth within the meaning of Section 71 of the Constitution of Australia. If the answer had been in the affirmative, the amending section by which the Board of Review was constituted, would have been invalid because of the provisions of Section 71 of the Australian Constitution. The Privy Council however, examined the functions of the Board and its powers and considered the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Taxation Act and came to the conclusion that the Board of Review was not a court and stood in the same position as the Commissioner. It was observed that the orders of the Board of Review were not made conclusive for any purpose whatsoever, and that the decisions of the Board were made the equivalent of the decision of the Commissioner. In dealing with the status of the Board in the context of the requirements of Section 71 of the Australian Constitution, Lord Sankey L.C. observed that "the authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a court which, nevertheless, are not courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power" (p. 296). It is in this connection that Lord Sankey referred to certain attributes of courts which he characterised as trappings. The negative propositions which he enunciated by reference to these trappings, indicate that the presence of the trappings would not make the Board a court and would not lead to the inference that the judicatory power exercised by tribunals was judicial power which courts alone can exercise. It would thus be noticed that the reference to the trappings was intended to show that the presence of the trappings does not alter the character of the tribunal, the decisive test being that judicial power under the Australian Constitution can be conferred only on courts and not on tribunals. When we refer to tribunals in dealing with the problem posed by Article 136(1), it is necessary to bear in mind the context in which Lord Sankey referred to these trappings.

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30. We have referred to these two decisions only for the purpose of emphasising the fact that the technical considerations which flow from the strict and rigid separation of powers, would not be applicable in dealing with the question about the status of Respondent 2 by reference to Article 136(1) of our Constitution. The use of the expression "judicial power" in the context, cannot be characterised as constitutionally impermissible or inappropriate, because our Constitution does not provide, as does Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, that judicial power can be conferred only on courts properly so-called. If such a consideration was relevant and material, then it would no doubt, be inappropriate to say that certain authorities or bodies which are given the power to deal with disputes between parties and finally determine them, are tribunals because the judicial power of the State has been statutorily transferred to them. In that case, the more appropriate expression to use would be that the powers which they exercise are quasi-judicial in character, and tribunals appointed under such a scheme of rigid separation of powers cannot be held to discharge the same judicial function as the courts. However, these considerations are, strictly speaking, in-applicable to the Indian Constitution, because though it is based on a broad separation of powers, there is no rigidity or exclusiveness involved in it as under Section 71 as well as other provisions of Chapter III of the Australian Constitution; and so, it would not be inappropriate to say that the main test in determining the status of any authority in the context of Article 136(1) is whether or not inherent judicial power of the State has been transferred to it.

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34. In this connection, we may usefully recall the observation made by Lord Haldane in Local Government Board v. Arlidge [(1915) AC 120, 120] . Said Lord Haldane: "My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same". Having regard to the nature of the power conferred on the State Government, it seems to us clear that for reaching a fair and objective decision in the dispute brought before it in its appellate jurisdiction, the State Government has the power to devise its own procedure and to exercise such other incidental and subsidiary powers as may be necessary to deal effectively with the dispute. We are, therefore, satisfied that the State Government which exercises its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) of the Rules is a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1); and so, the present appeal brought before this Court against the impugned appellate order passed by Respondent 2, is competent. In the result, the preliminary objection raised by Mr Goyal fails and must be rejected.

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44. An authority other than a court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the authority can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on the materials before it and by application of the relevant law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article 136. It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals.

45. The word "tribunal" finds place in Article 227 of the Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the same meaning as in Article 136.

46. Now, the question is whether the State Government deciding an appeal under Rule 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952 (hereafter referred to as the Service Rules) is a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution. The State Government made the Service Rules in exercise of its rule-making power under Section 112 read with Section 49(2) of the Factories Act, 1947. The Service Rules relate to the qualifications and conditions of service of a Welfare Officer in a factory and are well within the rule-making power. Rule 6 of the Service Rules prescribes the conditions of service of a Welfare Officer. Sub-rule (1) and (2) of Rule 6 provide that the Welfare Officer must have the appropriate status corresponding to the status of other executive heads of the factory, and his conditions of service shall be the same as of other members of the staff of corresponding status in the factory. Sub-rule (3) empowers the management to impose on the Welfare Officer one or more of the following punishments viz. (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increments including stoppage at an efficiency bar; (iii) reduction to a lower stage in a time scale; (iv) suspension; and (v) dismissal or termination of service in any other manner. The first proviso to sub-rule (3) provides that no order of punishment shall be passed against the Welfare Officer unless he has been informed of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The second proviso to sub-rule (3) imposes the further safeguard that the management cannot impose any punishment on him other than censure except with the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner, Punjab. Sub-rule (4-) provides that before passing orders on a reference under the last proviso, the Labour Commissioner shall give the Welfare Officer an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action, and, if necessary, may hear the parties in person. Sub-rule (5) provides that if the Labour Commissioner refuses to give his concurrence, the management may appeal to the State Government within thirty days from the date of the receipt of such refusal. Sub-rule (6) provides that the Welfare Officer upon whom the punishment of dismissal or termination of service is imposed may appeal to the State Government against the order of punishment within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the order by him. The decision of the State Government under both sub-rules (5) and (6) is made final and binding. Sub-rule (7) empowers the State Government to pass such interim orders as may be necessary pending the decision of the appeal filed under sub-rule (5) or sub-rule (6). If the management imposes a punishment without making a reference to the Labour Commissioner and without obtaining his concurrence, the order of the management is a nullity and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone on an appeal by the Welfare Officer under sub-rule (6). On the other hand, if the action of the management does not amount to a punishment, an appeal under sub-rule (6) is incompetent and is liable to be dismissed on that ground.

47. On an appeal under sub-rule (6), the dispute is whether the action of the management amounts to a punishment and if so, whether the punishment should be imposed. The dispute concerns the civil rights of the management and the Welfare Officer. The State Government is empowered to decide this dispute between the two contending parties. Since the State Government is empowered to give a decision, it may either confirm the punishment or set it aside and pass consequential orders such as an order of reinstatement. As a matter of fact, in the instant case the State Government passed an order of reinstatement. By the express words of sub-rule (6) of Rule 6, the decision of the State Government is made final and binding. The appellate decision conclusively determines the rights of the contending parties with regard to the matter in controversy between them. The appellate function and the power of conclusive determination of the civil rights of the parties with regard to matters in controversy between them indicate that the State Government is under a duty to act judicially and to decide the dispute solely by ascertaining the facts on the materials before it and by the application of the relevant law on the point. As the rule does not prescribe any procedure for the hearing of the appeal, the State Government may devise its own procedure consistently with its judicial duty. Normally, the State Government has the advantage of enquiries with regard to the subject-matter of the dispute at two previous stages viz. once by the management under sub-rule (3) and again by the Labour Commissioner under sub-rule (4). The State Government may also call upon the parties to make their representations in writing, at the appellate stage. As a matter of fact, in this case the parties were asked to make representations, and they did so. On ascertaining the relevant facts, the State Government may decide whether having regard to the relevant law viz. the ordinary law of master and servant as modified by the industrial law, the action of the management amounts to a punishment, and if so, whether such punishment should be imposed. A consideration of all these matters shows that the State Government deciding an appeal under Rule 6(6) of the Service Rules is vested with the judicial powers of the State, and satisfies the test of a tribunal as contemplated by Article 136 of the Constitution. It follows that the preliminary objection that the appeal under Article 136 does not lie, must be rejected."

He has also placed reliance upon paragraph(s) 67 to 73 of the judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Haji Manzoor Ahmed and another Versus State reported in AIR 1970 Allahabad page 467, the same are as under:-

"67. The respondents say that the aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court must be confined to authorities which are tribunals within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the requirement that the reasons should be stated proceeds upon the consideration that the impugned order is open to appeal to the Supreme Court and that the omission to state the reasons precludes the Supreme Court from effectively exercising its jurisdiction. The contention, in my opinion, is not well founded. From M.P. Industries Ltd. [A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671.] onward, the Supreme Court, it seems to me, placed the necessity for giving reasons on two broad grounds. The first arose out of the need to exclude or minimize arbitrariness on the part of the authority making the order, and the second arose upon the need to make the order amenable to effective judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court. It does appear that in some of its decisions, especially Bhagat Raja [A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1606.] , the Supreme Court laid emphasis almost entirely on the second of the two grounds. The two grounds may also be said to be inter-related, in the sense that the second is intended to achieve the object underlying the first. But I am inclined to the view that even if the order is not open to appeal to the Supreme Court it is necessary that it should state its reasons. It may be that the authority is not a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1) of the Constitution. That I believe, makes little difference. What is relevant, I think, is that the order is made in the exercise of a quasi judicial jurisdiction. As regards such an order, the party against whom it is made is entitled to know the reasons upon which it has been made. And that is apart from the consideration that it enables him to challenge the order in appeal before the Supreme Court. The need for disclosing reasons in quasi judicial orders arises from the ancient maxim integrated into our judicial system, that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. It is a principle arising out of the recognition that judicial tribunals must inspire public confidence and safeguard against the suspicion of arbitrariness and partiality. That is an objective which, speaking for myself, I consider to be an essential condition to the functioning of all courts and tribunals, judicial or quasi judicial. It is the glory of the rule of law that it is founded upon reasons. And reasons as opposed to arbitrary when distinguishes the rule of law from the rule of men.

68. But even if, as the respondents contend, the pronouncements of the Supreme Court mentioned above must be confined to tribunals within the meaning of Art. 136(1) of the Constitution I have no hesitation in holding that the State Government exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 7-F of the Act is such a tribunal.

69. It was at one time recognised as settled law that a tribunal falls within the ambit of Art. 136(1) if it derives authority from the sovereign power of the State and if it is invested with any part of the judicial functions of the State as distinct from purely administrative or executive functions if it further enjoys the "trappings of a court." That was the view expressed in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. [A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188.] and later in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh [A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 241.] . It was reiterated in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand [A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 677.] .

70. In Jaswant Sugar Mills [A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 677.] the Supreme Court examined the question whether a Conciliation Officer, who was empowered under clause 29 of a Government Order under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act to grant permission to an employer to alter the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen during a pending dispute or to discharge or punish them during such dispute, was a tribunal for the purposes of Art. 136(1). The Supreme Court referred to the absence of "the trappings of a court" in the Consiliation Officer. It pointed out that he was not required to sit in public, no formal pleadings were contemplated before him, and he was not expowered to compel the attendance of witnesses nor restricted in making an enquiry to evidence which the parties brought before him. He was not capable of delivering an effective judgment or an award effecting the rights of the parties. He was not invested with powers similar to those of the civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure for enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, compelling production of documents, issuing commissions for the examination of the witnesses and other matters. These considerations prevailed with the Supreme Court in holding that the Conciliation Officer was not a tribunal. But since then the law declared by the Supreme Court has taken a wider sweep. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. [A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1595 at p. 1606 (paragraph 33).] the Supreme Court explained that the presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not a decisive consideration, that the main and the basic test was

"Whether the adjudicating power, which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred upon it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in dis-charging its judicial function." It held that applying this test, the State Government, deciding an appeal under sub-rules (5) and (6) of Rule 6 of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules (1952) was a tribunal. It pointed out that the judicial power of the State

"... has been conferred on the State Government by a statutory Rule and it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its Welfare Officers. Where is, in that sense, a lis there is affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the State Government ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding. Besides, it is an order passed on appeal."

71. Now, an order made by the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act has been held by the Supreme Court in Lala Shri Bhagwan [1965 A.L.J. 353.] to effect the rights of the landlord and the tenant. Sec. 3(1) confers upon the tenant a statutory immunity against eviction in the absence of the grounds specified in the sub-section and of permission from the District Magistrate to sue for ejectment. The right of the tenant to that statutory immunity is the subject of proceedings before the District Magistrate and the Commissioner under Sec. 3 of the Act and before the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act. The jurisdiction exercised by each of these authorities partakes of the same nature. It was pointed out in Lala Shri Bhagwan [1965 A.L.J. 353.] that there was a lis between the landlord and the tenant in those proceedings, and there can be little doubt that the order of the State Government under Sec. 7-F is binding between the parties and finally adjudicates upon the right of the tenant to statutory immunity against eviction. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the State Government is of a revisional character. It may be mentioned that when considering the relevant provisions of Sec. 3 and Sec. 7-F of the Act in Lala Shri Bhagwan [1965 A.L.J. 353.] the Supreme Court expressly referred to its decision in the Associated Cement Companies [A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1595 at p. 1606 (paragraph 33).] . I am of opinion that the test laid down in the latter case for determining whether a body is a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1) of the Constitution is fully satisfied by the State Government acting under Sec. 7-F of the Act.

72. At this stage, I may refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nandram Hanatram, Calcutta v. Union of India [A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1922.] where the argument was rejected that the impugned order was bad because no reasons were stated. That decision was explained later by the Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India [A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1606.] in the following terms:

"...... it was plain as a pike-staff that the State Government had no alternative but to cancel the lease; the absence of any reasons in the order on review could not possibly leave anybody in doubt as to whether (what the?) reasons were. As a matter of fact in the setting of facts, the reasons were so obvious that it was not necessary to set them out. There is nothing in this decision which is contrary to 1966-1 S.C.R. 466: (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671) (supra). What the decision says is that the reasons for the action of the state were so obvious that it was not necessary, on the facts of the case, to repeat them in the order of the Central Government.

73. The question converged to a sharp focus before the Supreme Court in M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of Indian [A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671.] , Subba Rao, J. explained the necessity for disclosing reasons in a quasi judicial order. In the case before it the Central Government had rejected a revision application under Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1955. He observed:

".... Our Constitution posits a welfare State ................................................................... In the context of a welfare State; administrative tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they are the necessary concomitants of a welfare State. But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself. Self-discipline and supervision exclude or at any rate minimize arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness; It gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory Court to keep the tribunals within bounds. A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal.

The conception of exercise of revisional jurisdiction and the manner of disposal provided in R. 55 of the Rules, are indicative of the scope and nature of the Government's jurisdiction. If Tribunals can make order without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are to be given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard.

Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of All Party Hill Leaders Conference Vs. Captain W.A. Sangma reported in (1977) 4 SCC 161. Paragraphs referred are as under:-

23. The earliest decision of this Court as to the ambit of Article 136(1) with reference to the order of a tribunal came up for consideration in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. [AIR 1950 SC 188 : (1950) 1 SCR 459 : 950 Lab LJ 21] . The question whether an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was a tribunal within the scope of Article 136 was raised in that case. By majority the Constitution Bench of this Court held that the Industrial Tribunal was a tribunal for the purpose of Article 136. Having regard to the scheme of Article 136, this Court was not prepared to place a narrow interpretation on the amplitude of Article 136. This Court observed at p. 476/478 of the Report as follows:

"As pointed out in picturesque language by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931 AC 275] , there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. It seems to me that such tribunals though they are not full-fledged Courts, yet exercise quasi-judicial functions and are within the ambit of the word ''tribunal' in Article 136 of the Constitution.

Tribunals which do not derive authority from the sovereign power cannot fall within the ambit of Article 136. The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136 is that it should be constituted by the State. Again a tribunal would be outside the ambit of Article 136 if it is not invested with any part of the judicial functions of the State but discharges purely administrative or executive duties. Tribunals, however, which are found invested with certain functions of a Court of justice and have some of its trappings also would fall within the ambit of Article 136 ....

Then after four years, B.K. Mukerjea, J. (as he then was) who was one of the dissenting Judges in Bharat Bank, true to judicial discipline, spoke for the unanimous Court in the Constitution Bench in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh [AIR 1954 SC 520 : (1955) 1 SCR 267] in the following words:

24. The basic principle laid down in the Bharat Bank has not been departed from by this Court and has been reiterated in several later decisions (see J.K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur [AIR 1956 SC 231 : (1955) 2 SCR 1315 : (1956) 1 Lab LJ 227] ; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala [AIR 1961 SC 1669 : (1962) 2 SCR 339 : (1961) 31 Com Cas 387] ; Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmichand [AIR 1963 SC 677 : 1963 Supp 1 SCR 242 : 1963 Lab LJ 524] ; Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay [AIR 1963 SC 874 : 1963 Supp 1 SCR 625 : (1962) 2 Lab LJ 760] ; and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v.P.N. Sharma [AIR 1965 SC 1595 : (1965) 2 SCR 366 : (1965) 1 Lab LJ 433] ).

25. From a conspectus of the above decisions it will be seen that several tests have been laid down by this Court to determine whether a particular body or authority is a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136. The tests are not exhaustive in all cases. It is also well-settled that all the tests laid down may not be present in a given case. While some tests may be present others may be lacking. It is, however, absolutely necessary that the authority in order to come within the ambit of Article 136(1) as tribunal must be constituted by the State and invested with some function of judicial power of the State. This particular test is an unfailing one while some of the other tests may or may not be present at the same time.

26. It will be profitable to refer to an illuminating decision of the Constitution Bench in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. The question that was raised for decision in that case was as to whether the State Government of Punjab exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6 of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, was a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1) of the Constitution. Section 49(2) of the Factories Act, 1948, provides that the State Government may prescribe the duties, qualifications and conditions of service of Welfare Officers employed in a factory. The State Government framed the Rules under Section 49(2) of the Factories Act and Rule 6(6) provides that a Welfare Officer upon whom a punishment is imposed may appeal to the State Government against the order of punishment and the decision of the State Government shall be final and binding. It is against a certain order passed by the State Government under Rule 6(6) that the company came to this Court by special leave and an objection was raised that the State Government exercising power under Rule 6(6) was not a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1). The objection was repelled in the following words:

"Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the courts one common characteristic; both the courts and the tribunals are ''constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions'. [Vide Durga Shanker Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh]. They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign Stated.

But as we already stated, the consideration about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possesses the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The main and the basic test however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State Government exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) is a part of the State's judicial power. It has been conferred on the State Government by a statutory Rule and it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense, a lis; there is affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the State Government ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding. Besides, it is an order passed on appeal. Having regard to these distinctive features of the power conferred on the State Government by Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6). we feel no hesitation in holding that it is a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1).

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36. The question which we are required to resolve is as to the character of the Commission in adjudicating this dispute with regard to recognition of APHLC as a continuing recognised political party in the State of Meghalaya. It appears that out of 121 members of the Conference 81 had decided by majority that APHLC stood dissolved and these members joined the INC. Forty members had opposed the move to dissolve the party and actually stayed away from the Conference when the resolution to dissolve the party was passed. That has led to the dispute as to whether, notwithstanding the majority resolution in the Conference, the APHLC could still continue as a recognised political party in the State of Meghalaya for the purpose of allotment of the reserved symbol.

37. There is thus a lis between two groups of the Conference. The Commission is undoubtedly the specified and exclusive adjudicating authority of this lis. The Commission is created by the Constitution and the power to adjudicate the dispute flows from Article 324 as well as from Rule 5 and is thus conferred under the law as a fraction of judicial power of the State. The Commission has prescribed its own procedure in the Symbols Order, namely, to give a hearing to the parties when there is a dispute with regard to recognition or regarding choice of symbols. Para 15 of the Symbols Order makes specific reference to the procedure to be adopted by the Commission in hearing like disputes and it is required to take into account all the available facts and circumstances of the case and to hear such representatives of the sections or the groups and other persons as desire to be heard. The decision of the Commission under para 15 shall be binding on all rival sections or groups in the party. The Commission has followed, and if we may say so, rightly, this very procedure laid down in para 15 in adjudicating the present dispute although the same may not be a dispute contemplated under this paragraph. The dispute with which the Commission was concerned in the present case was a dispute of more serious nature than that which may be envisaged between two rival sections of a political party or between two splinter groups of the same party claiming to be the party, since the respondents' claim, here, was to annihilate the party beyond recognition and for good. When, therefore, the Commission has laid down a reasonable procedure in the Symbols Order in dealing with such a dispute, it was incumbent upon the Commission to choose the same procedure, as, indeed, it actually did, in adjudicating the present dispute. If the Commission were not specially required under the law to resolve this dispute within the framework of the scheme contemplated under Article 324 read with the Rules supplemented by the Symbols Order, the parties would have been required to approach the ordinary courts of law for determination of their legal rights with regard to their recognition or de-recognition. Since, however, a special machinery has been set up under the law relating to this matter and the same has to be decided with promptitude, the State's power of adjudicating such a dispute has been conferred upon the Election Commission in this behalf. It is true that the Election Commission has various administrative functions but that does not mean that while adjudicating a dispute of this special nature it does not exercise the judicial power conferred on it by the State.

38. To repeat, the power to decide this particular dispute is a part of the State's judicial power and that power is conferred on the Election Commission by Article 324 of the Constitution as also by Rule 5 of the Rules. The principal and non-failing test which must be present in order to determine whether a body or authority is a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136(1), is fulfilled in this case when the Election Commission is required to adjudicate a dispute between two parties, one group asserting to be the recognised political party of the State and the other group controverting the proposition before it, but at the same time not laying any claim to be that party. The fact that the decision is not relevant immediately for the purpose of a notified election and that disputes regarding property rights belonging to the party may be canvassed in civil courts or in other appropriate proceedings, is not of consequence in determination of the present question.

39. It is true that Rule 5(2) and sub-rules (4), (5) and (6) of Rule 10 relate to an election which has been notified under Rule 3 of the Rules. That, however, does not detract from the position that under Rule 5(1), the Election Commission is empowered to specify symbols in general terms and also the restrictions to which the choice of symbols will be subjected. As stated earlier, Rule 5 is in Part II of the Rules under the title "General Provisions". The conferment of judicial power of the State on the Commission in the matter of adjudication of the dispute of the nature with which we are concerned clearly flows from Rule 5(1) read with Article 324 of the Constitution.

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42. Thus the position that emerges from the above discussion is that the Commission is created under the Constitution and is invested under the law with not only administrative powers but also with certain judicial power of the State, however fractional it may be. The Commission exclusively resolves disputes, inter alia, between rival parties with regard to claims for being a recognised political party for the purpose of the electoral symbol.

43. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the Commission fulfils the essential tests of a tribunal and falls squarely within the ambit of Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled.

Further, reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by the State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Assn., (2012) 10 SCC 353 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1229 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 35 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 56 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 874 at page 365. Paragraphs referred are as under:-

18. Tribunals have primarily been constituted to deal with cases under special laws and to hence provide for specialised adjudication alongside the courts. Therefore, a particular Act/set of rules will determine whether the functions of a particular tribunal are akin to those of the courts, which provide for the basic administration of justice. Where there is a lis between two contesting parties and a statutory authority is required to decide such dispute between them, such an authority may be called as a quasi-judicial authority i.e. a situation where, (a) a statutory authority is empowered under a statute to do any act; (b) the order of such authority would adversely affect the subject; and (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties, and the contest is between the authority and the subject; and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is a quasi-judicial decision. An authority may be described as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a "court", but not all. In case certain powers under CPC or CrPC have been conferred upon an authority, but it has not been entrusted with the judicial powers of State, it cannot be held to be a court. (See Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees [AIR 1950 SC 188] , Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 153 : 1956 Cri LJ 326] , Engg. Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. [AIR 1963 SC 874] , Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma [AIR 1965 SC 1595] , Rama Rao v. Narayan [(1969) 1 SCC 167 : AIR 1969 SC 724] , State of H.P. v. Mahendra Pal [(1999) 4 SCC 43 : AIR 1999 SC 1786] , Keshab Narayan Banerjee v. State of Bihar [(2000) 1 SCC 607 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 272] , Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158] , K. Shamrao v. Asstt. Charity Commr. [(2003) 3 SCC 563] , Trans Mediterranean Airways v. Universal Exports [(2011) 10 SCC 316 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 148] , SCC p. 338, para 53 and Namit Sharma v. Union of India [(2013) 1 SCC 745] .)

19. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala [AIR 1961 SC 1669] Hidayatullah, J. (as His Lordship then was) made a distinction between a "court" and a "tribunal" as is explained hereunder: (AIR p. 1680, para 32)

"32. ... These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary courts of civil judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to courts, but are not courts. When the Constitution speaks of ''courts' in Article 136, 227 or 228 or in Articles 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates courts of civil judicature but not tribunals other than such courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions in Articles 136 and 227.

By ''courts' is meant courts of civil judicature and by ''tribunals', those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary courts of civil judicature."

20. To explain the distinction between a court and tribunal, His Lordship further relied upon the judgment in Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commr. of Taxation [1931 AC 275 : 1930 All ER Rep 671 (PC)] wherein it has been observed as under: (AC p. 297)

"In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject: (1) A tribunal is not necessarily a court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. (2) Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. (3) Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. (4) Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. (5) Nor because there is an appeal to a court. (6) Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body."

21. The present case is also required to be examined in the context of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, with specific reference to the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, where the expression "court" stood by itself, and not in juxtaposition with the other expression used therein, namely, "tribunal". The power of the High Court of judicial superintendence over the tribunals, under the amended Article 227 stood obliterated. By way of the amendment in clause (1), the words "and tribunals" stood deleted and the words "subject to its appellate jurisdiction" have been substituted after the words "all courts". In other words, this amendment purports to take away the High Court's power of superintendence over tribunals. Moreover, the High Court's power has been restricted to have judicial superintendence only over judgments of inferior courts i.e. judgments in cases where against the same appeal or revision lies with the High Court. A question does arise as regards whether the expression "courts" as it appears in the amended Article 227, is confined only to the regular civil or criminal courts that have been constituted under the hierarchy of courts and whether all tribunals have in fact been excluded from the purview of the High Court's superintendence. Undoubtedly, all courts are tribunals but all tribunals are not courts.

22.The High Court's power of judicial superintendence, even under the amended provisions of Article 227 is applicable, provided that two conditions are fulfilled; firstly, such tribunal, body or authority must perform judicial functions of rendering definitive judgments having finality, which bind the parties in respect of their rights, in the exercise of the sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State, and secondly, such tribunal, body or authority should be the subject to the High Court's appellate or revisional jurisdiction.

Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Aidal Singh Vs. Karan Singh reported in AIR 1957 All 414 (FB). Paragraphs referred are as under:-

74. In this connection reference might be made to the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 233] in which their Lord ships of the Supreme Court held that the court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. It is significant to note that their Lordships of the Supreme Court characterised the power under Article 226 merely as a supervisory power and not a power of superintendence. The word "Superintendence" in Lyer's Law Lexicon means "the act of superintending, care and oversight, for the purpose of direction, and with authority to direct." In Murray's New English Dictionary, Vol. IX (1919 Edition) meaning No. I of the word ''superintend' is given as follows:--

"1. Trans, to have or exercise the charge or direction of (operations or affairs); to look after, oversee, supervise the working or management of (an institution, etc.)

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78. The most marked difference between Article 226 and Article 227 consists in the method of approach that the Court would adopt in the two cases. Thus, the court V would not act under Article 226 unless there is a breach of some fundamental or other legal right of the party concerned. As observed by his Lordship Kania, C.J. in a decision of the Supreme Court reported in The State of Orissa v. Gopal Rungta [A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 12 (O)] " .... the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under this Article". Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. The Union of India [A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41] also contains observation to the same effect. Both under Art. 226 as well as under Art. 32 which are the two Articles relating to writ powers, the Court acts for the endorcement of legal rights. The only difference is that whereas under Art. 32 the endorsement of rights is confined to fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution, the enforcement of rights under Article 226 is not confined to fundamental rights only, but extends to other legal rights as well. On the other hand, while acting under Article 227, the court is not so much concerned with the enforcement of the legal rights of the parties as with the discharge of its own obligation irrespective of the rights of the parties. As observed in Jodhey v. Stated in reference to clause (1) of Article 227.

"There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned there."

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101. Even prior to the Constitution, the English theory of inherent power was held to be not applicable to India. In Pashupati Bharti v. Secretary of State [1938 (A.I.R.) Federal Court 1] their Lordships of the Federal Court while discussing the nature of the power of superintendence possessed by the Indian High Court made the following significant observations:--

"Nor is any support for the theory of an inherent power to be found in the analogy of the revisional and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts in British India. That jurisdiction is entirely a creature of statute, e.g. S. 224 of the Act of 1935 and Sec. 115, Civil P.C. Outside the statutory provisions no High Court has any inherent powers of revision over the Subordinate Courts within its jurisdiction, such for example as the court of King's Bench in England has for centuries exercised over courts inferior to itself."

Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651at page 706. Paragraphs referred are as under:-

98. But then is the Speaker or the Chairman acting under Paragraph 6(1) a Tribunal? "All tribunals are not courts, though all courts are tribunals". The word "courts" is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the Administration of Justice. By Administration of Justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. (See Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala [(1962) 2 SCR 339 : AIR 1961 SC 1669 : (1961) 31 Comp Cas 387] ). In that case Hidayatullah, J. said: (SCR p. 362)

"... By ''courts' is meant courts of civil judicature and by ''tribunals', those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary courts of civil judicature. Their procedures may differ but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that the courts have ''an air of detachment'. But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. Many tribunals, in recent years, have acquitted themselves so well and with such detachment as to make this test insufficient."

99. Where there is a lis -- an affirmation by one party and denial by another -- and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the rights and obligations of the parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an exercise of judicial power. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a Court. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma [(1965) 2 SCR 366 : AIR 1965 SC 1595 : (1965) 1 LLJ 433] this Court said: (SCR pp. 386-87)

"... The main and the basic test however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State Government exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) is a part of the State's judicial power.... There is, in that sense, a lis; there is affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it. The order which the State Government ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding."

100. By these well known and accepted tests of what constitute a Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman, acting under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal.

Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram Vs. Radhikabai reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 401. Paragraphs referred are as under:-

108. For the reasons aforesaid it must be held that the Full Bench case of Shanker Naroba Salunke v. Gyanchand Lobhachand Kothari [ Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 3, 10, 11 and 17 of 1979 of 1979 of 1980, decided on September 3, 1980] was wrongly decided except for the conclusion reached by the Full Bench that no appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court against the judgment of a Single Judge of that High Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution but not the reasons given by the Full Bench for reaching this particular conclusion. Accordingly, the said Full Bench decision is hereby overruled to the extent mentioned above and the view taken by the Special Bench in State of Maharashtra v. Kusum [(1981) 83 Bom LR 75 : 1981 Mah LJ 93] is approved.

Before coming to conclusion on the issue of maintainability of the present petition, it would be appropriate to consider Section 41 of the Act of 1973, which reads as under:-

"41. Control by State Government.-

(1) The [Authority),the Chairman or the (Vice-Chairman] shall carry out such directions as may be issued to it from time to time by the State Government for the efficient administration of this Act.

(2) If in, or in connection with, the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions by the [Authority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman) under this Act any dispute arises between the authority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman) and the State Government the decision of the State Government on such dispute shall be final.

(3) The State Government may, at any time, either on its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call for the records of any case disposed of or order passed by the [Authority or the Chairman) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legalitv or propriety of any order passed or direction issued and may pass such order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit:

Provided that the State Government shall not pass an order prejudicial to any person without affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(4) Every order of the State Government made in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court."

Section 12 of U.P. Industrial Development Area Act, being referred is also to be taken note, which reads as under:-

12. Applications of certain provisions of President's Act XI of 1973. - The provisions of Chapter VII and Sections 30, 32, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53 and 58 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, as re-enacted and modified by the Uttar Pradesh President's Act (Re-enactment with Modifications) Act, 1974, shall mutatis mutandis, apply to the Authority with adaptation that-

(a) any reference to the aforesaid Act shall be deemed to be a reference to this Act;

(b) any reference to the Authority constituted under the aforesaid Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the Authority constituted under this Act; and

(c) any reference to the Vice-Chairman of the Authority shall be deemed to be a reference to the Chief Executive Officer of the Authority.

In Section 12 of Act of 1976, certain provisions including Section 41 of Act of 1973, have been referred and about the provisions of Act of 1973 mentioned, this Section says that the same shall mutatis mutandis, apply to the authority with adaption as mentioned in Section 12 of the Act of 1976 itself. Thus, undisputedly any decision/order of the 'Authority' or "Chief Executive Officer" under the Act of 1976 can be assailed before the State Government under Section 41 of the Act of 1973.

Now coming to Section 41 of the Act of 1973, particularly Sub Section 3 of Section 41. The language used in the Sub Section 3 is similar to the language used in Section 397 of Cr.P.C. and Section 115 of CPC, as applicable in State of U.P., which confers revisional power upon the Sessions/District court and High Court. A plain reading of the provisions show that the State Government has the power to call for the records of any case disposed of or order passed by 'Authority' or 'the Chairman' either on its own motion or on an application made to it in this behalf for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed or direction issued and may pass such order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit. Therefore, the State Government can exercise the power under Sub Section 3 of Section 41 in relation to (i) any case disposed of by the Authority or Chairman, (ii) Order passed by authority and (iii) order passed by the Chairman.

Further, it reflects from the proviso to Sub Section 3 of Section 41 that it is mandatory for State Government to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the person concerned before passing an adverse order, in exercise of power conferred of Section 41 of the Act of 1973, against such person.

It would be relevant to observe that the 'Forum' under Sub Section 3 of Section 41 of the Act of 1973, has been created by the State for speedy redressal of grievance(s) of person aggrieved.

In the judgment passed in the case of T.C.Basappa Vs. T.Nagappa and another reported in AIR 1954 SC 440. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

"7. One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of certiorari, is, that the writ can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression "judicial acts" includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministerial acts. Atkin, L.J. thus summed up the law on this point in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [(1924) 1 KB 171 at 205]:

"Whenever anybody or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs."

Thus, considering the aforesaid, this Court holds that the State Government while exercising power under Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973, does not perform purely ministerial acts and it has to exercise the power conferred upon it under this Section, judicially.

Considering the aforesaid including the judgments referred hereinabove, this Court is of the view that in this case for determining that as to whether an "Authority" i.e. "State Government" is a "Tribunal" or not, as in this case the power of State Government under Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973 is in issue, which is as per above observations of this Court is revisional power, the basic test(s)/parameter(s) can be summarized as under:

(a) That the power of adjudication should be conferred on the concerned 'Authority' by a statute.

(b) That such adjudicating power is the part of State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function.

(c) That the 'Authority' concerned is under obligation to act judicially.

(d) That the decision of the 'Authority' on the 'lis' before it is binding between the parties and final.

In this case, the power of adjudication is conferred upon 'State Government' by the statute, the 'State Government' is under obligation to act judicially and is also required to follow principle of natural justice, as appears from the proviso to Sub Section 3 of Section 41 of the Act of 1973, the State Government in this Sub Section decides the lis between the parties and decision of 'State Government', as per Sub Section 4 of Section 41 is binding and final. Thus, all test(s)/ parameter(s), aforesaid, are satisfied and being so it is held that the 'State Government' under Section 41 Sub Clause 3 of the Act of 1973, is a 'Tribunal'.

It would be appropriate to refer Article 227 of Constitution of India, which reads as under:-

"227. [(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.]

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may--

(a) call for returns from such courts;

(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and

(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.

(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.

In the case of Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commr., Union Territory of Chandigarh, reported in 1984 Supp SCC 540 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 269 at page 545 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

"7. The High Court declined to grant any relief on the ground that an aided school is not "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution and is therefore not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court clearly overlooked the point that Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner are statutory authorities operating under the 1969 Act. They are quasi-judicial authorities and that was not disputed. Therefore, they will be comprehended in the expression ''Tribunal' as used in Article 227 of the Constitution which confers power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals by the High Court throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Obviously, therefore, the decision of the statutory quasi-judicial authorities which can be appropriately described as tribunal will be subject to judicial review namely a writ of certiorari by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The decision questioned before the High Court was of the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner exercising powers under Section 3 of the 1969 Act. And these statutory authorities are certainly amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court."

From the Article 227 of Constitution of India as also the judgments referred in this judgment it is apparent that "Tribunal" is under supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, which should be exercised within the restriction and limitations explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various pronouncements. In brief, the power should be exercised to correct the errors of jurisdiction and not to upset pure prior findings of facts, as the High Court exercising the power/jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India, is not an appellate authority.

Thus, for all the reasons recorded hereinbefore, this Court is of the view that present petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India, is maintainable before this Court. As such the objection pointed out by the Registry of this Court that "Proper group is Miscellaneous Bench U/A 226 as revision petition mentioned in prayer is pending before administrative Body", is thus overruled.

After holding aforesaid, the court feels it appropriate to refer certain pronouncements, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the jurisdiction and power of this Court while considering a petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India.

In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after examining the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution, observed as under:--

"This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, 1951 AIR (Cal) 193 to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors."

In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the context of the scope, power and jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, observed as under:

"20. We are also of opinion that the Election Tribunals are subject to the superintendence of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution, and that that superintendence is both judicial and administrative. That was held by this Court in ''Waryam Singh v. Amarnath', AIR 1954 SC 215 (K) , where it was observed that in this respect Article 227 went further than section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the superintendence was purely administrative, and that it restored the position under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It may also be noted that while in a ''certiorari' under Article 226 the High Court can only annul the decision of the Tribunal, it can, under Article 227, do that, and also issue further directions in the matter. We must accordingly hold that the application of the appellant for a writ of ''certiorari' and for other reliefs was maintainable under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

21. Then the question is whether there are proper grounds for the issue of ''certiorari' in the present case. There was considerable argument before us as to the character and scope of the writ of ''certiorari' and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in ''Parry and Co. v.Commercial Employees' Association, Madras', AIR 1952 SC 179 (L):- ''Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.' AIR 1952 SC 192 (M); - ''Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi' AIR 1952 SC 319 (N), and quite recently in AIR 1954 SC 440 (C). On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) ''Certiorari' will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) ''Certiorari' will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of ''certiorari' acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings or fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a superior Court were to re-hear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in ''certiorari." These propositions are well settled and are not in dispute."

In the case of M.L.Sethi Vs. R.P. Kapur, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 427. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

"12. ............ The word "jurisdiction" is a verbal cast of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Baid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 AC 147, namely, the entitlement "to enter upon the enquiry in question". If there was an entitlement to enter upon an inquiry into the question, then any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction. The best known formulation of this theory is that made byLord Denman in R. v. Bolton, (1841) 1 QB 66. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anisminde Ltd., (1969) 2 AC 147 Lord Reid said:

"But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive".

In the same case, Lord Pearce said:

"Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the tribunal may at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening stage while engaged on a proper enquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its inquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fall to make the inquiry which the Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity."

The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords, in the above case would show the extent to which ''lack' and ''excess' of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of "jurisdiction". The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. They comes perilously close to saying that there is a jurisdiction if the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as "basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal", "imposing an unwarranted condition" or "addressing themselves to a wrong question". The majority opinion in the case leaves a Court or Tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only construing the empowering statute which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the Court is prepared to allow in the end it can only be a value judgment (See H.W.R. Wade, "Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anismenic case", Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 85, 1969, P. 198). Why is it that a wrong decision on a question of limitation or res judicata was treated as a jurisdictional error an liable to be interfered with in revision? It is a bit difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or a decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to collateral attack. The reason can only be that the error of law was considered as vital by the Court. And there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the Court."

In the case of Chandrasekhar Singh Vs. Siya Ram Singh, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 118. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

"11. The only other question that remains to be considered is whether an order under Section 146(1B) can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is admitted that the powers conferred on the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution cannot in any way be curtailed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the powers of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution can be invoked in spite of the restrictions placed under Section 146(1D) of the Criminal Procedure Code. But the scope of interference by the High Court under Art. 227 is restricted. This Court has repeatedly held that "the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors vide 1954 S.C.R. 565 (Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath). In a later decision, (Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division, and Appeals, Assam, the view was reiterated and it was held that the power of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, and that under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. In a recent decision, (Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarts (2) this Court reiterated the view stated in the earlier decisions referred to and held that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the Court of appeal and that the High Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 227 convert itself into a court of appeal."

In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim, (1983) 4 SCC 566, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review while exercising such power. The powers can be used sparingly only when High Court comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. It further held that the High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of Tribunal etc. has resulted in grave injustice.

In Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni, (1998) 3 SCC 341, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set the conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could have ever.

In Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (1998) 8 SCC 310, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even if revisional jurisdiction was not available to the High Court, it still have powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the orders so passed by the Tribunal if the finding of fact arrived at was perverse.

In Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd.,(1999) 6 SCC 82, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Court is not to substitute its view for the opinion of Authorities/Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v.Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329, culled out the following principles:

"(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, theHigh Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, ''within the bounds of their authority'.

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very

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doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does notcorrespondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2014) 10 SCC 1, while dealing with the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, held Judicial Review, under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, to be part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. Even earlier, in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, the Court had observed as such. In Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 while holding that orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it further held that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was distinct from the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To this extent, it also overruled its contrary view in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675. In para 28 of the judgment in Radhey Shyam's case, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that: "28. We may also deal with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the view in Surya Dev Rai stands approved by larger Benches in Shail, Mahendra Saree Emporium and Salem Advocate Bar Assn and on that ground correctness of the said view cannot be gone into by this Bench. In Shail, though reference has been made to Surya Dev Rai, the same is only for the purpose of scope of power under Article 227 as is clear from para 3 of the said judgment. There is no discussion on the issue of maintainability of a petition under Article 226. In Mahendra Saree Emporium, reference to Surya Dev Rai is made in para 9 of the judgment only for the proposition that no subordinate legislation can whittle down the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. Similarly, in Salem Bar Assn. in para 40, reference to Surya Dev Rai is for the same purpose. We are, thus, unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent." The aforesaid principles stand reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji v.State of Haryana, (2017) 5 SCC 533. Now, adverting to merits of the case. For the reliefs sought in this petition, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner is invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, being aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondent no. 1 in hearing and deciding statutory revision preferred by the petitioner under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 read with Section 12 of U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. The petitioner in his statutory revision has challenged the order dated 06.03.2018 whereby the respondent no. 2 raised demand for time extension charges and denied the benefit of zero period from 28.10.2013 to 15.08.2015. The petitioner is constrained to approach this Hon'ble Court as the respondent no. 1 has not fixed any date for hearing of the statutory revision till date and the respondent no. 2 is threatening to take coercive measures including a levy of penalty and revocation of the lease related to the plot, which was executed on 12.10.2009 by respondent no. 2 in favour of the petitioner. The total cost of the plot in issue at the time of execution of lease deed was Rs. 1500627787/- out of which 10% had been paid by the petitioner. He also stated that after completion of certain formalities the construction was started over the plot leased out by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the petitioner. However, during the course of raising construction and carrying out the development work over the plot in question, some petitions were filed before Hon'ble National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'NGT') seeking directions to stop construction works undertaken by developers within 10 km. radius of Okhla Bird Sanctuary and on account of certain order passed by NGT, the development work over the plot in question could not be carried out. It is also stated that considering the fact that on account of orders passed by NGT construction work could not be carried out by the developers, the respondent no. 2 framed a policy for declaration of a particular period as 'zero period'. Thereafter, based upon the policy/guidelines for declaring 'zero period', the petitioner made a representation before respondent no. 2, which was rejected in an arbitrary manner vide order dated 06.03.2018 and also issued recovery certificate dated 12.09.2019. He further submitted that in the writ petition 940 of 2017 (Bikram Chatterji and other vs Union of India and others) and others the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the plight of home buyers, state of the real estate and exorbitant rate of interest being imposed by the authorities passed order(s) dated 10.06.2020,10.07.2020 and 19.08.2020 and considering the order(s) passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court the petitioner approached the respondent no. 2 for recalculation of dues in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. When no decision was taken, the petitioner approached the State Government under Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973, by means of filing of revision on 18.10.2021. The order dated 06.03.2018 and recovery certificate 12.09.2021 are in issue before the State Government in pending revision. Other prayer based upon the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have also been sought in the revision. He also stated that revision before the State Government was filed alongwith the applicants for interim relief. However, till date, neither the revision nor the interim relief application has been desposed of by the State Government. Further, submitted that despite of having knowledge of pendency of revision in issue, the authority concerned is adamant to recover the amount as also proceedings for cancellation of lease executed in favour of the petitioner on 12.10.2009 and if the authority concerned succeeds then in that event the revision petition would be rendered infructuous. He submitted that if the revision or application for interim relief is not decided within stipulated time then the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and injury. In these circumstances, the indulgence of this court is required. Learned Counsel for the side opposite could not, on the basis of record, could not dispute the aforesaid factual aspect of the case. Considering the entirety of the case and without entering into the merits of the case, opposite party no.1 i.e. Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Infrastructure and Industrial Development, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow, is directed to decide the interim relief application of the petitioner, after providing proper opportunity of hearing to the parties with expedition, say within a period of three months, from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order, if possible and if there is no other legal impediment. It is also open for opposite party no. 1 to decide the revision petition of the petitioner in the aforesaid period. At this stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that till decision of application for interim relief pending before opposite party no. 1, some protection be provided, as the authority concerned is adamant to take coercive action against the petitioner and in similar circumstances this Court has provided the interim protection, as appears from annexure Nos. 2 to 5, which are the order(s) dated 13.09.2021, 11.02.2019 and 20.09.2021 passed in Matters Under Article 227 No. 4322 of 2021, Writ C No. 4220 of 2019, Writ C No. 23624 of 2019 and Writ C No. 19588 of 2021, respectively. Considering the aforesaid, this Court provides that for a period of three months from today or till the passing of order on interim relief application, which ever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner. The present petition is disposed of finally in the above terms.
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