(Prayer: This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying to quash the order dated 22.03.2019 passed by the Presiding Officer, II Additional Labour Court, Bangalore in Ref No.44/2015 on I.A.No.5 [produced at Annexure-A] and further be pleased to dismiss the I.A.No.5 filed by the respondent [produced at Annexure-K]; and etc.,)1. These petitions involving similar and akin issues, have been heard together and are disposed of by this common order.2. The respondent-Sudhir Brahma was appointed as a Storage Development Principal Engineer with effect from 15.07.2013 by the management – M/s.Dell International Services India Pvt. Ltd. The management terminated the employment of the respondent –workman with effect from 28.01.2015. The respondent raised a dispute before the Labour Commissioner challenging the termination of his employment claiming to be a workman. The Government of Karnataka by its order dated 20.08.2015 has referred an Industrial Dispute to the Labour Court, the respondent filed his claim petition inter alia seeking prayer for setting aside his termination and also sought for reinstating him in his original post with full back wages, continuity of service and all other consequential benefits.3. During the course of trial, the respondent-workman was examined himself as WW-1 on 30.05.2017. After completion of recording the evidence, the deposition print out was handed over to the witness to read and sign to the deposition. It is the contention of the management- M/s. Dell International Services India Pvt. Ltd., that the authorized representative of the management and his counsel had left the court hall while the witness was reading the deposition. Thereafter, the workman had inserted two words i.e., “Original” and “Document” in the said evidence recorded by the Court. Hence, the management has filed an application I.A.No.3 to delete the word “Original” allegedly added at para 47 of the deposition dated 30.05.2017 by the workman.4. Subsequently, the management has filed I.A.No.4 under section 340 of Cr.P.C. and sought for initiation of proceedings against the workman for the commission of offence of fabricating false evidence by manipulating the evidence recorded by the Court. The workman has also filed an application [I.A.No.5] under Section 340 read with Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., and sought to initiate action against Sreekumar Kadawath S/o Sreedhar.H.R. Generalist authorized representative of the petitioner management company for the offences punishable under Sections 199, 200 and 209 of the IPC.5. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court passed an order keeping in abeyance all the pending application with an observation that the pending I.As will be heard along with the main matter and posted the case for further cross-examination. The petitioner filed a memo requesting the Court to pass an order at least on I.A.No.3 for removal of the additions. On hearing on I.A.No.3, the Labour Court disposed of the said I.A holding that the request of the management to delete the word “Original” shall be kept in abeyance since the issue involved in I.A.No4 and I.A.No5 requires to be decided. Being aggrieved by the same, the management has filed W.P.No.30033/2018. This Court vide order dated 27.07.2018 while issuing rule, stayed further proceedings Reference No.44/2015 pending on the file presiding Officer, II Additional Labour Court, Bengaluru until further orders expect on I.A.Nos.4 and 5 and directed the Labour Court to proceed further in the disposal of I.A.Nos.4 and 5 on merits. In compliance with the order passed by this Court, the Labour Court has disposed of I.A.Nos.4 and 5 vide common order dated 22.03.2019. Being aggrieved by the same, w.PNos.23188/2019 and 23189/2019 are filed by the Management.6. Learned counsel for the management would submit that the Labour Court has posted the matter for enquiry on I.A.Nos.4 and 5 by the respective parties after considering the arguments advanced by both the parties. It is contended that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to hold an enquiry under Section 340 read with Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. The Labour Court ought to have referred the matter to the learned Magistrate for enquiry. Learned counsel inviting the attention of this Court to objections filed to I.A.No.4, submitted that the workman has admitted the commission of the offence. It is categorically submitted that the workman and their counsel identified certain errors and on consultation with the management-first party, corrected the same. In such circumstances, it was obligatory on the part of the Labour Court to refer the matter to the learned Magistrate to hold an enquiry in terms of Section 340 of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel placed reliance on the following rulings:1. Pritish V/s State of Maharashtra and Other, [2002] 1 SCC 2532. Amarsang Nathaji, as himself and as Karta and Manager V/s Hardik Harashabhai Patel and Others, [2017] 1 SCC 113.7. Learned counsel appearing for the workman would submit that the Labour Court posted the matter for holding preliminary enquiry on I.A.Nos.4 and 5 in terms of section 340 of Cr.P.C. The Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding the commission of an offence referred to Section 195 [1][b] in each and every case. In order to refer the matter to the learned Magistrate to hold an enquiry under Section 340 of Cr.P.C., a preliminary enquiry has to be conducted by the Court to hold that it is expedient in the interest of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195[1][b]. This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected but considering the effect of that offence upon administration of justice. Learned counsel placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and another V/s.Meenakshi Marwah Another, reported in [2005] 4 SCC 370 as well as the decision of the Hon’ble High Court Of Delhi in the case of Indraprastha Power Generation Co. Ltd., V/s.Faheem Baig and Others, reported in [2015] 148 DRJ 167, made an endeavor to justify the order impugned.8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material on record, it is not in dispute that the allegations and counter allegations are made between the management and the workman inasmuch as the insertion of the words “Original” and “Document” in the evidence recorded by the Labour Court on 30.05.2017. On filing of I.A.No.3 for deleting of the said word “Original” in the deposition recorded on 30.05.2017, the management has filed I.A.No.4 under section 340 of Cr.P.c. to refer the matter to the learned magistrate to hold an enquiry. Similarly, the workman has also filed I.A.No.5 under section 340 of the Cr.P.C to refer the matter to the learned magistrate alleging offences against the management.9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the management is that in view of the admission made by the workman that the words “original” and “Document” were inserted in the deposition of the witnesses recorded by the Labour Court on 30.05.2017 with the consent of the management, is suffice to refer the matter to the learned Magistrate under Section 340 of Cr.P.C and no further enquiry as such is required. This argument would have been accepted by this Court if the Court was required to consider only on I.A.No.4 filed by the management but in view of the I.A.No.5 filed by the workman making certain allegations against the management, it is incumbent on the Labour Court to hold preliminary enquiry in the matter to arrive at a decision whether the matter requires to be referred to the learned Magistrate under Section 340 of Cr.P.C for holding an enquiry. In this regard, it is apt to collate the legal position as rendered by the Hon’ble Courts on this issue.10. In the case of Amarsang Nathaji supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed thus:“7. In the process of formation of opinion by the court that it expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into, the requirement should only be to have prima facie satisfaction of the offence which appears to have been committed. It is open to the court to hold a preliminary inquiry though it is not mandatory. In case, the court is otherwise in a position to from such an opinion, that it appears to the court that an offence as referred to under Section 340 of the CrPC has been committed, the court may dispense with the preliminary inquiry. Even after forming an opinion as to the offence which appears to have been committed also, it is not mandatory that a complaint should be filed as a matter of course. (See Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2002) 1 SCC 253].”11. In the light of this judgment, it is clear that the requirement of holding a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory in case the Court is otherwise in a position to from such an opinion that it is necessary that an offence as referred to under Section 340 of C.P.C has been committed, the Court may dispense with the preliminary inquiry.12. In the case of Pritish supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed thus:“16. Be it noted that the court at the stage envisaged in Section 340 of the Code is not deciding the guilt innocence of the party against whom proceedings are to be taken before the magistrate. At that stage the court only considers whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence affecting administration of justice. In M.S. Sheriff and anr. Vs. State of Madras and ors. (AIR 1954 SC 397) a Constitution Bench of this Court cautioned that no expression on the guilt or innocence of the persons should be made by the court while passing an order under Section 340 of the Code. An exercise of the court at that stage is not for finding whether only offence was committed or who committed the same. The scope is confined to see whether the court could then decide on the materials available that the matter requires inquiry by a criminal court and that it is expedient in the interest of justice to have it inquired into”13. In terms of the said judgment, it is not in dispute that the scope of exercise of the Court at the stage of considering the application under Section 340 of the Code is not for finding whether any offence was committed or who committed the same. The scope is confined to see whether the Court could then decide on the materials available that the matter requires inquiry by a Criminal Court.14. In the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held thus:“23. In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the court is not bound to make a compliant regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1))b), as the Section is conditioned by the words “Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice.” This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the compliant, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The board view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery of forged document remedyless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be discarded.”15. The aforesaid judgment indicates that the exercise under Section 340 of the Code will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary inquiry and record a finding to that effect. Further, it is held that the holding of a preliminary inquiry normally is not made during pendency of the proceedings before the Court and this is done at the stage when the proceedings are concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Though the learned counsel for the management made an attempt to distinguish this case, contending that the said judgment was rendered in the context of interpretation of Section 195[1][b][ii] of the Code and he same has no applicability to the facts of the present case, the same cannot be countenanced for the reason that the Hon’ble Apex Court elaborately considered the language used in Section 340 of the Code and the interpretation is given with respect to Section 340 of the Code vis-a vis 195[1][b] of the Code especially, the scope

of Section 340 of the Code and its application.16. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Indraprastha Power Generation Co.Ltd., supra referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rumini Ammal V/s. Narayana Reddiar [2007] 12 SCC 611 and the case of vishal Kapoor V/s. Sonal Kapoor[DDA No.322/2014, D.D 02.09.2014], has held that complaint under Section 340 of Cr.P.C would be adjudged by the Court by weighing not the magistrate of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact such commission of offence has upon administration of justice.17. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, it cannot be held that holding a preliminary enquiry by the Labour Court on I.A.Nos.4 and 5 to record a finding to the effect, whether in the interest of justice such an enquiry should be made into the alleged offences by weighing the impact of such commission of offence on the administration of justice is unjustifiable. Posting the matter for enquiry on I.A.Nos 4 and 5 cannot be construed as a final enquiry but it is only a preliminary enquiry which is a decision making procedure to refer the matter to the learned Magistrate for holding an enquiry under Section 340 of Cr.P.C.In the circumstance and for the reasons aforesaid, the orders impugned cannot be held to be untenable. Hence, the writ petitions, stand dismissed.In view dismissal of the writ petitions, all the pending I.As stand dismissed.