w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n

M/s. Bhushan Steel Limited, through its Power of Attorney Holder S.K. Agrawal v/s Mrs. Varsha A. Maheshwari, through her Power of Attorney Ajay Maheshwari

Company & Directors' Information:- BHUSHAN POWER & STEEL LIMITED [Active] CIN = U27100DL1999PLC108350

Company & Directors' Information:- VARSHA CORPORATION LIMITED [Active] CIN = U24134MH2000PLC130217

Company & Directors' Information:- AGRAWAL POWER PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U40100MP2007PTC019460

Company & Directors' Information:- S. G. POWER AND STEEL PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U14290DL2012PTC240718

Company & Directors' Information:- R. S. STEEL AND POWER PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70100CT2009PTC021362

Company & Directors' Information:- AJAY POWER PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U40109AP2000PTC034839

Company & Directors' Information:- AJAY STEEL PRIVATE LIMITED. [Dissolved] CIN = U27106KL1901PTC002669

    WRIT PETITION Nos. 5664 & 5364 OF 2010

    Decided On, 05 January 2011

    At, In the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur


    For the Petitioner: S. Dewani, Advocate. For the Respondent: Ajay Maheshwari, Power of Attorney Holder.

Judgment Text

1. Challenge in both these Writ Petitions filed by rival parties against each other is to orders dated 30.09.2010 passed by the 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur in Civil Suit No.70/2009. The said suit is filed by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5364/2010 as Summary Suit for recovery of amount of Rs. 38,89,674.14 along with interest @ 18% jointly and severally against the defendants therein. The dues claimed are on account of Magnetite Powder supplied by the plaintiff to defendant no.1 Company on the strength of purchase orders placed by the defendant no.1 Company with the plaintiff. The defendant no.2 is the General Manager in purchase department of defendant no.1 Company. By the impugned order passed below Exh.16 the trial Court has granted leave to defend under Subrule [5] of Rule 3 of Order 37 of Code of Civil Procedure Code, subject to defendants depositing a sum of Rs.34, 24,895/ in Court or then furnishing a bank guarantee for that sum within a period of one month. The plaintiff claims in Writ Petition that such a relief could not have been granted and a decree for amount claimed with interest ought to have been awarded. Defendant no.1 has filed Writ Petition No. 5664/2010, and very same order to the extent it calls upon defendant no.1 to deposit the amount or to furnish Bank guarantee has been assailed in it claiming unconditional leave. In that Writ Petition on 23.11.2010 this Court extended time to furnish bank guarantee till 30.11.2010 and thereafter on 01.12.2010 the petitioner /defendant no.1 has accordingly furnished the Bank guarantee in that amount to the Trial Court.

2. Plaintiff through her Power of Attorney Holder while assailing the order in writ Petition No. 5364/2010 has invited attention to the purchase orders to show that the quality of powder supplied was to be inspected by the defendants at their end and thereafter, payment was to be released within 7 days. The material if found inferior was to be returned within 7 days. Various terms and conditions of the purchase order are indicated to urge that time has always been the essence of the contract. In view of this the defence of defendants that material supplied was of inferior quality is, stated to be by way of after thought and for that purpose attention is invited to the quantity of powder asked for in each purchase orders and how it has steadily increased. The details of bills and payments released are also shown to this Court pointing out that except for the entries at Sr. Nos. 37 to 44 in chart there has been no delay at all and all payments have been released duly after inspection. It is urged that the payments released were not in accordance with supply or could not be correlated and hence plaintiff was required to send a special representative to understand the accounts. For amounts remaining outstanding emails were required to be forwarded, but then it did not receive any response. When legal notice was sent on 03.03.2009, immediately within two hours reply notice was forwarded by defendants taking a stand that the material was of inferior quality.

3. Attention has also been invited to the alleged third party test reports and also to the test reports conducted by the defendants as alleged to show how plea as raised about inferior quality of material do not match with the said story. The Attorney of plaintiff contends that first grievance of poor quality has been made almost after nine months and then on the basis of the so called independent test reports, prorata deductions have been effected from all supplies. Out of total 77 trucks supplied, payments have been released for 55 trucks and there was never any complaint about remaining 22 trucks. The establishment of defendants is stated to be very big and with facility for stringent quality check. It is urged that in reply to the legal notice for the first time on 03.03.2009 story of frequent break downs in preceding one year and of alleged loss of several Crores has been revealed & pressed into service. The letter dated 28.02.2009 is stated to be fabricated, as plaintiff got it on 26.03.2009 after receipt of the email reply of defendants. This communication dated 28.02.2009 is also urged to be exact replica of email reply, except for addition of figure of loss therein. The test certificates placed on record by the defendants and test certificates filed by the plaintiff are also pointed with contention that the test certificates of defendants are of same date i.e. of date of delivery. The learned Attorney states that thus on the basis of immediate tests, no grievance was made about the inferior qualify and material was appropriated and used for production by the defendants. After the stock supplied was appropriated, there is no question of its rejection. It is also urged that when the defendants allegedly felt need of impartial/ 3rd party test, why the plaintiff was not taken into confidence by arranging for joint sampling. It is urged that leave to defend has been sought for without any material and service of letters upon plaintiff is alleged through TCI Express Courier. The plaintiff states that these documents are fabricated and when plaintiff sought information from TCI Express Couriers, the said Courier has denied service of any such letters on plaintiff. Effort has also been made to show that records have been interpolated and fabricated by inviting attention to the counter submissions filed before this Court vide Stamp No. 12432/2010. The particulars used as Courier numbers/details are stated to be also manipulated. The effort of defendant to force plaintiff to lift 300 M.T. Of alleged inferior quality material is also stated to be again false in this background. It is contended that in the face of these complaints (alleged) about quality, the contract was never terminated and later supplies were accepted by the defendants. Plaintiff states that denial of signature of Arvind Srivatava by defendant is false & an application moved by her under Section 340 of Criminal Procedure Code is very much pending.

4. Shri Dewani, learned Counsel appearing for defendants has urged that the plaint as filed does not carry verification as required by Order VI Rule 15(1) of Code of Civil Procedure. It is further urged that the suit also suffers from misjoinder, in as much as there is no cause or contract for filing such suit against the defendant no.2 Shri B.K. Sinha, General Manager. Specific statement, that suit does not ask for any relief, not compatible with Order 37 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure is not contained in the plaint, and there is also prayer to release interest @ 18%, which is not supported by any statute or by any document. In view of these defects, unconditional leave to defend ought to have been granted. It is urged that as per purchase order only Court at Cuttack in State of Orissa has territorial jurisdiction and hence, the suit as filed at Nagpur could not have been looked into. The original documents were not filed along with the plaint and were tendered on record on last date behind the back of the defendants. Hence, no cognizance of those documents could have been taken and suit could not have been treated as summary suit. It is urged that the application moved by the defendant no.1 for directing plaintiff to take back 300 M.T. of powder is still pending and has not been decided. Earlier orders passed by this Court on 22.07.2010 in Writ Petition No. 1534/2010 are pressed into service to show how the aspect of jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties needed to be looked into first by the trial Court. The learned Counsel states that in the impugned order the trial Court has overlooked this direction and has decided all points together.

5. The balance confirmation letter on which the plaintiff has placed reliance is stated to be false and attention is invited to affidavit of Shri Arvind Shrivastava, alleged to be signatory to that balance confirmation disclosing that he has not placed any such signature. The defendant has also filed application under Section 340 of Criminal Procedure Code against the plaintiff and the same is stated to be pending. It is urged that the plaintiff cannot chose to rely only upon one clause of the contract and entire contract needs to be construed together. Various judgments are relied upon to substantiate all these aspects. The certificates of inferior quality produced on record and also correspondence are stated to require trial and hence it is contended that grant of unconditional leave was essential.

6. The attorney for plaintiff in reply has argued that there is no defect in verification and in any case that defect is curable. He further states that Mr. Sinha was the General Manager of defendant no.1 Company and he has been rightly sued in that capacity. It is further urged that the defendant no.1 has got no establishment at Cuttack and no cause of action has accrued at Cuttack, hence the parties by their consent cannot confer jurisdiction on that Court. It is submited that the purchase orders are signed by defendant no.2 General Manager Shri Sinha. He has done some wrong things and he is also party to forgery of letters, hence he has been rightly joined as defendant no.2. Attention is invited to plaint to urge that it contains all necessary averments. Original documents are stated to be filed at the time of hearing and passing of the orders below Exh.16 only to protect them and it is further argued that no prejudice is caused to the defendants thereby.

7. It is also argued that the defendant has not made any reference to either Sale of Goods Act or to the Contract Act and the plaintiff has also relied upon various judgments to show how said provisions clinch the controversy and an inference of deemed acceptance of material supplied needs to be drawn.

8. After hearing the respective parties, I find it first appropriate to consider the aspect of territorial jurisdiction. The Summary Suit is based upon purchase orders and the said orders specifically incorporate a condition that the dispute between the parties shall always to be deemed to have arisen at Cuttack and only Cuttack Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the claims. The defendant no.1 has relied upon the judgments in this respect to urge that the Court at Cuttack therefore would have only jurisdiction. I do not find it necessary to refer to all those rulings cited by both the sides as judgment of Hon?ble Supreme Court reported at 1971 (1) SCC 286 (Hakam Singh. vs. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd.) clearly covers this controversy. The said judgment states that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement, jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess. When there are two courts possessing jurisdiction to try the suit, by agreement between the parties that dispute may be tried in one of such courts and such agreement is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement therefore does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. Here the defendant no.1 has got its registered Office at New Delhi and plant at Narendrapur, Meramandli, District Dhenkanal in Orissa State. There is nothing on record to show that the defendant no.1 has got any establishment in Cuttack distict of Orissa. Though the defendant no.1 has urged that correspondence was made from Cuttack, again there is absolutely nothing to support this contention. In any case when plant is not in Cuttack District and Registered Officer is at New Delhi, it is apparent that for filing such a suit against the defendant no.1 Company, Cuttack Court will never have jurisdiction. I, therefore, find that the trial Court has correctly appreciated this controversy and there is nothing wrong with the same. The contention that this raises a disputed question of fact, is again without any merit.

9. To urge that suit does not contain statement and declaration as required by Order 37, and to support the argument of misjoinder, defendant no.1 has relied upon the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court reported at 1999 [3] Mh.L.J. 64 (Mafatlal Finance Limited Mumbai .vrs. Express Industrial Services Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai). To point out that the affidavit in support of plaint is defective, reliance is being placed upon the judgment reported at (2007) 1 SCC 341 (Baldev Singh .vrs. Shinder Pal Singh and another). Plaintiff has urged that these defects are curable and reliance is being placed upon the judgment of Delhi High Court in case of Khemchand and others .vrs. State and others in F.A.O.No.24143/ 2005 decided on 17.05.2010 by the learned Single Judge. Decision in case of Kailash Singh .vrs. Hiralal Dey of Gauhati High Court (learned Single Judge) decided on 30.03.1993 and the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Vidyawati Gupta and others .vrs. Bhakti Hari Nayak and others dated 03.02.2006 where the Hon'ble Apex Court has found that amendment to Order VI Rule 15 being procedural in nature, is directory and noncompliance with it does not automatically render the plaint nonest are also pressed into service.. View of Calcutta High Court to the contrary was therefore, set aside by the Apex Court. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Baldev Singh .vrs. Shinder Pal Singh and another (supra) reveals that a factual averment made cannot be both, true tothe knowledge and belief of deponent. When the plaint as filed is perused, in this respect, after prayer clause it is directly supported by affirmation as required by Order VI Rule 15[4] of Code of Civil Procedure. Between prayer clause and this affirmation, verification as contemplated by Order VI Rule 15[c] is missing. During arguments it became clear that the representative for plaintiff did not understand this position. But, then the affirmation filed is only with intention to support the statement of facts made in plaint. The affirmation does not specify separately, the facts true to personal knowledge of the deponent and true to his belief. But these defects are only procedural in nature and plaintiff needs to be given an opportunity to rectify it. Accordingly, the learned Trial Court is directed to give plaintiff before it, necessary reasonable opportunity to rectify these defects.

10. At this stage, I find it appropriate to consider the contentions about form of summary suit. Mafatlal Finance Limited Mumbai .vrs. Express Industrial Services Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai (supra) is the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court which holds that when claim for interest made in summary suit is not based on any agreement or any enactment, suit cannot be entertained as summary suit and hence unconditional leave to defend was given to that defendant. The observations at the end of paragraph no.4 show that the plaintiff has to aver in plaint that no relief not falling within the ambit of Order 37 Rule 2 is claimed by him, the learned Single Judge found that the claim for interest in that suit was not based on any agreement and not supported by any enactment. It is further found that contention of plaintiff there, that provisions of Interest Act bring the claim made therein within the four corners of Order 37 was matter of investigation. The learned Single Judge has relied upon Division Bench judgment reported at M/s Randerian & Singh vs. Indian Overseas Bank and later Full Bench of this Court has not followed this view. As the plaintiff has not touched this aspect at all & as defendant 1 has not pointed out the Full Bench view, I am reproducing essential observations therein. Said Full Bench also refers to two other Division Bench views which have bearing on the issue.

11. In AIR 2004 Bom 186 "SICOM Ltd. v. Prashant S. Tanna", (Full Bench) controversy was :

?2. The earlier Full Bench on 25th November, 2003,framed, for convenience, the following four questions of law:(

i) Whether the provisions of Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can be invoked while exercising powers under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure and deciding a summons for judgment/application for leave to defend a summary suit instituted under Order XXXVII, Rule 1(2) thereof?

(ii) Whether third option of abandoning a part of the claim in a summary suit is available to a plaintiff at the hearing of the summons for judgment or the options set out in two Division Bench judgments of this Court in M/s. Randerian and Singh v. Indian Overseas Bank and Hydraulic and General Engineering v. UCO Bank (1998 (1) LJ 793) are exhaustive?

(iii) Whether the Division Bench decision in Ajcon Capital Markets Limited v. Maya Rasayan Limited granting a third option as aforesaid is in accord with the summary procedure prescribed by Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure?

(iv) When at the hearing of a summons for judgment, the Court finds that a part of the claim in the summary suit, falls outside the scope of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, what are the options available to the plaintiff and what powers can the Court exercise?? And the Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court has held :

?12. In other words, a distinction must be drawn between the sustainability of a claim and the maintainability of the action as a summary suit. The negation of the former does not entail the negation of the latter. A suit can be said to fall outside the ambit of Order XXXVII only if the relief claimed therein is based on an action the nature of which does not fall within the classes specified in Order XXXVII, Rule 1(2). A relief cannot be said to fall outside the ambit of Order XXXVII, Rule 2 merely because the quantum thereof is excessive, so long as the nature of the relief falls within the clauses specified in Order XXXVII, Rule 1(2).

13. If the quantum of the claim in suit is not sustainable it is but a factor to be considered by the Judge while deciding and passing an order on, the summons for judgment. The tests for the exercise of jurisdiction while passing an order on a summons for judgment have been settled in a plethora of cases including of the Apex Court. In this reference, we are not concerned with the same.

14. We will now assume that when a part of the claim is not warranted by a statutory provision or by the contractual document on which the suit is based, the suit must be one which cannot be accepted as a summary suit as held in Randerian's case. Even so, we are also unable to agree with the ratio in Randerian's case that in such an eventuality only one of two consequences must follow viz. either to grant unconditional leave to defend or to permit the plaintiff to withdraw the summons for judgment with leave to file a fresh summons for judgment after amending the plaint. Nor are we able to agree with the further ratio that "Recording of a statement to give up or accept reduced interest is not sufficient.

21. We are also in respectful agreement with the judgment in Ajcon's case which holds that in such a case there are not merely two options as held in Randerian's case. We are unable to see any purpose in driving a plaintiff to first withdraw the summons or judgment, thereafter amend his plaint and finally take out a fresh summons for judgment. Such a course serves no useful purpose whatsoever. The same result can be achieved by the plaintiff merely making a statement at the bar. To amend the plaint, the plaintiff would be required under the rules to take out a chamber summons which itself would take a few years to be decided. Thereafter, the plaintiff would necessarily have to go through the procedure of taking not a fresh summons for judgment. Such a cumbersome course is not mandated by any of the provisions of the C.P.C. The defendant cannot possibly be prejudiced if the plaintiff is not made to suffer such a labourious, timeconsuming and cumbersome procedure. Mr. Zaiwalla was unable to indicate any reason why such a course should be adopted except stating that if it were not so it would encourage plaintiffs to take a chance by making unsustainable claims in the first instance. The reasoning does not appeal to us as justifying a conclusion in law contrary to the true construction of Order XXXVII."

It is also held that said Court can grant unconditional leave to defendant for some part of claim and conditional leave for remaining part. However, the Full Bench judgment no where expressly states and does not notice the view of the learned Single Judge reported at Mafatlal Finance Limited Mumbai .vrs. Express Industrial Services Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai (supra). Conclusions of Hon'ble Full Bench are: -

?28. In the circumstances, we summarise the answer to the reference as follows:

(1) The judgments in M/s. Randerian and Singh v. Indian Overseas Bank and Hydraulic and General Engineering v. UCO Bank (1998) 1 LJ 793 are overruled. The suit would be maintainable as a summary suit if it falls within one of the classes of suits enumerated in Order XXXVII, Rule 1(2) even if the claim made therein is not properly quantified or is in excess of what the plaintiff is entitled to.

(2) In a summary suit filed under Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. the plaintiff is entitled at any time to abandon or give up a part of the claim unilaterially. This, the plaintiff may do by making a statement to be recorded by the Court and without the necessity of the plaintiff making a formal application for the same by withdrawing the summons for judgment, amending the plaint and thereafter taking out a fresh summons for judgment or otherwise.

(3) At the hearing of the summons for judgment, it will be open to the Court to pass a decree for a part of the claim and grant unconditional leave to defend the suit in respect of rest of the claim.

(4) At the hearing of the summons for judgment, it is open to the Court to grant conditional leave to defend in respect of a part of the claim and unconditional leave to defend for the remaining part of the claim. In such an order it would follow that in the event of the Defendant failing to comply with the condition, he would suffer the consequences mentioned in Order XXXVII qua only that part of the claim for which conditional leave to defend has been granted and not in respect of that part of the claim for which unconditional leave has been granted.?

12. Thus, merely because demand for interest is not supported either by the document or by the law, Suit here does not cease to be a summary suit. But then the plaintiff has not made any request for amendment either before the Trial Court or before this Court and has not expressed readiness and willingness to abandon any part of the claim. Moreover, as already pointed out above, plaint as filed seeks joint and several relief against defendant no.1 Company and defendant no.2 Shri Sinha. Shri Sinha is stated to be its General Manager. When purchase orders are placed by company and contract is with Company, it is clear that there cannot be any other contract or independent contract with Shri Sinha, General Manager. On the strength of the contract, the relief in summary suit could have been asked for only against defendant no.1 Company. Even if Shri Sinha is treated as General Manager, then also relief will have to be against the Company only. However, prayer clause in plaint expressly seeks a joint and several decree against both the defendants. If the decree is envisaged against only Company, it cannot be viewed as joint and several. The representative for plaintiff and defendant no.1 have not raised any specific contentions about this nature of relief claimed. It is important to note that defendant no.1 alone has filed Writ Petition No.5664/2010 and defendant no.2 Shri Sinha has not approached this Court in the matter.

13. The defendant no.1 has relied upon judgment of learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court reported at AIR 1974 Cal.6 (Madan Mohan Sureka .vrs. Bhavani Cinema and others) where view taken is, only person whose name appears in Hundi can be sued under Order 37 Rule 2. The Hundi there was by the Firm and one of its partners was joined as party defendant though his name did not figure in Hundi. Learned Single Judge found that whether such person was or was not a partner of the Firm, is a question which required investigation and therefore, granted unconditional leave to defend. Here though position of defendant no.2 as General Manager of defendant no.1 Company is not in dispute, the prayer made for joint and several decree creates an impression that Shri Sinha is sought to be made responsible personally. If defendant no.2 is to be made responsible in his official capacity as General Manager, decree could have been asked only against defendant no.1 Company and there was no need to seek joint and several decree against both. The addition of defendant no.2 and relief sought against him, therefore, shows that the suit as filed is not squarely covered by Order 37 Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code.

14. If any claim for interest was to be given up or any other amendment in plaint was to be prayed, the request for same could have been made to the trial Court before it passed the impugned order. In any case that request could have been made to this Court when matters were heard on 21.12.2010 to 23.12.2010. There is no such request by the plaintiff. As I have found that grant of decree in summary suit against defendant no.2 Shri Sinha, is not possible, it is not necessary for this court to proceed to appreciate the grievance of plaintiff in the light of Section 55 of the Contract Act and provisions of Sections 41 and 42 of the Sale of Goods Act. That consideration would have been relevant only in case of entire grievance in Suit falling under provisions of Order 37. Various judgments are cited by the plaintiff through her authorized Attorney to substantiate that contention. I, have only mentioned those judgments for the purpose of record. Those judgments are ?

(1) Caltex [India] Ltd. .vrs. Bhagwan Devi Marodia (By Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1969 SC 405)

(2) Superintending Engineer .vrs. Patibandla Radhkrishna Murthy of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported at 1996 [3] ALT 1137.

(3) Shah Mohanlal Manilal .vrs. Firm Running in the Name and Style of Dhirubhau Bavajibhai by Gujarat High Court, reported at AIR 1962 Guj. 56.

(4) Lohmann Rausher Gmbh .vrs. Medisphere Marketing Pvt. Ltd. by Delhi High Court reported at 117 [2004] DLT 95 Consideration of these judgments relied upon by the plaintiff is not essential at this stage because of finding already reached above and also to avoid any prejudice to cause/defence of defendant no. 2 Shri Sinha.

15. Defendant no.1 has relied upon judgment reported at AIR 1993 SC 352 (R.N. Gosain .vrs. Yashpal Dhir) to urge that plaintiff cannot be allowed to approbate or reprobate. However, I do not find any approbation or reprobation by plaintiff on record atleast against the defendant no.1. Defendant no.1 has also relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported at 2007 [3] Mh.L.J. 8 (Ravi Prakash Khemka and another .vrs. Bank of India and others), wherein Division Bench of this Court found that when defence raised was not a moonshine, defendant was entitled to unconditional leave to defend. (1998) 5 SCC 354 (Sunil Enterprises and another .vrs. SBI Commercial and International Bank Ltd.) is the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court which follows the earlier judgment reported at AIR 1977 SC 577 (Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers .vrs. Basic Equipment Corp.). The learned Single Judge of this Court in 2010 [4] Mh.L.J. 294 (Harilal and Co., Mumbai .vrs. Gammon India Ltd. Mumbai) has followed this judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court.

16. The defence of defendant no.1 that material supplied to it was of inferior quality now needs to be looked into. While considering this defence at this stage it is necessary to remember that joint and several decree is asked for against defendants no.1 and 2 together. Defendant no.2 with conditional leave to defend, has not filed any proceeding against the impugned order before this Court. Purchase orders clearly show that quality of material was to be inspected by the defendant no.1 at it's site at MeraMundali. Each supply was to be accompanied by test certificate and accordingly it is not in dispute that supply made by the plaintiff satisfied these requirements. The first grievance authentically made by the defendant no.1 about inferior quality of supply is 03.03.2009. There is dispute between the parties about the earlier letter dated 28.02.2009 written in this respect by the defendant no.1 to

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plaintiff. According to the plaintiff that letter is received after email reply to notice dated 03.03.2009. Perusal of this reply dated 28.02.2009 and reply to legal notice dated 03.03.2009 does not reveal that there is much difference between the two. The supplies have been effected by the plaintiff from 24.11.2007 till 09.06.2008 and that was without any protest. First supply order was for 50 M.T. Of magnetite powder. Second was for 100 M.T., third one as for 200 M.T., fourth one was for 400 M.T., 5th one was for 500 M.T., while last one was of 1700 M.T. The details of compliance is also placed on record by showing break up of each supply with bill number, bill amount, date of payment etc. In reply to legal notice sent by the defendant no.1 under signature of defendant no.2, defence taken is supplies were accepted on the strength of test reports given by the plaintiff. Because of the malfunctioning in their factory, defendant no.1 was advised to check quality of Magnetite Powder and hence incorrectness of test reports given by the plaintiff came to light. This reply does not give any details date wise in this respect. 3 samples are stated to be tested and reply further shows acceptance of total bill amount, as also total outstanding amount. Amount of Rs. 18,10,280/ is then deducted on account of poor quality and balance of Rs. 16,17,615/ is adjusted against loss. Though in alleged communication dated 28.02.2009 these losses are stated to be approximately 20 Crores, Email reply notice dated 3/3/2009 does not show any adjustment or definite quantification of claim towards damages. The test reports of defendant no.1 showing less percentage of Magnetite and dated 12.08.2008, 20.08.2008, 01.08.2008 and 11.09.2008. When test on quality were agreed at end of defendants, acceptance & use of material and then story of malfunctioning for fairly long period all prima facie appear doubtful and lacking bonafides. Deduction from all supplies on the basis of 3 such quality checks or third party checks also creates some element of doubt. However, this can not be finally concluded here in present facts against defendant 2. 17. In this situation, I find that the conditional leave to defend granted by the trial Court to defendant no.1 [petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5664 of 2010] does not call for any interference. The said Court has looked into the necessary aspects and objections to its jurisdiction about misjoinder and also about the alleged supply of inferior quality of Magnetite Powder. I do not find any jurisdictional error or perversity in that approach, in so far as the challenge by defendant no.1 is concerned. The defendant no.1 has already furnished Bank guarantee as directed by the trial Court and in present circumstances, the said direction cannot be viewed as uncalled for. I do not find any substance in the effort of learned counsel for defendant no.1 to urge that recourse to provisions [e] as given in paragraph no.8 of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers .vrs. Basic Equipment Corp. (supra) is unjustified. 18. In view of these observations and findings, both the Petitions are dismissed. No costs.