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Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v/s Tempnology, LLC, Nka Old Cold Llc (2019)


Company & Directors' Information:- A V S R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120TG2005PTC045117

Company & Directors' Information:- S R HOLDINGS LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993TN1988PLC083659

Company & Directors' Information:- S R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993TN1988PTC083659

Company & Directors' Information:- A B HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70102KA2006PTC040894

Company & Directors' Information:- S K A HOLDINGS LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993DL1981PLC012592

Company & Directors' Information:- S K A HOLDINGS LIMITED [Active] CIN = L65993DL1981PLC012592

Company & Directors' Information:- G J HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U51100DL2004PTC126687

Company & Directors' Information:- G J HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993DL2004PTC126687

Company & Directors' Information:- P P HOLDINGS LTD [Active] CIN = U65993PN1981PLC025916

Company & Directors' Information:- G S D HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U70109WB1990PTC048518

Company & Directors' Information:- S T HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120MH1979PTC021588

Company & Directors' Information:- M C HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67190DL2009PTC190957

Company & Directors' Information:- J S K HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U67120WB1994PTC065660

Company & Directors' Information:- P R HOLDINGS LIMITED [Active] CIN = L27310AS1983PLC007154

Company & Directors' Information:- P R HOLDINGS LIMITED [Active] CIN = L27310DL1983PLC314402

Company & Directors' Information:- G R A HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U70101WB1992PTC055865

Company & Directors' Information:- B S S HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U67120WB1992PTC056874

Company & Directors' Information:- H M HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993ML2005PTC007956

Company & Directors' Information:- S M H HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993TG2006PTC049309

Company & Directors' Information:- M M HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U70109WB1993PTC058147

Company & Directors' Information:- D J HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120MH1992PTC067448

Company & Directors' Information:- R S M P HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67190MH1995PTC088443

Company & Directors' Information:- V A G HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1994PTC057817

Company & Directors' Information:- K E HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70101TN2013PTC089953

Company & Directors' Information:- NKA HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U65100DL2013PTC254769

Company & Directors' Information:- K C HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65990MH1981PTC024688

Company & Directors' Information:- A TO Z HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1987PTC028294

Company & Directors' Information:- V R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70102KA2009PTC051724

Company & Directors' Information:- J B HOLDINGS LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U91110ML1995PLC004396

Company & Directors' Information:- P G T HOLDINGS LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74899DL1994PLC057886

Company & Directors' Information:- S M HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65990MH2011PTC225004

Company & Directors' Information:- M S R HOLDINGS LIMITED [Active] CIN = U85110KA1995PLC018599

Company & Directors' Information:- V N C A HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999TN2011PTC081684

Company & Directors' Information:- S C HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74899DL1986PTC025017

Company & Directors' Information:- S G HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U70109WB1986PTC040839

Company & Directors' Information:- K C A HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1995PTC066204

Company & Directors' Information:- S N J HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120DL1997PTC084488

Company & Directors' Information:- H P HOLDINGS LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67120HP1997PLC019474

Company & Directors' Information:- K L N HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65990TG1986PTC006344

Company & Directors' Information:- M R HOLDINGS LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120MH1978PLC020559

Company & Directors' Information:- J T HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120MH1979PTC021585

Company & Directors' Information:- B M D HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51909TN1995PTC031179

Company & Directors' Information:- A R R PRODUCT INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U00292TZ2005PTC011514

Company & Directors' Information:- H K R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1982PTC013032

Company & Directors' Information:- R J HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1982PTC013033

Company & Directors' Information:- K D R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1982PTC013034

Company & Directors' Information:- P D R HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Amalgamated] CIN = U67120WB1996PTC077248

Company & Directors' Information:- W A HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993DL1997PTC084687

Company & Directors' Information:- W D HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993DL1997PTC084667

Company & Directors' Information:- MISSION HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120DL1996PTC082287

Company & Directors' Information:- A K HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899UP1986PTC037306

Company & Directors' Information:- J R D HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1994PTC059769

Company & Directors' Information:- C S HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U85110KA1995PTC018441

Company & Directors' Information:- R A HOLDINGS LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17119GJ1986PLC037333

Company & Directors' Information:- W. M. F. HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70101CT2011PTC022482

Company & Directors' Information:- A V HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U51109WB1992PTC054035

Company & Directors' Information:- K B R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120TG1998PTC030518

Company & Directors' Information:- E K HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1990PTC040323

Company & Directors' Information:- N R HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120WB1993PTC060077

Company & Directors' Information:- B P A HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U74990DL1982PTC013326

Company & Directors' Information:- V V HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1994PTC060480

Company & Directors' Information:- D D B HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120WB1992PTC055592

Company & Directors' Information:- M D HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120DL2001PTC111221

Company & Directors' Information:- V H A HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Converted to LLP and Dissolved] CIN = U65993DL2003PTC120147

Company & Directors' Information:- K E F HOLDINGS LTD [Amalgamated] CIN = U67120WB1988PLC045280

Company & Directors' Information:- A P HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U65993PN1981PTC025915

Company & Directors' Information:- N. R. HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120MH1993PTC140612

Company & Directors' Information:- M B HOLDINGS LTD. [Not available for efiling] CIN = U70109WB1986PLC041226

Company & Directors' Information:- J S R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45200KA2006PTC040195

Company & Directors' Information:- K M HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1995PTC064343

Company & Directors' Information:- A S H HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL2004PTC125403

Company & Directors' Information:- C M HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U45203WB1986PTC041627

Company & Directors' Information:- M H HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1995PTC067392

Company & Directors' Information:- I K HOLDINGS LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U70101WB1951PLC019703

Company & Directors' Information:- C & R HOLDINGS PVT. LTD. [Active] CIN = U65929WB1991PTC051376

Company & Directors' Information:- J J HOLDINGS LTD [Amalgamated] CIN = U65993WB1980PLC032736

Company & Directors' Information:- K G HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U65929WB1987PTC042868

Company & Directors' Information:- B & T HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74920DL2007PTC171796

Company & Directors' Information:- H D HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Amalgamated] CIN = U51109WB1991PTC051415

Company & Directors' Information:- N AND N HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1990PTC040846

Company & Directors' Information:- M P HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U67120DL1997PTC088350

Company & Directors' Information:- M R P PRODUCT PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111UP1993PTC015576

Company & Directors' Information:- B P HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1989PTC038274

Company & Directors' Information:- K P R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74900TZ2011PTC017467

Company & Directors' Information:- U AND V HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U65999TN2005PTC057659

Company & Directors' Information:- B AND B HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70101AS1999PTC005674

Company & Directors' Information:- M. G. HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67120DL2010PTC198226

Company & Directors' Information:- D G HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65110DL1998PTC094466

Company & Directors' Information:- I R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74120DL2008PTC185743

Company & Directors' Information:- S I HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74120DL2008PTC186043

Company & Directors' Information:- C J G HOLDINGS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70101KL2010PTC038559

Company & Directors' Information:- U P L HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120OR1990PTC002414

Company & Directors' Information:- N N HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U65999WB1990PTC048493

Company & Directors' Information:- O M K HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120WB1995PTC072914

Company & Directors' Information:- M K HOLDINGS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U65993TN1996PTC036985

Company & Directors' Information:- K I HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120MH1981PTC024069

Company & Directors' Information:- D R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993DL1982PTC013031

Company & Directors' Information:- R R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1983PTC017127

Company & Directors' Information:- G J HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Not available for efiling] CIN = U65993PB1985PTC006327

Company & Directors' Information:- M G L HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993TN1994PTC029354

Company & Directors' Information:- K V R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65191KA2012PTC063353

Company & Directors' Information:- R N M HOLDINGS P LTD. [Active] CIN = U65921WB1990PTC050174

Company & Directors' Information:- M D HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120CH1983PTC005399

Company & Directors' Information:- R V HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74899DL1989PTC036577

Company & Directors' Information:- B J HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120MH1982PTC028820

Company & Directors' Information:- R S HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U70109WB1986PTC040255

Company & Directors' Information:- A D HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U65993WB1976PTC030525

Company & Directors' Information:- S P HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U65993WB1988PTC044540

Company & Directors' Information:- R A HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U70200WB1986PTC040138

Company & Directors' Information:- A HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U70101WB1962PTC025617

Company & Directors' Information:- K T R HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120WB1993PTC059078

Company & Directors' Information:- B I HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U65922WB1988PTC043690

Company & Directors' Information:- E TO E HOLDINGS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65999KA2008PTC047780

Company & Directors' Information:- M A HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U26106UP2003PTC027990

Company & Directors' Information:- G L HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Dormant under section 455] CIN = U74996KA2008PTC044867

Company & Directors' Information:- A AND M HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67190TG1995PTC021464

Company & Directors' Information:- K V S HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U65993WB1993PTC060850

Company & Directors' Information:- V K HOLDINGS PRIVATE LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U27924DL1987PTC027924

Company & Directors' Information:- Q AND A HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67120MH2000PTC127319

Company & Directors' Information:- S K HOLDINGS PVT. LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U99999UP1988PTC010231

Company & Directors' Information:- V A HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120KL1986PTC004442

Company & Directors' Information:- S R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U65993TN1980PTC008388

Company & Directors' Information:- M T R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67110KA2007PTC042600

Company & Directors' Information:- C S A HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U65990MH1995PTC092555

Company & Directors' Information:- K N Z HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67120MH1998PTC117331

Company & Directors' Information:- S H HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U67120MH2001PTC131041

Company & Directors' Information:- D L HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67100TN2012PTC083929

Company & Directors' Information:- P C T HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70101TZ2004PTC010971

Company & Directors' Information:- M J P HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74900TG2015PTC098835

Company & Directors' Information:- P H HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U67120WB1985PTC039369

Company & Directors' Information:- J D S HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65993DL1993PTC053637

Company & Directors' Information:- M R S HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67120DL2001PTC113197

Company & Directors' Information:- J S M S HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45201DL2002PTC117110

Company & Directors' Information:- R M G HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U67120MP1987PTC004209

Company & Directors' Information:- B R HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Amalgamated] CIN = U74899HR1994PTC064054

Company & Directors' Information:- P R S HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67120KA2010PTC052295

Company & Directors' Information:- M AND D HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U67120MH1981PTC025882

Company & Directors' Information:- A T HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U74899DL1994PTC057216

Company & Directors' Information:- J AND S HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U67120RJ1996PTC012114

Company & Directors' Information:- S K V HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U65993DL1981PTC012910

Company & Directors' Information:- S M K S HOLDINGS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U45400WB1990PTC048498

Company & Directors' Information:- S J P HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U99999GJ1981PTC004682

    No. 17-1657

    Decided On, 20 May 2019

    At, Supreme Court of United States

    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE KAGAN
    By, THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE THOMAS
    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE GINSBURG
    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE BREYER
    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ALITO
    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR
    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE KAVANAUGH
    By, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR & THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE GORSUCH

    For the Appearing Parties: ---------------



Judgment Text

Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code enables a debtor to "reject any executory contract"--meaning a contract that neither party has finished performing. 11 U. S. C. 365(a). The section further provides that a debtor's rejection of a contract under that authority "constitutes a breach of such contract." 365(g).

Today we consider the meaning of those provisions in the context of a trademark licensing agreement. The question is whether the debtor-licensor's rejection of that contract deprives the licensee of its rights to use the trademark. We hold it does not. A rejection breaches a contract but does not rescind it. And that means all the rights that would ordinarily survive a contract breach, including those conveyed here, remain in place.

I

This case arises from a licensing agreement gone wrong. Respondent Tempnology, LLC, manufactured clothing and accessories designed to stay cool when used in exercise. It marketed those products under the brand name "Coolcore," using trademarks (e.g., logos and labels) to distinguish the gear from other athletic apparel. In 2012, Tempnology entered into a contract with petitioner Mission Product Holdings, Inc. See App. 203-255. The agreement gave Mission an exclusive license to distribute certain Coolcore products in the United States. And more important here, it granted Mission a non-exclusive license to use the Coolcore trademarks, both in the United States and around the world. The agreement was set to expire in July 2016. But in September 2015, Tempnology filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. And it soon afterward asked the Bankruptcy Court to allow it to "reject" the licensing agreement. 365(a).

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code sets out a framework for reorganizing a bankrupt business. See 1101-1174. The filing of a petition creates a bankruptcy estate consisting of all the debtor's assets and rights. See 541. The estate is the pot out of which creditors' claims are paid. It is administered by either a trustee or, as in this case, the debtor itself. See 1101, 1107.

Section 365(a) of the Code provides that a "trustee [or debtor], subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract." 365(a). A contract is executory if "performance remains due to some extent on both sides." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 522, n. 6 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such an agreement represents both an asset (the debtor's right to the counterparty's future performance) and a liability (the debtor's own obligations to perform). Section 365(a) enables the debtor (or its trustee), upon entering bankruptcy, to decide whether the contract is a good deal for the estate going forward. If so, the debtor will want to assume the contract, fulfilling its obligations while benefiting from the counterparty's performance. But if not, the debtor will want to reject the contract, repudiating any further performance of its duties. The bankruptcy court will generally approve that choice, under the deferential "business judgment" rule. Id., at 523.

According to Section 365(g), "the rejection of an executory contract[ ] constitutes a breach of such contract." As both parties here agree, the counterparty thus has a claim against the estate for damages resulting from the debtor's nonperformance. See Brief for Petitioner 17, 19; Brief for Respondent 30-31. But such a claim is unlikely to ever be paid in full. That is because the debtor's breach is deemed to occur "immediately before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition," rather than on the actual post-petition rejection date. 365(g)(1). By thus giving the counterparty a pre-petition claim, Section 365(g) places that party in the same boat as the debtor's unsecured creditors, who in a typical bankruptcy may receive only cents on the dollar. See Bildisco, 465 U. S., at 531-532 (noting the higher priority of post-petition claims).

In this case, the Bankruptcy Court (per usual) approved Tempnology's proposed rejection of its executory licensing agreement with Mission. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 83-84. That meant, as laid out above, two things on which the parties agree. First, Tempnology could stop performing under the contract. And second, Mission could assert (for whatever it might be worth) a pre-petition claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for damages resulting from Tempnology's nonperformance.

But Tempnology thought still another consequence ensued, and it returned to the Bankruptcy Court for a declaratory judgment confirming its view. According to Tempnology, its rejection of the contract also terminated the rights it had granted Mission to use the Coolcore trademarks. Tempnology based its argument on a negative inference. See Motion in No. 15-11400 (Bkrtcy. Ct. NH), pp. 9-14. Several provisions in Section 365 state that a counterparty to specific kinds of agreements may keep exercising contractual rights after a debtor's rejection. For example, Section 365(h) provides that if a bankrupt landlord rejects a lease, the tenant need not move out; instead, she may stay and pay rent (just as she did before) until the lease term expires. And still closer to home, Section 365(n) sets out a similar rule for some types of intellectual property licenses: If the debtor-licensor rejects the agreement, the licensee can continue to use the property (typically, a patent), so long as it makes whatever payments the contract demands. But Tempnology pointed out that neither Section 365(n) nor any similar provision covers trademark licenses. So, it reasoned, in that sort of contract a different rule must apply: The debtor's rejection must extinguish the rights that the agreement had conferred on the trademark licensee. The Bankruptcy Court agreed. See In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B. R. 1 (Bkrtcy. Ct. NH 2015). It held, relying on the same "negative inference," that Tempnology's rejection of the licensing agreement revoked Mission's right to use the Coolcore marks. Id., at 7.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, relying heavily on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit about the effects of rejection on trademark licensing agreements. See In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B. R. 809, 820-823 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA1 2016); Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F. 3d 372, 376-377 (CA7 2012). Rather than reason backward from Section 365(n) or similar provisions, the Panel focused on Section 365(g)'s statement that rejection of a contract "constitutes a breach." Outside bankruptcy, the court explained, the breach of an agreement does not eliminate rights the contract had already conferred on the non-breaching party. See 559 B. R., at 820. So neither could a rejection of an agreement in bankruptcy have that effect. A rejection "convert[s]" a "debtor's unfulfilled obligations" to a pre-petition damages claim. Id., at 822 (quoting Sunbeam, 686 F. 3d, at 377). But it does not "terminate the contract" or "vaporize[ ]" the counterparty's rights. 559 B. R., at 820, 822 (quoting Sunbeam, 686 F. 3d, at 377). Mission could thus continue to use the Coolcore trademarks.

But the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the Panel's and Seventh Circuit's view, and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court decision terminating Mission's license. See In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F. 3d 389 (2018). The majority first endorsed that court's inference from Section 365(n) and similar provisions. It next reasoned that special features of trademark law counsel against allowing a licensee to retain rights to a mark after the licensing agreement's rejection. Under that body of law, the majority stated, the trademark owner's "[f]ailure to monitor and exercise [quality] control" over goods associated with a trademark "jeopardiz[es] the continued validity of [its] own trademark rights." Id., at 402. So if (the majority continued) a licensee can keep using a mark after an agreement's rejection, the licensor will need to carry on its monitoring activities. And according to the majority, that would frustrate "Congress's principal aim in providing for rejection": to "release the debtor's estate from burdensome obligations." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Torruella dissented, mainly for the Seventh Circuit's reasons. See id., at 405-407.

We granted certiorari to resolve the division between the First and Seventh Circuits. 586 U. S. ___ (2018). We now affirm the Seventh's reasoning and reverse the decision below.1

II

Before reaching the merits, we pause to consider Tempnology's claim that this case is moot. Under settled law, we may dismiss the case for that reason only if "it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever" to Mission assuming it prevails. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). That demanding standard is not met here.

Mission has presented a claim for money damages--essentially lost profits--arising from its inability to use the Coolcore trademarks between the time Tempnology rejected the licensing agreement and its scheduled expiration date. See Reply Brief 22, and n. 8. Such claims, if at all plausible, ensure a live controversy. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1978). For better or worse, nothing so shows a continuing stake in a dispute's outcome as a demand for dollars and cents. See 13C C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3533.3, p. 2 (3d ed. 2008) (Wright & Miller) ("[A] case is not moot so long as a claim for monetary relief survives"). Ultimate recovery on that demand may be uncertain or even unlikely for any number of reasons, in this case as in others. But that is of no moment. If there is any chance of money changing hands, Mission's suit remains live. See Chafin, 568 U. S., at 172.

Tempnology makes a flurry of arguments about why Mission is not entitled to damages, but none so clearly precludes recovery as to make this case moot. First, Tempnology contends that Mission suffered no injury because it "never used the trademark[s] during [the post-rejection] period." Brief for Respondent 24; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. But that gets things backward. Mission's non-use of the marks during that time is precisely what gives rise to its damages claim; had it employed the marks, it would not have lost any profits. So next, Tempnology argues that Mission's non-use was its own "choice," for which damages cannot lie. See id., at 26. But recall that the Bankruptcy Court held that Mission could not use the marks after rejection (and its decision remained in effect through the agreement's expiration). See supra, at 4. And although (as Tempnology counters) the court issued "no injunction," Brief for Respondent 26, that difference does not matter: Mission need not have flouted a crystal-clear ruling and courted yet more legal trouble to preserve its claim. Cf. 13B Wright & Miller 3533.2.2, at 852 ("[C]ompliance [with a judicial decision] does not moot [a case] if it remains possible to undo the effects of compliance," as through compensation). So last, Tempnology claims that it bears no blame (and thus should not have to pay) for Mission's injury because all it did was "ask[ ] the court to make a ruling." Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-35. But whether Tempnology did anything to Mission amounting to a legal wrong is a prototypical merits question, which no court has addressed and which has no obvious answer. That means it is no reason to find this case moot.

And so too for Tempnology's further argument that Mission will be unable to convert any judgment in its favor to hard cash. Here, Tempnology notes that the bankruptcy estate has recently distributed all of its assets, leaving nothing to satisfy Mission's judgment. See Brief for Respondent 27. But courts often adjudicate disputes whose "practical impact" is unsure at best, as when "a defendant is insolvent." Chafin, 568 U. S., at 175. And Mission notes that if it prevails, it can seek the unwinding of prior distributions to get its fair share of the estate. See Reply Brief 23. So although this suit "may not make [Mission] rich," or even better off, it remains a live controversy--allowing us to proceed. Chafin, 568 U. S., at 176.

III

What is the effect of a debtor's (or trustee's) rejection of a contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code? The parties and courts of appeals have offered us two starkly different answers. According to one view, a rejection has the same consequence as a contract breach outside bankruptcy: It gives the counterparty a claim for damages, while leaving intact the rights the counterparty has received under the contract. According to the other view, a rejection (except in a few spheres) has more the effect of a contract rescission in the non-bankruptcy world: Though also allowing a damages claim, the rejection terminates the whole agreement along with all rights it conferred. Today, we hold that both Section 365's text and fundamental principles of bankruptcy law command the first, rejection-as-breach approach. We reject the competing claim that by specifically enabling the counterparties in some contracts to retain rights after rejection, Congress showed that it wanted the counterparties in all other contracts to lose their rights. And we reject an argument for the rescission approach turning on the distinctive features of trademark licenses. Rejection of a contract--any contract--in bankruptcy operates not as a rescission but as a breach.

A

We start with the text of the Code's principal provisions on rejection--and find that it does much of the work. As noted earlier, Section 365(a) gives a debtor the option, subject to court approval, to "assume or reject any executory contract." See supra, at 2. And Section 365(g) describes what rejection means. Rejection "constitutes a breach of [an executory] contract," deemed to occur "immediately before the date of the filing of the petition." See supra, at 3. Or said more pithily for current purposes, a rejection is a breach. And "breach" is neither a defined nor a specialized bankruptcy term. It means in the Code what it means in contract law outside bankruptcy. See Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 69 (1995) (Congress generally meant for the Bankruptcy Code to "incorporate the established meaning" of "terms that have accumulated settled meaning" (internal quotation marks omitted)). So the first place to go in divining the effects of rejection is to non-bankruptcy contract law, which can tell us the effects of breach.

Consider a made-up executory contract to see how the law of breach works outside bankruptcy. A dealer leases a photocopier to a law firm, while agreeing to service it every month; in exchange, the firm commits to pay a monthly fee. During the lease term, the dealer decides to stop servicing the machine, thus breaching the agreement in a material way. The law firm now has a choice (assuming no special contract term or state law). The firm can keep up its side of the bargain, continuing to pay for use of the copier, while suing the dealer for damages from the service breach. Or the firm can call the whole deal off, halting its own payments and returning the copier, while suing for any damages incurred. See 13 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts 39:32, pp. 701-702 (4th ed. 2013) ("[W]hen a contract is breached in the course of performance, the injured party may elect to continue the contract or refuse to perform further"). But to repeat: The choice to terminate the agreement and send back the copier is for the law firm. By contrast, the dealer has no ability, based on its own breach, to terminate the agreement. Or otherwise said, the dealer cannot get back the copier just by refusing to show up for a service appointment. The contract gave the law firm continuing rights in the copier, which the dealer cannot unilaterally revoke.

And now to return to bankruptcy: If the rejection of the photocopier contract "constitutes a breach," as the Code says, then the same results should follow (save for one twist as to timing). Assume here that the dealer files a Chapter 11 petition and decides to reject its agreement with the law firm. That means, as above, that the dealer will stop servicing the copier. It means, too, that the law firm has an option about how to respond--continue the contract or walk away, while suing for whatever damages go with its choice. (Here is where the twist comes in: Because the rejection is deemed to occur "immediately before" bankruptcy, the firm's damages suit is treated as a pre-petition claim on the estate, which will likely receive only cents on the dollar. See supra, at 3.) And most important, it means that assuming the law firm wants to keep using the copier, the dealer cannot take it back. A rejection does not terminate the contract. When it occurs, the debtor and counterparty do not go back to their pre-contract positions. Instead, the counterparty retains the rights it has received under the agreement. As after a breach, so too after a rejection, those rights survive.

All of this, it will hardly surprise you to learn, is not just about photocopier leases. Sections 365(a) and (g) speak broadly, to "any executory contract[s]." Many licensing agreements involving trademarks or other property are of that kind (including, all agree, the Tempnology-Mission contract). The licensor not only grants a license, but provides associated goods or services during its term; the licensee pays continuing royalties or fees. If the licensor breaches the agreement outside bankruptcy (again, barring any special contract term or state law), everything said above goes. In particular, the breach does not revoke the license or stop the licensee from doing what it allows. See, e.g., Sunbeam, 686 F. 3d, at 376 ("Outside of bankruptcy, a licensor's breach does not terminate a licensee's right to use [the licensed] intellectual property"). And because rejection "constitutes a breach," 365(g), the same consequences follow in bankruptcy. The debtor can stop performing its remaining obligations under the agreement. But the debtor cannot rescind the license already conveyed. So the licensee can continue to do whatever the license authorizes.

In preserving those rights, Section 365 reflects a general bankruptcy rule: The estate cannot possess anything more than the debtor itself did outside bankruptcy. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 1, 15 (1924) (establishing that principle); 541(a)(1) (defining the estate to include the "interests of the debtor in property" (emphasis added)). As one bankruptcy scholar has put the point: Whatever "limitation[s] on the debtor's property [apply] outside of bankruptcy[ ] appl[y] inside of bankruptcy as well. A debtor's property does not shrink by happenstance of bankruptcy, but it does not expand, either." D. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy 97 (6th ed. 2014). So if the not-yet debtor was subject to a counterparty's contractual right (say, to retain a copier or use a trademark), so too is the trustee or debtor once the bankruptcy petition has been filed. The rejection-as-breach rule (but not the rejection-as-rescission rule) ensures that result. By insisting that the same counterparty rights survive rejection as survive breach, the rule prevents a debtor in bankruptcy from recapturing interests it had given up.

And conversely, the rejection-as-rescission approach would circumvent the Code's stringent limits on "avoidance" actions--the exceptional cases in which trustees (or debtors) may indeed unwind pre-bankruptcy transfers that undermine the bankruptcy process. The most notable example is for fraudulent conveyances--usually, something-for-nothing transfers that deplete the estate (and so cheat creditors) on the eve of bankruptcy. See 548(a). A trustee's avoidance powers are laid out in a discrete set of sections in the Code, see 544-553, far away from Section 365. And they can be invoked in only narrow circumstances--unlike the power of rejection, which may be exercised for any plausible economic reason. See, e.g., 548(a) (describing the requirements for avoiding fraudulent transfers); supra, at 2-3. If trustees (or debtors) could use rejection to rescind previously granted interests, then rejection would become functionally equivalent to avoidance. Both, that is, would roll back a prior transfer. And that result would subvert everything the Code does to keep avoidances cabined--so they do not threaten the rule that the estate can take only what the debtor possessed before filing. Again, then, core tenets of bankruptcy law push in the same direction as Section 365's text: Rejection is breach, and has only its consequences.

B

Tempnology's main argument to the contrary, here as in the courts below, rests on a negative inference. See Brief for Respondent 33-41; supra, at 3-4. Several provisions of Section 365, Tempnology notes, "identif[y] categories of contracts under which a counterparty" may retain specified contract rights "notwithstanding rejection." Brief for Respondent 34. Sections 365(h) and (i) make clear that certain purchasers and lessees of real property and timeshare interests can continue to exercise rights after a debtor has rejected the lease or sales contract. See 365(h)(1) (real-property leases); 365(i) (real-property sales contracts); 365(h)(2), (i) (timeshare interests). And Section 365(n) similarly provides that licensees of some intellectual property--but not trademarks--retain contractual rights after rejection. See 365(n); 101(35A); supra, at 4. Tempnology argues from those provisions that the ordinary consequence of rejection must be something different--i.e., the termination, rather than survival, of contractual rights previously granted. Otherwise, Tempnology concludes, the statute's "general rule" would "swallow the exceptions." Brief for Respondent 19.

But that argument pays too little heed to the main provisions governing rejection and too much to subsidiary ones. On the one hand, it offers no account of how to read Section 365(g) (recall, rejection "constitutes a breach") to say essentially its opposite (i.e., that rejection and breach have divergent consequences). On the other hand, it treats as a neat, reticulated scheme of "narrowly tailored exception[s]," id., at 36 (emphasis deleted), what history reveals to be anything but. Each of the provisions Tempnology highlights emerged at a different time, over a span of half a century. See, e.g., 52 Stat. 881 (1938) (real-property leases); 1(b), 102 Stat. 2538 (1988) (intellectual property). And each responded to a discrete problem--as often as not, correcting a judicial ruling of just the kind Tempnology urges. See Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845, 911-912, 916-919 (1988) (identifying judicial decisions that the provisions overturned); compare, e.g., In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 B. R. 612, 618-619 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SD Fla. 1982), with, e.g., 365(h)(2), (i). Read as generously as possible to Tempnology, this mash-up of legislative interventions says nothing much of anything about the content of Section 365(g)'s general rule. Read less generously, it affirmatively refutes Tempnology's rendition. As one bankruptcy scholar noted after an exhaustive review of the history: "What the legislative record [reflects] is that whenever Congress has been confronted with the consequences of the [view that rejection terminates all contractual rights], it has expressed its disapproval." Andrew, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev., at 928. On that account, Congress enacted the provisions, as and when needed, to reinforce or clarify the general rule that contractual rights survive rejection.2

Consider more closely, for example, Congress's enactment of Section 365(n), which addresses certain intellectual property licensing agreements. No one disputes how that provision came about. In Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, the Fourth Circuit held that a debtor's rejection of an executory contract worked to revoke its grant of a patent license. See 756 F. 2d 1043, 1045-1048 (1985). In other words, Lubrizol adopted the same rule for patent licenses that the First Circuit announced for trademark licenses here. Congress sprang into action, drafting Section 365(n) to reverse Lubrizol and ensure the continuation of patent (and some other intellectual property) licensees' rights. See 102 Stat. 2538 (1988); S. Rep. No. 100-505, pp. 2-4 (1988) (explaining that Section 365(n) "corrects [Lubrizol's] perception" that "Section 365 was ever intended to be a mechanism for stripping innocent licensee[s] of rights"). As Tempnology highlights, that provision does not cover trademark licensing agreements, which continue to fall, along with most other contracts, within Section 365(g)'s general rule. See Brief for Respondent 38. But what of that? Even put aside the claim that Section 365(n) is part of a pattern--that Congress whacked Tempnology's view of rejection wherever it raised its head. See supra, at 13. Still, Congress's repudiation of Lubrizol for patent contracts does not show any intent to ratify that decision's approach for almost all others. Which is to say that no negative inference arises. Congress did nothing in adding Section 365(n) to alter the natural reading of Section 365(g)--that rejection and breach have the same results.

Tempnology's remaining argument turns on the way special features of trademark law may affect the fulfillment of the Code's goals. Like the First Circuit below, Tempnology here focuses on a trademark licensor's duty to monitor and "exercise quality control over the goods and services sold" under a license. Brief for Respondent 20; see supra, at 5. Absent those efforts to keep up quality, the mark will naturally decline in value and may eventually become altogether invalid. See 3 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 18:48, pp. 18-129, 18-133 (5th ed. 2018). So (Tempnology argues) unless rejection of a trademark licensing agreement terminates the licensee's rights to use the mark, the debtor will have to choose between expending scarce resources on quality control and risking the loss of a valuable asset. See Brief for Respondent 59. "Either choice," Tempnology concludes, "would impede a [debtor's] ability to reorganize," thus "undermining a fundamental purpose of the Code." Id., at 59-60.

To begin with, that argument is a mismatch with Tempnology's reading of Section 365. The argument is trademark-specific. But Tempnology's reading of Section 365 is not. Remember, Tempnology construes that section to mean that a debtor's rejection of a contract terminates the counterparty's rights "unless the contract falls within an express statutory exception." Id., at 27-28; see supra, at 12. That construction treats trademark agreements identically to most other contracts; the only agreements getting different treatment are those falling within the discrete provisions just discussed. And indeed, Tempnology could not have discovered, however hard it looked, any trademark-specific rule in Section 365. That section's special provisions, as all agree, do not mention trademarks; and the general provisions speak, well, generally. So Tempnology is essentially arguing that distinctive features of trademarks should persuade us to adopt a construction of Section 365 that will govern not just trademark agreements, but pretty nearly every executory contract. However serious Tempnology's trademark-related concerns, that would allow the tail to wag the Doberman.

And even putting aside that incongruity, Tempnology's plea to facilitate trademark licensors' reorganizations cannot overcome what Sections 365(a) and (g) direct. The Code of course aims to make reorganizations possible. But it does not permit anything and everything that might advance that goal. See, e.g., Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 51 (2008) (observing that in enacting Chapter 11, Congress did not have "a single purpose," but "str[uck] a balance" among multiple competing interests (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, Section 365 provides a debtor like Tempnology with a powerful tool: Through rejection, the debtor can escape all of its future contract obligations, without having to pay much of anything in return. See supra, at 3. But in allowing rejection of those contractual duties, Section 365 does not grant the debtor an exemption from all the burdens that generally applicable law--whether involving contracts or trademarks--imposes on property owners. See 28 U. S. C. 959(b) (requiring a trustee to manage the estate in accordance with applicable law). Nor does Section 365 relieve the debtor of the need, against the backdrop of that law, to make economic decisions about preserving the estate's value--such as whether to invest the resources needed to maintain a trademark. In thus delineating the burdens that a debtor may and may not escape, Congress also weighed (among other things) the legitimate interests and expectations of the debtor's counterparties. The resulting balance may indeed impede some reorganizations, of trademark licensors and others. But that is only to say that Section 365's edict that rejection is breach expresses a more complex set of aims than Tempnology acknowledges.

IV

For the reasons stated above, we hold that under Section 365, a debtor's rejection of an executory contract in bankruptcy has the same effect as a breach outside bankruptcy. Such an act cannot rescind rights that the contract previously granted. Here, that construction of Section 365 means that the debtor-licensor's rejection cannot revoke the trademark license.

We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Sotomayor, concurring.

I agree with the Court that a debtor's choice to reject an executory contact under 11 U. S. C. 365(a) functions as a breach of the contract rather than unwinding the rejected contract as if it never existed. Ante, at 8-10. This result follows from traditional bankruptcy principles and from the general rule set out in 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. I also agree that no specific aspects of trademark law compel a contrary rule that equates rejection with rescission. I therefore join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to highlight two potentially significant features of today's holding.

First, the Court does not decide that every trademark licensee has the unfettered right to continue using licensed marks postrejection. The Court granted certiorari to decide whether rejection "terminates rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor's breach under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Pet. for Cert. i. The answer is no, for the reasons the Court explains. But the baseline inquiry remains whether the licensee's rights would survive a breach under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Special terms in a licensing contract or state law could bear on that question in individual cases. See ante, at 9-10; Brief for American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae 20-25 (discussing examples of contract terms that could potentially lead a bankruptcy court to limit licensee rights postrejection).

Second, the Court's holding confirms that trademark licensees' postrejection rights and remedies are more expansive in some respects than those possessed by licensees of other types of intellectual property. Those variances stem from 365(n), one of several subject-specific provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that "embellis[h] on or twea[k]" the general rejection rule. Ante, at 13, n. 2. Section 365(n)--which applies to patents, copyrights, and four other types of intellectual property, but not to trademarks, 101(35A)--alters the general rejection rule in several respects. For example, a covered licensee that chooses to retain its rights postrejection must make all of its royalty payments; the licensee has no right to deduct damages from its payments even if it otherwise could have done so under nonbankruptcy law. 365(n)(2)(C)(i). This provision and others in 365(n) mean that the covered intellectual property types are governed by different rules than trademark licenses.

Although these differences may prove significant for individual licensors and licensees, they do not alter the outcome here. The Court rightly rejects Tempnology's argument that the presence of 365(n) changes what 365(g) says. As the Senate Report accompanying 365(n) explained, the bill did not "address or intend any inference to be drawn concerning the treatment of executory contracts" under 365's general rule. S. Rep. No. 100-505, p. 5 (1988); see ante, at 14. To the extent trademark licensees are treated differently from licensees of other forms of intellectual property, that outcome leaves Congress with the option to tailor a provision for trademark licenses, as it has repeatedly in other contexts. See ante, at 13-14.

With these observations, I join the Court's opinion.

Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.

This Court is not in the business of deciding abstract questions, no matter how interesting. Under the Constitution, our power extends only to deciding "Cases" and "Controversies" where the outcome matters to real parties in the real world. Art. III, 2. Because it's unclear whether we have anything like that here, I would dismiss the petition as improvidently granted.

This case began when Mission licensed the right to use certain of Tempnology's trademarks. After Tempnology entered bankruptcy, it sought and won from a bankruptcy court an order declaring that Mission could no longer use those trademarks

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. On appeal and now in this Court, Mission seeks a ruling that the bankruptcy court's declaration was wrong. But whoever is right about that, it isn't clear how it would make a difference: After the bank-ruptcy court ruled, the license agreement expired by its own terms, so nothing we might say here could restore Mission's ability to use Tempnology's trademarks. Recognizing that its original case seems to have become moot, Mission attempts an alternative theory in briefing before us. Now Mission says that if it prevails here it will, on remand, seek money damages from Tempnology's estate for the profits it lost when, out of respect for the bankruptcy court's order, it refrained from using the trademarks while its license still existed. But it's far from clear whether even this theory can keep the case alive. A damages claim "suffices to avoid mootness only if viable," which means damages must at least be "legally available for [the alleged] wrong." 13C C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3533.3, p. 22 (3d ed. 2008). Yet, as far as Mission has told us, Tempnology did nothing that could lawfully give rise to a damages claim. After all, when Tempnology asked the bankruptcy court to issue a declaratory ruling on a question of law, it was exercising its protected "First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances." Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741 (1983). And petitioning a court normally isn't an actionable wrong that can give rise to a claim for damages. Absent a claim of malice (which Mission hasn't suggested would have any basis here), the ordinary rule is that " 'no action lies against a party for resort to civil courts' " or for "the assertion of a legal argument." Lucsik v. Board of Ed. of Brunswick City School Dist., 621 F. 2d 841, 842 (CA6 1980) (per curiam); see, e.g., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757, 770, n. 14 (1983); Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433, 437-438 (1882). Maybe Mission's able lawyers will conjure something better on remand. But, so far at least, the company hasn't come close to articulating a viable legal theory on which a claim for damages could succeed. And where our jurisdiction is so much in doubt, I would decline to proceed to the merits. If the legal questions here are of sufficient importance, a live case presenting them will come along soon enough; there is no need to press the bounds of our constitutional authority to reach them today. --------------------------------------- Footnotes Footnote 1 In its briefing before this Court, Mission contends that its exclusive distribution rights survived the licensing agreement's rejection for the same reason as its trademark rights did. See Brief for Petitioner 40-44; supra, at 2. But the First Circuit held that Mission had waived that argument, see 879 F. 3d, at 401, and we have no reason to doubt that conclusion. Our decision thus affects only Mission's trademark rights. Footnote 2 At the same time, Congress took the opportunity when drafting those provisions to fill in certain details, generally left to state law, about the post-rejection relationship between the debtor and counterparty. See, e.g., Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845, 903, n. 200 (1988) (describing Congress's addition of subsidiary rules for real property leases in Section 365(h)); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29 (noting that Congress similarly set out detailed rules for patent licenses in Section 365(n)). The provisions are therefore not redundant of Section 365(g): Each sets out a remedial scheme embellishing on or tweaking the general rejection-as-breach rule.
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