w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n



Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd., Through Its Managing Director, Madurai v/s M. Peter & Others


Company & Directors' Information:- J P P MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ2003PTC010491

Company & Directors' Information:- K P N TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ2006PTC013048

Company & Directors' Information:- A R C MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ1994PTC004845

Company & Directors' Information:- D C MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U25199KL1996PTC009988

Company & Directors' Information:- B D TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17100MH1988PTC046822

Company & Directors' Information:- R A MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ2006PTC013248

Company & Directors' Information:- S M TEXTILE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ1990PLC002780

Company & Directors' Information:- P G TEXTILE MILLS LTD [Under Liquidation] CIN = U99999GJ1970PLC001724

Company & Directors' Information:- M H TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17120DL1994PTC057924

Company & Directors' Information:- M T A MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17115TZ1989PTC003048

Company & Directors' Information:- K S S TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ2005PTC011609

Company & Directors' Information:- D C TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17100MH1988PTC046811

Company & Directors' Information:- M P TEXTILE PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U17124AS1998PTC005297

Company & Directors' Information:- V M MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ2005PTC011763

Company & Directors' Information:- V E S TEXTILE COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ1994PTC005539

Company & Directors' Information:- S. S. MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U24231GJ1988PTC010885

Company & Directors' Information:- K P S TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17111TZ1995PTC006248

Company & Directors' Information:- B R G TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17111TZ1994PTC005358

Company & Directors' Information:- R B MILLS PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U15141AS1949PTC001939

Company & Directors' Information:- THE MAHALAKSHMI TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED [Active] CIN = U99999TN1925PLC001605

Company & Directors' Information:- A R S TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ1986PTC001739

Company & Directors' Information:- V-ON TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17111TN2006PTC060502

Company & Directors' Information:- V P R TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17111TZ2001PTC009623

Company & Directors' Information:- R L B TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17290PN2011PTC139830

Company & Directors' Information:- S K TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U18109DL2013PTC253544

Company & Directors' Information:- A P J TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17111DL2005PTC143831

Company & Directors' Information:- V N V TEXTILE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17111TZ2005PTC011695

Company & Directors' Information:- B T MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U18101MH1997PTC109479

Company & Directors' Information:- J T TEXTILE PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U18101HR1996PTC032972

Company & Directors' Information:- J K MILLS LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U17200WB1946PLC013603

Company & Directors' Information:- G N TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17116GJ2003PTC042654

Company & Directors' Information:- A B T MADURAI PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U50102TZ2002PTC010086

Company & Directors' Information:- G M MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Amalgamated] CIN = U18101MH2003PTC138487

Company & Directors' Information:- C AND C TEXTILE PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U74999MH1991PTC060853

Company & Directors' Information:- B R A TEXTILE PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U17116PN1981PTC023770

Company & Directors' Information:- TEXTILE (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17111UP1975PTC004207

Company & Directors' Information:- A K R TEXTILE MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17111TZ2009PTC014985

Company & Directors' Information:- V. B. TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17309DL2016PTC302347

Company & Directors' Information:- R R M TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U17123GJ2015PTC081690

Company & Directors' Information:- D N TEXTILE PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U52321TN1995PTC033866

Company & Directors' Information:- TEXTILE CORPORATION LIMITED [Dissolved] CIN = U99999MH1943PLC007561

    C.R.P.(MD) Nos. 863 & 890 of 2013 & Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 2086 of 2015 & M.P.(MD) No. 1 of 2015

    Decided On, 01 April 2021

    At, Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. SUBRAMANIAN

    For the Petitioner: Chitra Sampath, Senior Counsel, R.V. Rajkumar, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1, R2, V. Anand, F. Deepak, R3, J. Barathan, N. Dilip Kumar, Advocates.



Judgment Text

(Prayer: C.R.P.(MD) No.890 of 2013: Civil Revision Petition is filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the Order, dated 26.4.2013 passed in the Application in E.A. No.132 of 2013 in E.A. No.942 of 2008 in E.A. No.844 of 2008 in E.P. No.315 of 2000 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Court, Madurai.C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013: Civil Revision Petition is filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the fair and Decretal Order passed in E.A. No.132 of 2013 in E.A. No.942 of 2008 in E.A. No.844 of 2008 in E.P. No.315 of 2000 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Court, Madurai.Crl.O.P.(MD) No.2086 of 2015: Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the First Information Report in Crime No.54 of 2014 on the file of the First Respondent.)1. The two Civil Revision Petitions arise out of the proceedings in execution of the Decree in O.S. No.421 of 1982. Criminal Original Petition in Crl.O.P. No.2086 of 2015 is for quashing a First Information Report lodged against the Petitioners for certain offences in relation to execution of certain documents concerning the affairs of a Company namely, Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Limited, which is shown as the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.890 of 2013.2. The facts that led to filing of the Civil Revision Petitions are as follows:One M.S.S.V. Kirhnammaraja Cotton Sales Company and its Partners, who are arrayed as the Second Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013/the Third Respondent in C.R.P(MD) No.890 of 2013 filed a Suit for Recovery of money in O.S. No.421 of of 1982 against one Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd., represented by its Managing Director. The Suit came to be decreed on 18.6.1997. There was an attachment before Judgment in I.A. No.754 of 1982 that was effected on 13.11.1982 and made absolute on 19.3.1983. The Plaintiff/Decree-holder sought execution of the Decree in E.P. No.315 of 2000 by sale of the factory premises of the Judgment-debtor. Originally, a sale was ordered on 29.10.2001 by fixing the Court value at Rs.50,00,000. The same was consistently reduced and the property was sold eventually to the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 on 25.8.2008. The sale was also confirmed on 21.1.2008. Thereafter an Application in E.A. No.844 of 2008 was filed by the Petitioner in C.R.P(MD) No.863 of 2013 seeking delivery. At that stage, several Claim Petitions came to be filed by various persons including Statutory Corporations/Authorities as well as Labour Unions making various claims against the property.3. We are only concerned with one of those Claim Petitions in E.A. No.942 of 2008 in these Revisions. It is not in dispute that the other Claim Petitions were either dismissed or disposed of as settled out of Court. E.A. No.942 of 2008 was eventually dismissed for default on 29.4.2010. Upon dismissal, the Execution Court ordered delivery on 29.4.2010 and the same was effected on 14.5.2010. The Executing Court recorded delivery on 28.6.2010. The First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013, who was the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008, sought for restoration of the said Application and the same was allowed. The Order of Delivery was recalled.4. The said Order recalling the Order of Delivery was challenged in C.R.P.(MD) No.1840 of 2010 before this Court. This Court set aside the Order recalling delivery while sustaining restoration of E.A. No.942 of 2008. The Trial Court was directed to dispose of E.A. No.942 of 2008 within a specific time frame. E.A. No.942 of 2008 was filed by the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 claiming under a Memorandum of Understanding said to have been entered into between him and one Lakshmanan, who represented the Judgment-debtor namely Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd., on 13.10.2004. It appears that there were several proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India relating to the Memorandum of Understanding. This Court, by its Order, dated 8.9.2008 made in W.P.(MD) No.2603 of 2008, held that the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004 is illegal or non-est in the eye of law and cannot be relied upon for any purpose. Again, in W.P.(MD) No.10157 of 2010, this Court had held that the First Respondent in the Revision namely, the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 does not have locus standi to represent the Company namely, the Judgment-debtor. The Order made in W.P.(MD) No.2603 of 2008 concluding that the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004 is invalid was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.(MD) No.720 of 2008. A review of the Order in W.A.(MD) No.720 of 2008 also came to be dismissed by the Division Bench on 21.9.2012.5. Taking advantage of the conclusions reached in the Writ proceedings regarding the validity of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004, the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 filed an Application in E.A. No.132 of 2013 seeking rejection of the Application in E.A. No.942 of 2008 as not maintainable. This was resisted by the First Respondent contending that de hors the finding regarding the validity or otherwise of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004, he would be entitled to maintain the Application in view of Sections 69 & 70 of the Indian Contract Act. Several alleged irregularities in the Sale proceedings in E.P. No.No.315 of 2000 were also pointed out to buttress the contention that the sale itself is a result of a fraudulent collusion between the Auction Purchaser and the Staff of the Court.6. Aid of Order 21, Rule 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also invoked to claim that the sale would be amount to excess execution. A vast extent was sold for realization of a debt of about Rs.3,62,266. Inadequacy of Sale price was also cited as a reason for setting aside the sale. The Executing Court, which heard the Application in E.A. No.132 of 2013, had not only examined the locus standi of the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 to maintain the Application but went into the merits of the Application in E.A. No.942 of 2008 and concluded that the sale itself is bad. The Executing Court, without any evidence on record, concluded that the sale is in violation of provisions of Order 21, Rule 64, C.P.C. and also held that the sale is materially irregular. The Executing Court also upheld the locus standi of the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 and dismissed E.A. No.132 of 2013. It is this Order namely, the Order dismissing E.A. No.132 of 2013 is the subject matter of challenge in both the Revisions one by the Auction Purchaser and other by the Judgment-debtor itself.7. No doubt, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 would submit that he would question the locus standi of the person, who claims to be the Managing Director of the Judgment-debtor in C.R.P(MD) No.890 of 2013. I do not propose to go into the said controversy as the same Petitioner has filed the Criminal Original Petition also. I would be overstepping if I decide on the locus standi of the person, who had claimed to be representing the Company namely, Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd in C.R.P.(MD) No.890 of 2013. I, therefore, confine myself to the claims and Counter-claims in E.A. No.132 of 2013.8. I have heard Mrs. Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. R.V. Rajkumar for the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 and the Second Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.890 of 2013, Mr. J. Barathan, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No. 890 of 2013 and the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.2086 of 2015 and the Third Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013, Mr. V .Anand, learned counsel appearing for the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 and the Second Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.890 of 2013 and Mr. N. Dilip Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Second Respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.2086 of 2015.9. Mrs. Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in C.R.P(MD) No.863 of 2013 would vehemently contend that the Application in E.A. No.942 of 2008 at the instance of the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 itself is not maintainable. She would further contend that the Application in any sense is barred by limitation. She would also submit that the Executing Court exceeded its limit and erred in going into the merits of E.A. No.942 of 2008 even while deciding the Application in E.A. No.132 of 2013. Drawing my attention to the conclusion of the Writ Court in W.P.(MD) No.10157 of 2010, W.P.(MD) No.2603 of 2008 and W.A.(MD) No.720 of 2008, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 has no locus standi to maintain the Application for setting aside the sale in execution of the Decree.10. Mr. J. Bharathan, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.890 of 2013 would substantially support the case of the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 for the present only on the question of locus standi of the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008. He would further submit that the Application questioning the sale on the same ground is pending before the Executing Court and therefore, he is not on the same page with the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 on the merits of E.A. No.942 of 2008.11. Contending contra, Mr. V. Anand, learned Counsel appearing for the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013, who is the Second Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.890 of 2013 would vehemently contend that the Application for setting aside the sale filed by him is perfectly maintainable and he is entitled to maintain such Application as a person whose interests will be affected by the sale.12. Drawing my attention to the language of Order 21, Rule 90 of C.P.C. Mr. V. Anand, learned Counsel appearing for the First Respondent would submit that any person whose interests are affected by the sale may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. Drawing inspiration from the words “whose interests will be affected by the sale”, Mr. V. Anand would submit that since he has paid moneys payable by the Judgment-debtor Company under the orders of this Court, he is entitled to maintain the Application to set aside the sale de hors the Order of the Court that the Memorandum of Understanding under which he claims to be interested in the affairs of the Company has been held to be invalid by this Court.13. I have considered the rival submissions.14. Though the learned Counsel on either side had argued on the merits of E.A. No.942 of 2008, I do not propose to go into the merits or demerits of the Application on the grounds that are available for setting aside the sale in execution. If I do so, I will be committing the same mistake that the Trial Court has committed in going into the merits of the Application while considering the Application for striking of E.A. No.942 of 2008.15. The prayer in E.A. No.132 of 2013 against which these Revisions arise is to dismiss E.A. No.942 of 2008 as not maintainable, since it has been filed by the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 solely based on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004 which has been found to be invalid and illegal by this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to decide the locus standi of the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 to challenge the sale, his capacity to challenge the same assumes significance. In terms of Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., the sale in execution of the Decree can be questioned by the Decree-holder, the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. There could be no doubt that the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 will not come under any one of the first three categories. It has to be seen as to whether he could be termed as “a person whose rights will be affected by the sale” in order to enable him to maintain E.A. No.942 of 2008 to set aside the sale.16. In this connection, Mrs. Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 would rely upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in M.R.R.M. Murugappa Chetiar v. Kannammai Aachi, 1958 (2) MLJ 461, wherein the scope of very words that "any person whose interests will be affected by the sale" was considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench. The Division Bench considered locus standi of a Decree-holder, who had not taken any step in execution of the Decree to seek to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90, of C.P.C. While doing so, the Division Bench has observed as follows:"This Appeal raises an interesting question of law which we think can be answered by a reference to the principle of the Full Bench decision in Ayyappa v. Kasiperumal Nayakar, ILR1939 Mad 374: AIR 1939 Mad 250. The question is whether a Creditor, who has obtained a Decree against a Debtor, whose property has been sold in execution of a Decree obtained by another Creditor can apply to have the sale set aside under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. Of course if the Applicant is not only the holder of another Decree but also had applied for rateable distribution of assets or taken steps which would entitle him to such a rateable distribution, then he would have the right to apply; but in the present case admittedly the Decree-holder who is the Appellant before us, has not taken any step in execution. He will not, therefore, be a person entitled to a share in the rateable distribution of assets. Then it only remains to consider whether he can he said to be a person, whose interests are affected by the sale. The words are indeed very wide and on a literal construction of the words not only Decree-holders but even ordinary Creditors, who have not yet sought to enforce their claims can be said to be affected by the sale of any of the properties of their debtor. Indeed any one who has a prospective claim which can be satisfied by a sale of the properties of a person against whom he has the claim can he said to be a person, whose interests are affected by the sale of such property. We have no hesitation in holding that this wide construction was not contemplated by the words. The interests which are alleged to be affected by the sale should be interests which are directly and immediately likely to be affected and not interests which may hypothetically and remotely be affected by the sale. It is on this principle that the decision of the Full Bench, in Ayyappa v. Kasiperumal Maykar, ILR 1939 Mad 374: AIR 1939 Mad 250, was based. In that case, a person, who had obtained an Attachment before Judgment was held to be a person whose interests were affected within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., when the property attached had been sold in execution of a decree obtained by another person. One of the points which was decided by the Full Bench was that the expression "interests" cannot be confined to interest in the property but would comprise any kind of pecuniary benefit that the Appellant is likely to have derived if the sale had not taken place. To this extent the learned Judges of the Full Bench overruled the decision of a Division Bench in Kathiresan Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar, 27 Mad LJ 302: AIR 1915 Mad 541 (2), which was founded on the view that "interests" referred to interests in the property sold. It may be mentioned that the actual decision in Kathiresan Chettiar v. Ramsawami Chettiar, 27 Mad LJ 302: AIR 1915 Mad 541 (2), is quite in consonance with the ruling of the Full Bench because the Appellant in that case was a mere Decree-holder, who was not entitled to rateable distribution and therefore, he was not entitled to apply."17. The learned Senior Counsel would also rely upon the Judgment of this Court in S.K. Sundaram v. M. Jothi Rajamannar Chettiar and others, 1972 (2) MLJ 433, wherein this Court had considered locus standi of a Decree-holder to file an Application under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. After referring to the Judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Sailappan v. Subbiah Pillai, 1962 (2) MLJ 493, this Court has held as follows:"2. Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, describes the persons, who may apply to the Court to set aside the sale as the Decree-holder or any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets or whose interests are affected by the sale. Clearly some limitation must be placed on the words "whose interests are affected by the sale". It will be noted that even a person, who has obtained a Decree against the Judgment-debtors, cannot come within the second phrase "any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets", unless he has filed an Execution Petition. When even the right of the person, who has obtained a Decree is hedged in by such a restriction, it stands to reason that a mere Creditor like the Petitioner herein, who has not even obtained a Decree and who has not filed any Execution Petition, cannot claim, to be a person, whose interests are affected by the sale."18. The learned Judge, who decided S.K. Sundaram v. M. Jothi Rajamannar Chettiar and others, 1972 (2) MLJ 433, also referred to and followed the Judgment of the Division Bench reported in M.R.R.M. Murugappa Chetiar v. Kannammai Aachi, 1958 (2) MLJ 461, referred to supra.19. The learned Senior Counsel would also draw my attention to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in reported in Ganpat Sangh (dead) by L.Rs. v. Kailash Shankar and others, 1987 (3) SCC 146, to contend that the Application under Order 21, Rules 89, 90 or 91, C.P.C is not maintainable after confirmation of sale.20. As already pointed out, I do not propose to go into the merits or demerits of E.A. No.942 of 2008 as these Revisions are only against the Orders passed in E.A. No.132 of 2013, which is an Application seeking the Court to reject E.A. No.942 of 2008 as not maintainable at the instance of the Petitioners herein. Reliance was also placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the Judgment of this Court in Saminathan v. Manager, State Bank of India, Aravakurichi, Karur District, 2010 (1) MWN (Civil) 209, wherein again this Court has considered whether the Judgment-debtor could raise a question of validity of the sale on the ground that it is in violation of Order 21, Rule 64, C.P.C. without having filed any Application under Order 21, Rules 89 or 90, C.P.C at the later stage of execution. Even this Judgment in my opinion travels beyond the scope of these Revisions.21. Mr. V. Anand, learned Counsel appearing for the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 namely, the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 would contend that in view of the provisions of Sections 65, 69 & 70 of the Indian Contract Act, the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 would be “a person, whose interests are affected by the sale” within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 90 of C.P.C. I do not think that the said contention of the learned Counsel for the First Respondent could be accepted. Section 65 of the Contract Act imposes an obligation on any person, who has received advantage under a void Agreement to restore it. It is not the case here. The Auction Purchaser or the Decree-holder who had brought the property to sale had not received any advantage under an Agreement, which is declared to be void. In fact, the finding of the Writ Court on the validity of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004 is that the person, who has entered into the said Agreement i.e. the Memorandum of Understanding has no locus standi to represent the Judgment-debtor Company with whom the Memorandum of Understanding is said to have been entered into. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Judgment-debtor had received certain advantage. Mr. V. Anand, learned Counsel would try to justify his claim by contending that he has paid certain moneys to certain Statutory Corporations on the directions of this Court. Those were all Interim Orders, which were passed by the consent of the parties or when there was no opposition. The Petitioner herein was not made as a party to any of those proceedings. Therefore, he cannot be prejudiced by Orders passed behind his back. May be the First Respondent has paid monies to the person, who had induced him to enter into the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004 and they had received certain advantage. But that by itself would not give him a right to question the sale in execution of the Decree.22. Adverting to the claim based on Section 69 of the Contract Act, the said provision enables a person, who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay and therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by other. I do not think that the First Respondent would fall within the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Contract Act, which specifies that a person, who has paid money which another is bound to pay. Therefore, Section 69 of the Contract Act would not enable the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 to claim her right to seek to set aside the sale.23. Section 70 of the Contract Act relied upon by the learned Counsel for the First Respondent would also be of no avail since Section 70 would also impose an obligation on a person, who enjoys the benefit of gratuitous act which is done lawfully. Even according to the First Respondent/Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 the acts done by him namely the payment made by him were pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004. Once this Court had held that the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 13.10.2004 itself is invalid, for want of capacity of the executants, then, it cannot be said that payments made by him were done lawfully. The Petitioner namely the auction purchaser has not enjoyed the benefit of such non-gratuitous act. Therefore, in the light of the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M.R.R.M. Murugappa Chetiar v. Kannammai Aachi, 1958 (2) MLJ 461, I do not think that the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008/the First Respondent in C.R.P.(MD) No.863 of 2013 could be termed as the person, whose interest is affected by the sale within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C to enable him to seek to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C.24. Mr. Anand, would also place reliance on the Judgment of this Court in Subbulakshmi Ammal v. R. Balasubramanian and 31 others, 1996 (2) LW 728, wherein this Court had held that the purchaser from the Administrator, who had not taken the Sale Deed would be entitled to maintain an Application under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. This Court had held that merely because the purchaser from the Administrator had not taken the Sale Deed she cannot be construed to be a person whose interests will not be affected by the sale. This Court found that the sale by the Administrator was also confirmed by the Court and what remains was that only the Administrative act of execution of the Sale Deed. Therefore, the purchaser from the Administrator was construed to be a person, who could come within the scope and ambit of the words 'person whose interest will be affected by the sale'.25. I do not think that the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 could be equated to be a purchaser from the Administrator. As pointed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in M.R.R.M. Murugappa Chetiar v. Kannammai Aachi, 1958 (2) MLJ 461, the words 'person whose interests will be affected by such sale' cannot be given a wide meaning so as to include any person, who claims to have some fraction of an interest including the Creditor or Decree-holder, who has not taken any steps in execution of the Decree. Therefore, even assuming that the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 has made a certain payments on behalf of the Judgment-debtor Company or the other Creditors of the Judgment-debtor Company, he cannot be construed as a person, who would be entitled to apply for setting aside the sale in execution of a Decree obtained by a third person. I am therefore of the considered opinion that the Petitioner in E.A. No.942 of 2008 has no locus standi to maintain an Application for setting aside the sale. Therefore, the two Civil Revision Petitions are allowed. The Order of the Executing Court dismissing E.A. No.132 of 2013 is set aside. E.A. No.132 of 2013 will stand allowed. As a consequence, E.A. No.942 of 2008 will stand dismissed.26. Coming to the Criminal Original Petition seeking to quash the First Information Report, the First Information Report has been filed under Sections 468, 461, 420 r/w 34 of IPC as against the Petitioners therein namely one Alagusundaram and two others. The grounds that are available to the persons, who seek to quash the First Information Report are no longer res intergra.27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604, has set out the grounds that are available to a person against whom an First Information Report has been filed to seek quashing of the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had concluded that the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be exercised either to prevent abuse of process of Court or to secure ends of justice. In State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had also pointed out the circumstances under which First Information Report could be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In doing so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:“(i) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report on the Complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused.(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and the materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an Order of the Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR on Complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused.(iv) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an Order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.(v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or Complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused.(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a Criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.(vii) Where a Criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

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instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”This Judgment has been repeatedly followed and reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various subsequent decisions.28. No doubt, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in the Criminal Original Petition would contend that basically Civil disputes are sought to be converted as a Criminal case through the impugned First Information Report and therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. A reading of the First Information Report would show that certain ingredients of offences under the charging provisions namely Sections 468, 471 & 420 r/w 34 of IPC have been made out. The test is whether ingredients of the offences have been made out and not whether the Accused would be finally convicted. As pointed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case, it cannot be said that the allegations in the First Information Report or the Complaint was inherently improbable. Therefore, I do not think that the Petitioners have made out a case for quashing the First Information Report as such.29. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel in Madras Cricket Club and others v. M. Subbaiah, 2010 (3) MLJ Crl. 52, arises out of a case, where offences are under the Companies Act. Therefore, I do think the principles stated therein could be applied to the facts of the case on hand.30. In the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Soundaram v. P.K. Pounraj, 2014 (10) SCC 616, and another the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of Court and secure the ends of justice. While doing so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as follows:“13. The inherent power should not be exercised to strifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless the are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the Complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance.14. At this stage the High Court cannot analyse and conviction or acquittal. This is not the stage to decide whether there is any truth in the allegations made but to form an opinion whether on the basis of the allegation a cognizable offence or offenes alleged has been prima facie made out. The guilt or otherwise of the Accused can be proved only after conducting a full-fledged trial.”31. In view of the above pronouncements, I do not think that the First Information Report in Crime No.54 of 2014 could be quashed invoking the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In the light of the above, Criminal Original Petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
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