1. The petitioners in these Writ petitions are residents of Agatti Island in the Union Territory of Lakshadweep. They have approached this Court being aggrieved by Exhibit P13 fax message sent by the Deputy Collector (HQ) to the 3rd respondent wherein the said authority has been directed to take expeditious steps to dispossess the petitioners from the land in their possession for the purpose of constructing a ‘Beach Road’ from the northern end of the Agatti Island to the Southern Side of the Island all along the western shore.
2. The petitioners contend that their registered holdings abut the sea on the western side and according to them, the accretions on the western side of their property form part of their registered holding and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same since time immemorial. They also contend that their possession of the accretions has been confirmed by the proceedings taken under various regulations applicable to the Union Territory of Lakshadweep. According to the petitioners, if the respondents intend to acquire their properties for the construction of the beach road, they have no other alternative but to acquire the property by complying with the procedure established by law.
3. The petitioners state that a person by name E.P. Firoz Koya filed a Public Interest Litigation contending that the construction of the beach road is contrary to the terms of the approved Integrated Island Management Plan (IIMP for short) since the construction was being carried out without leaving the requisite clearance as per the approved plan. A Division Bench of this Court, after hearing the litigant and the Lakshadweep Administration, dismissed the Writ Petition against which Special Leave Petition has been preferred before the Apex Court which is pending adjudication. While dismissing the Writ petition, this Court had held that the remedy of the objectors lies before the Civil Court as the proceedings initiated by the Administration pursuant to directions issued by this Court in an earlier Writ Petition under the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 (‘LMA Regulation’ for short) had become final and was not subjected to any challenge. The said order has been challenged before the Apex Court and is pending.
4. The petitioners state that several suits were instituted by persons similarly placed as the petitioners seeking injunction before the Sub Court, Amini, and when the application seeking injunction was dismissed, the plaintiffs took up the matter before the District Court, Kavaratti, which Court was pleased to grant them interim relief. Copies of such orders are produced as Exhibits P3 to P7. The petitioners state that they intend to approach the Civil Court and have issued notice to the Administration under Section 80 of the C.P.C. However, due to the lack of transportation facilities, they are not in a position to approach the Civil Court and establish their rights. It is further stated that right to property is a constitutional as well a human right and as steps are being initiated on a war footing basis to construct the beach road, they have no other alternative but to approach this Court to protect their property rights. It is based on these prefatory facts that the petitioners have approached this Court seeking to quash Exhibit P13 and also for directing the respondents from dispossessing the petitioners from the land abutting their registered land beyond and towards the sea on the western side in Agatti Island of the Union territory of Lakshadweep.
5. The respondents 2 to 4 have filed a detailed counter affidavit controverting the contentions raised by the petitioners. Their specific contention is that the petitioners have suppressed material facts and have approached this Court concealing the previous proceedings and also the fact that the rights of the parties including the petitioners were conclusively and finally decided in such proceedings. They state that some of the petitioners have been consistently raising claims over the accreted land adjoining their properties in Agatti Island for the past several years. The petitioners 1, 2, 4, and 5 in W.P. (C) No. 12567 of 2020 had approached Court challenging the eviction notices issued by the Collector and had filed W.P. (C) No. 11285 of 2015 and 11298 of 2015. This Court by judgment dated 26.10.2015 directed the administration to finalise the proceedings pending before the Collector under Regulation 11 (3) of the LMA Regulation. As per the said regulation, the Collector is empowered to decide disputes over any property between the Government and private individuals, and the decision taken by the said authority is regarded as final subject to the provisions of the Regulation. Pursuant to the judgment of this Court, notices were issued to the petitioner as well as other objectors of the island road and all of them had appeared before the Collector and they were heard in detail and the contentions were considered and the claims were rejected by Exhibit R2 (b) and Exhibit R2 (c). The said orders were passed on 4.3.2016, which insofar as the accreted lands are considered seals the issue. As per regulation (4), the persons aggrieved by the order of the Collector could have preferred a Civil Suit within a period of 6 months from the date of such order. However, the petitioners did not approach the Civil Court as per the regulations. They could also have preferred an appeal before the Administrator under regulation 78 (1) (d) before the Administrator within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. As the petitioners who were parties to the proceedings of the Collector under regulation 11 (3) did not choose to challenge the said order invoking the remedies provided therein, they cannot raise any further claims or invoke the powers under Section 9 of the C.P.C. in view of regulation 112 which says that no suit or other proceeding shall, unless otherwise expressly provided in this regulation, lie or be instituted in any Civil Court with respect to any matter arising under and provided for by the regulation. According to the respondents, the petitioners were under a solemn obligation to candidly disclose the above fact in this Writ petition as it was a fact which had a material bearing on the adjudication of facts raised in this case. It is contended that since these material facts are suppressed with malafide intention the writ petition is liable to be rejected on that count alone.
6. It is further stated that the time for the institution of the suit as well as the appeal has become barred by limitation, no Writ Petition is liable to be entertained. It is further stated that as the regulations do not permit the Appellate Authority to entertain an appeal after the claim had become time-barred, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be made applicable. Now that the remedies available to the objectors have come to an end, they cannot approach this Court and seek to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
7. It is further stated that the right of the Government over the newly formed land is a right arising from the Regulations and the dispute regarding the same has been decided by the Collector as per the Regulations. In that view of the matter, further claims cannot be entertained in view of Regulation 112 of the LMA Regulations.
8. The respondents in their statement denied that the petitioners are in possession of any extent of accreted land as contended by them in the petition. They also state that as per Regulation 11 (1) all lands, public roads, lanes and paths and bridges, tanks, ditches, dikes and fences on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high- water mark and all standing or flowing water and all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto which are not the property of any person have been declared to be the property of the Government as per the Regulations, the high-water mark has been explained to mean the highest point reached by ordinary spring tides at any season of the year. It is stated that due to undercurrent in the sea, in many islands of the Lakshadweep Archipelago, as a natural phenomenon, erosions take place in certain parts and accretion on other parts. Regulation 11 (1) has been incorporated taking note of the above phenomenon and the peculiar geographical features of the island. It is stated that no extent of private property is being utilised for construction of the beach road but the same is being constructed exclusively through accreted lands. It is further stated that the survey of properties in Agatti Island was concluded in the year 1971 and it was carried out strictly in tune with the LMA Regulations. After completion of the survey, notification was issued under Section 11(1) and prior to its issuance, the survey officer had issued notice to the landholders. It is stated that the validity of the notification issued under 11 (1) of the Regulation will be conclusive unless it is modified or altered by the Civil Court in a properly instituted suit. Such a suit has to be instituted within a period of 3 years from the date of notification. None of the landholders had instituted any such suit and hence the notification has become final. According to the respondents, any accretion of land which takes place outside the boundary of the Island surveyed and finalised during 1971 becomes the property of the Government. It is stated that the entire stretch of accreted lands required for construction of beach road was identified and all encroachments were removed in the year 2016 itself.
9. According to the respondents, a Division Bench of this Court while dismissing W.P. (C) No. 35694 of 2016 filed by one Firoz Khan Koya had held that the order dated 4.3.2016 passed by the Collector as per the directions issued by this Court has become final and the finding of the Collector that all accretion which was not the property of the person were the property of Government and were thus beyond the lands which were demarcated in favour of various individuals was upheld. This Court had also held that the claims of the objectors over the accreted lands had no legal foundation. Though an SLP was filed challenging the said judgment, the Apex Court has not stayed the same.
10. They would state that it was decided to construct the road on a war footing basis as it is a long pending project and also for the reason that Agatti Island is a strategically important piece of land lying on the westernmost part of the Lakshadweep group of islands and the building of the beach road is required to meet the requirement of coastal security of the nation, needs of the fishermen, general public, tourists, electricity department and to improve the public infrastructure. They have denied that there is a lack of transportation facilities between the islands. They would deny that the constitutional rights of the petitioners are not infringed as the right of the objectors were adjudicated in accordance with law by the Collector under the regulations in terms of the directions issued by this Court. It is contended that the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and to seek high prerogative writs in their favour as their statutory rights became time-barred long ago and their claims as per the regulations were rejected in such proceedings. The respondents also deny that the beach road is within the no-development zone and that they contain that the construction of the road is not in conflict with the integrated island management plan.
11. An application seeking impleadment was filed by certain residents of the island which was allowed. The additional respondents 5 to 11 have filed a counteraffidavit supporting the contentions taken by the Lakshadweep Administration. They contend that the island is suffering a great deal due to lack of proper and adequate road connectivity and it has been the long-standing demand of the residents to construct a beach road. They state that the beach road is constructed along with the accretions on the western side of the beach over which no private individual has any right. They state that the existing roads are very narrow and the proposed beach road would solve the problems faced by the Islanders due to lack of road connectivity and will throw open immense opportunities for all-round developments in the residential, commercial, and tourist sector.
12. The petitioners have filed a reply affidavit, wherein they state that the legal system has come to a standstill due to the pandemic and the monsoon rains and citizens like the petitioners are not in a position to invoke their rights and seek legal remedies. They contend that the dispute between a citizen and the Administration cannot be decided by an officer of the Government and that too in a summary statutory proceedings. According to the petitioners, the proceedings under the Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulations would not stand in the way of adjudication of title by the Civil Court. They state that the question of title over accreted lands was considered by the District Court, Kavaratti in A.S. No. 2 of 2000, and it was held that the accreted land belongs to the citizen. However, while the Second Appeal was pending before this Court, the plaintiff in the said suit passed away and the suit abated. According to the petitioners, the access to the sea is a crucial element of Island life and the construction of the beach road would impede their access. They state that preservation of the beaches is crucial from the ecological, social, and economic perspectives, and if the beach road project is implemented it would sound the death knell of the islands. They have also contended that the beach road is being constructed mostly in the NDZ notified under the IIMP. They also state that no sanction from the Lakshadweep Coastal Zone Management Authority was secured for making such construction. They deny that there is any suppression of material facts and they have every right to establish their rights and title over their property. They also deny that their claims have become timebarred.
13. I have heard Sri P.B. Krishnan, the learned counsel who appeared for the petitioners in both the Writ Petitions, Sri S. Manu, the learned Central Government Standing Counsel who appeared for the Lakshadweep Administration and Sri. Philip. J. Vettickattu, the learned counsel who appeared for the party respondents.
14. Sri P.B. Krishnan, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Apex court in Anita Kushwaha and others vs. Pushap Sudan and others [(2016) 8 SCC 509] and stated that the Access to justice as a constitutional value will be a mere illusion if justice is not speedy and he further relied upon another decision of the Apex court in the State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and others. [(2011) 10 SCC 404] and submitted that the right to property is considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. He further contended that the fundamental right of the petitioners to access the Courts cannot be snatched away as what is at stake is their right to property which is now elevated to the status of a human right in addition to being a constitutional right. He then contended that if an order has been passed under 11(3) of the Regulations as contended by the respondents, it is for the respondents to initiate an action under Regulation 15, which has not been undertaken in the instant case. According to the learned counsel, the respondents by an executive order are trying to dispossess the petitioner of their valuable property. He would also contend that the Appellate Court had granted orders of injunction in favor of some of the objectors and it is only due to the inability of the petitioners to approach the Civil Court that they have approached this Court in order to enable them to get a breathing time to approach the Court and obtain similar relief.
15. Sri. S. Manu, the learned Central Government Standing Counsel has reiterated the contentions that he has taken in the counter affidavit which have been extensively narrated above. According to the learned counsel, the contentions advanced by the petitioners is with the objective of delaying the construction of the beach road and nothing more. He would take this Court through the entire sequence of events and it was argued that it was beyond any pale of doubt that the accreted land would belong absolutely to the Government. The survey in the island having completed in the year 1971 and the rights of the property owners having been adjudicated by the Collector under 11 (3) as directed by this Court in W.P. (C) No.11285 of 2015 resulting in Exhibit R2 (b) and (c) orders, the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that the accretions on the western side of their property would belong to them. He would also refer to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court which is produced as Exts. P1 and P 2 and it was argued that the assertion of the petitioner in the said case that any road on the western side would be over private land cannot be accepted in view of the order passed by the Collector on 4.3.2016. This Court, taking note of the fact that the construction of the road has been delayed considerably, had dismissed the Writ Petition. According to the learned counsel, persons aggrieved by the order of the Collector ought to have exhausted the remedies provided under the regulations itself by either approaching the civil court within 6 months or ought to have preferred an appeal before the Administrator within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. No such endeavour was made. Relying upon the law declared by this Court in Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise vs. Krishna Poduval [2005 (4) KLT 947] and Krishnan T. and another vs. State of Kerala and others [2007 (1) KLT SN 62] it was contended that a party cannot invoke the provisions of the Article 226 of the Constitution of India to bypass a statutory remedy once the period of limitation has run itself out and when the appellate authority does not have the power to condone the delay in filing the appeals beyond the maximum period prescribed under the Act.
16. Sri. Philip. J .Vettickattu, appearing for the private respondents supported the submissions of the learned Central Government Counsel and submitted that any delay in completing the much-awaited Island road cannot be countenanced.
17. I have anxiously considered the submissions and have carefully gone through the records.
18. It appears that the Lakshadweep Administration has decided to construct a Beach Road from the northern end of the Agatti Island to its southern side all along the western shore through accreted land. The accreted land is situated between the lagoon on the west and the private holdings on the east. The case of the Lakshadweep Administration is that the construction of the Beach Road is to meet the requirement of Coastal Security of the Nation, for upgradation of the existing infrastructure and to generally aid in the overall development of the Island.
19. The Laccadive, Minicoy, and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and tenancy Regulation, 1965 provides for the settlement and assessment of land revenue, rights, and liabilities of holders of land and other matters relating to land in the Union Territory of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands. The provisions of the regulations extend to the whole of the Union territory of the Laccadive, Minicoy, and Amindivi Islands. Regulation 11 coming under Chapter III reads as follows :
11.(1) All lands, public roads, lanes and paths and bridges, tanks, ditches. dikes and fences on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high-water-mark, and all standing or flowing water, and all rights In in or over the same or appertaining thereto. which are not the property any person are and are hereby declared to be, the property of the Government.
Explanation—in this sub—section. (i) “land” includes any newly formed island and (ii) “high-water-mark" means the highest springtides at any season of the year.
(2) Unless it is otherwise expressly provided in the terms of a grant made by the Government, the right to mines, quarries, minerals and mineral products including mineral oil, natural gas and petroleum shell vest in the Government, it shall have all the powers necessary for the proper enjoyment of such rights.
3) Where any property or any right in or over any property is claimed by or on behalf of the Government, or by any person as against the Government and the claim is disputed, such dispute shall be decided by the Collector whose order shall be subject to the provisions of this Regulation be final.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom may institute a civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the date of such order and the decision of the Civil Court shall be binding on the parities.
20. In other words, Regulation 11 declares that the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below the high-water-mark and all standing and flowing water and all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto which are not the property of any person shall be the property of the Government. Explanation (ii) to Regulation 1 says that high-water-mark means the highest point reached by ordinary spring tides at any season of the year. Where any property or any right in or over any property is claimed by any person as against the Government and the claim is disputed, such dispute has to be decided by the Collector and the provision says that such order shall be final subject to the provisions of the Regulations. Regulation 78 sub-clause (d) states that if any person is aggrieved by the order passed by the Collector, he can challenge the same in appeal before the Administrator. Regulation 11 (4) however, provides for a further remedy to the aggrieved person from such an order made under 11 (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom, to institute a civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the date of such order and the decision of the Civil Court shall be binding on the parties.
21. I find from the records that the petitioners 1, 2, 4, and 5 in W.P. (C) No. 12567 of 2020 had approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 11285 of 2015 and 11298 of 2015 challenging the orders of eviction issued by the Deputy Collector, Agatti. Those Writ Petitions were finally heard by this Court and a copy of which is produced as Exhibit R2(a). The Relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below for easy reference.
1. These writ petitions are filed by the islanders residing in Agatti under the Lakshadweep Administration. They challenge the eviction notice issued by the Agatti Deputy Collector under the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (Land Revenue and Tenancy) Regulations 1965.
2. There are two issues in these writ petitions: one pertains to right to take usufructs and the other is regarding threat of eviction.
3. The petitioners' claim is that the land in question belongs to them and therefore the respondents cannot interfere with the right to enjoyment of the land.
10. Admittedly eviction proceedings are pending. Whether the property is belonged to the petitioner herein or the petitioner are encroachers, are the matters to be decided by the competent authority constituted under the above Act. This Court cannot decide upon the right over the propriety, unless and until the proceedings are concluded. Taking note of the facts and circumstances, the following directions are issued:
1. The respondents are directed to finalize the entire proceedings within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment,
2. The right to take usufructs from the land in question is left to the discretion of the Lakshadweep administration.
3. The Lakshadweep Administration is free to auction and credit the amount in a separate account till the final adjudication of eviction proceedings are concluded.
Needless to say, while concluding the eviction proceedings, the petitioners shall be heard in the matter. All the materials placed by the petitioners including the judgment referred to in the W.A No.885 of 2015, (Beebi vs. Administrator [(2004) KLT 1019) shall also be adverted to and the petitioner shall be given an opportunity of hearing. If it ultimately found that the petitioners are entitled to retain the land, if the usufructs are auctioned, the petitioners shall be compensated for the value of the usufructs which was auctioned. Till the final decision is taken, the petitioner shall not be evicted.
22. In terms of the directions issued by this Court, the Collector, Lakshadweep heard the objectors as well as the Deputy Collector, Agatti for the Administration and he concluded on the basis of the materials that the accreted foreshore land is vested with the Government by virtue of Rule 11 of the Regulation 1965. The Collector took note of the fact that Rough Patta as per Rule 49 and 50 of the Lakshadweep Land Revenue and Tenancy Rules, 1968 on the basis of the Lakshadweep Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 has been confirmed and the final records of Rights as per Rule 59 of the LRT Rules, 1968 read with regulation 36 of the regulations of 1965 has been published decades back. It was further held that the land in question is not the property of any person and the said property is Government land and the Government has proprietary rights in respect of the same. He conclusively decided that the property in question is that of the Government.
23. The petitioners have no case that they have not participated in such proceedings. In fact, it is on the basis for directions issued in the writ petition filed by some of them that such orders were passed. However, the order passed by the District Collector has not been challenged either before the Civil Court in terms of Regulation 11 (4) or before the Administrator in Appeal under Regulation 78. The said order has become final. Curiously, the petitioners have not stated in the writ petition about the orders passed by the District Collector in Exhibit R2 (b) and (c) proceedings.
24. There is yet another matter. One Firoz Khan had filed a petition as Public Interest Litigation against the construction of a beach road on the western shore of the Agatti Island in Lakshadweep Union territory. The said writ petition was considered by a Division Bench of this Court and the same was dismissed by judgment dated 15.9.2017 produced as Exhibit P1 in W.P. (C) No. 12567/2020. Para No. 3 to 7 of the judgment would shed light on a lot of aspects including the sequence of events.
“3. It appears that the Agatti administration, considering various aspects, have decided to construct a beach road about twenty metres away from the high tide line from the northern end to the southern end of the island along the western side This obviously was not welcomed by the residents along the coast, in as much as, in between their land and sea, the road would be built and all the coconut trees and access to the sea would be obstructed.The lands which they were occupying and enjoying in excess of their registered holding would be taken away for the road.
4. It appears that some of the persons filed W.P.(C) No 11298 of 2015 before this Court, which was disposed of on 26.10.2015 by a learned single Judge directing the authorities, who had initiated encroachment proceedings as well, to conclude the proceedings within a period of three months. It may be noted here that an appeal against the said judgment was filed by the petitioner therein, which, after some arguments, has been withdrawn today.
5. Pursuant to the orders of the learned single Judge, it seems that the Collector of Lakshadweep, after public notice, held a meeting of all the objectors, including the fifteen as mentioned in Exhibit R2(c) order dated 04.03.2016. All persons were heard and taking note of the provisions of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965, the Collector held that all accretions which were not the property of any person were properties of Government and were thus beyond the lands which were demarcated in favour of various individuals. Their claim of right over the said accretions were thus rejected. This in our view, settles the issue. If anyone was aggrieved by the above order, he had a right to move the civil court.
6. The order of the Collector was passed on 04.03.2010 and we are in September, 2017. No one has challenged the said order Now, the argument that survey maps show that on one side of the land is the lagoon and to assert that any road that would be made on the western side would be over private lands cannot be accepted. The Administration clearly states that no land covered by a survey plan, the ownership of which stands in the name of any individual is not even being touched, much less encroached upon The grievance now appears to be that in between the private land and sea, there is a substantial vacant land, which was hitherto being used by the private individuals. Coconut trees that were growing on this non-private land were being enjoyed by these persons. Good number of those trees are to be cut for the road. The cutting of those coconut trees and loss of free access to the sea are the causes of this public interest litigation. We do not find that the contentions now raised to establish their claim has any legal foundation.
7. We are told that because of this litigation, the road project has already been delayed considerably. In view of the findings that no person's right, interest or title are being encroached upon by the Government by constructing the road, no law being violated, we have no reason to entertain this writ petition. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed.”
25. The Division Bench took note of the fact that the order passed by the Collector stood unchallenged. The contention that the road was attempted to be constructed on private land was also rejected. This Court also took note of the fact that due to various litigations, the road project had been considerably delayed. Finally, holding that no person’s rights, interest, or title are being encroached upon by the Government by constructing the road, no law is being violated.
26. One of the main contentions of the petitioner is that the District Court has stayed the proceedings in a challenge raised by some of the objectors. It is submitted across the bar that Exhibits P3 to P7 has since been vacated and there are no other orders interdicting the construction of the beach road. The reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners on Exhibit P16 judgment of the Civil Court will not help him as in para 34 of the judgment, the learned District Judge had specifically refused to record any finding on the issue as to the ownership of the accreted land as it was not necessary to decide the said dispute in that appeal.
27. I am not impressed with the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the failure to mention the filing of W.P. (C) No. 11285 of 2015 was not wilful. The orders passed in the said Writ Petition as well as the initiation of the proceedings by the District Collector had a material bearing in so far as the issues raised by the petitioner in the instant case are concerned. As held in Dalip Singh V State of Uttar Pradesh [(2010) 2 SCC 114) a person who approaches the court for grant of relief, equitable or otherwise, is under a solemn obligation to candidly disclose all the material/important facts which have a bearing on the adjudication of the issues raised in the case. In other words, he owes a duty to the court to bring out all the facts and refrain from concealing/suppressing any material fact within his knowledge or which he could have known by exercising diligence expected of a person of ordinary prudence. If he is found guilty of concealment of material facts or making an attempt to pollute the pure stream of justice, the court not only has the right but a duty to deny relief to such persons. This settled position will apply on all fours against the petitioners and there is no reason to brush aside the contention of the learned standing counsel that the petitioners have suppressed material facts.
28. There is no dispute that the petitioners 1, 2, 4, and 5 in W.P.(C) No.12567/2020, had approached this Court and after considering all aspects, this Court had directed the Collector to finalise the entire proceeding under Regulation 11 within a period of three months. Ext.R2(b) and (c) would reveal that the entire objectors were heard either personally or through their mukthiyars and orders were passed as early as on 4.3.2016. The Regulation itself prov
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ides a remedy to the petitioners either to prefer an appeal before the Administrator or to institute a suit within the time prescribed. The objectors have not ventured to do that. Instead, the petitioners have waited for almost four years to approach this Court seeking a direction to interdict the respondents from proceeding with the construction on the ground that they require more time to approach the Civil Court. As rightly submitted by Sri.S.Manu, once the statutory remedy provided for under the Regulations becomes barred by limitation, the petitioners cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court and seek interdiction. In Asst. Commissioner of Central Excise vs. Krishna Poduval [2005 (4) KLT 947] the Division Bench of this Court observed in paragraph 7 that; “7. At the outset we may state that in so far as the respondents have not taken up the original orders imposing penalty in appeal before the appellate authority within the maximum period prescribed under S.85(3) of the Finance Act, 1994, they cannot get the appeals revived and heard on merits by resorting to the discretionary remedy before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Once the period of limitation has run itself out and the appellate authority does not have power to condone the delay in filing the appeals beyond the maximum period prescribed under the Act, the remedies of the appellants come to an end just like in the case of a time barred suit and the respondents cannot by invoking the discretionary remedy under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, resurrect their unenforceable cause of action and require this court to consider their contention against the original orders on merit. That would amount to defeating the very law of limitation which we are not expected to do under Art.226. If we are to entertain the contentions of the respondents on merits, that would amount to negating the law of limitation which we have no jurisdiction to do under Article 226 and which may even lead to anomalous results. We are not satisfied that the jurisdiction of this Court under Art 226 of the Constitution of India is so wide as to resurrect a cause of action which has become unenforceable on account of the law of limitation. Further, we are of the firm opinion that the jurisdiction under Art 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked against express statutory provisions, however harsh the effect of the provisions may be on an assessee or litigant.” 29. Having considered all the relevant facts, I am of the considered opinion that these Writ Petitions have to fail. The possession and ownership of the accreted land vests with the government alone and the said position having been declared by Exhibit R2 (b) and (c), the contentions now belatedly advanced by the petitioners cannot be sustained. It appears to me that this is yet another attempt on the part of the petitioners to delay the construction of the road which has some strategic importance in so far as coastal security of the nation is concerned. The construction of the road will also go a long way to improve the infrastructural facilities and provide easy access to the islanders from one part of the island to the other part. Construction of the road will also aid in the overall development of the Island and thus improve the quality of the life of the residents. As noted by the Division Bench while rendering judgment in the PIL filed by one of the aggrieved persons, the construction of the road has been unduly delayed for a long time. The petitioners have failed to make out any case. These Writ Petitions will stand dismissed.