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K.B.Bipin Kumar v/s State of Bihar

    C.W.J.C 8826 Of 2004

    Decided On, 18 April 2006

    At, High Court of Bihar

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BARIN GHOSH

    For the Appearing Parties: ------------



Judgment Text

BARIN GHOSH, J.

(1.) Heard both the parties.

BARIN GHOSH, J.

(1.) Heard both the parties.

(2.) Services of the petitioner have been terminated for the Director General of Police has refused to give concurrence to the appointment of the petitioner and hence, this writ petition. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appointing authority, being the Superintendent of Police, it was unjust to terminate the appointment given by the Superintendent of Police for non-approval of such appointment by the Director General of Police. If the appointmen

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t as was given to the petitioner, was given fairly, the Court, would have gone into the contention as raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioned, but having regard to the fact that the petitioner could not be given an appointment by the Superintendent of Police in the circumstances he purported to appointment of the petitioner, the appointment from the date one was a nonest appointment and the same having not crystalized into a legal appointment could be put to art end at any point of time. The fact remains' that although it is alleged that the Superintendent of Police sought for names from the Employment Exchange but the name of the petitioner was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Instead the petitioner purported to respond to be a notice which was allegedly pasted, in the notice Board. The established rules contained in the Police manual do not permit recruitment through such notices. The petitioner was sought to be appointed through back door. As a result, in order to make the appointment legal, Superintendent of Police had no other option but to obtain approval of the, Director General, which in the normal circumstances was not necessary. Inasmuch as the appointment was illegal from the very commencement thereof, question of giving any show cause did not arise. The question of show cause would have arisen, if the appointment had been questioned on the ground of irregularity. It must be kept in mind that a thing, which is contrary to law is illegal and a thing, which is illegal, has no existence and accordingly, no right can be founded on a thing, which is not in existence. It is significant to note that the petitioner is seeking to rely upon a report prepared by the Superintendent which suggests that the appointment of the petitioner was given after applying the required mandate of the law, but the fact remains that the petitioner himself has contended in the writ petition that no advertisement was published inviting applications for filling up the post and at the same time, though allegedly an approach was made to the Employment Exchange, the name of the petitioner was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange and as such, the one and the only conclusion would be that the Superintendent of Police having had granted an illegal appointment to the petitioner through back door wanted to save that appointment and for that submitted a totally incorrect and useless report. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed.

(2.) Services of the petitioner have been terminated for the Director General of Police has refused to give concurrence to the appointment of the petitioner and hence, this writ petition. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appointing authority, being the Superintendent of Police, it was unjust to terminate the appointment given by the Superintendent of Police for non-approval of such appointment by the Director General of Police. If the appointment as was given to the petitioner, was given fairly, the Court, would have gone into the contention as raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioned, but having regard to the fact that the petitioner could not be given an appointment by the Superintendent of Police in the circumstances he purported to appointment of the petitioner, the appointment from the date one was a nonest appointment and the same having not crystalized into a legal appointment could be put to art end at any point of time. The fact remains' that although it is alleged that the Superintendent of Police sought for names from the Employment Exchange but the name of the petitioner was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Instead the petitioner purported to respond to be a notice which was allegedly pasted, in the notice Board. The established rules contained in the Police manual do not permit recruitment through such notices. The petitioner was sought to be appointed through back door. As a result, in order to make the appointment legal, Superintendent of Police had no other option but to obtain approval of the, Director General, which in the normal circumstances was not necessary. Inasmuch as the appointment was illegal from the very commencement thereof, question of giving any show cause did not arise. The question of show cause would have arisen, if the appointment had been questioned on the ground of irregularity. It must be kept in mind that a thing, which is contrary to law is illegal and a thing, which is illegal, has no existence and accordingly, no right can be founded on a thing, which is not in existence. It is significant to note that the petitioner is seeking to rely upon a report prepared by the Superintendent which suggests that the appointment of the petitioner was given after applying the required mandate of the law, but the fact remains that the petitioner himself has contended in the writ petition that no advertisement was published inviting applications for filling up the post and at the same time, though allegedly an approach was made to the Employment Exchange, the name of the petitioner was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange and as such, the one and the only conclusion would be that the Superintendent of Police having had granted an illegal appointment to the petitioner through back door wanted to save that appointment and for that submitted a totally incorrect and useless report. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed
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