w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n



Harish Trivedi v/s State of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Home & Others


Company & Directors' Information:- AT HOME INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U17211DL2001PTC112255

Company & Directors' Information:- V HOME PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL2001PTC109331

Company & Directors' Information:- G. P. HOME PRIVATE LIMITED [Under Process of Striking Off] CIN = U70102MH2011PTC213056

Company & Directors' Information:- HARISH INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29299MH1959PTC011457

Company & Directors' Information:- HARISH AND COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Converted to LLP and Dissolved] CIN = U45201RJ1995PTC010374

Company & Directors' Information:- TRIVEDI AND COMPANY LIMITED [Dissolved] CIN = U99999MH1937PTC002633

    U/S 482/378/407 No. 2174 of 2020

    Decided On, 30 September 2020

    At, High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad Lucknow Bench

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE VIRENDRA KUMAR-II

    For the Applicant: Ravi Shanker Singh, Advocate. For the Respondents: G.A.



Judgment Text

1. Heard Shri Ravi Shanker Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned A.G.A. for the State, who participated in the proceedings through video conferencing.2. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred on behalf of petitioner-Harish Trivedi to quash the charge sheet dated 15.05.2019 so far as it relates to the petitioner and set aside the order dated 05.03.2020 passed by learned Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I. (Ayodhya Prakaran), Lucknow in Criminal Case No. 16909 of 2020, State Vs. Tushar Trivedi and others, arising out of Crime No. 0021 of 2019, under Sections 498-A, 323, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, relating to Police Station Ashiyana, District Lucknow.3. Learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon the following exposition of law:(i) Kansraj Vs. State of Punjab, (2000) 2 JIC 353 SC;(ii) Lata Singh Vs. State of U.P. (2006) SCC(Crl.) 478;(iii) Geeta Mehrotra and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, (2012) 2 SC(Crl.Report) 1910.4. While relying upon the above exposition of law learned counsel for petitioner has argued that it is held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that in offences punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. all the members of his family should not be prosecuted, if general allegations have been levelled by the victim against the family members. If specific allegations are for husband only then only husband should be prosecuted.5. Learned counsel for petitioner has further submitted that petitioner is a retired army personnel and pension holder. He is aged 74 years and his wife is aged 73 years. It was the second marriage of his son, Tushar Trivedi, therefore, there was no occasion for demanding any dowry at the point of time of his marriage.6. It is also contended that F.I.R. of this case was registered on the behest of maternal uncle of the victim and she has levelled allegations against the petitioner, her husband and mother-in-law. She was never harassed by the petitioner and his family members for demand of dowry. On the other hand, incident quoted in the F.I.R. that the victim tried to enter in the house of the petitioner, in this regard the petitioner asked her to come with her maternal uncle, then matter would be settled. In these circumstances, the petitioner and his family members have falsely been implicated in this crime. The Investigating Officer has not investigated the real facts of this case fairly and impartially. In these circumstances, the charge sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer and the summoning order dated 05.03.2020 are liable to be quashed.7. Learned A.G.A. has opposed this petition by submitting that on perusal of F.I.R. and charge sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer it reveal that thorough investigation has been conducted by the Investigating Officer and after finding role of petitioner he has submitted charge sheet against him, his wife and his son. The victim was harassed and tortured for demand of dowry.8. Following exposition of law are relevant regarding petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:A Full Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir Vs. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1189 at page 649 in following paras has held as under:11. Section 482 is prefaced with an overriding provision. The statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court adverted to the body of precedent on the subject and laid down guiding principles which the High Court should consider in determining as to whether to quash an FIR or complaint in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The considerations which must weigh with the High Court are: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61) "61. ... the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."12. In Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], Dr Justice A.K. Sikri, speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that in respect of offences against society, it is the duty of the State to punish the offender. In consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrence. In such a case, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised: (SCC p. 484, para 29.7) "29.7. ... Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits...."This Court held, while dealing with an offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code that the following circumstances had weighed with it in quashing the first information report: (SCC p. 485, para 33) "33. We have gone through the FIR as well which was recorded on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It gives an indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because of some previous dispute between the parties, though nature of dispute, etc. is not stated in detail. However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz. "respectable persons have been trying for a compromise uptil now, which could not be finalised". This becomes an important aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the complainant. In this context when we find that the elders of the village, including Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully in future, this becomes an important consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the Court. It has not even started. In view of compromise between parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Even though nature of injuries can still be established by producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who caused these injuries. The chances of conviction, therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to drag these proceedings. ..."13. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi [State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563] , a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court explained the earlier decisions and the principles which must govern in deciding whether a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence should be quashed. In that case, the respondents were alleged to have obtained letters of credit from a bank in favour of fictitious entities. The charge-sheet involved the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus beneficiary companies were alleged to have got them discounted by attaching fabricated bills. Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) emphasised that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence the Court was not dealing with a simple case where "the accused had borrowed money from a bank, to divert it elsewhere". The Court held that the manner in which letters of credit were issued and funds were siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law: (SCC p. 42, para 26) "26. ... availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation."The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings was hence set aside by this Court.14. The same principle was followed in CBI v. Maninder Singh [CBI v.Maninder Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 389: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 292] by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section 482: (SCC p. 394, para 17) "17. ... In economic offences the Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved."15. In a subsequent decision in State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley [State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley, (2016) 1 SCC 376: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 282] , the Court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a woman "who was following the command of her husband" and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: (SCC p. 387, paras 14-15) "14. ... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in CrPC relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score.15. ... A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system. ..."16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in following paras has held as under:102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.105. Reverting to the present case, the allegations made in the complaint, in our considered opinion, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of a case and an investigation thereon and this case does not fall under any one of the categories of cases formulated above calling for the exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash the FIR itself.A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Minu Kumari Vs.. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310 at page 365 in following paras has held as under:18. Section 362 of the Code, as noted above, permits correctness of clerical or arithmetical errors. There is no quarrel with that proposition. But the High Court seems to have completely lost sight of the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code.19. The section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.20. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [SeeJanata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305: 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [(1964) 2 SCR 336: AIR 1964 SC 1: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Som Mittal Vs. Govt. of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 753: (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 73: (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 895 at page 759 in the following paras has held as under:9. At this stage we are not prepared to enter into the merits of the case on the basis of contentions urged by the respective counsel. Here are our reasons:In a catena of decisions this Court has deprecated the interference by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code in a routine manner. It has been consistently held that the power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger when prima facie it appears to court that the trial would likely to end in acquittal. In other words, the inherent power of the court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.10. This Court, in a catena of decisions, consistently gave a note of caution that inherent power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. This Court also held that the High Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whims and caprice.11. We now refer to a few decisions of this Court deprecating the exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers by the High Court according to its whims and caprice.12. In State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha [(1980) 1 SCC 554: 1980 SCC (Cri) 272] this Court pointed out at SCC p. 574: (SCC para 28) "28. ... The High Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction committed a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. In our opinion the High Court was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. We say no more."13. In Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad [(1972) 1 SCC 452: 1972 SCC (Cri) 208] this Court at SCC p. 455 pointed out: (SCC para 12) "12. ... In exercising jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court can quash proceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily enquire as to whether the evidence is ''reliable or not'. Where again, investigation into the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be impeding the investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code."14. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Admn. [(1974) 4 SCC 522: 1974 SCC (Cri) 558] the application filed by the accused under Section 561-A of the old Code for quashing the investigation was dismissed as being premature and incompetent on the finding that prima facie, the allegations in the FIR, if assumed to be correct, constitute a cognizable offence.15. In Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana [(1977) 4 SCC 451: 1977 SCC (Cri) 613] this Court pointed out: (SCC p. 451) "2. It surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a first information report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the FIR. It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases." (emphasis supplied)16. In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan [(1988) 4 SCC 655: 1989 SCC (Cri) 27] this Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and has given the working that in exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not.17. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] this Court after referring to various decisions of this Court, enumerated various categories of cases by way of illustration wherein the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised by the High Court. They are: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) "102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."18.We may observe here that despite this Court consistently having held in a catena of decisions that inherent power of the High Court should not be exercised according to whims and caprice and it has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, we often come across the High Court exercising the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a routine manner at its whims and caprice setting at naught the cognizance taken and the FIR lodged at the threshold committing grave miscarriage of justice. While it is true that so long as the inherent power of Section 482 is in the statute book, exercise of such power is not impermissible but it must be noted that such power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, the sole aim of which is to secure the ends of justice. The power under Section 482 is not intended to scuttle justice at the threshold.A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hamida Vs. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 234 at page 478 in following paras has held as under:7. It is well-established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978 SC 47] and it was held as under: (SCC p. 555, para 8) The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;(3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545] after a review of large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under: (SCC p. 657, para 29) "29. ... The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment."9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have been required to surrender as the bail application could be entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to the respondents-accused had been passed by any court nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In such circumstances, the High Court committed manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any court examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside.A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188 at page 747 in following paras has held as under:12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few--Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre[(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd.[(2000) 3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v.State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636: 2000 SCC (Cri) 513] this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8) "It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Vijayasarathy Vs. Sudha Seetharam, (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 454: (2019) 16 SCC 739: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 208 at page 743 in the following paras has held as under:8. The primary question before this Court is whether the High Court has erred in rejecting the plea of the appellants for quashing the criminal proceedings against them. The question at the heart of the present dispute is whether the averments in the complaint disclose the ingredients necessary to constitute an offence under the Penal Code.9. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure saves the inherent power of the High Court to make orders necessary to secure the ends of justice. InIndian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC (India) Ltd. [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC (India) Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court reviewed the precedents on the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and formulated guiding principles in the following terms: (SCC p. 748, para 12) "12.***(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence."10. The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is required to examine whether the averments in the complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for an offence alleged under the Penal Code. If the averments taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence, the criminal proceedings may be quashed under Section 482. A criminal proceeding can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint do not disclose the commission of an offence under the Penal Code. The complaint must be examined as a whole, without evaluating the merits of the allegations. Though the law does not require that the complaint reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence verbatim, the complaint must contain the basic facts necessary for making out an offence under the Penal Code.28. The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be exercised with care. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, a High Court can examine whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been given a cloak of a criminal offence. Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation of the criminal proceeding will constitute an abuse of the process of the court.A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 168 at page 319 in following paras has held as under:7. The High Court observed that the allegations made against Respondents 1 to 3 at the most constitute an offence under Section 506 IPC for criminal intimidation. Read as a whole, the allegations made against Respondents 1 to 3 did not make out an offence under Sections 306/34 IPC. The High Court further held that ingredients of Section 107 IPC are also not satisfied. In that view, the petition filed by Respondents 1 to 3 for quashing the criminal proceeding was allowed.8. It is no more res integra that exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge-sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding.12. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. The High Court ought not to have quashed the proceedings at this stage, scuttling a full-fledged trial in which Respondents 1 to 3 would have a fair opportunity to prove their innocence.13. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment [Baisahab v. State of M.P. MCRC No. 4883 of 2015, decided on 27-7-2016 (MP)] of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed.A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arun Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 3 SCC 736: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 217: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 164 at page 740 in following paras has held as under:11. Though the offences in question are non-compoundable but the power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC of the Court to quash the proceedings in such offences is well recognised by various decisions of this Court and the issue is no longer res integra. Reference may be made to the observations of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988]: (SCC p. 340, para 57) "57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceeding by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceedings or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment."12. B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] ,Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] ,Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] andShiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] to illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or effect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by a High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment.13. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat[Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] after analysing the precedents on the above issue has summarised the broad principles in para 16 of the reports as under: (SCC pp. 653-54) "16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though t

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he victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."14. In another decision in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] it has been observed that in respect of offence against the society it is the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there is a settlement between the offender and victim the same shall not prevail since it is in interests of the society that offender should be punished which acts as deterrent for others from committing similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrent punishment. In such cases, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute and thus may exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as the case may be.15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down, we are of the view that offences for which the appellants have been charged are in fact offences against society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious impact upon society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overriding effect of public interests in punishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither an offence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions or has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in refusing to quash the charge-sheet on the ground of compromise between the parties.9. As per the facts narrated in the F.I.R., on 12.05.2018 marriage of victim was solemnized with Tushar Trivedi, who is the son of petitioner. A demand of five lakhs rupees was made at the point of time of marriage and amount of three lakhs rupees cash and seventy thousand rupees for refrigerator, television, etc., articles was given then victim was brought by the petitioner and his family members at her matrimonial home. Jewellary amounting to one lakh and fifty thousand rupees was also given in the marriage. The petitioner and his family members mentally and physically tortured the victim for demand of remaining two lakhs rupees. When in the month of July, 2018 she became pregnant some medicines were administered to her, as a result, her pregnancy was terminated. Again on 21.11.2018 at about 11:30 p.m. some intoxicated medicine was administered to the victim. At this point of time she was pregnant and the petitioner and his family members were interested to terminate her pregnancy. The victim when denied for termination of her pregnancy on 07.11.2019, then she was again turned out from her maternal home. The Investigating Officer has put specific questions regarding role of petitioner. She has specifically answered that her husband assaulted her and petitioner supported his son and once he thrown water glass on her. The victim has supported the version of the F.I.R. Likewise, other witnesses, her mother Smt. Manju Mishra, her brother Aditya Mishra, maternal uncles Vinay Dwivedi and Anand Dwivedi have supported the statement of victim and the facts narrated in the F.I.R. There is no material contradiction apparent in the statement of victim.10. The Investigating Officer has conducted thorough investigation and filed charge sheet against the petitioner and other accused persons. There is no ground for quashing of F.I.R. or summoning order dated 05.03.2020, as no apparent misuse of process of law revealed during investigation conducted by Investigating Officer.11. The petition lacks merits and is liable to be dismissed.12. Dismissed accordingly.13. Learned counsel for petitioner at this stage, has lastly submitted that some time may be granted to the petitioner before the court concerned.14. In view of above submission, it is provided if petitioner surrenders before the trial court within 15 days from today and moves application for bail, his bail application shall be disposed of expeditiously by the trial court in accordance with the directions of this Court as well as of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.15. During the aforesaid period of 15 days no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner.16. It is made clear that aforesaid period of 15 days shall not be extended in any circumstance.17. With the above observations/ directions, the petition is dismissed.
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