Santosh Duggal, J.
(1) THE petitioner is tenant in a portion of property No. 8, Jamna Road, Civil Lines, Delhi under respondents No. 1 and 2, by means of a registered lease deed. dated 25. 3. 1983. The order which has given rise to the present revision petition under section 25b (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (for short 'the Act'), was passed by. the Additional Rent Controller dismissing the application filed by the petitioner for leave to contest the eviction petition, instituted by respondent No. I, Suit. Chand Rani, invoking provisions of section 14d of the Act, wherein respondent No. 2, was impleaded as second respondent.
(2) THE Additional Rent Controller, consequential to dismissal of application for leave to defend, passed an eviction order under section 14d read with section 25b of the Act by means of the impugned order dated 24. 9. 1992.
(3) THE correctness of this order has been assailed in the present revision petition on the contention that the petition under section 14-D was not maintainable, on the facts of the present Case, inasmuch as according to respondent No. 1's own case, as set up in the eviction petition, she was the joint owner of the properly wherein the tenancy premises are situate, with her son, respondent No, 2. And that the premises were jointly let out by the two in favour of the present petitioner, and the rent was also being paid to them jointly.
(4) THE pica is that in face of this admitted position, respondent No. 1, as one of the joint landlords, could not have taken recourse to the special provisions of section 14d as, according to petitioner's contention the said provisions are available only in case the lease is by a widow alone or her deceased husband, and that the said provision would not, in any case, apply when the lease is by the widow along with her son.
(5) IT is further contended that in the case of joint landlords, a petition can be Filed only for bona fide personal requirement by the joint landlords under the provisions of clause (e) to proviso to section 14 (1) of the Act, and that such a petition was, in fact, pending having been filed by the respondents jointly, and the petitioner has been granted therein leave to contest. . '
(6) BAWA Shiv Charan Singh, appearing for the petitioner, dwelt at length on this contention, arguing that the provisions of section 14d together with sections 14a, 14b and 14c carved out a special category of landlords, whereby the ordinary procedure has been departed from, and that in order to. avail of the provisions pertaining to specified landlords, the respondent No. 1, has to prove that the case falls strictly within the four comers of the special provisions of section 14d, and once it was shown this was not so for the reason that the premises had not been let out by respondent No. l alone, who was the petitioner in the petition under section 14d, the Additional Rent Controller ought to have allowed the application for leave to defend, and afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to make good his points.
(7) IN view of the fact, however, that the question raised is a question of law, and for reasons not apparent on record, this point having not been dealt with by the Additional Rent Controller, this Court has considered it expedient to address itself to this question. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in the first instance on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported as 43 (1991) DLT 447, S. Surjit Singh Kaira vs. Union of India and another and 43 (1991) DLT 456, EMC Limited, Calcutta vs. Smt. Santosh Sethi.
(8) MR. Bawa contended that in so far as the provisions of section 14d arc concerned, the Supreme Court has held in the case of EMC Steel Ltd. (supra) read with S. S. Kaira's case (supra) that a widow has to establish that the premises had been "let out by her" or "by her husband". It is submitted that inasmuch as in the present case, the premises had been let out by respondent No. l, after she became a widow, and jointly with her son, impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the eviction case, special provisions of section 14-D were not available, and that the only remedy available was by way of a petition under section 14 (1) (e) of the Act which, in fact, as already noted, was pending when the petition under section 14d was filed.
(9) THE learned counsel went on to argue that by virtue of section 45 of the lndian Contract Act, in the case of joint promisors or joint promises, the agreement can be enforced by all of them together, or by the survivor, in the event of the death of one of them. He contended that on these premises, the tenancy having jointly been created by the respondents, it could not he split up by one of them, seeking eviction of the tenant, without joining the other joint landlord, as a co-petitioner, and that by recourse to section 14-D, an attempt has been made to short circuit or circumvent the provisions of section 14 (1) (c) of the Act. The learned counsel further added that in case one of the joint owners is allowed to utilise section 14d, then this would be tantamount to creating a third category of landlords, which is not contemplated by law.
(10) I have given my careful thought to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There can be no disputing the proposition that section 14d, like sections 14a, 14b and 14c creates a special category of landlords, providing for a summary and speedy procedure of section 25b, and that in order to succeed in evicting a tenant by recourse to any one of them, the landlord/landlady concerned must satisfy all the para meters of the special provisions, being invoked in a given case.
(11) THE wording of section 14-D, as extracted below, enjoins upon the landlady to prove the basic tact of being a widow, and that premises were let out by her or by her deceased husband:
"14-D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow- (1) where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her. "
(12) THE first test is satisfied in the present case, because there is no denial of the fact that respondent No. I was a widow at the lime of filing of the eviction petition. The second requirement of the premises having been let out by her is satisfied to the extent that the letting was by her, the only distinction being made out on behalf of the tenant is that it was not a case of letting out by her alone, but jointly with her son, and that this would disentitle her, from utilising special provisions of section 14d.
(13) I do - not agree. As pointed out by Shri Ishwar Sahai, appearing for respondent No. 1, this point is no longer res intcgra, and the Supreme Court in three decisions has held in unqualified terms that in the event of there being more than one owner of a properly, one of the co-owners can take recourse to the special provisions, introduced by the Amending Act 57 of 1988.
(14) THE first case in the series is the case reported as (1977) 2 SCC 814, Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak and others. This was a case where an eviction petition was filed under the provisions of section 14a rend with section 25b of the Acl. The tacts reveal that petitioner was one of the co-owners, and the tenant's main contention was that he could not by himself file the eviction petition availing special provisions of section 14a. In that case, one of the issues raised was that the landlord, who had filed the eviction petition under section 14-A of the Act had not let out the premises himself, hut had inherited the property along with other heirs from his father. The contention, that it was not a case of premises having been let out by him, was repelled on the view that when the landlord steps into the shoes of his father, he represented the former owner/lessor and would fall under section 14-A. This proposition has been reiterated in the case of S. S. Kaira (supra).
(15) IN so far as the contention which is relevant to the present case is concerned, namely, that only one of the co-owners of the property could not file by himself an eviction petition under section 14a of the Act, this proposition was also rejected by holding that a co-owner of the property was as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner, and that there was no substance in the contention that the absence of the other co-owners disentitled the petitioner in the case from suing for eviction under section 14a. This view was in turn based on an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case reported as (1976) 4 SCC 184, Sri Ram Pnsricha vs. Jagannath and others, where it was held unqualifiedly that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is.
(16) THE provisions under consideration in that case were that of section 13 (1) (0 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which read as follows:
"Section 13. Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in. any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall he made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (f) where the premises arc reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held. "
(17) THESE provisions are, more or less, akin to the provisions of clause (g) of the proviso to section 14 (1), and also to some extent those of clause (e).
(18) THE contention which was raised on behalf of the petitioner, in that case, was that one of the several co-owners /co-landlords could not seek eviction, and that all must join. This plea was rejected categorically by holding that jurisprudentially it was not correct to say:
". . . . . . lhal a co-owner of a property is nol its owner. He owns every part of the composite properly along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner of the property. The position will change only when partition lakes place, it is, therefore, nol possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is nol the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (f). "
(Emphasis added). It was further held: "it is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of Section 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants.?
(19) CONFIRMING and endorsing the view in the aforesaid case, it was held in Kanta Goel's case (supra) that one of the co-wners/co-landlords could take out eviction proceedings even under the special provisions, (section 14a in that case), and the other co-owners need not be joined, particularly when there was no evidence that there was any objection to the eviction petition being filed by one of them.
(20) THIS proposition has been followed in a subsequent case also, reported as Judements Today 1989 (1) S. C. 67, Pat Singh vs. Shri Sunder Singh (dead) by Lrs. and others, following the dictum of the case of Sri Ram Pasricha (supra), applied the law laid down in the case of Kanta Goel (supra). This was also a case under section 14a, and it was held that one of the co-owners was entitled to maintain the eviction petition alone, and that he was to he taken to have proved the grounds of eviction by showing that his need was bona fide.
(21) SHRI Ishwar Sahai further placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case reported as AIR 1990 Madhya Pradesh 191, Harbabns Singh vs. Smi. Margral G. Bhingardive. The provisions under consideration, namely, section 23-J (iii) read with section 23-A (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 were pari materia to that of section 14d and also to some extent to section 14 (1) (c) of the Acl. There also summary procedure by means of an application before the Rent Controlling Authority was provided in the case of certain specified persons, namely, a 'widow'
(22) THE contention of the tenant in that case was that in view of the lad that the widow, who had applied for eviction petition under the special provisions of section 23-A (a) was not the sole owner or the sole landlord of the premises, bill only one of them, the petition by her alone was nol, compelent. It was contended in that case that a category of special class of landlords, distinct from the remaining landlords, had been carved out, giving them heiiclil of a special forum, as well as summary procedure, and that that being so, the petitioner in such a case has to satisfy that the case fell within the purview of the special provisions. Bill the Court on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the cases of Kanta Goel (supra). Pal Singh (supra) as also Sri Ram Pasricha (supra) held that the widow, who was one of the co-owners/landlords of the premises with some others, could initiate eviction proceedings against the lenani in the absence of other co-owners, if they do not object to her approaching the Court and seeking eviction,
(23) THE fads of that case are almost on all fours with the present case, because here also the case is of a widow, who is one of life co-owners, and adilledly a co-landlady. On the strength of the Supreme Court decisions, referred to above, the objections of the tenant that she being; not the sole owner or sole landlord could not utilise the provisions of section 14d. lack all substance, and deserve to be rejected.
(24) A fine distinction which is sought to be nude, and on which Mr. Bawa laid stress, namely, that the three cases before the Supreme Court, were of persons to whom the tenant had attorned to the exclusion of others, and that it was only in such a context that it was held that the petitions in those cases' were maintainable under the special provisions, creating specified categories of landlords.
(25) I am afraid the contention is raised on an erroneous assumption, inasmuch as these judgments do not draw any distinction, which is sought to be made by the learned counsel. A reading of these cases reveals that it was not on the basis of the fact that the tenant had attorned to the petitioner in a particular case, that the petition was held to be maintainable, but for the reason, as held in Sri Ram Pasricha's case (supra), and followed in Kanta Goel's case (supra) and Pal Singh's case (supra) that one of the co-owners was as much an owner of the property as the sole owner is, and till a partition takes place, has a right to possession of the entire property, and in this view of the matter, it was held that even one of the co-owners could take recourse to the special provisions, if other conditions were satisfied. In any event, Kanta Goel's was not a case where the tenant had attorned to the petitioner alone, and the rent which was being received, after death lot' the father, by him was on behalf of the estate of the deceased father. This fits squarely with the case of joint landlords who receive rent jointly for the entire estate, and as such there is nothing to distinguish this case from that of Kanta Goel's case, and for the matter of that, from other cases decided by the Supreme Court.
(26) THE Supreme Court has cmphalically laid down in Kanta Goel's case by observing:
"Equally without force in our view is the plea (hat one co-owner cannot sue for eviction even if the other co-lessors have no objection. "
(27) IN the present case also, the son has been impleaded as respondent No. 2. and he has no objection to the proceedings being taken by his mother under section 14d. It was also explained in the case of Kaiila Goel (supra) that they emphasis on "let out by him" in section 14a was with the object of pre-empling common class of benami evasions, and "not to attach special sanctity to nominalism. "
(28) THE Madhya Pradesh High Court also highlighted the rationale behind enactment of the special provisions for speedier procedure in case of certain special categories of landlords, as recognition of a a need to provide quick, expeditious and efficacious remedy for eviction of tenants to certain categories of landlords. Taking judicial notice of the length of time a civil suit, including suits for cviclion traverse in ordinary course.
(29) IT goes without saying that the special provisions of sections 14a, 14b, 14c and 14d have been created with the same object in view. This Court has held in a recent judgment reported as 1993 (25) Delhi Reported Judgments 52, Mrs. Sarla Luthra vs. M/s. Gadore Tools (India) Pvt. Lid. , taking note of the dicta laid down by the apex Court in a number of cases, that the operative provisions of a welfare legislation should receive a beneficent construction from the Courts, and further that in order to interpret a law, one must understand the background and the purpose for which the law was enacted, and in. case the literal construction leads to absurdity, the Court can take recourse to an interpretation which concurs with the substance and object of the legislation.
(30) THIS proposition was recognised in the context of rent control legislation by the Supreme Court in the case reported as (1986) 4 SCC 661, Kamleshwar Singh Srivastava vs. Iv Additional Distt. Judge, Luck now and others, as under:
"The court must strive to so interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. The courts must therefore keep the legislative policy in mind in applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. "
(31) IN this view of the matter, and taking note of the objectives behind the enactment of special provisions of section 14d, I am of the view that the petitioner under section 14d cannot he non-suited on a narrow interpretation that she must be the sole owner/sole landlady of the premises.
(32) IN view of the aforesaid, I do not find any. Force in the objections of the petitioner that on the facts of this case, the provisions of section 14d were not available, and on this contention leave to contest ought to have been accorded.
(33) THE cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are entirely distinguishable. In 1988 (1) R. L. R. 32, Shri Ujagar Singh Kakkar vs. Shri Chander Mohan and others, the other co-owner bad not, at all, been impleaded either as co-petitioner or co-respondent, and it was in that context that the Court held that petition by one co-owners was not maintainable.
(34) THE case covered by order dated 18lh January, 1990 passed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (C) 326 of 1990, Dr. S. M. Nehra vs. D. D. Mulik, copy whereof was supplied by Mr. Bawa during arguments has no bearing at all on the fads (if this case, because -that was ? case of additional accommodation being sought by the landlord by means of a petition under section 14 (1) (e) of the Act, and in that event the Court was of the view that there was no need for taking summary procedure as the landlord was already in occupation of two floors of the house, and that leave to contest ought to have been granted.
(35) THE ratio of the judgment in Saria Lulhra's case (supra), on which Mr. Bawa placed reliance docs not seen to be of any relevance to the issue raised herein because in that case the relationship of landlord and tenant was, being denied, and it was then that the Court considered the question of altornnent, and the same having been established, held that the case fell within the definition of letting' of the premises by the widow. In the present case, there is no dispute about allotment. The only pica is that it was not exclusively in favour of respondent No. 1. That, in my considered view, should not make any difference because the cases of Sri Ram Pasricha, Kanta Goel and Pal Singh (supra) were decided not on the basis of allotment, but by holding that the concept of co-ownership has ingrained in it, all the incidents of the rights of a sole owner.
(36) IT is also not clear as to in what. Way the observations of this Court in the case of Capt. (Retd.) Ravi Gupta vs. Suit. Vidya Wati, 1993 (1) RCR 113, to the effect that "the Court can come to the assistance of only honest and straight forward litigants and not of a person who conceals or distorts facts and creates artificial scarcity, because in such like matters, the courts have to insist on utmost good faith" is of any relevance to the present case, because there is no allegation of suppression and concealment of a fact.
(37) I would also like to dispose of in passing the contention that the petition under section 14 (1) (e) of the Act, being already pending, second petition under section 14d was not maintainable, and, in any case, it was not explained as to why a second petition had been filed on the same facts.
(38) IN so far as the first objection is concerned, Mr. Bawa himself conceded that pendency of a petition under section 14 (1) (c) would he no bar, by itself. Otherwise also, this Court has held in the case of Capt. Ravi Gupta (supra) a petition under section 14-D was maintainable even while a petition under section 14 (l) (e) of the Act was already pending, because the para meters of the two provisions arc altogether different. Same proposition has been laid down in another case by the Supreme Court reported as 1991 (1) RCR 603, K. L. Malhotra vs, Smt. Prakash Mehra, that if a right accrues, during the pendency of a petition under section 14 (1) (c), to bring an application under section 14d, then such a petition would be maintainable.
(39) IN so far as the second objection is concerned, Shri Ishwar Sahai explained that before the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of EMC Steel Ltd. (supra), the view adopted by the Delhi High Court was that in case the premises had been let out by a widow herself, namely, after she had become a widow, then the provisions of section 14d cannot he availed of, and since in this case the letting was by respondent No. I when she had already become a widow, in lace of the prevailing view of the High Court, the petition undo section 14 (1) (e), was filed in anticipation of the retirement of the son, with whom respondent No. 1 was residing, while he was in employment at Bombay, and that the present petition under section 14d was filed on 1. 8. 1991 as soon as the judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered in EMC Steel Ltd. 's case holding that it was immaterial for the application under section 14d, whether the premises were lei out by the landlady before she became a widow or afterwards.
(40) THE only contention remaining to be examined is the plea that the lenancy premises are not bona fide required by respondent No. 1, and that she was admittedly in occupation of sufficient accommodation.
(41) I would not go by the objections raised on behalf of respondent No. 1 by Mr. Ishwar Sahai that this point has not been pressed in the grounds of revision because, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Bawa that ground 'c' of the grounds of the revision refers to this part of the objections taken by the tenant expressly in the application for leave to contest.
(42) NEVERTHELESS, I do not find any such facts being disclosed in the applications for leave to contest which, if established, would disentitle respondent No. 1 from getting eviction of the petitioner. In the first instance, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of S. S. Kalra (supra) that cases under sections 14b, 14c and 14d are to be decided on their own para meters, and that the argument about a tenant's right to contest the application of even a classified landlord on the grounds specified in section, 14 (1) (e) of the Act would be basically faulty. It was held in unqualified terms that:
". . . . If an application is filed under Section 14-B, 14-C or 14-D, tenant's right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon section 14 (1) (e). "
(43) IT was no doubt added that even then the landlord or the landlady will have particularly to satisfy the Rent Controller that there was bona fide need of the tenancy premises for his or. Her residence, but beyond that the tenant has no right to insist on all the ingredients of clause (c) of proviso to section. 14 (1) of the Act being shown to exist, even in a petition under sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D.
(44) THAT being so, the petitioner cannot insist on a close scrutiny of the requirements of respondent No. 1 by applying the provisions of clause (e) of proviso to section 14 (1) of the Act. All that he can seek is that the landlady should have shown by setting out such facts in the eviction petition as would satisfy the Rent Controller that she needed the premises bona fide for her residence.
(45) ON a reading of the impugned order which has been assailed in this revision petition, I am satisfied that the Additional Rent Controller has correctly assessed the situation. All that is required for a landlady is to give details of the grounds on the basis of which she seeks eviction of the tenant. This has been very explicitly done by averments against clause IS of the eviction petition. The site plan of the property was also ' a part of the eviction petition, and even if the principles of Supreme Court judgment in the case reported as IW2 (2) All India Rent Control Journal 643, Precision Steel and Engineering Works and another vs. Prem Duvu Niranjan Dava Tayal are applied, even then it can he said on the basis of the averments in the eviction petition, and the facts slated in the reply affidavit read with the site plan, that petitioner's allegation that respondent No. 1 was in possession of four rooms in the properly where the tenancy premises situate,. Is not borne out.
(46) A copy of the site plan was supplied during arguments by counsel for respondent No. 1, correctness whereof was nol disputed from the side of the petitioner. This justifies the plea taken by respondent No. 1 in her reply affidavit to the application for leave to contest that the accommodation with her in this properly, (8 Jamna Road. Civil Lines, Delhi) was hardly sufficient. Which consisted of one room, one store without any kitchen or bath, and that the only toilet facility available was adjacent to the servant quarter at the end of 10 wide driveway on the other side of the portion, at present with respondent No. I, and the said toilet facility is to be used jointly with the occupants of servant quarter with the. Tenant In face of this, respondent No. 1's plea has been rightly accepted that this accommodation was not adequate or sufficient for her requirements, as there was no kitchen, no bath, no drawing-cum-dining, nor any other accommodation which was reasonably required by person of her status. It has also come on regard by affidavit, which fact has not been disputed, that ever since the death of her husband in 1968, respondent No. 1 has been living constantly with respondent No. 2, her only son, and that they had no other accommodation in Delhi except in the aforesaid portion which is lying locked up with belongings of the respondents which were stored while leaving for Bombay.
(47) DUE precaution was taken by respondent No. 1 even before retirement of her son, and there is no dispute that the said son has since retired. Mr. Ishwar Sahai contended on the basis of a Supreme Court judgment reported as AIR 1990 SC 115, Arnrit Lal Gupta vs. Smt. Budhwanti that it can even be said that in the case of a landlady being used of living for long years with a particular member of the family, and when that member of the family also has no other residential accommodation in Delhi, then in that event she can plead that also to be a component of her requirement.
(48) I find substance in this argument. Here respondent No. l slated in the petition that she was 77 years of age, and had always lived with the son, ever since the death of her husband and that in such an event son's lack of any other accommodation also becomes her requirement. As this line of approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Lal Gupta (supra), where it was held that in the event of a landlady petitioner being an old widow, and the eviction petition was on the ground of personal necessity, then the presence of her son in the house being necessary for looking after her and that the said son shall be coming and occupying a. portion of the house in recognition of that need of the petitioner, was a factor to support landlady's plea of bona fide personal requirement.
(49) IN so far as other plea of the petitioner that sometime in 1991, some other property came to the share of the respondents, by virtue of the death of the brother of deceased husband of respondent No. 1 is concerned, that does not seem to be of any avail, because as per the site plan, there is no other property or portion which is part of property : 8, Jamna Road, Civil Lines, and otherwise also respondent No. l has shown by affidavit to the satisfaction of the Additional Rent Controller that that portion on the death of brother of her deceased husband could not have come to her or her son, but bad gone to the sister of the said deceased under the present law of inheritance and succession. This plea, therefore, is not of such a nature which entitles the tenant for leave to contest.
(50) I, therefore, do not find any infirmity or error committed by the Addl. Rent Controller in declining leave to contest to the petitioner and dismissing the application for leave to defend. The eviction order bad to follow as a consequence. The order assailed in this revision petition is a well reasoned and well considered order on facts. This Court in revisional jurisdiction under section 25b (8) of the Act cannot act as an appellate court to scrutinise the Findings on facts, which are supported by reasons, and which have not been shown on the face of the record, to be erroneous or vitiated by any infirmity or perversity.
(51) BEFORE parting, I would also like to deal with one other point of distinction which Mr. Bawa sought to make, trying to make this case distinguishable from the case of Kanta Goel (supra), on the contention that the provisions of section 14-A, which were subject matter of that eviction petition, started with non obstinate clause, which was missing from the provisions of section 14d. This contention is devoid of any force, because the provisions of sections 14b, 14c as well as 14d have been made to be governed by special provisions of Chapter III-A providing summary trial of certain applications. This chapter opens with section 25a, which by itself contains an all-inclusive non-obstinate clause. In face of this, section 25a, as held in the case reported as 1990 (2) All India Rent Control Journal 219, B. M. Chanana vs. Union of India and others, providing that the provisions of Chapter III-A are to apply, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Act or any other law, for the time being in force, and which are made applicable to sections 14b,. 14c and 14d; then there is nothing to distinguish sectionl4d from section 14a on the basis of non-obstacle clause.
(52) AT the fag end Mr. Bawa submitted that the petitioner was prepared to surrender some part of the tenancy premises in exchange for the portion which the landlady had in her occupation. Shri Ishwar Sahai explained, in reply, that in view of the total need of respondent No. 1, coupled with the fact that she has in view of peculiar circumstances and age to have her son also to live with her, the offer which is being made by the petitioner w
Please Login To View The Full Judgment!
as not workable, and does not provide them with sufficient accommodation needed for their personal residence and requirement. He submitted that this offer should not stand in the way of respondent No. 1 getting an eviction order under section 14d 'because it was the consistent view of this High Court that a landlord, in the event of a case for eviction being made out, could not he compelled to accept the offer of the tenant for exchange of premises. (53) THIS contention Finds support from the judgment of this Court in the cases reported as 1988 (2) Delhi Lawyer 304, H. S. Treohan vs. M/s. Hindustan Kokoku Wire Limited, (substituted on M/s. Hindustan Development Corporation Limited) and 41 (1990) DLT 278, Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd. vs. D. N. Dhir and one other unreported judgment in SAO 251 of 1974, laying down that there was no law which requires a landlord to exchange the premises with his tenant, or that upon failure to so exchange, it should be taken that the requirement of the landlord is not, bona fide. (54) I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid judgments, and in view of the tad that the offer made by the petitioner, as expressed by Mr. Bawa 'towards the end of the hearing,- was not found suitable by respondent No. 1, and as such not acceptable; she cannot be compelled to accept this offer, nor she would be held disentitled to an eviction order under section 14-D, for which the case is otherwise made out, as discussed above, as a consequence of declining the offer. (55) I would also like to deal with another contention-raised in the application for leave to defend, namely, that the premises were not required for any bona fide purpose of residence of respondent No. 1, but with the object of obtaining vacant possession to construct multi-storeyed flats. The Additional Rent Controller has held that there were no concrete facts alleged in the-affidavit in support of this allegation made in the application, and that in the absence of that, this plea cannot be considered to be of any substance. Apart from the fact that this finding has been arrived at by the Additional Rent Controller on a correct appreciation of the affidavits in support of the application, and the reply-affidavit of the landlady, coupled with the averments made in the eviction petition; otherwise also, the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 19 are adequate deterrent for the landlady, against her not putting the premises to personal use, which was the ground in the petition under section 14d, as in the event of her failure to occupy the premises within two months of getting vacant possession, or having so occupied, if at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, she re-lets to any other person, then it would be open to the tenant to apply to the Controller for restoration of possession and the Controller on being satisfied on facts alleged, could order restoration of possession or payment of such compensation to the evicted tenant, as deemed fit. In face of these provisions, the mere allegations, at this stage, cannot stand in the way of the petitioner from getting an eviction order under section 14-D of the Act. (56) AS a result, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 2000. 00. (57) THE respondent was granted three months' time to vacate the premises when the impugned order was passed in September 1992. That period is already over. Therefore, grant fresh period of two months to the petitioner from today to hand over vacant possession of the tenancy premises to respondent No. 1.