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Factory Manager, Central India Machinery v/s Prakash Singh

    M.P. 210 of 1994

    Decided On, 08 January 1996

    At, High Court of Madhya Pradesh


    For the Appearing Parties: O.P. Agarwal, P.L. Dubey, R.D. Jain, R.V. Sharma, Advocates.

Judgment Text

(1.) THE beginning of the new year of 1968, did not prove to be a happy occasion for Prakash Singh who figures as a petitioner in Writ Petition No. 496 of 1994 and respondent in Writ Petition No. 210 of 1994. The controversy in which he embroiled himself has not seen its terminal point even though more than 25 years have elapsed. He got partial relief from the Labour Court. Both he and his employer were unsatisfied. An appeal was preferred. Some relief was given to the petitioner The employer's appeal met with no success. Still, dissatisfied both sides have preferred these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As both writ petitions arise out of a common order, it is thought apt to deal with them in this single and 1 common order.

(2.) ANNEXURE P/1, is the appellate order and Annexure P/2, is the order out of which appeal arose. Before going into the legal submissions made by the parties the facts in brief to be noticed.

(3.) THE petitioner Prakash Singh hereinafter referred to as 'workman' has been described as 'badli worker1 by his employer. He was employed in sheet-cutting khata as welder. The term 'khata' in English means 'department'. It is alleged that he disobeyed legal and valid orders given to him by his superiors. As the factory opened on January 1, 1968, the workman was ordered to work with incharge in the department in Muller Section. It is said that worker disobeyed and refused to work. An entry was made on his daily attendance card. There is to the effect 'refused to work'. It is said that he not only refused to work but remained in the department where other workers were performing their duties. So far as refusal to work is concerned it is so recorded in writing. This is Annexure P/3. The further fact that he was asked to leave the department and he refused to do so is not supported by any written order. Reliance has been placed on the oral statement made by Shri, Popaldas, P. W. 5, who was the incharge in the department. The workman was served with a charge-sheet on this very day. Copy of this is Annexure P/4. The workman submitted his reply. This is Annexure P/5. It is dated January 4, 1968. The plea taken by him was that he did not disobey any order given to him. A charge-sheet was served. A domestic inquiry was conducted. It is stated that the workman did not join the enquiry despite notice of this inquiry was served on him. This led to an exparte inquiry being conducted. Enquiry report was submitted. The Factory Manager took notice of the exparte inquiry report so submitted and passed an order of dismissal. This happened on January 30, 1968. Copy of this order, is Annexure P/6. 3 A. On the passing of this order, the workman took recourse to Sections 31 (3), 61 and 62 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). An application was preferred. That is Annexure P/8. A written statement was filed by the employer. This is Annexure P/8a. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the domestic inquiry was defective. It accordingly proceeded to hold an inquiry at his own level. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the employer had in fact asked the workman to go to work in the Muller Assembly section and this order was disobeyed. A written order given in this regard was also said to have been disobeyed. A finding was also recorded that the workman continued to remain in the department. His previous conduct as apparent from Annexure D/35, D/36, D/38, D/39, D/40, 41 and D/43 (on the record of the Labour Court) was taken note of. A finding was recorded that the workman was gainfully employed. It, however, came to the conclusion that the misconduct on the part of the workman was a minor one and the extreme step taken by the management, was not justified. The Labour Court instead of reinstating thought it proper to compensate the petitioner. It was of the view that he should be given compensation. This amount was fixed at Rs. 50,000/ -. (4.) AGAINST the above verdict given by the Labour Court the employer and the employee, preferred appeals before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that misconduct attributed to him has stood proved. It however, modified the order passed by the Labour Court. It ordered reinstatement with 50% backwages. Copy of this order is Annexure P/2. Both sides, as noticed above, have preferred petitions in this Court. The employer contends that the misconduct attributed to the workman was such which would fall within the term 'major misconduct'. It would be apt to note the relevant provision. The term 'major misconduct' has been defined in Rule 12 (1) (d) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963. These provisions be noticed. These read as under :

"rule 12: Disciplinary action for misconduct. (1) The following acts or omissions on the part of an employee shall amount to a major misconduct : *** **** **** **** **** **** (d) wilful disobedience of any lawful or reasonable order of a superior involving safety of any person or property or other matter having an adverse effect upon the work or wages of other employees : **** *** **** **** *** **** (f) drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour, during working hours, at the undertaking or conduct endangering the life or safety of any person, intimation, physical duress, or any act subversive of discipline. "

(5.) AS one of the contentions of the employer 2 is that the workman was merely a 'badli worker' therefore the definition of this term be also noticed. This is defined under Rule 2 (iv). It reads as under :

"2 (iv) A 'badli' employee means an employee who is employed on the post of a permanent employee, or a probationer or a permanent seasonal employee who is temporarily absent. "

(6.) THE argument with regard to the petitioner being a 'badli' worker and that he is not entitled to reinstatement has been argued for quite some length. Before noticing the legal issues it would be apt to notice the evidence which has been brought on the record.

(7.) IT be seen that the statement made by the workman in his claim petition is being highlighted. The workman has merely stated that he was being treated as a 'badli' worker. According to the counsel for the workman, this statement cannot be said to be an admission on the part of the workman. The respondent-employer in its written statement has said in categoric terms that the workman was a 'badli' worker. It has further been pointed out that the workman wanted his status to be declared as permanent. He preferred a petition before the Labour Court. This was rejected. That order has been placed on the record. Reliance has been placed on the oral statements which were recovered before the Labour Court. Popaldas as P. W. 5 has stated that the workman was a 'badli' worker. He has, however, stated that the workman was not working against any vacant post. He was unable to indicate as to whether any regular worker had rejoined and a 'badli' worker was asked to demit. This would be so found in para 12 of the statement of Popaldas. Another witness on which reliance has been placed by the employer is Shiv Charan Lal Bajpai. This witness has appeared as P. W. No. 6. All that this witness has stated is that the workman was working as a 'baldi' worker. Statement of witness No. 9, Keshav Prasad has also been adverted to. This is Exhibit P-18. It would be apt to reproduce what he has said :. . (VERNACULAR MATTER OMMITED). . Before examining the impact of these statements, it would be apt to point out that before a worker can be said to be a 'badli' employee it has to be established that he was employed on the post which is permanent. None who have come in the witness box have so stated. A badli worker means a worker who works in place of some one i. e. a permanent workman, meaning thereby he has to demit as soon as a permanent employee rejoins. This aspect of the matter has not been proved by the employer. It is not in dispute that the workman has been working continuously for eleven years till the date of termination. At no point of time, he was made to leave the job he was performing. As such, merely labelling the workman as a 'badli' worker would not determine his status. I am accordingly, of the view that the workman though described as a 'badli' worker is not such a worker. Clause 2 (iv) of the Standing Orders referred to above is not attracted. This aspect would be taken note of and adverted to again after examining the case law on the subject.

(8.) THE legal position be now noticed.

(9.) THE decisions on which the employer has placed reliance be noticed. These are :

(1) Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Rashtriya Mills Mazdoor Sangh, (1987-I-LLJ-97) (SC); (2) Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Parel, Bombay v. The Appollo Mills Ltd. (1960-II-LLJ-263) (SC); (3) Sukhjit Storch and Chemical Ltd. v. State of Punjab. (1962-II-LLJ-269) (Punj); (4) A. D. Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Quilon Textile Workers' Union, (1951 -IILLJ-40) (LAT); (5) Employees of Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Ltd. v. Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills, (1958-II-LLJ-I15) (AP); (6) Lallappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile 1 Mills, (1981-ILLJ-308) (SC); (7) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Workmen, (1969-II-LLJ-755) (SC); (8) Girdhar Lal Lalji Bhai v. Nagarsuna (MN), (1964-II-LLJ235) (Guj).

(10.) FROM the above decisions, an argument is sought to be raised that a 'badli' workman is merely a casual employee. He has no right to seek reinstatement. It is also argued that such 'badli' worker is not entitled to compensation. It is stressed that as a 'badli' worker attends to temporary duties, therefore, the question of reinstatement would not arise.

(11.) THERE can be no dispute with the legal-proposition enunciated in the aforementioned decisions. A Badli workman may not be entitled to the relief of reinstatement but the question which is to be determined in the present petition is as to whether the workman was in fact a Badli workman -or not. There can be no dispute with the proposition that a Badli workman means, a workman who is employed in an industrial establishment in place of another workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of the establishment. In other words, a Badli workman appointed against a post, permanent or temporary, when the incumbent on this post is temporarily absent. Normally, the name of such Badli workman is not to be found on the muster rolls of an establishment. Merely because, the employer has chosen to describe a workman as a Badli workman would not be conclusive in this regard. The employer must prove that such a workman is. a person who is only on the Badli list and he should have a chance of employment if a permanent post becomes vacant. See: Vijayakumar Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1960-IILLJ-567) (Mad) and Mahadev Textile Mills v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, 1976 LIC 1284 (Kant). In the present case as indicated above, the employee had been working continously for eleven years. The employer has failed to indicate as to against whose vacancy, the workman was working. As such, the workman is not to be treated as Badli worker, and therefore, the decisions on which reliance is being placed by the employer would have no applicability. In this regard, it would be apt to notice what was said by the Supreme Court in H. D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, (1986-I-LLJ-127). The plea taken was that the employee was merely a 'badli' worker. In para 9 it was observed as under:

"not being satisfied with the pleas noted above the respondent-bank had also a case that the appellant was only a Badli workman who could be deemed to have worked only on days when the permanent workman or probationer was not employed. The bank did not make available before the Tribunal any documentary evidence to show as to how the appellant could be treated as a badli worker and as to whose place he occupied during the days he worked. The confidential circular directing the officers that workman like the appellant should not be engaged continously but should as far as possible, be offered work on rotation basis and the case that the appellant is a badli worker have to be characterised as unfair labour practice. The 5th Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act contains a list of unfair labour practices as defined in Section 2 (ra). Item 10 read as follows : "to, employ workmen as 'badlis' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and priveleges of permanent workmen". We have no option but to observe that the bank, in this case, indulged in methods amounting to unfair labour practice. The plea that the appellant was a badli worker also has to fail".

Thus, by no stretch of imagination, the workman in the present case can be treated as a badli worker.

(12.) THE argument that the workman was guilty of serious misconduct, and therefore, he was not entitled to any relief be now examined. 12a. The factual position which is being reiterated by the employer is to the effect that on January 1, 1968, the workman was given an order to go for work in the welding section and this order given by the superior officers was disobeyed. Initially, oral order was passed, and thereafter, a written order is said to have been issued. It is argued that the workman not only disobeyed the order to work on the welding section on the 'muller assembly' but also refused to leave the factory premises when he was called upon to do so.

(13.) IT be seen that Rule 12 (1) (d) of Standing Orders referred to above deals with the concept of misconduct. A perusal of the above provisions indicates in no uncertain terms that there should be disobedience and this refusal should involve safety of other persons or property or may have an adverse effect upon the work or wages of other employees. The Industrial Court rightly came to the conclusion that all these ingredients should have been pleaded and proved to attract the provisions of the above clause describing misconduct. No; fault can be found with the reasoning given by the Industrial Court that the ingredients which are required to be proved are :

(i) that, there is wilful disobedience; (ii) that, there is reasonable apprehension of safety of any other person or property of the management and (iii) that, wilful disobedience would have adverse effect upon the work or wages of other employees. None of the ingredients referred to above were pleaded and proved by the employer. Again, the ingredients mentioned in Rule 12 (1) (f) of the Standing Orders referred to above are also missing. There was no riotous or disorderly behaviour on the part of the workman. Nothing has been brought on the record that this conduct endangered the life or safety of any other person. Again there is nothing on the record, to indicate that any person was intimated or there was physical injury caused to any other person. The findings recorded in this regard by the Court below which are based on cogent reasons do not require further examination under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is accordingly held that the workman was not guilty of any misconduct.

(14.) IT be seen that in the present case enquiry was held by the employer. This enquiry was held to be deficient. An enquiry was conducted by the Labour Court. This can be done by the Labour Court. The learned counsel appearing for the employer has placed reliance on the following decisions :

(i) Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory Pvt. Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory Pvt. Ltd, (1965-IILLJ-162) (SC); (ii) Phulbari Estate v. Its Workmen, (1959-II-LLJ-663) (SC); (iii) Khardah and Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1963-II-LLJ-452) (SC) and (iv) Ms. Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd v. The Workmen, (1981-II-LLJ-218) (SC) As indicated above, there is no dispute with the proposition that the Labour Court can hold an enquiry at its own and this is precisely what has happened in this case.

(15.) THE argument on behalf of the employer that the workman was found guilty of misconduct, and therefore, there was no justification to reinstate him or to grant him 50% of the backwages. Reliance is being placed on the decision given by the Supreme Court reported as P. H. Kalyani v. Air France Calcutta, (1963-I-LLJ-679) and D. C. Roy v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Ors. , AIR 1976 SC 1760. It is pertinently pointed out that D. C. Roy's case (supra) deals specifically with the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960, and, therefore, holds the fields.

(16.) I am of the view that there is no merit in the contention of the employer. The workman was entitled to wages if full effect is given to the decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980-I-LLJ-137). It can be said that the workman would at least be entitled to wages upto the date when the Labour Court passed the order after holding enquiry.

(17.) THE decision given in P. H. Kalyani's case, (supra) was considered by this Court in two decisions and it was held that the workman would be entitled to backwages. Before dealing with the decisions of this Court, it would be apt to refer to para 13 of D. C. Roy's case (supra). It reads as under :

"the second contention must also therefore fail. We would however, like to add that the decision in P. H. Kalyani's case, is not to be construed as a charter for employers to dismiss employees after the pretence of an enquiry. The enquiry in the instant case does not suffer from i defects so serious or fundamental as to make it non est. On an appropriate occasion it may become necessary to carve an exception to the ratio of Kalyani's case so as to exclude from its operation at least that class of cases in which under the facade of a domestic enquiry, the employer passed an order gravely detrimental to the employee's interest like an order of dismissal. An enquiry blatantly and consciously violating principles of natural justice may well 2 be equated with the total absence of any enquiry so as to exclude the application of the 'relation back' doctrine. But we will not pursue the point beyond this as the facts before us do not warrant a closer consideration thereof. "

The above para does indicate there is no hard and fast rule as to grant or non-grant of backwages. In the present case enquiry was held by employer. This was found to be deficient. As such Labour Court held an enquiry of its own.

(18.) THE decision given by this Court in Arvind Kumar Saxena v. M. P. S. R. T. Corpn. , M. P. No. 1128 decided on January 30, 1992, considered the matter in detail and in para 6 it was held that the workman is entitled to backwages. It is relevant It be noticed and read as under :

"however, their Lordships, in Desh Raj Gupta's case, held still, following their own decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes' case, (supra) that if the order of punishment passed by the Management is declared illegal and the punishment is upheld subsequently by the Labour Court the date of dismissal cannot relate back to the date of illegal order of the employer. Upon so holding they found the appellant in that case entitled to his salary for the period of forced unemployment under an illegal order. Accordingly in this case also, the petitioner cannot be denied that relief and indeed, he is entitled only to that relief because both Courts below have not given him any relief. "

(19.) THE matter was again considered recently by Honourable Shri Justice A. K. Mathur, in Motilal v. The Factory Manager, J. C. Mills, Birla Nagar, Gwalior, decided on May 12, 1994 in M. P. No. 147 of 1983. The decision of the Supreme Court on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the employer was taken note of. It was categorically held that the ratio of judgement in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. , (supra) would prevail. It would be apt to note the observation made in para 7 which are as under : "in the present case, it is a fact that no domestic enquiry against the petitioner was held and, therefore, the Management was given an opportunity by the Labour Court to lead the evidence so as to bring home the guilt of the petitioner workman and Management justified the petitioner. But looking to past 20 years of service of the petitioner, the Labour Court did not pass the order of removal and granted reinstatement but without any benefit of backwages. But the Hon'ble Supreme Court in identical situation, took the view that the incumbent will be entitled to the benefit of salary from the period i. e. the date of order of discharge till the date of the order of the Labour Court when the order is justified before the Labour Court. To borrow the words of their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. (supra) that "a void dismissal is just, void and does not exist" therefore, in the present case, the dismissal is void ab initio as it was in the breach of principles of natural justice but a fresh breach was infused by the Labour Court when it found the incumbent guilty of misconduct. Therefore in this view of the matter, I allow the petition and direct the respondents to pay the wages to petitioner from the date of his discharge. "

(20.) IN view of the above position of law, the question arises as to whether the decision given by the Labour Court granting fixed compensation would meet the ends of justice or not of the workman was entitled or reinstatement with 50% backwages as allowed by the Industrial Court. The fact, however, remains that the workman is entitled to some relief. Before recording a finding with regard to this aspect of the matter, another factor which is required to be gone into is as to whether the workman was gainfully employed or not. In this regard, there is evidence to suggest that in the year 1971, the workman did make some effort to engage himself and the observations made by the Industrial Court be noticed :

"so far as awarding of back wages is concerned the learned counsel for the Non-applicant Employer invited my attention to the evidence part of the case and strenuously argued that the Employee had no case in this respect as he remained employed during all the period of his ouster from the employment. I have no hesitation in confirming the findings so far as believing the witnesses of the Non-applicant i. e. , DW 10 Ashok Kumar, DW 11 Komalsingh, DW 12 Bhaiyalal, DW Banmali Dwivedi, DW 5 Popaldas, DW 6 Shyambeharilal, DW 7 B. D. Sharma are concerned for holding that the Applicant-Employee was engaged in the job. PW 1 Surendranath has been employed in the shop for Rs. 700/ -. p. m. suggests about the scope of work in the shop besides the Applicant himself. DW 10, Ashok Kumar has stated that the total Rs. 10,000/- loan amount against Prakashsing was over-due and for this reason he used to go to his place. He has also stated that the -- Applicant - Employee was asking for another loan, reflects on the financial condition and earnings of Prakashsingh. However, it is not sufficient to prove that the ousted employee was in some employment during his ouster from the job, but should also be proved that he was receiving adequate remuneration during any such period, so as to disentitle him for back wages. The employment of the -- Applicant during such period must be proved as "gainful" for which there is no reliable evidence on record. . . . . "

(21.) THUS, from 1968 to 1971, there is no evidence on the record that the workman was, gainfully employed. After that period, there is some evidence that the workman was doing some work but the question is as to whether this was gainful employment or not. It is not employment but gainful employment which is required to be seen. Merely because, the workman has engaged himself in some activity is not enough to come to the conclusion that the workman was gainfully employed. This aspect of the matter was considered by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) (1984-II-LLJ-517). The workman in the above case was maintaining his family by helping his father-in-law who was having a coal depot. It was held that if an employee is keeping his body and soul together by doing some work then this cannot be treated as gainful employment. It would be apt to quote what was said by the Supreme Court in the aformentioned case. ". . . . . he was maintaining his family by helping his father-inlaw Tara chand who owns a coal-depot, and that he and the members of his family lived with his father-in-law and that he had no alternative source of maintenance. If this is gainful employment, the employer can contend that the dismissed employee in order to keep his body and soul together had taken to begging and that would as will be gainful employment. The gross perversity with which 5 the employer had approached this case has left us stunned. If the employer after an utterly unsustainable termination order of service wants to deny backwages on the ground that the appellants and the members of his family were staying with the fatherin-law of the appellant as there was no alternative source of maintenance and during this period appellant was helping his father-in-law Tara Chand who had a coal-depot, it cannot be said that the appellant was gainfully employed. . . . . "

Thus : even if it be presumed that the workman was doing some work which was not carried on by him but his wife or by his son that does not fall within the definition of the term 'gainful employment. ' Therefore, the finding recorded by the Labour Court as well as by the Industrial Court cannot be faulted in this regard.

(22.) THE next question arises as to how and in what manner the workman is required to be compensated.

(23.) SOME of the principles which can be spelled out from the various judicial pronouncements were noticed by this Court in CIMMCO Ltd. Birlanagar v. Nandkishore, 1995 (3) SCT 412. Reference was made to a decision given by the Patna High Court and also to the decision given by the Supreme Court. The relevant paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 be noticed. These read as under :

"13. There is hardly any doubt that whenever compensation is granted in lieu of reinstatement then this is in addition to the backwages till the date of reinstatement. If any authority is needed, reference may be made to the decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. P. P. Chopra, (1970-I-LLJ-63) (SC).

14. As to what should be the quantum of compensation the Patna High Court in the case of B. Choudhury v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, 1983 LIC 1755 (Pat) has laid down various criteria. These are as under : (i) the backwages receivable ; (ii) compensation for deprivation of the job with future prospect and obtainability of alternative employment ; (iii) employee's age ; (iv) length of service in the establishment ; (v) capacity of the employer to pay and the nature of the employer's business ; (vi) gainful employment in mitigation of damages ; and (vii) circumstances leading to the disengagement and the past conduct.

15. The Supreme Court has also dealt with this aspect of the matter in the case of S. S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd. , (1957ii-LLJ-696) (SC). The observations made by the Supreme Court may be noticed with advantage. These are as under :

"the Industrial Tribunal would have to take into account the terms and conditions of; employment, the tenure of service, the possibility of termination of the employment at the instance of either party the possibility of retrenchment by the employer of resignation or retirement by the workman and even of the employer himself ceasing to exist or of the workman being awarded various benefits including reinstatement under the terms of future awards by Industrial Tribunal in the event of industrial disputes arising between the parties in the future. In computing the money value of the benefit of reinstatement the Industrial Tribunal would also have to take into account the present value of what his salary, benefits etc. would be till he attained the age of superannuation and the value of such benefits would have to be computed as from the date when s

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uch reinstatment was ordered under the terms of the award. Having regard to the considerations detailed above, it is impossible to compute the money value of this benefit of reinstatement awarded to the appellant with mathematical exactitude and the best that any Tribunal or Court would do under the circumstances would be as to correct an estimate as is possible bearing, of course, in mind all the relevant factors pro and con. " (24.) IN the present case, the workman has been out of service for almost thirty years. He is around 55 years of age. As such, it would not be apt to reinstate him and the lump sum compensation as given in lieu of reinstatement by the Labour Court seems to be just and proper. I am conscious of the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case reported as State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow, (1994-I-LLJ-872), that, this Court should not sit as a Court of Appeal with a view to examine as to whether the quantum fixed by the Industrial Court is right or wrong. The same view has been expressed in the decisions reported as Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989-IILLJ- 57) (SC) and State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, (1964-IILLJ-150) (SC). But, in the present case, the Industrial Court has granted the relief of reinstatement with 50% backwages. As indicated above, the workman has attained the age of 55. No useful purpose would be served by putting him back in service. It would, accordingly, be apt to compensate him by paying lump sum compensation. The Labour Court had granted a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000/- on March 18, 1991. The petitioner has not received this amount. Let the employer now pay this amount to the workman. The workman would be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum with effect from the date the Labour Court passed the order. (25.) THUS : I am of the view; (i) that, the workman is not a badli workman; (ii) that, the workman was not guilty of any major misconduct; (iii) that, the workman was not in employment which would fall within the definition of the term 'gainful employment'; (iv) that, the workman is entitled to be compensated and taking into consideration the present age of the workman, it would be proper to pay him a lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/-as awarded by the Labour Court. In addition to this, the workman would be entitled to interest from the date of the order passed by the Labour Court. (26.) THUS : Writ Petition No. 210 of 1994 is partly allowed. The order passed by the Industrial Court is modified. The findings recorded'on merits are upheld. The finding with regard to relief is reversed and that of the Labour Court is upheld. The workman is held entitled to a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50, OOO/ -. He would also be entitled to interest w. e. f. March 18, 1991. Interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In case payment is not made within one month then the workman would be entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum. (27.) THE other result would be the writ petition bearing No. 496 of 1994 preferred by the workman would stand dismissed. The workman would however be entitled to costs. Costs Rs. 1,000/- ?