w w w . L a w y e r S e r v i c e s . i n



Duncan Engineering Ltd. (erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.) Through its Manager v/s Ajay C. Shelke & Others


Company & Directors' Information:- M & B ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45200GJ1981PLC004437

Company & Directors' Information:- G. R. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U65990MH1990PTC058602

Company & Directors' Information:- G G ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = L28900MH2006PLC159174

Company & Directors' Information:- V U B ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29290MH2005PTC154033

Company & Directors' Information:- N S ENGINEERING COMPANY PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U29219TG1989PTC010511

Company & Directors' Information:- S S S ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U27205KA1981PTC004194

Company & Directors' Information:- H M G ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45200MH1977PLC019533

Company & Directors' Information:- K R R ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29309TN1989PTC016852

Company & Directors' Information:- G G ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28900MH2006PLC159174

Company & Directors' Information:- DUNCAN ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = L28991PN1961PLC139151

Company & Directors' Information:- D B ENGINEERING PRIVATE LTD [Active] CIN = U74899DL1986PTC026541

Company & Directors' Information:- G G ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28900MH2006PTC159174

Company & Directors' Information:- J P ENGINEERING CORPN PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U34103WB1951PTC019638

Company & Directors' Information:- AJAY (INDIA) LTD [Active] CIN = U18102RJ1996PLC011678

Company & Directors' Information:- S N B ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U27106DL2007PTC301213

Company & Directors' Information:- T P W ENGINEERING LTD [Active] CIN = U27203WB1975PLC029939

Company & Directors' Information:- C L ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U34300PB1992PTC012057

Company & Directors' Information:- W & W ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U72900TN2003PTC051228

Company & Directors' Information:- M L R ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999TG2006PTC051974

Company & Directors' Information:- K B ENGINEERING CO PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U74160TG1988PTC008366

Company & Directors' Information:- R P ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U29299WB1992PTC055482

Company & Directors' Information:- J & K ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45203JK2006PLC002684

Company & Directors' Information:- S P T ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Converted to LLP] CIN = U27109UP2005PTC030940

Company & Directors' Information:- A R F ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = U27200TN1980PLC008347

Company & Directors' Information:- A M ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Amalgamated] CIN = U65910MH1981PTC187856

Company & Directors' Information:- S. S. E. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U36990MH2007PTC175320

Company & Directors' Information:- C T ENGINEERING LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29259GJ1986PLC009007

Company & Directors' Information:- R AND S ENGINEERING INDIA PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U29199GJ1995PTC027661

Company & Directors' Information:- U AND R ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29199TZ1999PTC009012

Company & Directors' Information:- I Q ENGINEERING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U85110KA1996PTC021507

Company & Directors' Information:- G M ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28910GJ2013PTC077091

Company & Directors' Information:- W. E. ENGINEERING PVT. LTD. [Active] CIN = U52335WB1985PTC039370

Company & Directors' Information:- L. B. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999WB2018PTC225084

Company & Directors' Information:- R I ENGINEERING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74210KA1991PTC012420

Company & Directors' Information:- U D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U32109DL1999PTC102586

Company & Directors' Information:- K M T S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29192DL2005PTC141240

Company & Directors' Information:- C A G ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = U00350PB2006PLC029521

Company & Directors' Information:- C A G ENGINEERING LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29110PB2006PLC029521

Company & Directors' Information:- D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29269TZ1932PTC000046

Company & Directors' Information:- V K B ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL2005PTC141483

Company & Directors' Information:- INDIA ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U72200PN1999PTC014259

Company & Directors' Information:- C N C ENGINEERING LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U93000KA1986PLC007922

Company & Directors' Information:- M K V ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29199TZ1997PTC007736

Company & Directors' Information:- G V T ENGINEERING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29219DL1996PTC082427

Company & Directors' Information:- K. I. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999WB2009PTC133109

Company & Directors' Information:- G M E P ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29192DL1998PTC096737

Company & Directors' Information:- J T ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1984PTC018756

Company & Directors' Information:- M C ENGINEERING CO PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U74899DL1972PTC006392

Company & Directors' Information:- C P ENGINEERING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U27209TN1987PTC014052

Company & Directors' Information:- J B L ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28112MP2008PTC021459

Company & Directors' Information:- H V S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28920MH2005PTC158342

Company & Directors' Information:- S C ENGINEERING CO PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U74210WB1982PTC035623

Company & Directors' Information:- U M ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29200MH1977PTC019574

Company & Directors' Information:- A V K ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1995PTC071971

Company & Directors' Information:- S K ENGINEERING CO PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U05001UP1952PTC002408

Company & Directors' Information:- G D ENGINEERING COMPANY (INDIA) PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U74210WB1993PTC058553

Company & Directors' Information:- V M R ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29120DL2005PTC136764

Company & Directors' Information:- K. S. I. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U36999HR2007PTC036660

Company & Directors' Information:- N S S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28999KA1989PTC010312

Company & Directors' Information:- A P V ENGINEERING CO LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U29113WB1945PLC006428

Company & Directors' Information:- G B ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29212PB1996PTC017500

Company & Directors' Information:- C M S ENGINEERING INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74210TN2010PTC075302

Company & Directors' Information:- J K B ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U31300TN1996PTC036482

Company & Directors' Information:- T S C ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70109DL2011PTC217251

Company & Directors' Information:- H T S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999MH2008PTC187914

Company & Directors' Information:- T P ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45201OR2010PTC011517

Company & Directors' Information:- S B ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U29199GJ1982PTC005292

Company & Directors' Information:- J J ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U29219WB1986PTC041433

Company & Directors' Information:- D & L ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Converted to LLP] CIN = U29113TN2004PTC052690

Company & Directors' Information:- H R P ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U31503MH1997PTC108621

Company & Directors' Information:- S H ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U70101WB1999PTC088930

Company & Directors' Information:- V K S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U28133TN2005PTC057283

Company & Directors' Information:- M K ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U29199GJ1995PTC027278

Company & Directors' Information:- K J ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29299PN2006PTC129171

Company & Directors' Information:- C S S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45302TN2003PTC051161

Company & Directors' Information:- N. P. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U31100WB2010PTC150609

Company & Directors' Information:- S R K ENGINEERING CO PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U67120WB1994PTC063442

Company & Directors' Information:- AJAY AND CO. PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U01122DL1997PTC089125

Company & Directors' Information:- M P T ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U29299KL1994PTC007761

Company & Directors' Information:- T S R C ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29100UP2020PTC133920

Company & Directors' Information:- C S ENGINEERING INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28110MH2021PTC361962

Company & Directors' Information:- A K ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U50300UP1981PTC005354

Company & Directors' Information:- H M T D ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U99999MH1981PTC035175

Company & Directors' Information:- J P ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U28129MH1972PTC015813

Company & Directors' Information:- V M ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28920MH1969PTC014224

Company & Directors' Information:- H M A ENGINEERING LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45209PB2008PLC031777

Company & Directors' Information:- P T S ENGINEERING INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74210TZ2011PTC016944

Company & Directors' Information:- K S M ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74210TG1997PTC028612

Company & Directors' Information:- M M ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Converted to LLP] CIN = U28932MH1979PTC021819

Company & Directors' Information:- N G T ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U27109WB1968PTC027292

Company & Directors' Information:- M A S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U99999MH1976PTC019233

Company & Directors' Information:- G R K ENGINEERING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74200AP2011PTC076356

Company & Directors' Information:- P N S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29120TN2006PTC060120

Company & Directors' Information:- K P ENGINEERING CORPORATION PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U74200WB1961PTC025258

Company & Directors' Information:- M A N INDIA ENGINEERING LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U74200WB1979PLC020893

Company & Directors' Information:- R V K ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29253TN2010PTC074505

Company & Directors' Information:- R K ENGINEERING COMPANY PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U74899DL1975PTC007743

Company & Directors' Information:- G S A ENGINEERING CORPN PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U74210WB1957PTC023382

Company & Directors' Information:- A R M ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED. [Strike Off] CIN = U00500JH1988PTC003057

Company & Directors' Information:- L & V ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45202MZ2005PTC007690

Company & Directors' Information:- S G A ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29200MH2005PTC154349

Company & Directors' Information:- C P C ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29120TZ1986PTC001880

Company & Directors' Information:- P K R ENGINEERING INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29130TZ2004PTC011094

Company & Directors' Information:- M N B ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U70101TN2005PTC057442

Company & Directors' Information:- R R K ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74999WB2011PTC161080

Company & Directors' Information:- M S V ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U52399TG2020PTC147098

Company & Directors' Information:- D M S ENGINEERING CO PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U28920WB1964PTC026168

Company & Directors' Information:- C R T ENGINEERING LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U32109DL1990PLC038842

Company & Directors' Information:- S D S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U28999PN2000PTC014838

Company & Directors' Information:- G B L ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29130RJ1998PTC015182

Company & Directors' Information:- N T ENGINEERING COMPANY PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U99999PY1986PTC000445

Company & Directors' Information:- R K ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U31100MH2005PTC152838

Company & Directors' Information:- V J S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29130TN1996PTC036636

Company & Directors' Information:- R. K. V. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29253MH2010PTC205237

Company & Directors' Information:- U S ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U34300CH1986PTC006887

Company & Directors' Information:- A D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74210OR1989PTC002348

Company & Directors' Information:- R J ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U27107RJ1972PTC001441

Company & Directors' Information:- H F ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29244KL2013PTC033909

Company & Directors' Information:- O N ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74899DL1988PTC031987

Company & Directors' Information:- I D M ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29199KA1981PTC004517

Company & Directors' Information:- P S R ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U40200WB1987PTC042244

Company & Directors' Information:- P N ENGINEERING CO PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U74210WB1980PTC032750

Company & Directors' Information:- A M A R ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29219DL1997PTC084187

Company & Directors' Information:- S G D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29210KA2009PTC050452

Company & Directors' Information:- G A S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29191MH2004PTC149606

Company & Directors' Information:- G T ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29219PN2012PTC145781

Company & Directors' Information:- M. M. K. ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29305MH2014PTC252830

Company & Directors' Information:- K-4 ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U31400MH2010PTC204004

Company & Directors' Information:- N J ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U45209MH2015PTC262607

Company & Directors' Information:- P R S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29253TN2009PTC073915

Company & Directors' Information:- U P S ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U40300TN2013PTC090167

Company & Directors' Information:- K G D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45400WB2014PTC200732

Company & Directors' Information:- T A ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U28992CH2003PTC025800

Company & Directors' Information:- M N A ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U45202CH2006PTC030215

Company & Directors' Information:- A A P ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U27106DL2005PTC138318

Company & Directors' Information:- A C ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29253DL2011PTC222515

Company & Directors' Information:- S. Z. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U29253DL2014PTC274095

Company & Directors' Information:- IN ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U74210DL2011PTC212284

Company & Directors' Information:- J N ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45400DL2015PTC278906

Company & Directors' Information:- N I ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45400DL2015PTC280734

Company & Directors' Information:- A N D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51502DL2012PTC242516

Company & Directors' Information:- R R V ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51909DL1997PTC089342

Company & Directors' Information:- Z. M. ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U51909DL2007PTC168270

Company & Directors' Information:- K Y ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74999DL2013PTC248278

Company & Directors' Information:- R AND T ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U34300DL2005PTC136846

Company & Directors' Information:- THE ENGINEERING CORPORATION PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U99999KA1951PTC000699

Company & Directors' Information:- S J P ENGINEERING CO. PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U51505KA2002PTC030808

Company & Directors' Information:- D Y R ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U45205KA2014PTC075105

Company & Directors' Information:- T J ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U28999MH2021PTC353062

Company & Directors' Information:- S I ENGINEERING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U27109UP1967PTC003182

Company & Directors' Information:- W D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U29308MH2020PTC345065

Company & Directors' Information:- S D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U18101DL1999PTC102948

Company & Directors' Information:- M B D ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED [Strike Off] CIN = U74210DL2008PTC181446

Company & Directors' Information:- A. B. C. ENGINEERING CORPORATION LIMITED [Not available for efiling] CIN = U99999MH1950PLC008192

Company & Directors' Information:-  ENGINEERING COMPANY ( [Not Available for eFiling] CIN = U99999MH1951PLC010002

Company & Directors' Information:- F M P ENGINEERING PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U29259GJ1965PTC001337

    Writ Petition (ST.) Nos. 93088 of 2020, 93042 of 2020, 93100 of 2020, 93073 of 2020, 93037 of 2020, 93056 of 2020, 93093 of 2020, 93041 of 2020, 93101 of 2020, 93039 of 2020, 93077 of 2020, 93097 of 2020, 93052 of 2020, 93047 of 2020, 93036 of 2020, 93091 of 2020 & 93045 of 2020

    Decided On, 21 June 2021

    At, High Court of Judicature at Bombay

    By, THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI

    For the Petitioner: Nutan Patankar i/b. Tanaya Patankar, Advocates. For the Respondents: Nitin Kulkarni, Advocate.



Judgment Text

1. Rule. With consent Rule made returnable forthwith. These Petitions involve a common question of law, hence the same are heard together and are being decided by this common Judgment.2. The Petitioner-Employer assails Awards of the Labour Court-II, Pune. By the impugned Awards, the Labour Court has held the dismissal orders to be void and inoperative for non-compliance of provisions under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the ID Act’) and directed the Petitioner to reinstate all the Respondent-workmen with continuity of service, full back wages and all consequential benefits.3. The facts giving rise to the present petitions are as under:-The Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing Tube Valves for Automobile Sector. Respondent-workmen were employed in one of the factories of the Petitioner. They were served with charge sheets alleging willful insubordination, disobedience, illegal strike, riotous and disorderly behaviour, etc. which constituted misconduct under model standard orders under Sections 24(a), (b), (k), (l), (w) framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The Petitioner, not being satisfied with the explanation submitted by the Respondent-workmen, initiated enquiry into the alleged misconduct. The Enquiry Officer recorded a finding that the Respondent -workmen were guilty of misconduct. Hence, vide order dated 10/10/2014 the Petitioner terminated the services of Respondent-workmen with immediate effect. Aggrieved by the dismissal order, the Respondent-Workmen raised an industrial dispute, which was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 10 of the ID Act. The Reference was on the question of validity and legality of termination of services of the Respondent-Workmen and if so, whether the Respondent-Workmen were entitled for reinstatement with continuity of service, back-wages, and other benefits.4. The Respondent-workmen filed their statement of claim before the Labour Court inter alia contending that dismissal is illegal and void for want of approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. It was the case of the Respondent - workmen that issuance of charge sheet and consequent dismissal was a result of victimization for having joined the Union viz. Maharashtra Rajya Rashtriya Kamgar Sangh (INTAK), which was espousing their cause. The Respondent-workmen contended that the dismissal order was passed pending the Reference i.e., Ref. (IT) No.17 of 2014 pertaining to the Charter of Demands raised by the Union of which they were the members. The Respondent-workmen contended that the dismissal orders were inoperative, having been passed without seeking approval from the authority before which the Reference was pending. On merits the Respondent-workmen alleged that the enquiry was not fair and proper and that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as regards the misconduct were perverse.5. The Petitioner denied that the issuance of a charge sheet was an act of victimization. The Petitioner contended that the Respondent-Workmen had participated in the enquiry, which was conducted to enquire into the misconduct committed by them. It was further alleged that the Enquiry Officer upon considering the material on record held the Respondent-workmen guilty of the charges levelled. The Petitioner claimed that it was not necessary to seek approval and denied that the order of dismissal was void or inoperative for breach of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act.6. The Labour Court framed preliminary issues relating to fairness of the enquiry and perversity or otherwise of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The Labour Court, by Part -I Award on the said preliminary issues, held the enquiry to be fair, proper and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The Labour Court further held that there was sufficient and acceptable evidence before the Enquiry Officer to come to the conclusion that the Respondent-workmen have committed misconduct mentioned in the charge sheet. The Labour Court therefore held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on sufficient and acceptable evidence and that the same are not perverse and accordingly answered the preliminary issues in favour of the Petitioner.7. Nevertheless, in the final awards, which are assailed in these petitions, the Labour Court interfered with the punishment and ordered reinstatement mainly on the ground of non-compliance of the provision under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In arriving at these findings, the Labour Court has taken note of the fact that the Reference pertaining to the Charter of Demand was pending adjudication and that the dismissal orders were issued during pendency of the said Reference without complying with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 224, the Labour Court held that the dismissal orders which are in contravention of the mandatory provision of Section 33(2) (b) of the ID Act are void and inoperative. The Labour Court therefore set aside the said dismissal orders with direction to the Petitioner to reinstate the Respondent-workmen with continuity in service, full back wages and all consequential benefits.8. The Respondent-Workmen have not challenged the findings rendered by the Labour Court on the preliminary issues viz. fairness of the enquiry and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer with regard to the misconduct. The challenge raised by the Petitioner in these petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is restricted to the order of reinstatement with consequential benefits for want of compliance of Section 33(2) (b) of the ID Act.9. Ms Nutan Patankar, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that once a workman files an application under Section 33A or raises an industrial dispute resulting in Reference under Section 10 of the ID Act, the industrial adjudicator cannot restrict adjudication only to the issue of non-compliance of provision under Section 33(2)(b) but must adjudicate the substantive dispute on merits in accordance with the provisions of the ID Act. She submits that in the instant case, having held that the enquiry is fair and proper, and the charges have been proved, the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the dismissal orders and ordering reinstatement solely on the ground of contravention of provision under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In support of this contention, she has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 160, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. Vs. Satyaprakash (2013) 9 SCC 232, Management of Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. Vs. S. Balkrishnan 2016 (12) SCC 221 and Managemnt of North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation Vs. Shivsharanappa 2017 (16) SCC 540. 10. Per contra, Mr. Nitin Kulkarni, learned counsel for the Respondent-workmen submits that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila (supra) has resolved the controversy and has held that the dismissal order in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is void and inoperative. He submits that the decision in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. (Supra) was based on the peculiar facts of the case whereas in Karur Vysya (supra) the issue of non-compliance of Section 33(2)(b) has been kept open. He emphasizes that termination of the services of Respondent-workmen was clearly in the teeth of Section 33(2) (b) of the ID Act. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, the dismissal order being void ab initio, the Labour Court was not competent to go into the justifiability of the dismissal order and or the question relating to the justifiability or proportionality of the dismissal order.11. Learned counsel for Respondent-workmen has relied upon the decision in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. Vs. Mackinnon Employees Union 2015 (4) SCC 544, wherein the Apex Court while considering the impact of noncompliance of Section 25FFA and 25G of the ID Act has reiterated the legal principle that if a statutory provision prescribes a particular procedure to be followed by the Authority to do an act, it should be done only in that particular manner. It is held that if such procedure is not followed in the prescribed manner, as provided in the statutory provision, then such act of the Authority is null and void ab-initio.12. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent has also relied upon the decision in S.G. Chemical and Dyes Trading Employees Union Vs. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Ltd. And Ors. 1986 (2) SCC 624 wherein the Apex Court has held that closure in contravention of the provisions of Section 25-O of ID Act is illegal. It is emphasized that if the services of a workman are terminated in violation of any of the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, such termination is unlawful and ineffective, and the workman would ordinarily be entitled to reinstatement and payment of full back-wages. He submits that in the instant case, the Petitioner had admittedly not obtained approval and hence the termination which is in breach of mandatory provision is void ab-initio. He therefore contends that the Labour Court was perfectly justified in ordering reinstatement with full back-wages and consequential benefits.13. I have perused the records and considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties.14. It is not in dispute that the Respondent-Workmen were served with charge sheets for committing several acts of misconduct. They participated in an enquiry into the alleged misconduct and that the Enquiry Officer held them guilty of the said misconduct. The Petitioner dismissed the services of Respondent-Workmen during the pendency of a Reference relating to Charter of Demands, without payment of one month wages and seeking approval as per the mandate of Section 33 (2)(b) of the I.D. Act. In a Reference made under Section 10 of the I.D. Act, the Labour Court recorded a finding that the inquiry is fair and proper and that the findings of the Inquiry Officer are based on the material on record and are not perverse. The Labour Court has held the termination to be illegal and void solely on the ground of non-compliance of Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act.15. There is no challenge to the findings recorded by the Labour Court on the preliminary issues, viz. fairness of the enquiry and perversity or otherwise of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on the alleged misconduct. The challenge is restricted to the order of reinstatement for noncompliance with the provisions of Section 33 (2)(b) of the ID Act. Though the learned counsel for the respective parties have argued at great length and cited several decisions, the central issue is whether non-compliance with the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act would ipso facto entitle the Respondent-workmen to be reinstated with all consequential benefits or whether, having held the misconduct to be proved, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the dismissal order, notwithstanding non-compliance of the mandatory provision under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.16. In order to appreciate the submissions and answer the above questions it would be advantageous to consider the scope and ambit of the provisions of Sections 33 and 33A of the ID Act as well as the law on the subject. The relevant portion of Section 33 and Section 33A of ID Act read as under:-“Sec. 33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or] a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall—(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman,--(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman:Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.(3) xxxSec. 33A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceedings. - Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], any employee aggrieved by such contravention may, make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner,(a) to such conciliation officer or Board, and the conciliation officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in mediating in, and promoting the settlement of, such industrial dispute; and(b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.”17. Section 33 of the I.D. Act, as it stood prior to 1956 amendment, imposed a total ban on change of service conditions to the prejudice of workman or discharge or dismissal of the workman during the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or any other proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute. The object was to protect the workman concerned against victimization for having raised an industrial dispute and further to ensure adjudication of pending industrial proceedings in a peaceful atmosphere. The effect of the unamended section was that pending an industrial dispute, the employer could not alter the service conditions and or pass discharge or dismissal order even in a matter not connected with the pending dispute. Section 33 was therefore amended in the year 1956.18. Section 33, as amended in the year 1956 makes a broad division between action proposed to be taken by the employer regarding any matter connected with the dispute on the one hand and action proposed to be taken regarding a matter not connected with the dispute pending before the authority. To be more specific Sub-Section (1) of Section 33 deals with matters connected with the pending dispute and imposes a ban on change of service conditions or discharge or dismissal of the workman save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Whereas Sub-Section (2) of Section 33 deals with the alterations in the conditions of service as well as discharge or dismissal of workman concerned in any pending dispute where such alteration or such discharge or dismissal is in regard to a matter not connected to the pending dispute.19. It is to be noted that clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 33 recognizes the right of the employer to make an alteration in the condition of service so long as it does not relate to a matter connected to a pending dispute. Clause (b) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 33 enables the employer to dismiss or discharge the workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute provided the concerned employee is paid wages for one month and the employer makes an application to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken.20. In P.H. Kalyani v/s. M/s. Air France Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1756, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while approving the view in Strawboard Mfg. Co. vs. Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 held that the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) contemplates the three conditions mentioned therein viz. (i) dismissal or discharge (ii) payment of wages for one month and (iii) making of an application for approval, to be simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction.21. In P.H. Kalyani (supra), the workman was dismissed for misconduct. Application was filed by the employer under Section 33(2)(b) for approval of action taken and a complaint filed by the workman under Section 33A challenging the legality of the action taken. The Labour Court held that the dismissal was justifiable and therefore, accorded approval to the action taken and dismissed the Application under Section 33A of the Act. It was urged that the Labour Court having held that the inquiry was biased and in violation of principles of natural justice, it was not open for Labour Court to consider the justifiability of the dismissal. It was in this context that the Apex Court held that it was open to the Tribunal to go into the propriety of an order of dismissal itself when there is a defect in the domestic inquiry. The Apex Court held that if inquiry is not defective, the Labour Court has only to see whether there was a prima facie case for dismissal and whether the employer had come to the bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty of misconduct and upon being satisfied that there was no unfair labour practice and victimization, grant approval which would relate to the date of the order of dismissal. It is further held that if the inquiry is defective for any reason, the Labour Court will also have to consider for itself, on the evidence adduced before it, whether the dismissal was justified. However, coming to the conclusion on its own appraisal of evidence adduced before it that the dismissal was justified, its approval of the order of dismissal made by the employer in a defective enquiry would still relate back to the date when the order was made.22. The scope of the enquiry to be held by the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal while granting or refusing 23/68 approval for the discharge or dismissal of the workman under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act has been explained by the Apex Court in a recent decision in John D’souza Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation 2020 I CLR 198. The Apex Court held that Section 33(2)(b) contemplates an enquiry by way of summary proceedings as to whether a proper domestic enquiry has been held to prove the misconduct so attributed to the workman and whether he has been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself in consonance with the principles of natural justice. The object of such an enquiry is to lift the veil to find out that there is no hidden motive to punish the workman or an abortive attempt to punish him for a non-existing misconduct.23. The Apex Court reiterated that such summary proceedings are not akin and at par with its jurisdiction to adjudicate an ‘industrial dispute’ nor does it clothe it with a power to peep into the quantum of punishment. Referring to the previous judgments including the judgment of three judge Bench in Punjab National Bank (supra), the Apex Court has held that in the first stage the Labour Court/Tribunal has to consider whether or not a prima facie case for discharge or dismissal is made out on the basis of the domestic enquiry, if such enquiry does not suffer from any defect, viz. it has not been held in violation of principles of natural justice and conclusion arrived at by the employer is bona fide or that there was no unfair labour practice for victimization of the workman. The approval must follow when no defect is detected. The second stage comes when the Labour Court /Tribunal finds that the domestic enquiry suffers from one or the other legal ailment. In that case, the Labour Court/Tribunal shall permit the parties to adduce their respective evidence and on appraisal thereof the Labour Court/Tribunal shall conclude its enquiry whether the discharge or any other punishment including dismissal was justified.24. It has been emphasized that power to permit the parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a workman, cannot be exercised mechanically, without first examining the material led in the domestic enquiry, as if it is an essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Referring to the decision of the Punjab National Bank (supra), the Apex Court has held that the order of dismissal even if approved under Section 33(2)(b) would not attain finality and that if an industrial dispute is raised on such a dismissal, the order of dismissal passed even with a requisite permission obtained under Section 33 has to face the scrutiny of Tribunal.25. Section 33A gives an option to the employee aggrieved by contravention of Section 33 to make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner, to the Conciliatory Authority or Adjudicatory Authority before whom the conciliation or other proceedings are pending. Until the enactment of Section 33A, in the year 1950, the sole remedy which the employee could avail for breach of Section 33 was to raise an industrial dispute and to move the Appropriate Government for its Reference to a Tribunal under Section 10 of the ID Act. Recourse to this provision involved delay and left the redress of the grievance entirely in the discretion of the appropriate Government. Section 33A was enacted to obviate this situation.26. This section demarcates the scope of the action to be taken by the Conciliatory Authority and Adjudicatory Authority. When a complaint is made to the Conciliatory Authority, viz. a Conciliation Officer or the Board, such authority is required to take such complaint into account in bringing about settlement of the complained dispute. The Conciliation Officer or the Board is not empowered to adjudicate upon the dispute. It is within the exclusive domain of the Adjudicatory Authority viz. Arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred under Section 10 of the ID Act. Such adjudication must be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the ID Act and the Adjudicatory Authority is required to submit its Award to the Appropriate Government.27. In Punjab Beverages (supra), the Apex court considered the effect of contravention of Section 33(2)(b) on an order of dismissal passed in breach of Section 33, viz. whether such breach would render the order of dismissal void and inoperative, which would entitle the workman to say that he continues to be in service and is entitled to receive wages. In this context the Apex Court considered the scope of the enquiry under Section 33A. Referring to the judgment of Automobile Products of India Ltd. and Equitable Coal Co. and Punjab National Bank (supra) the Apex Court held that –“11. It will found therefore be seen that the frst issue which is required to be decided in a complaint filed by an aggrieved workman under Section 33A is whether the order of discharge or dismissal made by the employer is in contravention of Section 33. The foundation of the complaint under Section 33A is a contravention of Section 33 and if the workman is unable to show that the employer has contravened section 33 in making the order of discharge or dismissal, the complaint would be liable to be rejected. But, if the contravention of section 33 is established, the next question would be whether the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is justified on merits. The Tribunal would have to go into this question and decide whether, on the merits, the order of the discharge or dismissal, passed by the employer, is justified and if it is, the tribunal would sustain the order, treating the breach of Section 33 as a mere technical breach. Since, in such a case, the original order of discharge or dismissal would stand justified, it would not be open to the tribunal, unless there are compelling circumstances, to make any substantial order of compensation in favour of the workmen. In fact, in Equitable Coal Co.’s case an order of compensation made by the Tribunal in favour of the workmen, was reversed by this Court. The Tribunal would have to consider all the aspects of the case and ultimately, what order would meet the ends of justice would necessarily have to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. But this much is clear that a mere contravention of Section 33 by the employer will not entitle the workman to an order of reinstatement, because enquiry under Section 33A is not confined only to the determination of the question as to whether the employer has contravened section 33 but even if such contravention is proved, the tribunal has to go further and deal with the merits of the order of discharge or dismissal.”28. In Strawboard Mfg. Co. (supra) and Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. S.N. Modak, AIR 1966 SC 380 a two Benches consisting of three learned Judges of the Apex Court had taken a view that if the approval is not granted under Section 33(2) (b) of the ID Act, the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed and therefore the employee becomes entitled to wages from the date of dismissal to the date of disapproval of the application. This was contrary to the view expressed in Punjab Beverages (supra), which had held that non approval of the order of dismissal or failure to make application under Section 33(2)(b) would not render the order of dismissal inoperative but would only render the employer liable to punishment under Section 31 of the Act, with the remedy to the employee available either to file a complaint under Section 33A or by way of raising an industrial dispute to be adjudicated in a Reference under Section 10 (1)(d) of the ID Act.29. In view of these conflicting views, a Reference came to be made to the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila (supra). The Reference involved two questions. The first was with regard to the date from which the order of dismissal would become ineffective i.e., from the date of dismissal order or from the date of rejection of approval. The second question was whether failure to make an application under Section 33(2) (b) would render the dismissal order inoperative. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court answered the questions thus:-“13. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b), can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory. This apart, from the object of Section 33and in the context of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), it is obvious that the conditions contained in the said proviso are to be essentially complied with. Further any employer who contravenes the provisions of Section 33 invites a punishment under S.31(1) with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.1000/- or with both. This penal provision is again a pointer of the mandatory nature of the proviso to comply with the conditions stated therein. To put it in other way, the said conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfied if an order of discharge or dismissal passed under Section 33(2)(b) is to be operative. If an employer desires to take benefit of the said provision for passing an order of discharge or dismissal of an employee, he has also to take the burden of discharging the statutory obligation placed on him in the said proviso. Taking a contrary view that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by an employer in contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso does not render such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very purpose of the proviso and it becomes meaningless. It is well-settled rule of interpretation that no part of statute shall be construed as unnecessary or superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or disobeyed by an employer. He cannot disobey the mandatory provision and then say that the order of discharge or dismissal made in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The interpretation of statute must be such that it should advance the legislative intent and serve the purpose for which it is made rather than to frustrate it. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them are already strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the provision of Section 33(2)(b) to ease out a workman without complying with the conditions contained in the said proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be unconnected with the already pending industrial dispute. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman.14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2) (b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2) (b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2) (b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. The said Section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted.15. The view that when no application is made or the one made is withdrawn, there is no order of refusal of such application on merit and as such the order of dismissal or discharge does not become void or inoperative unless such an order is set aside under Section 33A, cannot be accepted. In our view, not making an application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). An employer who does not make an application under Section 33(2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory obligation created on him to make such an application. If it is so done, he will be happier or more comfortable than an employer who obeys the command of law and makes an application inviting scrutiny of the authority in the matter of granting approval of the action taken by him. Adherence to and obedience of law should be obvious and necessary in a system governed by rule of law. An employer by design can avoid to make an application after dismissing or discharging an employee or file it and withdraw before any order is passed on it, on its merits, to take a position that such order is not inoperative or void till it is set aside under Section 33A notwithstanding the contravention of Section 33(2) (b) proviso, driving the employee to have recourse to one or more proceeding by making a complaint under section 33A or to raise another industrial dispute or to make a complaint under Section 31(1). Such an approach destroys the protection specifically and expressly given to an employee under the said proviso as against possible victimization, unfair labour practice or harassment because of pendency of industrial dispute so that an employee can be saved from hardship of unemployment.16. xxx17. xxx18. In view of what is stated above, we respectfully agree with and endorse the view taken in the case of Strawboard and Tata Iron & Steel Co. and further state that the view expressed in Punjab Beverages on the question is not the correct view. The question raised in the beginning of this judgment is answered accordingly.”30. In Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. and anr. v/s. Prabhakar H. Manjuare and anr. (2003) 1 SCC 320, the Apex Court considered the question whether the management was entitled to pass an order of dismissal again after the earlier order of dismissal was rendered void and inoperative for breach of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In the said case, the order of the Tribunal holding dismissal to be invalid for noncompliance of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) had attained finality. The employer, treating non-compliance as a mere technical breach once again passed a dismissal order without further inquiry and without paying wages for the period between first dismissal and second dismissal. The Tribunal, relying upon Punjab Beverages, granted approval, which order was affirmed by a learned Single Judge. The Division Bench, in an Appeal, set-aside the order and held that the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service with all consequential benefits. The Apex Court, following the law laid down in Jaipur Zila, held that refusal to grant approval rendered the dismissal order void and inoperative. It was held that the first order having attained finality, it was not open for the employer to make a second application for approval, that too without paying full wages and that such application was nothing but an act of victimization.31. A similar question was raised before this Court in AIR India Ltd. v/s. V.M. Mhadgut and anr. in Writ Petition No.2818 of 2003, wherein the Approval Application was withdrawn reserving liberty to file a fresh application. Subsequently, the workman was reinstated and on the very next date he was placed under suspension. The workman was thereafter dismissed for having committed misconduct which was the subject matter of the earlier enquiry. The management forwarded to the workman his wages for one month and thereupon moved an application for approval under Section 33(2)(b). Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila, the Tribunal held that since the first application was withdrawn, there was no approval and consequently the workman was deemed to be in service. It was further held that it was not permissible to grant permission to file a fresh application upon withdrawal of the first application. The Tribunal dismissed the Application inter alia on a ground that the order of dismissal was nullity.32. Relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila and Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court (as his Lordship then was) held that the original order of dismissal was rendered void and inoperative in view of withdrawal of the previous application for approval. The workman was therefore entitled to continue in service and to the payment of his wages in accordance with law. The second dismissal order was held to be in breach of Section 33(2)(b) for failure to pay back wages from the date of the first order of dismissal. It has been held that in such situation, the breach of Section 33(2)(b) could not be treated as only a lapse and that no fresh order of termination could be passed without paying full back wages, by merely effectuating the requirement of one month’s notice. The earlier order of dismissal being void and inoperative the workman was held to be entitled for all consequential benefits. It is further held that the consequence of refusal, withdrawal, or non-filing of application for approval invalidates the order of dismissal, however, it does not obliterate the underlying misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings. Hence, it is not necessary for the employer to hold a fresh disciplinary inquiry. It is held that the object of Section 33(2)(b) is to prevent victimization of workman or unfair labour practice during the pendency of the Reference.33. At this stage, it would also be relevant to refer to the decision of Apex Court in United Bank of India Vs. Sidhartha Chakraborty AIR 2007 SC 3071. In this case the workman, who was dismissed for acts of misconduct, had raised an industrial dispute, which was referred for adjudication under Section 10 of the ID Act. The Reference was on the question of legality and validity of order of dismissal pending the proceedings of the Labour Court for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 33 (2)(b) of the ID Act. The Tribunal held that the enquiry was fair, proper and in compliance with the principles of natural justice and, further held that the imposition of the punishment of dismissal was justified. In a challenge before the learned Single Judge, it was contended that the principles of doctrine of prospective overruling would be applicable as the decision in Punjab Beverages (supra), was holding the field at the time the action was taken. This plea was negatived by the learned Single Judge and relying upon the subsequent decision in Jaipur Zila it was held that the decision in Punjab Beverages, having been overruled, cannot have any application. The Division Bench affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge and held that the workman would be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.34. In an appeal against the said order, the Apex Court referred to paragraph 13 of the judgment in Jaipur Zila (supra) and reiterated that the proviso to section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is in the nature of a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during pendency of an industrial dispute. The Apex Court held that the judgment of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench does not suffer from any infirmity. The Apex Court therefore did not interfere with the order of reinstatement, however, considering the peculiar facts of the case, the background in which the disciplinary action was taken, and the position in law as it stood at the relevant time, the Apex Court restricted the quantum of back wages to Rs.2,00,000/- and granted liberty to the Bank to take action in terms of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act.35. A similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in DTC Vs. Premchand, Ex Sweeper, 176 (2011) DLT 476. The challenge in the said case was to the order of reinstatement for want of approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. It was contended that since the proceedings under 33(2)(b) were dismissed for want of prosecution, it was obligatory to address the controversy on merits. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court relying upon the decision of Jaipur Zila (supra) held that the provision under Section 33(2)(b) is mandatory and rejected the contention of the Management that when an application under Section 33(2) (b) was dismissed for want of prosecution, the same cannot be given the status of non-approval. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Engineering Laghu Udyog Employees Union vs. Judge Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal and Anr. (2003) 12 SCC 1 Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that:-“13. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to law laid down in Engineering Laghu Udyog Employees Union (supra). In the said case, a three-judge Bench of the Apex Court referred to the decisions in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. V. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, 1980 (2) SCR 145 and P.H. Kalyani (supra) and expressed the view as follows:-‘When in terms of the proviso appended to clause (b) of Section 33 of the Act, an approval is sought for and is refused the order of dismissal becomes void. If an approval is not obtained still, the order of punishment cannot be given effect to. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the tribunal in a reference under section 10 of the Act, when passes an order recording a finding of misconduct, brings life into the dead. Unfortunately, the Court did not take notice of the binding decisions in Motipur Sugar Factory’s case (supra) and Firestone’s case (supra).We may further notice that P.H.Kalyani’s case (supra) has also recently been followed by another Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zilla Sahakari Bhoomi Bikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others, 2002 (2) SCC 244.’14. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, there can be no scintilla of doubt that when there is no approval by the industrial adjudicator on an application preferred under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the order of dismissal is ab initio void. What is ab initio void, as has been held in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. (supra), is void and does not exist. Once the order of dismissal did not exist, the relation between the employer and the employee continued and there was no severance of status. The reference that was made to the labour court was in respect of the selfsame charges and when there has been no approval as requisite under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the question of addressing the said reference on merits by the labour court was totally unwarranted because the said order had already paved the path of extension. The labour court does not adjudicate a lis in the vacuum. Ergo, we do not find any in the approach of the labour court and the stamp of approval given by the learned Single Judge.”36. Similarly, in Top Securities Ltd. Vs. Subhashchandra Jha, 191 (2012) DLT 361, the question before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was whether noncompliance of the provision of section 33(2)(b) of ID Act would ipso facto render the order of dismissal ineffective and whether the employee, in such circumstances would be required to file an application under Section 33A of the ID Act for having the said order of dismissal being declared as void ab initio. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank (supra), Hindustan General Electrical Corporation Ltd. Vs. Vishwanath Prasad and Anr., 1971 (2) SCC 605 and the decision of this Court in Batuk K. Vyas Vs. Surat Borough Municipality and ORs. 1952 II L.L.J. 178 it was contended that there was distinction between the violation of provision of Section 33(2)(b) and adjudication under Section 33A of the ID Act. It was contended that in the proceedings under Section 33A, the Tribunal was not only required to consider whether the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) had been contravened but had to enter upon an adjudication with regard to the substantive dispute qua dismissal/termination.37. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court held that though the decisions in Punjab National Bank, the Hindustan General Electrical Corporation and Batuk Vyas (supra) tend to support the arguments, the same would be of no use in view of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila. Referring to paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the decision in Jaipur Zila the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that –“20. As would be noticed upon a reading of the above extract, the Supreme Court specifically provided that Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straight away make a complaint before the very authority where an industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and, thereafter, an adjudication. It is also clearly pointed out that the employer who does not make an application under Section 33(2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory obligation created on him to make such an application. As such, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act would by itself amount to the order of dismissal being void or inoperative. If this happens, it is not at all necessary for an employee to file a complaint under Section 33A to have the order of dismissal/termination set-aside following an adjudication on merits.21. It is therefore, abundantly clear that the employee may file a complaint with regard to the relief that is required to be given to the employee in respect of the contravention of the provisions of Section 33. In other words, where no application seeking an approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act is made by the employer, the employee may yet make a complaint under Section 33A seeking relief of reinstatement and payment of back wages. It is that dispute which will be taken up by the Industrial Tribunal which will obviously go into the question as to whether there has been or there has not been compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act. Once the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the mandatory provisions have been contravened, the only thing that needs to be done by the Tribunal is to direct that the employee be given an appropriate relief by way of reinstatement and by making an order with regard to back wages. The Tribunal is not required to go into the question of as to whether the dismissal was good or bad, on merits”.38. In a subsequent decision, in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. (supra) a two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the question whether in a proceeding under Section 33A of the ID Act, the workman would be entitled for reinstatement with continuity of service for breach of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In a complaint filed by a workman under Section 33A of the ID Act the Tribunal held that the charge was duly proved but ordered reinstatement with full back wages and continuity in service in view of non-compliance of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. This was in view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila (supra). The award was upheld by the learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench. The employer challenged the order before the Apex Court. The Apex Court rejected the contention that the enquiry under Section 33A is confined only to the determination of the question of alleged contravention of the provision of Section 33 by the employer. While quashing the orders of the courts below, the Apex Court referred to the decision in Jaipur Zila and upon considering the law laid down in Punjab National Bank and P.H. Kalyani vs. M/s. AIR France Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1756, held:-23. In the present case, the Tribunal accepted that during this very short span of service as a daily wager the respondent had committed the misconduct which had been duly proved. Having held so, the Tribunal was expected to dismiss the Complaint filed by the respondent. It could not have passed the order of reinstatement with continuity in service in favour of the respondent on the basis that initially the appellant had committed a breach of Section 33(2) (b) of the Act. It is true that the appellant had not applied for the necessary approval as required under that section. That is why the Complaint was filed by the respondent under Section 33A of the Act. That Complaint having been filed, it was adjudicated like a reference as required by the statute. The same having been done, and the misconduct having been held to have been proved, now there is no question to hold that the termination shall still continue to be void and inoperative. The de jure relationship of employer and employee would come to an end with effect from the date of the order of dismissal passed by the appellant. In the facts of the present case, when the respondent had indulged into a misconduct within a very short span of service which had been duly proved, there was no occasion to pass the award of reinstatement with continuity in service…”39. In Karur Vysya Bank (supra) the workman had filed a complaint under Section 33A of the ID Act. The Tribunal recorded a finding that the enquiry was fair and proper and upon considering the evidence on record held that the dismissal was unjustified. The ld. Single Judge as well as the Division Bench did not go into the validity of the dismissal order and affirmed the Award for want of approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Setting aside the said order, the Apex Court held that once the tribunal had reached the conclusion that the domestic enquiry held against the workman was proper, no further scrutiny or investigation of the correctness of the findings recorded could have been made unless the said findings disclosed perversity. In considering the scope of the inquiry under Section 33A, the Apex Court reiterated the principles in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. (supra) and enunciated the law on issue thus:-“10. Section 33-A of the Act enjoins upon the industrial adjudicator a twin duty. The first is to find out as to whether the employer has contravened the provision of Section 33 (in the present case by not filing an application seeking approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act). However, a finding on the above question would not be conclusive of the matter and the industrial adjudicator is required to answer the further question as to whether the dismissal or such other punishment as may have been imposed on the workman is justified in law. The issue of sustainability of the punishment imposed naturally has to be decided within the contours of the reference jurisdiction as indicated above. That Section 33A of the Act enjoins upon the industrial adjudicator the aforesaid twin duties is once again clear from a recent pronouncement of this court in Rajasthan SRTC vs. Satyaprakash, wherein this Court had the occasion to consider the long line of decisions taking the said view eventually culminating in what had been recorded in para 23 of the decision in Rajasthan SRTC….”40. In Shivsharanappa (supra), the Division Bench had affirmed the order of the ld. Single Judge that the dismissal of the workman was void ab-initio for want of approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court, while setting aside the said order, reiterated the view expressed in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. and Karur Vysya Bank Ltd (supra) that a finding on the question as to whether the employer has contravened the provision of Section 33(2)(b) would not be conclusive of the matter and the Industrial Adjudicator is required to answer the further question as to whether the dismissal or such other punishment as may have been imposed on the workman is justified in law.41. In Ravindra (supra), an application for approval was withdrawn. In a complaint under Section 33A, the employees had sought interim relief of reinstatement or full back wages on the ground that the dismissal was in breach of mandatory provision under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Learned Single Judge of this Court while declining to grant the interim relief observed that even if it is prima facie found that there is contravention of provisions of Section 33(2)(b), on account of withdrawal of approval application, it is still open for the employer to prove the misconduct of the employee in a complaint under Section 33A. It was further held that when the final relief of reinstatement depends and hinges upon misconduct being proved by the employer and the relief of reinstatement also being dependent on that aspect, grant of interim relief would be impermissible.42. It is to be noted that in Ravindra (supra) the question before the learned Single Judge of this Court was not relating to the scope of enquiry under Section 33A or the effect of contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act but, the question was whether the employees were entitled for interim relief in proceedings filed under Section 33A of the ID Act. While answering the said question the learned Single Judge of this Court referred to the decisions in Punjab National Bank, P.H. Kalyani and Jaipur Zila (supra) and observed that even after withdrawal of the application under Section 33(2)(b), it is still open for the employer to prove the misconduct of the employees in the complaint filed under Section 33A of the ID Act. Suffice it to say that a judgment of a court operates as a precedent only for what it decides and not for general or casual observation. In this case, as noted above the main issue before the learned Single Judge was regarding grant of interim relief in a complaint under Section 33A of the ID Act and the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the process of answering the said issue cannot be considered as a binding precedent.43. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court would indicate that prior to the decision in Jaipur Zilla, the prevalent view as reflected in Automobile Product of India Ltd., Equitable Coal Company Ltd., and Punjab National Bank (supra) was that the breach of Section 33 does not render the dismissal order void and inoperative. Once a complaint is filed under Section 33A and/or a dispute is raised, the Tribunal has to deal not only with the question of contravention but also with the merits of the order of dismissal. This view was followed and reiterated by the Apex Court in Punjab Beverages (supra) wherein it was held that even when contravention of mandatory provision is established, the Tribunal is required to decide whether the dismissal or discharge order is justified on merits, and if it is, to sustain the order of dismissal or discharge by treating the contravention as a mere technical breach.44. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zilla (supra) was necessitated because of conflict in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. and Tata Iron and Steel Co. on the one hand and Punjab Beverages on the other. The Apex Court has considered the question whether the contravention of Section 33 would render the order of dismissal void or inoperative for breach of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. The Constitution Bench has clearly held that (i) the provision under Section 33(2)(b) is mandatory; (ii) Order of dismissal or discharge though brings an end to the relationship of employer and employee from the date of the order, the order remains inchoate as it is subject to the approval of the authority under the provision; (iii) the employer-employee relationship comes to an end de jure only with grant of approval; (iv) Contravention of the mandatory provision, refusal to grant approval or withdrawal of approval application renders the dismissal or discharge order void and inoperative and it would be deemed that the order of dismissal or discharge had never been passed; (v) The employee dismissed or discharged in contravention of the mandatory provision is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available, without a separate or specific order of reinstatement; (vi) If the approval is given, the employee is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order of approval on any of the grounds available.45. In the subsequent decisions a two Judge Bench in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. and Karur Vysya Bank (supra) and a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivsharanappa (supra) have taken a view that when there is a challenge to the dismissal or discharge order in a Reference under Section 10 or complaint under Section 33A, which is to be treated as a Reference under Section 10, the Tribunal/ Labour Court has to deal not only with the question of contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act but also with the merits of the order of dismissal.46. It is well-settled that ratio laid down in the decision must be judged in the background and facts of the case and that the observations cannot be read divorced from peculiar facts and context in which made. In this context, it is relevant to note that in Rajasthan S.R.T.C., (supra), a daily wage employee appointed for a term of three months had committed several acts of misconduct in a short span of service and was dismissed w.e.f. 20th November 1987, for misconduct which had been duly proved. The employee had questioned the legality of the dismissal order in a suit. The Civil Court had held the charge to be proved and the suit was dismissed in the November 1994. The employee did not challenge the findings recorded in the Civil Suit but filed a complaint under Sec.33A, without disclosing that the suit had been dismissed. A daily wage employee, who had not completed 240 days of service, was ordered to be reinstated with continuity in service only on the ground of breach of Section 33(2)(b). In this factual background, a two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court set-aside the order of reinstatement.47. The Hon’ble Supreme Court though referred to the decision of Jaipur Zila (supra), did not distinguish the ratio laid down but relying mainly upon the previous decision in Punjab National Bank (supra) the two Judge Bench reiterated that the employee would not succeed in obtaining an order of reinstatement merely by proving contravention of Section 33. It is held that after such contravention is proved it would still be open to the employer to justify the impugned dismissal on the merits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the complaint under Section 33A having been adjudicated upon as a Reference and misconduct having been proved, the order of dismissal would not be void and inoperative for noncompliance of Section 33(2)(b). It may be mentioned that this is the same view taken earlier in Punjab Beverages, which has been overruled by the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila.48. In Karur Vysya Bank, a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the issue and followed the proposition laid down in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. In Shivsharanappa, a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court again considered the question whether the contravention of provision under Section 33(2)(b) is conclusive or whether the Tribunal is required to consider the justifiability of the dismissal order on merits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not refer to the decision of Jaipur Zilla but has endorsed the view in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. and Karur Vysya Bank that a finding on the question as to whether the employer had contravened the provisions of Section 33(2)(b), would not be conclusive of the matter and the Industrial Adjudicator is required to answer the further question as to whether the dismissal or such other punishment as may have been imposed on the workman is justifiable in law.49. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to paragraph 12 of the Judgment in Karur Vysya Bank, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed thus:-“12. While considering the issue, the Court noted in paragraph 6 of the judgment that the object behind enacting Section 33as it stood prior to its amendment in 1956, was to allow continuance of industrial proceedings pending before any authority/ court/tribunal prescribed by the Act in a peaceful atmosphere undisturbed by any other industrial dispute. In course of time, it was felt that the unamended Section 33 was too stringent, for it placed a total ban on the right of the employer to make any alteration in conditions of service or to make any order of discharge or dismissal even in cases where such alteration in conditions of service or passing of an order of dismissal or discharge, was not in any manner connected with the dispute pending before an industrial authority. Section 33 was, therefore, amended in 1956 to permit the employer to make changes in conditions of service, or to discharge or dismiss employees in relation to matters not connected with the pending industrial dispute. At the same time, it was also felt necessary that some safeguards must be simultaneously provided for the workmen, and therefore a provision was made that the employer must make an application for prior permission if the proposed change in the service conditions, or the proposed dismissal/discharge is in connection with a pending dispute. In other cases where there is no such connection, and where the workman is to be discharged or dismissed, (i) firstly there has to be an order of discharge or dismissal, and then it was laid down in the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) that, (ii) the concerned workman has to be paid wages for one month, and (iii) an application is to be made to the authority concerned before which the earlier proceeding is pending, for approval of the action taken by the employer.”50. It is not in dispute that Jaipur Zila still holds the field and by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila is a binding precedent. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Official liquidator Vs. Dayanand and Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 1 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v/s. Pranay Sethi, 2017 16 SCC 680.51. It is sought to be contended that Jaipur Zila did not consider the situation where the workman chooses to opt for Reference under Section 10 challenging his dismissal on various grounds including the ground of non-compliance of Section 33(2)(b). It is contended that the Constitution Bench has not dealt with the procedure to be followed or issues to be decided in such Reference. As noted above, the decision in Jaipur Zila emphasizes the mandatory nature of the proviso of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act and conclusively holds that noncompliance of this mandatory provision renders the dismissal or discharge order void and inoperative.52. The clear and categorical pronouncement of the Constitution Bench would indicate that an order of dismissal or discharge remains incomplete and inchoate till the grant of approval under the mandatory provision of Section 33(2)(b). The decision of the Constitution Bench does not indicate that an order in breach of 33(2)(b) can be subsequently validated in a reference or in a complaint under section 33A. On the contrary, the dictum is that an order of dismissal, in breach of this mandatory provision is ab initio void and does not severe the employer-employee relationship, consequently, the employee is deemed to continue in service. Hence, contravention of the mandatory provision, either due to nonpayment of one-month wages or non-filing of approval application or withdrawal or rejection of approval application, would entitle the employee for reinstatement with all consequential benefits. This is the principle in Jaipur Zila which has been followed and relied upon in United Bank of India (supra), wherein in a Reference under Section 10, the dismissal order was held to be void for non-compliance of proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act and the workman was ordered to be reinstated with full back wages even though the inquiry was held to be fair and proper, and order of dismissal was justified. It will therefore be wrong to distinguish the judgment as confined to the interpretation of Section 33(2)(b) and or to uphold the contention of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the judgment did not consider the scope of inquiry in a compliant under Section 33A or in a Reference under Section 10 of the ID Act.53. The decision of the Apex Court in Indian Telephone Industries (supra) and the decision of this Court in Air India (supra) further emphasizes that withdrawal of the approval application invalidates the order of dismissal, and the workman would be entitled to full back wages as if his services were never terminated. Such an employee cannot be dismissed by issuing a fresh dismissal order without paying the full back wages from the date of the frst order of dismissal till the second order of dismissal. It is thus crystal clear that contravention of Section 33(2)(b), which renders the dismissal order void ab initio and entitles the workman to reinstatement with all consequential benefits cannot be treated as a technical breach. Treating the contravention as a mere technical breach and validating a void order subsequently in a Reference under Section 10 or Complaint under Sec. 33A of the ID Act by giving an opportunity to the employer to justify the action of dismissal on merits would be contrary to the dictum of the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila (supra). Moreover, such interpretation as sought to be expounded by the counsel for the Petitioner is not in harmony with the object of the provision and does no effectuate the object of legislature.54. An employee, who is dismissed in breach of Section 33(2)(b) can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment, notwithstanding the order of dismissal or discharge. What are the rights available and what is the remedy open to such employee, when the employer refuses to reinstate and /or to pay wages, has been considered by the Apex Court in T.N. State Transport Corporation v/s. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam (2001) 9 SCC 99. The Apex Court has held thus :-“16. From the conspectus of the views taken in the decisions referred to above the position is manifest that while the employer has the discretion to initiate a departmental inquiry and pass an order of dism

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issal or discharge against the workman the order remains in an inchoate state till the employer obtains order of approval from the Tribunal. By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de facto relationship of employer and employee may be ended but not the de jure relationship for that could happen only when the Tribunal accords its approval. The relationship of employer and employee is not legally terminated till approval of discharge or dismissal is given by the Tribunal. In a case where the Tribunal refuses to accord approval to the action taken by the employer and rejects the petition filed under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act on merit the employer is bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and give him all the consequential benefits. If the employer refuses to grant the benefits to the employer the latter is entitled to have his right enforced by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no rational basis for holding that even after the order of dismissal or discharge has been rendered invalid on the Tribunals rejection of the prayer for approval the workman should suffer the consequences of such invalid order of dismissal or discharge till the matter is decided by the Tribunal again in an industrial dispute. Accepting this contention would render the bar contained in Section 33(1) irrelevant. In the present case as noted earlier the Tribunal on consideration of the matter held that the employer had failed to establish a prima facie case for dismissal/discharge of the workman, and therefore, dismissed the application filed by the employer on merit. The inevitable consequence of this would be that the employer was duty bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and pay him his wages for the period, even though he may be subsequently placed under suspension and an enquiry initiated against him.”55. It is thus well settled that if the employer refuses to reinstate or pay wages to a workman, notwithstanding undisputed breach of Section 33(2)(b), such workman is entitled to have his right enforced by filing petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, without testing validity of the order of dismissal either in a Reference under Section 10 or in a complaint under Section 33A of the ID Act. The workman also has an option of seeking wages under Section 33C of the ID Act without a specific order of reinstatement. The question which therefore arises is whether a workman, who chooses to question breach of Section 33(2)(b), either by filing a complaint under Section 33A or by raising an industrial dispute, can be deprived of such relief, and be compelled to adjudicate the dispute on merits. An affirmative answer to this question would be contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila and T.N. State Transport Corporation (supra) and would lead to an anomalous consequence. In as much as the workman, who chooses to enforce his right under Article 226 of the Constitution or claim wages under Section 33C would be entitled to the reliefs without testing validity of the dismissal order on merits. Whereas, an employee, who opts to raise an industrial dispute or file a complaint under Section 33A would be deprived of the benefits of immediate reinstatement and wages. Despite being out of service and having lost his means of livelihood, he would be compelled to fight a prolonged legal battle in adjudication of dispute on merit. Hence, an employee who takes recourse to a statutory remedy either by raising an industrial dispute or filing a complaint under Section 33A for breach of statutory protection, would be in a disadvantageous position as compared to an employee who chooses to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or an application under Section 33C of the ID Act.56. It is also relevant to note that giving an opportunity to the employer to justify the order of dismissal/discharge would deprive the workman from working and earning his wages till adjudication of the dispute on merits. On the contrary giving such opportunity would lead to rewarding an employer who by design, avoids complying with the statutory mandate, which expressly gives protection to an employee against possible victimization and unfair labour practice. Hence, such an interpretation, as canvassed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, would be tantamount to putting a premium on an unlawful act of engaging in unfair labour practice and/or victimization.57. In this context it would be relevant to refer to ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ 13th edition-2012 by Justice G. P. Singh wherein it is observed that it is the duty of a Court to avoid hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity, and anomaly while selecting out of diferent interpretations. The doctrine must be applied with great care and in case absurd inconvenience is to be caused that interpretation has to be avoided. In the instant case, interpreting the provision in the manner canvassed by learned counsel for the Petitioner would lead to an anomalous result causing hardship and injustice to an employee who resorts to a statutory remedy and protecting and rewarding an employer who chooses to violate a statutory provision. It is therefore not permissible to accede to such interpretation, which would result in anomalous consequences, defeat the protection envisaged under the Section and render the proviso otiose.58. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that the Reference relating to Charter of Demands was pending. As it is evident from the averments in para 6 of the written statement, the Petitioner was aware of pendency of the Reference. The Petitioner has dismissed the Respondent-workman during the pendency of the said Reference without complying with the mandatory provision of Section 33(2)(b). Non-compliance of this mandatory provision renders the dismissal order void and non-est. The employer-employee relationship not having been legally terminated, the Petitioner is bound to treat the Respondent workmen as continuing in service and give them all consequential benefits. Consequently, the Respondent-workmen, are entitled for reinstatement with consequential benefits. Hence, I am unable to accede to the contention that the misconduct having been proved on merits, the Labour Court could not have passed an order of reinstatement, notwithstanding contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In my considered view, the decision of the Labour Court is in accordance with the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila (supra) and hence the Labour Court was justified in ordering reinstatement with consequential benefits. It is however clarified that Respondent-Workmen will be entitled for reinstatement provided they have not attained the age of superannuation during the interregnum period. Respondent-Workmen, who have attained the age of superannuation will be entitled for wages from the date of dismissal till the date of superannuation.59. Subject to the above clarification, the petitions are dismissed. Under the circumstances no order as to costs.60. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states that by order dated 05/10/2020 this Court had granted ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clause (c) and the same is continuing till date. She prays for continuation of the interim relief so as to enable the Petitioner to challenge the order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.61. In the light of the aforesaid statement, interim order to continue for a period of four weeks.
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