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D.B. Sogani & Others v/s Akhil Bharatiya Bank of Rajasthan Karmchari Sangh & Others

    Special Appeal (Writ) No. 64 of 2000

    Decided On, 16 May 2000

    At, High Court of Rajasthan Jaipur Bench

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.R. YADAV & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PARIHAR

    For the Appellant:Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Sr. Advocate, Arun Morga, S. Kasliwal, Advocates. For the Respondent: Marudhar Mridul, Sr. Advocate, Sanjay Pareek, S.B. Mathur, Paras Kuhad, Naina Saraf, N.C. Chaudhary, Advocates.



Judgment Text

R.R. Yadav, J.

1. This special appeal has been preferred under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, questioning the order dated 27-9-99, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 2094/99, between Akhil Bharatiya Bank of Rajasthan Karamchari Sangh v. Reserve Bank of India, whereby, the learned single Judge has directed the CBI, through its Director, Jaipur, to hold a thorough investigation right from the time when Bangur group had started purchasing shares of the Bank of Rajasthan Limited and then controlled the Bank as Managing Director/Directors and by nominee Directors, and as to how and where and in what manner the amount of Bank was siphoned to the sister concerns of the Bangur group and as to how much amount is still due and how much returned or returnable for the purpose of criminal and civil consequences. The learned single Judge by his impugned order also directed the Reserve Bank of India to take immediate action under Section 36-AA and other provisions of the Banking Regulation Act.

2. We consider it unnecessary to delineate the facts and circumstances of the case under which the learned single Judge was compelled to issue the aforesaid direction to CBI to investigate the acts, commissions and omissions committed by Bangur group leading misfeasance and malfeasance to the tune of Rs. 300 crores to the Bank of Rajasthan Limited and also directing the Reserve Bank of India respondent No. 2 to take steps immediately under Section 36-AA of Banking Regulation Act as these facts and circumstances are narrated in detail by the learned single Judge in his impugned order.

3. Having perused the order, dated 27-9-99, impugned in the present special appeal, we called upon the learned counsel for the appellants, at the very threshold, to satisfy us as to how the present appeal is entertainable under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, in spite of the objection raised by the Office of Registry of this Court in its report dated 1-10-1999 that this special appeal is filed against interim order, therefore, it is not maintainable.

4. The learned counsel for the appellants urged before us that before making submissions as to whether the instant special appeal is entertainable, it is necessary for him to invite the attention of this Court, to the relief sought before the learned single Judge in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2094/99 from where the order impugned under appeal has originated, so as to meet the query raised by the Court. The learned counsel for the appellants, invited our attention to the reliefs sought in the aforesaid writ petition which read thus :

"It is, therefore, prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate writ, order or direction :-

(a) The respondents may be directed to produce the relevant record.

(b) The impugned disciplinary proceedings initiated and charge-sheets referred to in the writ petition may kindly be quashed and set aside.

(c) The impugned promotion exercise conducted by the respondent No. 2 during the period 1995 to 1997 and orders issued pursuant thereto as mentioned in the writ petition may kindly be declared illegal and be set aside.

(d) The respondents may be directed to appropriate criminal proceedings through the CBI/C.V.C. in respect of the fraudulent transactions and criminal activities that have come to light in the course of the statutory inspections conducted by the RBI, in the affairs of the respondent No. 2 in the years 1997 and 1998.

Alternatively, the RBI may be directed to re

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fer the inspection reports of the years 1997 and 1998 along with concerned record to the CBI for investigation and the CBI may be directed to conduct speedy and effective investigation in respect of fraudulent transactions referred to hereinabove and in RBI Inspection Reports.

(e) The respondent RBI may be directed to discharge its statutory functions, duty and responsibility under Section 36-AA of the Act of 1949, by removing all the Directors, office- bearers, officers nominated/appointed by or at the instance of the Bangur Group.

(f) Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 may be directed to enforce and ensure compliance of the directions contained in the orders/communications dated 9-11-98, 27-11-98 and 7-12-98 respectively as referred to hereinabove.

(g) The respondent No. 1, the RBI may be directed to ensure independent individual existence of the Bank without taking any action like moratorium or merger.

(h) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which may be considered just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be also be issued in favour of the petitioner."

5. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to convert a service writ petition into a public interest petition. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, a learned single Judge of Rajasthan High Court has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, treating a service writ petition to be a public interest litigation, which is entertainable by a Division Bench, therefore, the order impugned dated 27-9-99, passed by the learned single Judge, is non est and deserves to be set aside. It is submitted that the writ petition before the learned single Judge was filed primarily for quashing of charge-sheets and promotions, but later on, it was converted into a public interest litigation, which meant abuse of the process of the Court. On point of maintainability of special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the order impugned passed by the learned single Judge, is a final judgment within the ambit of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, so far as it relates to the direction issued by learned single Judge to Reserve Bank of India to take immediate action under Section 36-AA of the Banking Regulation Act within 15 days from the receipt of the certified copy of his order. It is submitted that direction of learned single Judge for holding investigation by CBI about the functioning and siphoning of the amount and part played by Bangur group and its nominees Directors in siphoning the amount to its sister concerns to the tune of about Rs. 300 crores is also final and as such it falls within the scope of expression "judgment" used under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on the decision, rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court, in case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1786.

6. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the employees of Bank alleging themselves to be members of petitioner-Union, are challenging their charge-sheets and promotions on serious allegation of mala fides. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that the petitioner-Union was required to state full facts succinctly and that on basis of vague and casual allegations issuing of charge-sheets and making promotions to the employees of Bank, with an ulterior motive, cannot be accepted, without specific pleadings and adequate proof of mala fides.

7. The learned counsel for the respondents were called upon to reply the aforesaid argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellants. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, Akhil Bharatiya Bank of Rajasthan Karamchari Sangh, submitted that the allegations of mala fides, made before the learned single Judge in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 2094/99, are specific and it is incorrect to allege that these allegations are vague. It is further submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 that in order to ascertain the correctness of mala fides averred in the writ petition and denied by appellants the learned single Judge has ordered impartial inquiry by CBI by passing impugned interlocutory order against which special appeal is not entertainable. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has invited our attention towards mala fides averred in the writ petition and supported in the return filed by the RBI respondent No. 2 and Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. respondent No. 3.

8. It is submitted by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 with equal vehemence that the controversy involved in the present special appeal, relating to its entertainability, is concluded by catena of judgments, rendered by Division Benches of this Court, after surveying judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the subject, including the decision in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra v. M/s. J. K. Synthetics, Kota, reported in 1993 (1) Raj LR 543, wherein, after examining the ratio of the decision rendered in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) and other decisions rendered by Apex Court, the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, ruled that against an interlocutory order, passed by a learned single Judge, special appeal is not maintainable. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 placed reliance on other decisions of learned Judges constituting Division Benches of this Court from time to time, which would be discussed at appropriate place of this judgment a little later.

9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, the Bank of Rajasthan Limited, adopted the aforesaid argument of Shri Mridul, on point of non-maintainability of the present special appeal and invited our attention to the direction issued by the learned single Judge, in the impugned order, wherein, it is directed that it is necessary to have a proper report about the functioning and siphoning of the amount and part played by Bangur Group and its nominee Directors in siphoning the amount to its sister-concerns to the tune of about Rs. 300 crores. It is submitted by the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that the learned single Judge directed that before the impugned charge-sheet be proceeded further, the CBI should hold a thorough inquiry through a very responsible officer, as to how, where and in what manner the amount of the Bank was siphoned to the sister-concerns of Bangur Group and how much amount is still due. The learned counsel also invited our attention to Annexure-31, filed by the RBI itself, wherein, it is stated that Bangur Group was influencing the functioning of the Bank directly or indirectly and it has been admitted in the return filed by RBI, the respondent No. 2, that the said nominee Directors of the Bangur Group are still wielding influence, and therefore, it shall be appropriate to direct the Reserve Bank of India, to take immediate action under Section 36-AA or any other provision of the Banking Regulation Act. It is submitted at the Bar on behalf of respondent No. 3 that the inquiry by the CBI has close nexus with the allegation of mala fides made by the petitioner-Union in the writ petition, leading deprivation of the source of livelihood of about 800 members of the petitioner-Union of the Rajasthan Bank Limited. It is submitted by the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that cumulative effect of the mismanagement of the Bank and diversion of funds as revealed in the inspections conducted by Reserve Bank of India from time to time is that the Bank's financial position had deteriorated considerably and several advances granted to the companies, firms in which the Bangur Group were interested had turned into NPA, recoveries of which are found to be difficult. On 31-3-99, the Bank had reported net loss of Rs. 67.46 crores and accumulated loss of Rs. 157.05 crores. Asset quality of the Bank deteriorated sharply and the Bank reported Gross Non-Performing Advances at Rs. 352 Crores as on 31-3-99 from Rs. 195 crores as on 31-3-97 a rise of around 80 per cent during the period.

10. The learned counsel, Shri N. C. Choudary, appearing on behalf of the CBI, submitted that in the present case, the CBI investigation has reached at advanced stage. The Investigating Officers of the CBI, after recording statements of a number of witnesses and also after examining voluminous records of the Bank are in a very short time, submitting their interim report in compliance of Court's order, indicating thereto that a large scale financial irregularities have been committed by the responsible officers of the Bank of Rajasthan Limited, as averred in t he writ petition by the petitioner-Union.

11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of other respondents adopted the aforesaid arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf respondent No. 1.

12. In his rejoinder argument the learned counsel for the appellants invited our attention to the order, passed on 10-3-2000, by the learned Judges, constituting the Division Bench. The aforesaid order dated 10-3-2000 is reproduced hereinbelow :-

"Heard. Admit.

Mr. S. B. Mathur, learned counsel, takes notice on behalf of Reserve Bank of India (respondent No. 2). Issue notice to the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 returnable within ten days. Such notice may be taken Dasti.

In the meantime, the status quo as it exists today, shall be maintained.

Having regard to the controversy raised and subject-matter of the appeal, we direct the Office to list this appeal as first case, for hearing and final disposal on 22-3-2000."

13. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that since the present special appeal has already been admitted on 10-3-2000, therefore, by necessary implications, it is to be presumed that the objection raised by the Office of Registry of this Court relating to entertainability of the present appeal, is washed off and the learned counsel for the respondents are debarred to raise the question of its entertainability at the stage of final hearing.

14. We have given our thoughtful anxious consideration to the rival oral as well as written submissions made at the Bar. We have perused the order impugned under appeal dated 27-9-99 passed by the learned single Judge, in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We are called upon to decide the following meaningful questions involved in the instant special appeal :-

1. Whether merely by admitting the appeal and meanwhile directing to maintain status quo on 10-3-2000, the respondents are debarred to raise the plea of entertainability of the instant special appeal?

2. Whether the order impugned dated 27-9-99 passed by the learned single Judge falls within the ambit of expression "judgment" under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, or it is an interlocutory order, which does not fall within the meaning of "judgment" used under the aforesaid section?

3. Whether the learned single Judge, while exercising his power under Article 226 of the Constitution, is merely to act as a Court of disputes settling between the parties or being a senior partner of administration, he can oversee the conduct of the parties directing CBI, to make investigation in disastrous scenario of financial irregularities committed by Directors and Officers of the Bank of Rajasthan Limited, to set out the material facts, specifying particular person or group of persons against whom such averments are made in the writ petition, so that he/they may have an opportunity to controvert such allegations touching livelihood of the members of the petitioner-Union?

Question No. 1 :

15. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants that since the appeal has already been admitted on 10-3-2000 and interim order was passed directing to maintain status quo by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, on the said date, therefore, the question relating to entertainability of the instant appeal cannot be allowed to be raised at the stage of final hearing of the instant special appeal. The aforesaid argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants, is opposed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. It is submitted by the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that writ petitions are admitted and interim stay orders are granted by Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, if a debatable question of law is involved. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that admission of cases under Article 226 of the Constitution and passing of ad interim stay orders, do not fall within the purview of precedents, therefore, such admissions, or ad interim stay orders are subject to final hearing and order of admissions and ad interim stay orders depend on the final result of the writ petitions or appeals as the case may be.

16. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. We are of the view that there is substance in the argument raised by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1. In our considered opinion, a writ or appeal is admitted if it is found at the stage of admission that it raises some debatable question of law and ad interim stay orders are passed at the stage of admission, if a prima facie case is established in favour of petitioner to the satisfaction of the Court, at the stage of admission. We are of the view that admission of writ petition, or appeal, or passing an ad interim stay order do not fall within the ambit of precedents and such admissions or grant of ad interim orders are subject to the result of final hearing of the writs or appeals as the case may be. In our humble opinion, after admission of the instant special appeal and passing of ad interim stay order by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench on 10-3-2000, do not debar the learned Counsel for the respondents, to raise the question relating to entertainability of the instant special appeal and an argument contrary to it, is hereby repelled.

Question No. 2 :

17. For better and deeper understanding of the question involved, it would be expedient in the interest of justice to quote the relevant provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, which reads thus :-

"S. 18(1). Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court :-

(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under S. 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court."

18. The expression "judgment" used under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, came up for consideration, before a Division Bench of this Court, in case of State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills, reported in AIR 1974 Raj 110, wherein, it is observed by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench which reads thus (at Page 111) :-

"Our reasons are that the order operates subject to the ultimate decision of the rights of the parties in regard to the validity of the notification of 28th November, 1972. Specific conditions have been imposed by the learned single Judge under which this order has been passed. All arguments against the advisability or otherwise of such an order are irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the question whether the order appealed against is a judgment or interlocutory order. The grievance of the learned Counsel which he more than once emphasized was that this order settled the fate of the 7 petitions in favour of the petitioners. The crucial question whether the notification is valid and the fundamental rights of the petitioner are violated or not remains to be decided. The operation of the impugned notification has been kept in abeyance until the basic questions were decided. In our opinion, it is a clear case of an interlocutory order being assailed in appeal under Section 18 of the High Court Ordinance which is not permissible. The order of 17-1-1973 is not a judgment and these seven appeals, therefore, are not maintainable. The office objection is upheld."

19. The aforesaid expression "judgment" also came up for consideration in the case of Southern Roadways (P) Ltd. v. P. Mathurai Veeraswami, reported in AIR 1964 Mad 194 (FB), wherein, the learned five Judges constituting the Full Bench in Madras High Court, observed that the true import of the word "judgment" or tests by which any judicial order can be regarded as a judgment is that it should be the determination of right and liability. The word "determination" itself indicates that such right as has been adjudicated upon must have been so adjudicated finally, so far as the controversy between the parties in the Court was concerned.

20. The expression "judgment" came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the case of Asrumati Devi v. Kumar Rupendra Dey, Rajkot, reported in AIR 1953 SC 198, wherein, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held, which reads thus (at Page 199) :-

"A final judgment is an adjudication which conclusively determined the rights of the parties with regard to all matters in issue in the suit, whereas a preliminary or interlocutory judgment is a decree by which the right to the relief claimed in the suit is decided but under which further proceedings are necessary before a suit in its entirety can be disposed of. Save and except final and preliminary judgments thus defined, all other decisions are 'orders' and they do not come within the description of "judgments" under the relevant issue of the Letters Patent.

(Emphasis supplied)

21. The expression "judgment" used under Section 18(1) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, again came up for consideration before the learned Judges, constituting Division Bench in the case of Dr. A. K. Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 21-1-1994 (unreported), wherein learned Judges constituting Division Bench reaffirmed the view taken by the earlier Division Bench, in the case of Hindo Open Sugar Mills (supra) and after full-fledged discussion of Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), arrived at a conclusion that the ratio laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), is not applicable to interlocutory orders passed in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

22. Prior to the unreported judgment in the case of Dr. A. K. Sharma's case (supra), the aforesaid question relating to true import of expression "judgment" used under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, came up for consideration in the case of Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra v. M/s. J. K. Synthetics Ltd., reported in 1993 (1) Raj LR 543, the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, in paragraph-15 of their judgment came to the conclusion, after taking note of proposition of law propounded in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), which reads thus :-

"We have gone through the case law cited before us as also provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance, 1949. The case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786, has been considered in the case of Gulam Abbas (supra) by this Court and it has been held that special appeals against interlocutory orders are not maintainable. Having considered all the submissions and the cases cited before us and having gone through the provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance, we are unable to agree with Shri Punamiya that the impugned order dated 15-9-93 is a judgment. This order does not determine any of the rights of the parties nor it determines any point of controversy relating to the merits of the case, it only decides the question as to whether the matter should be heard by a Division Bench or a Single Bench and by this order dated 15-9-93 the learned single Judge has held that the matter was cognizable by a Single Bench. Such an order can by no stretch of imagination be said to be a judgment. There is ample authority for taking the view that special appeals in such cases are not maintainable and we hold accordingly."

23. In our considered opinion, the previous decisions, decided by several Division Benches of this Court, after taking into consideration the proposition of law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), have ruled that interlocutory orders, passed in writ petitions, by learned single Judge do not fall within the ambit of "judgment" used under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. We respectfully concur with the view taken by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, in the case of Hindo Open Sugar Mills (supra), the decision rendered by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, in the case of Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra (supra) and the decision rendered by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench in the case of Dr. A. K. Sharma (supra).

24. We have no hesitation to hold that the question of entertainability of a special appeal against an interlocutory order passed by learned single Judge, which does not determine the rights of the parties finally does not arise. This matter is not res integra now, in view of Division Bench decisions of this Court, in the case of Hindo Open Sugar Mill's case (supra); Ikram v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1980 Raj 182; Jodhpur Sahkari Upbhokta Whole Bhandar Ltd. v. Badri Nath Kalla, reported in 1982 WLN (UC) 253; Balwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan (DB Civil Special Appeal No. 357 of 1982, decided on April 9, 1982); and Gulam Abbas Kamruddin v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1982 Raj LW 696. It is held that scope of appeal provided under Civil Procedure Code, is different from the scope of appeal, provided under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949.

25. Let us apply the aforesaid interpretation of expression "judgment" used in sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, with the facts and circumstances of the present case. Before applying the test laid down by catena of decisions rendered by learned Judges constituting Division Benches from time to time from 1974 up to 1994, we think it proper to quote the operative portion of the order impugned dated 27-9-99, under appeal, passed by the learned single Judge, which reads thus :-

"With the abovesaid directions, the case is adjourned to 26-10-99 for further hearing. The report by CBI be placed on record when received and on receipt of which the validity and legality of the impugned charge-sheets would be decided."

26. From reading of the operative portion of order impugned quoted hereinabove, we are satisfied that by impugned order, learned single Judge has not determined the rights and liabilities of the parties finally, therefore, no special appeal lies against such an order under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. In our considered opinion, the order impugned under appeal dated 27-9-99, is not a judgment within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, therefore, the appeal is not entertainable. The objection of the Office of the Registry of the Court dated 1-10-99, to the effect that the instant special appeal which is preferred against interim order, is not maintainable, is hereby sustained and upheld.

Question No. 3 :

27. Shri N. C. Chaudhary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of CBI has placed before us, the investigation done by CBI uptill date of hearing in pursuant to the order dated 27-9-99, passed by the learned single Judge, which throws a flood of light towards the disastrous scenario of financial irregularities, committed by responsible Directors, Officers against whom serious allegations of mala fides are averred in the writ petition, which lead us to believe that the order passed by the learned single Judge under appeal, was to prevent the continuance of disastrous scenario of financial irregularities leading to economic collapse of the Bank, respondent No. 3, with a view to ensure proper implementation of rule of law, as envisaged under Section 36-AA of the Banking Regulation Act. Misfeasance and malfeasance averred against some of the Directors and Officers of the Bank is bound to have adverse impact and lack of probity, leading to high degree of corruption and fraud, prevailing in the functioning of the Bank, the respondent No. 3, as revealed from CBI inquiry, which cannot be pushed under the carpet. The functioning of the Bank, the respondent No. 3, has adverse effect on foreign investment and funding from the international Monetary Fund and the World Bank, who have warned that future aid to underdeveloped countries may be subject to the requisite steps being taken to eradicate corruption. We have no hesitation to hold that the learned single Judge while exercising his jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was not expected to act and pass order as a Court of dispute settling between the parties but being a senior partner of administration was to oversee the conduct of the parties against whom serious charges of misfeasance and malfeasance were averred in the writ petition touching the deprivation of the source of livelihood of the members of petitioner Union who are employees of the Bank, respondent No. 3. The learned single Judge being senior partner of administration constitutionally and legally was justified to direct the RBI, respondent No. 2 to ensure the implementation of Section 36-AA of Banking Regulation Act as the acts of RBI, respondent No. 2 was found to be demurrable in initiating proceedings against Directors and other responsible Officers of the Bank of respondent No. 3. It is informed during the course of argument by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of RBI, respondent No. 2 Sri Mathur that in compliance of order impugned dated 27-9-99 show cause notices are issued to delinquent Directors of the Bank and proceedings are initiated under Section 36-AA of the Banking Regulation Act. In our considered opinion the learned single Judge has committed no error in directing CBI to hold inquiry through a responsible Officer right from the time when Bangur group had started to purchase shares of Bank, respondent No. 3 and then controlled it as Managing Director/Directors and by nominee Director and as to how and where and in what manner the amount of Bank, respondent No. 3 was siphoned to the sister concerns of the Bangur Group and as how much amount is still due and how much returned or returnable for the purpose of criminal and civil consequences. From perusal of CBI inquiry it is revealed that a huge amount of Bank, respondent No. 3 has been siphoned. The interim report of CBI was not made available to this Court on the date of final hearing, hence, we refrained to make comments on it and left it for consideration of learned single Judge.

28. In our considered opinion the order passed by the learned single Judge, directing CBI inquiry is imminently just and proper and we decline to make the aforesaid interlocutory order, ineffective, by interfering with the order impugned under appeal. A perusal of the direction made by the learned single Judge made it abundantly clear that he has not determined the rights and liabilities of the parties finally, but he has adjourned the case to 26-10-99, for further hearing, which is being delayed by filing special appeal. In the impugned interlocutory order, the learned single Judge has made it clear that after placing of the report by CBI on record the validity and legality of the charge-sheets relating to the members of the petitioner-Union, who are employees of the Bank of Rajasthan Limited, would be decided. Looking into the large scale activities of malfeasance and misfeasance continuing in the Bank of respondent No. 3 it was essential to direct the respondent No. 2, to proceed under Section 36-AA of Banking Regulation Act.

29. After concluding our discussion on the point of non-maintainability of the instant appeal, we do not propose to dwell upon other points raised in their written submissions submitted by the learned counsel for the parties and decisions cited in support thereof. We are constrained to observe with anguish that the appellants, in their subsequent written submissions dated 5-4-2000 mentioned that the appellants were not given a fair and equal opportunity to be heard and final hearing was punctuated by reminders from the Bench, referring that public time of the Court should not be wasted. Judicial restraint does not permit us to observe more than this that the aforesaid mention made in the written submissions dated 5-4-2000 is inconsiderate, incorrect and afterthought. Reason is not far to seek. A detailed written argument was submitted immediately after conclusion of the oral arguments, by the learned counsel for the appellants on 29-3-2000 wherein no grievance was made by them that no fair opportunity of hearing was granted by the Bench and the final hearing of the special appeal was punctuated by reminders from the Bench to avoid wastage of the public time of the Court, we must hasten to add that the litigants must realise that the Courts cannot be forced by pressure tactics to decide the cases in the manner which they desire. In fact, such pressure tactics would undermine the supremacy of rule of law and dispensation of justice based on truth. In our humble opinion, justice is synonym to truth and fair play in accordance with law. In this regard we feel obliged to quote with respect the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the case of Dr. Buddhi Kota Sabbarao v. K. Parasaran, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2687 : (1996 Cri LJ 3983), which reads thus (at page 2691 of AIR) :-

"... ... ... ... No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived or frivolous petitions. ... ... ..."

As a result of the aforementioned discussion, the instant special appeal is hereby dismissed, as incompetent. However, keeping in view, all the facts and circumstances of the case, we request the learned single Judge, to decide the writ petition, finally, on merits, expeditiously. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

Before parting with the judgment, it is observed that on 22-3-2000, on the date of hearing, the learned counsel, Shri N.C. Chaudhary, placed before us, the investigation done by the CBI, for our perusal. The interim report of CBI was not placed before us on the date of hearing of the appeal. It is wrongly mentioned in the written submissions submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 3 that the interim report of CBI was placed before us on 22-3-2000, on the date of hearing. The interim report of CBI reveals that it was signed by the Investigating Officers of CBI, on 28-3-2000, therefore, question of presenting the said report before us on the date of hearing does not arise. We, therefore, declined to look into the interim report of CBI ex parte, after conclusion of hearing by the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel, Shri N.C. Chaudhary is hereby directed to place the interim report of CBI before the learned single Judge, by moving a proper application within two weeks from today and in case, the aforesaid report is placed before the learned single Judge within the aforesaid period, it shall be treated to have been filed within time stipulated in the order impugned under appeal dated 27-9-99, passed by the learned single Judge. Office to return the interim report of CBI to the learned counsel Shri N.C. Chaudhary, for its presentation before learned single Judge.

Appeal Dismissed.
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