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Chinu Das & Others v/s Nimai Debdas


Company & Directors' Information:- G DAS & CO PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U74992WB1935PTC008299

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Company & Directors' Information:- D K DAS & CO PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U51909WB1938PTC009288

Company & Directors' Information:- U C DAS & CO PVT LTD [Active] CIN = U31200WB1987PTC042709

Company & Directors' Information:- DAS & DAS PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U51109WB1950PTC019222

Company & Directors' Information:- A S DAS CO PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U51109WB1957PTC023552

Company & Directors' Information:- DAS-G INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [Active] CIN = U24304DL2020PTC370609

Company & Directors' Information:- P K DAS & CO PVT LTD [Strike Off] CIN = U74210WB1955PTC022259

    RSA No. 12 of 2016

    Decided On, 12 March 2020

    At, High Court of Tripura

    By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH

    For the Appellants: D.R. Chowdhury, D. Deb, Advocates. For the Respondent: D. Chakraborty, Sr. Advocate, H. Laskar, Advocate.



Judgment Text


Judgment & Order

1. This second appeal is preferred by the original plaintiffs against the judgment and decree, dated 10.12.2015 and 16.12.2015 respectively passed in Title Appeal No. 11/2011 by the learned Additional District Judge (Court No.5), West Tripura, Agartala.

2. At the time of admission of this second appeal, the Court after taking into consideration the submission of learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellants [here-in-after referred to as the plaintiffs] has formulated the following substantial question of law: Whether, when the right of recovery is extinguished in view of the Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and when the possessor can transfer that land in a legally approved manner, whether a civil court is completely barred to declare the title by prescription?

3. The above substantial question of law was formulated in view of the judgment in Gurdwara Sahib V. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala, (2014) 1 SCC 669, that no person can be allowed to institute a suit on the basis of the adverse possession.

4. The facts relevant to decide the said substantial question of law may be taken into consideration.

5. In the plaint the plaintiffs have mentioned two Schedules of land as ‘A’ & ‘B’. The plaintiffs have claimed acquisition of their right, title, interest and confirmation of possession over the land as described in Schedule ‘A’ by way of adverse possession since according to them the defendant’s ownership right over the land of Schedule ‘A’ have been extinguished by elapse of time. In this appeal, the plaintiffs have further prayed for confirmation of possession over the said suit land and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from entering into the suit land. The plaintiffs have admitted that Lt. Dwarika Deb Das was the original owner of the suit land described in the Schedule ‘A’ & ‘B’ of the plaint along with other land. The predecessor of the plaintiffs namely, Makhanlal Das, entered into the suit land forcefully in the middle of May 1954 being found the same as vacant denying right, title, interest of the true owner namely Lt. Dwarika Deb Das, the predecessor of the defendantrespondent [hereinafter referred to as defendant]. The predecessor of the plaintiffs had started to live over the suit land along with his family for many years beyond the statutory period of limitation and after death of Lt. Makhanlal Das, his legal heirs, the present plaintiffs continued to remain in possession and till the institution of the suit they have been possessing the suit land denying the right, title and interest of the defendant. Later on, the plaintiff No.1, Smt. Chinu Bala Das purchased the ‘B’ Schedule land which was under possession of the defendant No.1, namely, Nimai Deb Das by paying consideration money of Rs. 83,000/- as the defendant No.1 told the plaintiffs that the ‘B’ Schedule land had fallen in his share by way of amicable partition with the defendant No.2. Therefore, the plaintiff, Chinu Bala Das became the absolute owner of the ‘B’ Schedule land by way of purchase vide registered Sale-deed No.1- 13107 [Exbt.1] and the defendant No.2 never raised any objection for such transfer of land in favour of the plaintiff No.1.

6. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that the defendant No.1 being desperate in nature, along with some other unknown persons on the various dates starting from 5th November, 2008 threatened the plaintiffs to vacate the suit land claiming that he as well as his mother i.e. the defendant No.2 are the owners of the Schedule ‘A’ land by way of inheritance from their predecessor and sale of ‘B’ Schedule land was not legally executed and in this way, the defendants have been disturbing the peaceful possession of the suit lands described in Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’. The defendants on several dates and lastly on 20.04.2009, tried to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land but due to timely resistance of the plaintiffs as well as other persons of the locality failed to do so. The plaintiffs further stated that the defendant No.2 being not looked after by her son i.e. the defendant No.1, requested the plaintiffs to allow her to stay in a hut in the Schedule ‘A’ of the suit land and accordingly, the plaintiffs allowed the defendant no.2 to stay in the extreme north-east corner of the land of Schedule ‘A’. However, the plaintiffs at that time were not taking any steps against the defendant No.2 to evict her from the Schedule ‘A’ land, but, the defendant No.2 should be restrained from entering into lands of Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ land.

7. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement denying the statements made in the plaint and took the plea that before transferring the land of Schedule ‘B’ there was no partition of the suit land of Schedule ‘B’ and the plaintiffs purchased only the share of the defendant No.1 of the ‘B’ Schedule land and thereby only became the co-owner having 50% share over the land of Schedule ‘B’ along with defendant No.2. The defendants further pleaded that in the year 1989, the predecessor of the plaintiffs shifted his place of residence and requested the defendants to allow him to reside in a portion of the ‘A’ Schedule land for a temporary period and accordingly, the defendants allowed the predecessor of the plaintiffs to reside for a temporary period in a portion of the ‘A’ Schedule land and the predecessor of the plaintiffs constructed two mud wall huts over a portion of the ‘A’ Schedule land measuring approximately 3 Gandas and after the death of their predecessor, the present plaintiffs have been in possession of the same as permissive possessors under the defendants. The remaining portion of the ‘A’ Schedule land was all along in possession of the defendants but after institution of the suit, the plaintiffs on 02.07.2009, forcibly trespassed into the remaining portion of the ‘A’ Schedule land by erecting boundary fencing denying right, title and interest of the defendants.

8. The defendants also pleaded that ‘A’ Schedule land appertaining to Khatian No.2292 was finally published on 13.12.1967 and in that Khatian entire ‘A’ & ‘B’ Schedule of land were shown in possession of the father of the defendant No.1, but, in the last revisional settlement operation, the plaintiffs in collusion with the settlement staff managed to record their names in the Column No.24 of the said Khatian as forceful possessor of the ‘A’ Schedule land since 1954. The defendants approached for correction of the Khatian i.e. record of right and they were advised that in appropriate stage of settlement operation they will get opportunity to file objection and will also be entitled to file a suit for recovery of possession of the ‘A’ Schedule land. Therefore, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the plaintiffs.

9. Exchange of pleadings being completed, after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the learned Civil Judge Jr. Division, Agartala, West Tripura had framed the following issues:-

(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in law and form?

(ii) Whether there is any cause of action for this suit?

(iii) Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over the schedule B land by way of purchase?

(iv) Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and acquired right by way of adverse possession of the schedule A land?

(v) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land?

(vi) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their representatives, men and agent from disturbing over the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land?

(vii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree as prayed for?

(viii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any other relief or reliefs in this suit?

10. At the outset, the learned trial Judge took up the issue No.iii to decide the plaintiffs’ right, title and interest over the land of Schedule ‘B’ by way of purchase and considered the deposition of Sri Kishore Das, PW 1 [the plaintiff No.2] and found that their mother Smt. Chinu Das [the plaintiff No.1] purchased the land of Schedule ‘B’ from the defendant No.2 Sri Nimai Deb Das by Exbt.1 being Sale-deed No.1-13107. The said statement of PW 1 is corroborated by PW 2 Sri Sukumar Das and PW 3 Sri Monoranjan Deb, who appeared before the learned Civil Judge as independent witnesses. It is the clear observation of both the Courts below that the land of Schedule ‘B’ was the purchased land of Smt. Chinu Das, the plaintiff No.1 considering the admission of this fact by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants. Both the Courts below after deciding right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiffs over the ‘B’ Schedule land permanently restrained the defendants and their men and agents from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the ‘B’ Schedule land.

11. The learned trial Court after analysis of the evidence came to a finding that the plaintiffs successfully proved the acquisition of title over the land of Schedule ‘A’ by way of adverse possession and delivered the judgment and decree accordingly.

12. While deciding the question of plaintiffs’ acquisition of title by way of adverse possession, the first appellate Court at its finding had observed thus:-

“Now the question is even the possession of the plaintiff-respondents over the suit land is proved whether the Court can declare the title of the plaintiff-respondent on the basis of adverse possession. Under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, as suit for possession of immovable property by a plaintiff, who while in possession of the property had been dispossessed from such possession, when such suit is based on previous possession and not based on title, can be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act as suit for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein, based on title, can be filed by a person claiming title within 12 years. The limitation under this Article commences from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. In these circumstances, it is apparent that to contest a suit for possession, filed by a person on the basis of his title, a plea of adverse possession can be taken by a defendant who is in hostile, continuance and open possession, to the knowledge of the true owner, if such a person has remained in possession for a period of 12 years. It, thus, naturally has to be inferred that plea of adverse possession is a defence available only to a defendant. This conclusion is further clear from the language used in Article 65 wherein, in Column No.3 it has been specifically mentioned “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff”. Thus, a perusal of the aforesaid Article 65 shows that the plea is available only to defendant against a plaintiff. In these circumstances, natural inference must follow that when such a plea of adverse possession is only available to a defendant, then no declaration can be sought by a plaintiff with regard to his ownership on the basis of an adverse possession.”

13. To arrive at his conclusion, the learned first appellate Court has heavily relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala, reported in (2014) 1 SCC 669, which is extracted hereunder:-

“There cannot be any quarrel to this extent the judgments of the courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the Plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings filed against the Appellant and Appellant is arrayed as Defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.”

14. Applying the ratio of the above decision, the learned first appellate Court held that in view of the aforesaid ratio the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration of right, title, interest of the land of Schedule ‘A’ on the basis of adverse possession is not maintainable.

15. Mr. D.R. Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the findings returned by the First Appellate Court to arrive at its decision that a plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for declaration of title under the structured scheme of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is perverse and he vehemently urged that a plaintiff can claim acquisition of title over a certain land by way of adverse possession in view of Article 65 of the Limitation Act.

16. The issue in regard to the law whether a plaintiff can maintain a suit claiming right, title, interest over a certain land by way of adverse possession and for permanent injunction as envisaged under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [in short, the Act] is by now well settled in view of the judgment of the Apex Court by a three Judge Bench in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. Vrs. Manjit Kaur & Ors., reported in (2019) 8 SCC 729. The Apex Court after a comprehensive interpretative discussion and having made an elaborate survey of the law and various authorities passed by the Apex Court had considered the case of Gurudwara Sahib (supra). After their Lordships conscious consideration it was held as under:

“50. In Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala [(2014) 1 SCC 669] proposition was not disputed. A decision based upon concession cannot be treated as precedent as has been held by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Mahaveer Oil Industries, (1999) 4 SCC 357, Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638 and Uptron (India) Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan (1998) 6 SCC 538. Though, it appears that there was some expression of opinion since the Court observed that there cannot be any quarrel that plea of adverse possession cannot be taken by a plaintiff. The fact remains that the proposition was not disputed and no argument to the contrary had been raised, as such there was no decision on the aforesaid aspect only an observation was made as to proposition of law, which is palpably incorrect.

51. The statute does not define adverse possession, it is a common law concept, the period of which has been prescribed statutorily under the law of limitation in Article 65 as 12 years. Law of limitation does not define the concept of adverse possession nor anywhere contains a provision that the plaintiff cannot sue based on adverse possession. It only deals with limitation to sue and extinguishment of rights. There may be a case where a person who has perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession is sought to be ousted or has been dispossessed by a forceful entry by the owner or by some other person, his right to obtain possession can be resisted only when the person who is seeking to protect his possession, is able to show that he has also perfected his title by adverse possession for requisite period against such a plaintiff.

52. Under Article 64 also suit can be filed based on the possessory title. Law never intends a person who has perfected title to be deprived of filing suit under Article 65 to recover possession and to render him remediless. In case of infringement of any other right attracting any other Article such as in case the land is sold away by the owner after the extinguishment of his title, the suit can be filed by a person who has perfected his title by adverse possession to question alienation and attempt of dispossession.

53. Law of adverse possession does not qualify only a defendant for the acquisition of title by way of adverse possession, it may be perfected by a person who is filing a suit. It only restricts a right of the owner to recover possession before the period of limitation fixed for the extinction of his rights expires. Once right is extinguished another person acquires prescriptive right which cannot be defeated by re-entry by the owner or subsequent acknowledgment of his rights. In such a case suit can be filed by a person whose right is sought to be defeated.

54. In India, the law respect possession, persons are not permitted to take law in their hands and dispossess a person in possession by force as observed in Lallu Yashwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh [AIR 1968 SC 620] by this Court. The suit can be filed only based on the possessory title for appropriate relief under the Specific Relief Act by a person in possession. Articles 64 and 65 both are attracted in such cases as held by this Court in Desh Raj v. Bhagat Ram (2007) 9 SCC 641. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165 it was held that if rightful owner does not commence an action to take possession within the period of limitation, his rights are lost and person in possession acquires an absolute title.

55. In Sarangadeva Periya Matam v. Ramaswami Gounder, AIR 1966 SC 1603, the plaintiff’s suit for recovery of possession was decreed against the Math based on the perfection of the title by way of adverse possession, he could not have been dispossessed by the Math. The Court held that under Article 144 read with Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the title of Math extinguished in 1927 and the plaintiff acquired title in 1927. In 1950, he delivered possession, but such delivery of possession did not transfer any title to Math. The suit filed in 1954 was held to be within time and decreed.

56. There is the acquisition of title in favour of plaintiff though it is negative conferral of right on extinguishment of the right of an owner of the property. The right ripened by prescription by his adverse possession is absolute and on dispossession, he can sue based on ‘title' as envisaged in the opening part under Article 65 of Act. Under Article 65, the suit can be filed based on the title for recovery of possession within 12 years of the start of adverse possession, if any, set up by the defendant. Otherwise right to recover possession based on the title is absolute irrespective of limitation in the absence of adverse possession by the defendant for 12 years. The possession as trespasser is not adverse nor long possession is synonymous with adverse possession.

57. In Article 65 in the opening part a suit “for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title” has been used. Expression “title” would include the title acquired by the plaintiff by way of adverse possession. The title is perfected by adverse possession has been held in a catena of decisions.

58. We are not inclined to accept the submission that there is no conferral of right by adverse possession. Section 27 of Limitation Act, 1963 provides for extinguishment of right on the lapse of limitation fixed to institute a suit for possession of any property, the right to such property shall stand extinguished. The concept of adverse possession as evolved goes beyond it on completion of period and extinguishment of right confers the same right on the possessor, which has been extinguished and not more than that. For a person to sue for possession would indicate that right has accrued to him in praesenti to obtain it, not in futuro. Any property in Section 27 would include corporeal or incorporeal property. Article 65 deals with immovable property.

59. Possession is the root of title and is right like the property. As ownership is also of different kinds of viz. sole ownership, contingent ownership, corporeal ownership, and legal equitable ownership. Limited ownership or limited right to property may be enjoyed by a holder. What can be prescribable against is limited to the rights of the holder. Possession confers enforceable right under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. It has to be looked into what kind of possession is enjoyed viz. de facto i.e., actual, ‘de jure possession’, constructive possession, concurrent possession over a small portion of the property. In case the owner is in symbolic possession, there is no dispossession, there can be formal, exclusive or joint possession. The joint possessor/coowner possession is not presumed to be adverse. Personal law also plays a role to construe nature of possession.

60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to coexist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e., adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. Trespasser’s possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and the large the concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.

61. Adverse possession is heritable and there can be tacking of adverse possession by two or more persons as the right is transmissible one. In our opinion, it confers a perfected right which cannot be defeated on re-entry except as provided in Article 65 itself. Tacking is based on the fulfillment of certain conditions, tacking maybe by possession by the purchaser, legatee or assignee, etc. so as to constitute continuity of possession, that person must be claiming through whom it is sought to be tacked, and would depend on the identity of the same property under the same right. Two distinct trespassers cannot tack their possession to constitute conferral of right by adverse possession for the prescribed period.

62. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owner’s title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit.

63. When we consider the law of adverse possession as has developed vis--vis to property dedicated to public use, courts have been loath to confer the right by adverse possession. There are instances when such properties are encroached upon and then a plea of adverse possession is raised. In Such cases, on the land reserved for public utility, it is desirable that rights should not accrue. The law of adverse possession may cause harsh consequences, hence, we are constrained to observe that it would be advisable that concerning such properties dedicated to public cause, it is made clear in the statute of limitation that no rights can accrue by adverse possession.

64. Resultantly, we hold that decisions of Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala (supra) and decision relying on it in State of Uttarakhand v. Mandir Shri Lakshmi Siddh Maharaj [(2017) 9 SCC 579] and Dharampal (dead) through LRs v. Punjab Wakf Board [(2018) 11 SCC 449] cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly, thus they are hereby overruled. We hold that plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession can be taken by plaintiff under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and there is no bar under the Limitation Act, 1963 to sue on aforesaid basis in case of infringement of any rights of a plaintiff.”

17. Applying the aforesaid overwhelming ratio laid down by the Apex Court, I should have no hesitation that a plaintiff can well maintain a suit claiming title by virtue of adverse possession under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. That apart, the plaintiff can further seek for a permanent injunction thereby restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. In the instant case, it came to light that it is the specific pleaded case of the plaintiffs that they entered into the suit land of Schedule ‘A’ & ‘B’ through their predecessor in the year 1954, though the defendants had pleaded that the predecessor of the plaintiffs had entered into the suit land in the year 1989 as a permissive possessor only over a small portion of land belonging to the defendants. The said assertion of the defendants that the plaintiffs entered into the suit land as their permissive possessor is enough to support the plaintiffs’ claim that they started possession over the suit land in front of the eyes of the defendants, at least. Next remains to decide whether the plaintiffs have been able to establish the essential requirements of adverse possession. After perusal of Exbt.2 and Exbt.B, the Khatian No.2292 being the later khatian, it is clear that the names of the plaintiffs [plaintiff No.2 and 3] have been entered and recorded as forceful possessor as against plot (Dag) Nos.18600, 18599,18603 and 18604, specifically described in Schedule ‘A’ land of the plaint since the year 1954. It is settled law that khatian has presumptive value of its correctness unless rebutted.

18. In this context, the trial Court took note of the case of Raja Durga Singh of Solon V. Tholu & Ors., reported in AIR 1963 SC 361, wherein the Supreme Court has held that-

“Judicial Commissioner has omitted to bear in mind the provisions of Section 44 of the Act which give a presumptive value to the entries in revenue records. It was argued before us that there are prior entries which are in conflict with those on which the learned District Judge has relied. It is sufficient to say that where there is such a conflict, it is the later entry which must prevail.”

19. The learned counsel appearing for the defendants has led much emphasis to the fact that if the plaintiffs were really in possession of the suit land mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint from the year 1954, then, in the khatian No.2292 published on 15.12.1967 [Exbt.A] the names of the plaintiffs should have been mentioned at Column No.24 of the said Khatian. But all on a sudden, in the finally published khatian which was published in the year 2006, the plaintiffs were shown as forceful possessor at Column No.24 [Exbt.2 & Exbt.B]. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants tried to persuade this Court that there are two conflicting khatians recorded in favour of plaintiffs at different point of times. But having regard to the decision of the Apex Court in Raja Durga Singh (supra), I have no hesitation to hold that the latest khatian which was published in favour of the plaintiffs showing them as forceful possessor has to be accepted in absence of any available evidence to rebut such presumption of its correctness.

20. In view of the aforesaid discussion and applying the ratio laid down in Rabinder Kaur Grewal (supra), there should not be any contrary view that a plaintiff has every right to institute and maintain a suit for declaration claiming acquisition of title and confirmation of possession and for a declaration of granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing their peaceful possession over the suit land of Schedule ‘A’ & ‘B’.

Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for extinguishment of right on the lapse of limitation fixed to institute a suit for posses

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sion of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. If we read this provision in conjunction with Article 65 of the Limitation Act, then, we find that in the opening part it prescribes a suit “for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein based on title.” Expression “title” would include the title acquired by the plaintiff by way of adverse possession. By the said expression, a right is conferred upon a plaintiff for claiming acquisition of title since the right of the owner of a property is extinguished for his failure to evict the plaintiff from his own land by way of instituting a suit for declaration and recovery of possession based on title under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. As a corollary, the extinguishment of such right of owner, the plaintiff on acquisition of title by prescription can raise a plea of acquisition of title by way of adverse possession and accordingly, can sue the true owner of the property for declaration, and permanent injunction restraining such true owner from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. 21. Accordingly, the substantial question of law as formulated by this Court at the time of admission of this appeal is answered. This Court has already held that the plaintiff-appellants have been able to establish all the essential ingredients on adverse possession. Consequently, this Court declares that the plaintiffs have acquired right, title, interest over the suit land by virtue of adverse possession under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Further, their possession over the suit land of Schedule ‘A’ & ‘B’ is confirmed and the defendant is permanently restrained from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the land of Schedule ‘A’. 22. This Court also declares the right, title, interest of the plaintiffs over the Schedule ‘B’ land and confirms the possession of the plaintiffs over the land of Schedule ‘B’. The defendant, his representatives, men and agents are permanently restrained from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. 23. In the result, the judgment and decree, passed by the learned First Appellate Court dated 10.12.2015 & 16.12.2015 respectively dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellants that the plaintiff-appellants cannot maintain a suit for declaration of title by way of adverse possession and further the finding returned by the learned First Appellate Court that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the essential requirements of adverse possession is called for interference in view of the enunciation of law as discussed above and consequently, the said judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside and quashed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court dated 14.02.2011 in connection with case No. T.S. 29 of 2009 declaring the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the land of Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ are restored and thereby confirmed. 24. The appeal, accordingly, stands allowed and disposed of. 25. Send back the LCRs along with a copy of judgment forthwith.
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