V.G. Palshikar, J.
1. By this petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated February 19, 1996 passed by the respondent No. 2. There is no challenge to the order dated February 1, 1996 by which the admission was cancelled. The petition thus suffers from a basic infirmity.
2. It will be necessary, therefore, to see the prayers made in this petition. The prayers made in the petition are as under :--
"12/I.-- By an appropriate writ, order or direction Respondents be restrained from effecting the ouster of petitioner from the B.S.T.C. course she is undergoing in the Phalodi Centre.
12/II.-- Any other appropriate writ, order or direction as may be considered proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be granted.
12/III.-- Costs of the writ petition allowed to the petitioner."
3. The prayers are, ther
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efore, for restraining the respondents from effecting the ouster of the petitioner from the course she is undergoing in Phalodi Centre. The petition was filed on March 25, 1996 when the petitioner was already transferred to Barmer Institution on November 13, 1995. The petition was filed after the order dated February 1, 1996 was passed as also the order dated February 19, 1996 filed with the petition as Annexure-1 was passed and yet there is no prayer for quashing either of the orders.
4. There are no averments in the petition alleging how these orders are bad in law and are required to be quashed. All that has been contended in the petition is that the petitioner having undergone substantial pant of training and having secured the admission without committing any fraud for the mistake of the Institution in granting the earlier admission, the petitioner should not be made to suffer. There is also passing reference to the previous litigation between the parties, reference to which is necessary for proper adjudication of this petition.
5. Writ Petition No. 4967 of 1994 was filed before this Court by the petitioner and her sister whereby rejection of admission of Smt. Varsha, sister of the petitioner, was challenged and mandamus was claimed seeking transfer of the petitioner from Phalodi to Barmer. lt was claimed by the petitioner's sister in this petition that admission was granted to the petitioner on the basis of marks obtained by her in the Secondary Examination at the second time which examination she took for improvement of marks and not giving similar treatment to her was claimed to be discriminatory by Smt. Varsha, the sister of the petitioner. The writ petition was allowed by a single Bench of this Court. The respondents went in appeal and the Division Bench reversed the judgment of the single Bench by its order dated December 11, 1995. The Division Bench took the view that the improved marks in the circumstances mentioned in the order could not be taken into consideration and, therefore, the order of learned single Judge was reversed.
6. It was after this judgment dated December 11, 1995 that the order dated February 1, 1996 was issued directing that if admission is given to the persons mentioned i.e. the petitioner and her sister in pursuance of the earlier order of the Court the same be cancelled obviously because improved marks could not be taken into consideration. Yet this order is not challenged. Even the communication of this order by letter dated February 19, 1996 which is annexed to the petition is not squarely challenged in the writ petition. It is nowhere challenged that the order dated February 1, 1996 cancelling the admission of the petitioner granted on the basis of the improved marks was illegal or unsustainable in law and liable to be quashed.
7. In these circumstances the prayers of the petitioner cannot be granted under any circumstances. The petition, therefore, fails on the ground that there is no prayer either for quashing the letter dated February 1, 1996 or the letter dated February 19, 1996 and only a direction is claimed restraining the respondents from cancelling the admission of the petitioner. The admission has been cancelled on the basis of a judgment delivered by this Court as there was no option with the respondents but to do so. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court having acquired finality cannot be questioned in this petition before the single Bench. Taking into view the defective pleadings and the attending circumstances, the petition must fail.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited several judgments in support of his claim that the cancellation of petitioner's admission was unsustainable. Factually it is not necessary to consider those judgments as consideration thereof will arise in the event of pleadings being complete. If the petitioner does not claim that the order of cancellation is illegal and should, therefore, be quashed, recourse to these judgnents is of no consequence. Yet I will deal with these cases in order to avoid possible charge of not considering the arguments made at the Bar.
9. The first decision is Navin Khandelwal v. JNV University 1997 WLR 143 (paras 5 and 6) wherein it has been held by this Court that if admission is given with full disclosure of facts the same should not be disturbed. This case is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the admission of the petitioner is not cancelled for non-disclosure of certain material facts. It is cancelled on the basis of interpretation of particular Rule and, therefore, this judgment is of no consequence,
10. The next decision cited is A. Sudha Vs. University of Mysore and Another, wherein the Supreme Court of India has observed that where ineligible person is admitted to a college, he should not be disturbed. These observations of the Supreme Court of India pertain to the facts of that particular case and on the circumstances existing in that case. It cannot be read as laying down a law that even ineligible person wrongly admitted must always be continued.
11. Then the learned counsel for the petitioner cited three decisions in Shri Krishnan Vs. The Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, Ashok Chand Singhvi Vs. University of Jodhpur and Others, and Rajendra Prasad Mathur Ors. Vs. Karnataka University and Another, wherein it has been observed that the admission was granted negligently. These cases have no application to the facts of the present case because there is no question of negligent grant of admission to the petitioner. The petitioner was granted admission consciously. The Rule on the basis of which the admission was granted was interpreted by this Court and it was observed that the interpretation put by the respondents in case of the grant of admission to the petitioner was wrong. Therefore, the cases of negligent grant of admission being granted cannot and do not apply in the present case.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner also cited Director of Tribunal Welfare, Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Laveti Giri and another, and Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, on the ground that for the proposition that even in cases where admission is obtained by fraud, if the student has completed the course, he should not be denied the benefits thereof. These authorities do not apply to the facts of the present case as the petitioner has not secured admission by fraud. The petitioner has not completed the course. The situation contemplated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was completion of the Course under the Orders of the Court. In the present case the course . being not completed yet these decisions are of no help.
13. Similarly, the decisions cited by the petitioner do not help the petitioner in the present case as her admission is cancelled on the basis of interpretation of Rules applicable in that behalf. I have also pointed out that the petition is liable to be dismissed solely on the ground of defective pleadings. The petitioner has not pleaded that for the reasons mentioned in the petition and for the reasons of the judgments of the several Courts the cancellation of admission by the order dated February 1, 1996 and its communication by letter dated February 19, 1996 was bad and these orders were, therefore, liable to be quashed. I have considered the case law cited on the hypothesis that such pleadings do exist and yet these decisions are of no use to the petitioner. Viewed from any point, therefore, I am firmly of the opinion that the petitioner deserves to be non-suited for want of pleadings and her admission being basically against the Rules.
14. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed. All interim orders are hereby vacated and it is observed that no right is created in the petitioner by reason of any of these interim orders and the petitioner shall stand removed from the course from February 1, 1996. There will be no order as to costs.