S. C. AGRAWAL, J.

The common question which arises for consideration in these appeals, by special leave, and the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is, Whether who a person was inducted as a tenant in premises, which are public premises for the purpose of the Public Premises (Eviction Of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Public Premises Act') and whose tenancy has expired or has been terminated, can be evicted from the said premises as being a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises under the provision of the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rent Control Act'). In short, the question is whether the provision of the Public Premises Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments

2. Civil Appeals Nos. 2368 and 2369 of 1986 relate to the premises which are part of a building situated at 5 Parliament Street, New Delhi. The said building originally belonged to Punjab National Bank Ltd., a banking company. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (appellant 1 in Civil Appeal No. 2368 of 1986) and M/s. Sahu Jain Services Ltd. (appellant 1 in Civil Appeal No. 2369 of 1986) were tenants of premises located in the said building since July 1, 1958. As a result of the enactment of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Banks Nationalisation Act'), the undertaking of the Punjab National Bank Ltd., was transferred and vested in Punjab National Bank a body corporate constituted under the provisions of the said Act and the aforesaid appellants became the tenants of Punjab National Bank. By notices dated May 18, 1971 issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenancies of both the appellants were terminated by Punjab National Bank, with effect from November 30, 1971. Thereafter, the said Bank initiated proceedings under the Rent Control Act against both the appellants. In those proceedings an objection was raised by the said appellants that proceedings for eviction under the Rent Control Act were not maintainable view of the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act. During the pendency of the said proceedings under the Rent Control Act, proceedings were initiated by the Estate Officer against the appellants under the Public Premises Act and while the said proceeding under the Public Premises Act were pending the earlier proceedings initiated under the Rent Control Act were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, by orders dated August 6, 1979. In the proceedings under the Public Premises Act the Estate Officer passed orders for eviction against the appellants and appeals filed by the appellants against the said orders of the Estate Officers were dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi. The appellants filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in the Delhi High Court. The said writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court by orders dated May 30, 1986. Aggrieved by the said orders of the High Court, the appellants have these appeals after obtaining special leave to appeal

3. Civil Appeal No., 3725 of 1986 relates to an office room in the Allahabad Bank Building situated at 17, Parliament street, New Delhi. The said building belongs to Allahabad Bank, a body corporate constituted under the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act. The said premises were let out to Pt. K. B. Parsai, the appellant in this appeal, for a period of three years with effect from February 1, 1982. After the expiry of the said period eviction proceedings under the provision of the Public Premises Act were initiated to evict the appellant and in those proceedings the Estate Officer passed an order dated March 29, 1986. The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, wherein he challenged the validity of the order passed by the Estate Officer. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Delhi High Court by order dated August 7, 1986. The appellant has filed this appeal against the said decision of the Delhi High Court after obtaining special leave to appeal

4. Writ Petition No. 864 of 1985, relates to premises in the building located at 10, Darya Ganj, New Delhi. The said building originally belonged to Bharat Insurance Company Limited, as insurance company which was carrying on life insurance business. M/s. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. (petitioner 1 in the writ petition) was in occupation of a part of the said property as a tenant under M/s. Bharat insurance Co. Ltd. since 1948. The life insurance business carried on by the various insurance companies, including M/s. Bharat Insurance Company Ltd., was nationalised and vested in Life Insurance Corporation. The Life Insurance Corporation gave a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act terminating a tenancy of petitioner 1 with effect from August 31, 1953 and thereafter proceedings for eviction were initiated against petitioner 1 under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and notices dated December 15, 1984 were issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4(1) and Section 7(3) of the Public Premises Act. Feeling aggrieved by these notices the petitioners have filed the writ petition

5. Before we proceed to deal with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants in the appeals and for the petitioners in the writ petition (hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioners') it would be relevant to advert to the legislative history of Public Premises Act

6. The Public Premises Act was preceded by two such enactments. The first enactment was the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1950 Act') which was enacted by Parliament to provide for the eviction of certain persons from government premises and for certain matters connected therewith. It was confined, in its application, to premises (a building or a part of a building) belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by the Central Government and it empowered the competent authority to evict a person in unauthorised occupation of such premises after issuing a notice to such person. The 1950 Act did not define the expression "unauthorised occupation" and it also did not prescribe the procedure to be followed by the competent authority before passing the order of eviction. There was a provision for appeal to the Central Government against the order of the competent authority. The 1950 Act declared as unconstitutional by the Calcutta High Court in Jagu Singh v. M. Shaukat Ali 58 CWN 1066 : 1955 AIR(Cal) 4499 ) and by the Punjab High Court in Satish Chander v. Delhi Improvement Trust 1958 AIR(P&H) 1 : 59 Punj LR 621) on the ground that it imposed unreasonable restriction on the right of the citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the constitution, and by the Allahabad High Court in Brigade Commander, Meerut Sub Area v. Ganga Prasad 1956 AIR(All) 507 : 1956 All(LJ) 251 on the ground that it was violative of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution

7. Thereupon Parliament enacted the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1958 Act'). In the 1958 Act; the definition of public premises was enlarged to include, in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi, premises belonging to Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any municipal committee or notified area committee and premises belonging to Delhi Development Authority. In the 1958 Act, the expression "unauthorised occupation" was defined. It also laid down the procedure to be followed by the Estate Officer for evicting a Person in unauthorised occupation of public premises and it made provision for filing an appeal against every order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the District Judge may designate in that behalf. In Northern India Caterers Private Limited v. State of Punjab ( 1967 (3) SCR 399 : 1967 AIR(SC) 1581 ) Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 was held to be void by this Court on the ground that the said provision conferred an additional remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and that by providing two alternative remedies to the government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other and to pick and choose some of those in occupation of public properties and premises for the application of the more drastic procedure under Section 5, the said provision was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The provision contained in the Punjab Act were similar to those contained in the 1958 Act. Keeping in view the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Limited case ( 1967 (3) SCR 399 :

8. This led to the enactment of the Public Premises Act by Parliament in 1971. It was brought into effect from September 16, 1958, the date on which the 1958 Act came into force. The provisions of the Public Premises Act are similar to those contained in the 1958 Act. The definition of 'public premises' contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act has been widened so as to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of a company, as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty one percent of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Government as well as premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any corporation (not being a company, as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act in 1956, or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned and controlled by the Central Government. It contains certain additional provisions, providing for offences and penalties (Section 11), liability of heirs and representatives (Section 13), recovery of rent etc. as an arrear of land revenue (Section 14) and bar of jurisdiction of courts (Section 15). The validity of the Public Premises Act was upheld by this Court in Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer ( 1972 (2) SCC 239 : 1973 (1) SCR 515 )

9. The Public Premises Act was amended in 1980 by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, whereby the definition of 'public premises' in Section 2(e) was amended to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of certain autonomous and statutory organisations, viz. any University established or incorporated by any Central Act, any institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961, any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, and the Bhakra Management Board and as well as premises belonging to or taken on lease by any company which is subsidiary of a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 in which not less than fifty one percent of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Government. By the said Amending Act of 1980, the total period taken in eviction proceedings was also sought to be curtailed by reducing the period for showing cause against notice of eviction, the period within which an unauthorised occupant should vacate the premises after eviction order has been passed and the period for filling an appeal against the order of an Estate Officer. By the said Amending Act of 1980 provisions were also made, by inserting Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C to deal with the squatting or spreading of goods on or against or in front of any public premises and removal of unauthorised constructions or encroachments on public premises. The Public Premises Act was further amended in 1984 by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1984 whereby certain further amendments were made to provide for increased penalties and making the offences under the Act cognisable and to enable the Estate Officers to exercise their powers under the Act effectively

10. As stated in the preamble, the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and, for certain incidental matters. In Section 2, various expressions have been defined. The definitions of the following expressions which are of relevance are reproduced as under

"(c) "Premises

" means any land or any building or part of a building and includes -

(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building, and

(ii) any fitting affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;" *

"(e) "Public Premises" means -

(1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980 under the control of Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat;

(2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, -

(i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) in which not less than fifty one percent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of the Act) of the first mentioned company

(ii) any corporation [not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a local authority] established or controlled by the Central Government

(iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act

(iv) any institute incorporated by the Institute of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961)(v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (38 of 1963)

(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under Section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966) and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under sub-section (6) of Section 80 of that Act, and

(3) in relation to the Union territory of Delhi -

(i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any municipal committee or notified area committee, and

(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by the said Authority

(g) "Unauthorised Occupation

", in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been expired for any reason whatsoever." *

Section 3 makes provision for appointment by Central Government of gazetted officers of government or officers of equal rank of the statutory authority as Estate Officers. Section 4 relates to issue of show cause against order or eviction and provides as under

"4(1) If the Estate Officer is of an opinion that any person are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, the Estate Officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made

(2) The notice shall -

(a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public premises, -

(i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than seven days from the date of issue thereof; and

(ii) to appear before the Estate Officer on the date specified in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired

(3) The Estate Officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned

(4) Where the Estate Officer knows or has reasons to believe that any persons are in occupation of the public premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed."

Section 5 relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants and provides as under

"5. (1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under Section 4 and any personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 4, the Estate Officer is satisfied that occupation of the public premises is unauthorised, the Estate Officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated on such date as may be specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction on or before the date specified in the said order or within fifteen days of the date of its publication under sub-section (1) whichever is later, the estate officer or any officer duly authorised by the estate officer in this behalf may after the date so specified or after the expiry of the period aforesaid, whichever is later, evict that person from, and take possession of the public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary."

Section 5-A provides for removal of unauthorised constructions/structures or fixtures, cattle or other animal from public premises. Section 5-B deals with demolition of unauthorised constructions. Section 5-C empowers the Estate Officer to seal unauthorised constructions. Section 6 provides for disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants. Section 7 empowers the Estate Officer to require payment of rent or damages on account of use and occupation of public premises along with interest by the person found in unauthorised occupation. Section 8 lays down that an Estate Officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under the Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying to suit in respect of certain matters, viz. summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents, and any other matter which may be prescribed. Section 9 provides for an appeal from every order of the Estate Officer in respect of any public premises passed under Sections 5, 5-B, 5-C, and 7 to an appellant officer who shall be a District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in the district of not less than ten years standing as the District Judge may designate in this behalf. It also prescribes the period of limitation for filing such appeals and also lays down that the appeal shall be disposed of by the appellant officer as expeditiously as possible. Section 10 attaches finality to the orders made by an Estate Officer or appellant officer and provides that the said orders shall not be called in question in any original suit application or execution proceedings and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act. Section 11 provides for offences and penalties and Section 11-A lays down that the offences under Section 11 would be treated as cognizable offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 15 relates to bar of jurisdiction and it provides as under

"15. No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of -

(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any such public premises, or

(b) the removal of any building, structure of fixture or goods, cattle or other animal from any public premises under Section 5-A, or

(c) the demolition of any building or other structure made, or ordered to be made, under Section 5-B, or

(cc) the sealing of any erection or work or of any public premises under Section 5-C

(d) the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of Section 7 or damages payable under sub-section (2), or interest payable under sub-section (2-A) of that Section

(e) the recovery of -

(i) costs of removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, cattle or other animal under Section 5-A, or

(ii) expenses of demolition under Section 5-B, or

(iii) costs awarded to the Central Government or statutory authority under sub-section (5) of Section 9, or

(iv) any portion of such rent, damages, cost of removal, expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central Government or the statutory authority." *

11. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 18 of the Public Premises Act, the Central Government has made the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Public Premises Rules'). Rule 5 of the said Rules relates to holding of inquiries and Rule 9 relates to procedure in appeals

12. We will first deal with the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to the scope of the definition of the expression 'public premises' contained in Section 2 (e) and 'unauthorised occupation ', contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act

13. As mentioned earlier, the appeals relate to premises belonging to nationalised banks, viz, Punjab National Bank and Allahabad Bank, constituted under the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act. It has been urged by Shri Yogeshwar Prasad, that the premises belonging to a nationalized bank do not fall within the ambit of the definition of 'public premises' contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, for the reason that nationalised bank is not a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 and it is also not a corporation established by or under a Central Act. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent banks is that the nationalised bank is a corporation established by a Central Act, viz, the Banks Nationalisation Act, and the premises belonging to a nationalised bank are 'public premise ' under Section 2(e) 2(ii) of the Public Premises Act. The question which, therefore, requires to be considered is whether a nationalised bank is a corporation established by or under a Central Act and is owned or controlled by the Central Government

14. The nationalised banks have been established under the Banks Nationalisation Act, wherein the nationalised banks have been described as 'corresponding new bank'. In sub-section (i) of Section 3 of the Banks Nationalisation Act, it has been provided that on the commencement of the said Act, there shall be constituted such corresponding new banks as are specified in the First Schedule. In sub-section (2) of Section 3, it is laid down that the paid-up capital of every corresponding new bank constituted under sub-section (1) shall, until any provision is made in this behalf in any scheme made under Section 9, be equal to the paid-up capital of the existing bank in relation to which it is the corresponding new bank. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that the entire capital of the new bank shall stand vested in, and allowed to the Central Government. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 lays down that every corresponding new bank shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provision of the said Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to contract, and may sue and be sued in its name. From the aforesaid provisions contained in Section 3 of the Banks Nationalisation Act it is evident that the nationalised banks have been established under the provisions of the said Act and the same are distinct juristic persons with perpetual succession and the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contact and having the right to sue and be sued in their own name and further that the entire capital of the said banks is vested in the Central Government, meaning thereby, that the said banks are owned by the Central Government

15. Shri. Yogeshwar Prasad has pointed out that, in view of Section 3(4) of the Banks Nationalisation Act, the nationalised bank is a body corporate and not a corporation and that there is a distinction between a body corporate and a corporation inasmuch as a body corporate includes bodies, such as companies, cooperative societies, etc. which are not corporations. Reliance has been placed in this regard on the decision of Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority ( 1985 (55) CC 81 (Del HC). We find no substance in this contention

16. In English law a corporation has been defined as

"a body of persons or an office which is recognised by the law as having a personality which is distinct from the separate personalities of the members of the body or the personality of the individual holder for the time being of the office in question." *

(See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn., volume 9, para 1201). Generally speaking, corporations are of two kinds, corporation aggregate and corporation sole. A corporation aggregate has been described as an incorporate group of co-existing persons and a corporation sole as an incorporated series of successive persons (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th edn. p. 308). The distinctive feature of a corporation are that it has the capacity of continuous existence and succession, notwithstanding changes in its membership and it possesses the capacity of taking, holding and conveying property, entering into contracts, suing and being sued, and exercising such other powers and privileges conferred on it by law of its creation just as a natural person may (see S. S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi ( 1981 (3) SCC 431 : 1981 SCC(Cr) 733 : 1981 (3) SCR 864 )). Corporation aggregate may be public or private. A public corporation is a corporation formed for a public purpose e.g. local government authorities, and it is usually incorporated by a public general Act of Parliament. A private corporation is a corporation formed for profit e.g. a limited company, and it is usually incorporated under a statutory enactment. After the second world war there has been development of a new pattern of public corporations in England as an instrument of planning in the mixed economy. The general characteristics of such a public corporation is that it is normally created by a special statute; it has no shares and no shareholders either private or public, and its shareholder, in the symbolic sense, is the nation represented through government and Parliament; the responsibility of the public corporation is to the government, represented by the competent Minister and through the Minister to Parliament; the administration of the public corporation is entirely in the hands of a board which is appointed by the competent Minister; and it has the legal status of a corporate body with independent legal personality. (See W. Friedman : "The New Public Corporations and the Law" ( 1974 (2) SCC 402 : 1975 (1) SCR 1 ). There is a similar growth of this type of public corporation in other countries. This trend is also evident in our country since independence and a number of such public corporations have been constituted by the Acts of Parliament

17. The distinction between such a public corporation and a corporation generally known in law has been explained in the following observations of Denning L.J., as he then was : (KB pp. 22-23)

"The Transport Act, 1947, brings into being the British Transport Commission, which is a statutory corporation of a kind comparatively new to English law. It has many of the qualities which belong to corporations of other kinds to which we have been accustomed. It has, for instance, defined powers which it cannot exceed; and it is directed by a group of men whose duty it is to see that those powers are properly used. It may own property, carry on business, borrow and lend money, just as any other corporation may do, so long as it keeps within the bounds which Parliament has set. But the significant difference in this corporation is that there are no shareholders to subscribe the capital or to have any voice in its affairs. The money which the corporation needs is not raised by the issue of shares but its borrowing is not secured by debentures, but is guaranteed by the Treasury. If it cannot repay, the loss falls on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom; that is to say, on the tax payer. There are no shareholders to elect the directors or to fix their remuneration. There are no profits to be made or distributed." *

(Tamlin v. Hannaford, 1950 (1) KB 18 : 1949 (2) ALLER 327

18. Reference has already been made to the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act which shows that the nationalised bank has been constituted as a district juristic person by the Act and it is owned by the Central Government. There are other provisions in the Banks Nationalisation Act which show that the general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the business of the bank is vested in a Board of Directors constituted by the Central Government and the Central Government has the power to remove the person from the membership of the Board of Directors [Section 7(2) and 7(3)] and in the discharge of its functions the bank is to be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve Bank give (Section 8). This indicates that the nationalised bank has all the attributes of the new pattern of public corporation

19. Merely because the expression 'body corporate' has been used in relation to the nationalised banks in Section 3(4) of the Banks Nationalisation Act and the expression 'corporation' has not been used, does not mean that the nationalised bank is not a corporation. The expression 'body corporate' is used in legal parlance to mean 'a public or private corporation' (Black's Law Dictionary p. 159)

20. Shri. Yogeshwar Prasad has urged that in order to constitute a corporation there must exist persons, i.e. members, composing it, and that this element is missing in the nationalised banks inasmuch as the Banks Nationalisation Act does not provide for any membership to these banks. This contention is without any merit because, as noticed earlier, in the new pattern of public corporations which have developed, there are no shares and no shareholders, either in public or private, and its shareholder, in the symbolic sense, is the nation represented through government and Parliament. A similar contention was raised before the High Court of Australia in the Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth ( 1948 (76) CLR 1 ) in relation to the Commonwealth Banks established as a body corporate by the Commonwealth Bank Act, 1945. While rejecting this contention, Latham C.J. has observed : (CLR p. 227)

"The Commonwealth Parliament has declared that the bank is a corporation and the court must on this, as on many previous occasions, accept that the bank (though it has no corporators) exists as a new kind of juristic person." *

Similarly Dixon J. has observed : (CLR p. 361)

"Although the Commonwealth Bank is declared to be a body corporate there are no corporators. I see no reason to doubt the constitutional power of the Federal Parliament, for a purpose within its competence, to create a juristic person without identifying an individual or a group of natural persons with it, as the living constituent or constituents of the corporation. In other legal systems an abstraction or even an inanimate physical thing has been made and artificial person as the object of rights and duties." *

21. It may also be mentioned that in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India ( 1970 (1) SCC 248 : 1970 (3) SCR 530 ) this Court, while referring to nationalised banks constituted under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, 1969, has treated the nationalised banks as corporations

22. While construing the expression 'corporation' in Section 2(e) (2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act it cannot be ignored that the object of the legislation in enlarging the definition of 'public premises' in Section 2(e) is to make available the machinery of the Act for evicting unauthorised occupants not only from the premises belonging to the Central Government but also from premises belonging to companies, corporations and statutory bodies in which the Central Government has a substantial interest. Under Section 2(e) (2)(i) premises belonging to a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up capital held by the Central Government, are to be treated as public premises. It could not be the intention of Parliament that premises belonging to public corporations whose entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government and who are the instrumentalities of State would be excluded from the ambit of the definition of 'public premises'. In our opinion, therefore, the expression 'corporation' in Section 2(e) (2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act would include public corporations of the new pattern constituted under the Central Acts wherein the entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government

23. Shri Yogeshwar Prasad has placed reliance on the decision of the Court in S. S. Dhanoa case ( 1981 (3) SCC 431 : 1981 SCC(Cr) 733 : 1981 (3) SCR 864 ) wherein this Court has considered the question whether the Cooperative Store Ltd., a cooperative society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 is a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, for the purposes of clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. This Court has observed that a corporation established by or under an Act of legislature could only mean a body corporate which owes its existence and not merely its corporate status to the Act and a distinction has been drawn between a corporation established by or under an Act and a body incorporated under an Act. It has been held that the Cooperative Store Ltd., which is a society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, is not a statutory body because it is not created by a statute and that it is a body created by an Act of a group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of a statute. This decision does not lend any assistance to the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad

24. In Oriental Bank of Commerce case ( 1985 (55) CC 81 (Del HC) the question for consideration was, whether the Chairman of a nationalised bank is a public servant and sanction under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary to prosecute him. M. L. Jain, J. has held that the nationalised bank is a body corporate and not a corporation within the meaning of clause Twelfth of Section 21 IPC and, therefore, the Chairman of the nationalised bank is a corporation, the Chairman of the said bank is not in the service or pay of the bank and further (in the facts of the case) it could not be said that the Chairman was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Sachar, J. did not consider it necessary to deal with the question, as to whether the nationalised bank is a corporation because he was of the view that Section 197 CrPC was not attracted. For the reasons mentioned earlier, the judgment of Jain, J insofar as it draws a distinction between a 'body corporate' and a 'corporation' and lays down that the nationalised bank, though a 'body corporate' is not a corporation, cannot be upheld. The other reason given by Jain, J. is that the nationalised bank is merely a personified institution having no members and is, therefore, not a corporation. This view also cannot be sustained. We have already pointed out that in order to constitute a corporation it is not necessary that there should be shareholders or members and that in the new pattern of public corporation that has developed there are no shareholders or members

25. Keeping in view the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act we are of the opinion that the nationalised bank is a corporation established by a Central Act and it is owned and controlled by the Central Government. The premises belonging to a nationalised bank are public premises under Section 2(e) (2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that premises belonging to a nationalised bank do not fall within the ambit of the definition of 'public premises' contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act

26. Shri Yogeshwar Prasad has also urged that 'public premises' as defined in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, must be confined to premises let out for residential purposes only and should not cover premises let out for commercial purposes and that if premises let out for commercial purposes are included, Section 2(e) would be rendered unconstitutional as being violative of the provisions of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 read with Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. The submission of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad is that a construction which would sustain the constitutionality of the provisions of Section 2(e) should be preferred over a construction which would render them unconstitutional. We find no force in this contention

27. There is no warrant for confining the scope of the definition of 'public premises' contained in Section 2(e) to premises used for residential purposes only and to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit. In Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer ( 1972 (2) SCC 239 : 1973 (1) SCR 515 ) a similar contention was advanced and it was argued that the expression 'premises' in Public Premises Act would not apply to agricultural land. This Court rejected that contention with the observation : (SCC p. 249, para 23)

"The word 'premises' is defined to mean any land. Any land will include agricultural land. There is nothing in the Act to exclude the applicability of the Act to agricultural land." *

28. We are also unable to hold that the inclusion of premises used for commercial purposes within the ambit of the definition of 'public premises', would render the Public Premises Act as violative of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution or right to freedom to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution or the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate how a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises used for commercial purposes, can invoke the Directive Principles under Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. As indicated in the statement of Objects and Reasons the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. It serves a public purpose, viz. making available, for use, public premises after eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. The need to provide speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation cannot be confined to premises used of residential purposes. There is no reason to assume that such a need will not be there in respect of premises used for commercial purposes. No distinction can, therefore, be made between premises used for residential purposes and premises used for commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply equally to both the types of public premises. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that the definition of public premises contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act should be so construed as to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit

29. Shri A. K. Ganguli, has urged that a person who was put in occupation of the premises as a tenant and who has continued in such occupation after the expiry or the termination of his tenancy cannot be regarded as a person in unauthorised occupation under Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act. The submission of Shri Ganguli is that, the occupation of a person who was put in possession as a tenant is juridical possession and such an occupation cannot be regarded as unauthorised occupation. In support of this submission, Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Brigadier K. K. Verma v. Union of India 1954 AIR(Bom) 358 : 56 BomLR 308 which has been approved by this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh ( 1968 (2) SCR 203 : 1968 AIR(SC) 620 )

30. The definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation' contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two parts. In the first part the said expression has been defined to mean the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation. It implies occupation by a person who has entered into occupation which was permissive at the inception but has ceased to be so. The second part of the definition is inclusive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. This part covers a case where a person had entered into occupation legally under valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been determined. The words "whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer" in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The definition of unauthorised occupation contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case where a person has entered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in accordance with law

31. Brigadier K. K. Verma v. Union of India 1954 AIR(Bom) 358 : 56 BomLR 308 was decided under the provisions of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950, which did not contain the definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation'. In that case it has been held that under the Indian law, the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law and although he may not have the right to continue in possession, after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute, and therefore, an erstwhile tenant can never become a trespasser and his possession cannot be regarded as unauthorised occupation. The learned Judges have also observed that unless the legislature had given indication of a clear intention that by the expression 'unauthorised occupation' it meant not only person who had no title at all but also persons who are titled at the inception and whose title came to an end, it would not be proper to give an interpretation to the expression 'unauthorised occupation' which would run counter to the principles of law which have been accepted in this country. After this decision the legislature intervened and introduced the definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation' in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, which definition has been reproduced in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act and in the said definition the legislature has taken care to make an express provision indicating that the expression 'unauthorised occupation' includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. In the circumstances the petitioners cannot derive any assistance from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Brigadier K. K. Verma case

32. Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of A. P. Sen, J. in Express

Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India ( 1986 (1) SCC 133 : 1985 (S3) SCR 382 ) and has submitted that in that case the learned Judge has held that cases involving relationship between the lessor and lessee fall outside the purview of the Public Premises Act. We have carefully perused the said decision and we are unable to agree with Shri Ganguli. In that case A. P. Sen, J. has observed that the new building had been constructed by the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. after the grant of permission by the unauthorised occupation of the same within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act. It was also held by the learned Judge that the Express Newspapers Ltd. with the sanction of lessor on plots Nos. 9 and 10 demised on perpetual lease can, by no process of reasoning, be regarded as public premises belonging to the Central Government under Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, and therefore, there was no question of the lessor applying for eviction of the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. The aforesaid observations indicate that the learned Judge did not proceed on the basis that cases involving relationship of lessor and lessee fall outside the purview of the Public Premises Act. On the other hand the said observations show that the learned Judge has held that the provisions of the Public Premises Act could not be invoked in the facts of that case 33. Another submission that has been urged by Shri Ganguli is that the question whether a lease has been determined or not involves complicated questions of law and the estate officer, who is not required to be an officer well versed in law, cannot be expected to decide such questions and, therefore, it must be held that the provisions of the Public Premises Act have no application to a case when the person sought to be evicted had obtained possession of the premises as a lessee. It is true that there is no requirement in the Public Premises Act that the estate officer must be a person well versed in law. But, that, by itself, cannot be a ground for excluding from the ambit of the said Act premises in unauthorised occupation of persons who obtained possession of the said premises under a lease. Section 4 of the Public Premises Act requiring issuing of a notice to the person in unauthorised occupation of any public premises requiring him to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. Section 5 makes provisions for production of evidence in support of the cause shown by the person who has been served with a notice under Section 4 and giving of a personal hearing by the estate officer. Section 8 provides that an estate officer, shall, for the purpose of holding and enquiry under the said Act have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified therein namely(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring discovery and production of documents; and (c) any other matters which may be prescribed 34. Rule 5(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1971, requires the Estate Officer to record the summary of evidence tendered before him. Moreover Section 9 confers a right of appeal against an order of the Estate Officer and the said appeal has to be heard either by the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years' standing as the District Judge may designate in that behalf. It shows that the final order that is passed is by a judicial officer in the rank of a District Judge 35. A similar contention was raised before this Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay ( 1974 (2) SCC 402 : 1975 (1) SCR 1 ) wherein the validity of the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 were challenged before this Court and the said contention was negatived. Alagiriswami, J. speaking for the majority, has observed as under : (SCC p. 423, para 17) "Even though the officers deciding these questions would be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts for giving notice to the party affected, to inform him of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, for the party affected to file a written statement and produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on oath, and requiring the discovery and production of documents are a valuable safeguard for the person affected. So is the provision for appeal to the Principal Judge of the city civil court in the city of Bombay, or to a District Judge in the districts who has got to deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible, also a sufficient safeguard as was recognised in Suraj.