Sudhir Agarwal, J.
1. This revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1887") has come up at the instance of defendant-tenant, who is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 21.03.2005 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 4/Judge Small Cause Court, Banda in Small Cause Suit No. 3 of 1999. The court below has decreed the suit partly directing plaintiff to refund Rs. 50,000/- deposited by defendant-revisionist towards security and on payment thereof the defendant-revisionist shall vacate disputed premises and handover vacant possession to plaintiff-respondent.
2. The dispute relates to shop situate in Mohalla Sarai, near Sabzi Mandi Road, Banda. The plaint case set up by plaintiff is that disputed shop shown as 'A, B, C, D' in the map at the bottom of plaint, was initially owned by Sri Phool Chand Chowrasia (husband of plaintiff-respondent), who died on 11.12.1998, whereafter the plaintiff became owner thereof. The shop was let out by plaintiff's husband in December, 1993 to defendant-revisionist on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- per month. Alongwith shop the existing furniture was also let out. The defendant-revisionist did not pay rent on and after 01.01.1998, i.e., during life time of plaintiffs husband, who died on 11.12.1998. Thereafter the plaintiff also demanded rent but not paid by defendant. Ultimately on 14.03.1999 when despite demand defendant refused to pay rent, the plaintiff served notice dated 15.03.1999 through her counsel Sri Chandra Pal, demanding arrears of rent of preceding 14 months, terminating tenancy and requiring defendant to vacate shop and handover to plaintiff. The defendant did not act as directed hence the suit for eviction and arrears of rent etc.
3. The defendant contested suit denying allegations made in plaint. In additional pleas he stated that rent was paid earlier to Sri Phool Chand Chowrasia and after his death to plaintiff but they did not issue any receipt to defendant. The rent upto December, 1998 was already paid. The plaintiff initially did not accept rent of January and February, 1999, which was remitted thereafter by money-order on 10.03.1999 but plaintiff refused to accept the same. It is pleaded that there was no default. It is also said that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- was deposited by defendant towards security amount with late Phool Chand and the question of vacation of shop would depend on refund of said amount but no such proposal was made by plaintiff. The notice of plaintiff was replied by defendant on 23.03.1999. Notice dated 15.03.1999 sent by plaintiff is illegal and contrary to the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1882") and U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972"), hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. Defendant deposited entire rent and there is no default. Even otherwise, he has complied with requirements of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972, hence, there is no default.
4. The plaintiff examined herself as PW-1 and one Laxmi Narain as PW-2 and also filed documentary evidence constituting copy of not
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ce (paper No. 7C), copy of sale deeds (paper No. 41C and 42C) and rent deed (paper No. 43C).5. Contesting the matter, defendant examined himself as DW-1 and adduced documentary evidences as receipt of postal money-order (paper No. 45A), money-order receipt and postal receipt (paper No. 46A and 47A), money-order receipts (paper No. 48A, 49A, 50A, 51A, 52A) postal money-order receipt (paper No. 53A), registry receipt alongwith acknowledgment (paper No. 54A) and Challan receipt (paper No. 78A).6. The rent deed was not a registered document though tenancy was for a period of five years. The Trial Court, therefore, held that being unregistered document it was not admissible in evidence though parties may rely the same for collateral purposes. It further held that tenancy was for a period of five years and period has expired. There was no default in payment of rent upto 22.12.1998 as this fact could not be proved by plaintiff but since tenancy was only for a period of five years, which had already expired, defendant is liable to vacate premises after refund of security amount of Rs. 50,000/-. It also decided the question, whether quit notice was valid or not in favour of plaintiff by relying on a decision of this Court in Abdul Jalil Vs. Haji Abdul Jalil, .7. Before this Court Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri M.C. Mishra, learned counsel for the revisionist, raised two points. Firstly, the agreement/rent deed could not have been relied since it was an unregistered document; and, secondly, quit notice/notice terminating tenancy dated 15.03.1999 was not valid and tenancy was not terminated in accordance with law, therefore, the suit could not have been decreed in respect of eviction from premises in dispute. He placed reliance on this Court's decisions in Zarif Ahmad and Another Vs. Satish Kumar and Another, and Abdul Jalil Vs. Haji Abdul Jalil (supra).8. On the contrary, Sri P.K. Kesari, Advocate appearing for plaintiff-respondent, submitted that the agreement has rightly been relied on for collateral purposes and since it was a fixed term tenancy, which stood determined by efflux of time, in law, there was no necessity of notice under Section 106 of Act, 1882, therefore, the question of validity of notice would be wholly irrelevant. The court below has rightly decreed suit for eviction. On behalf of respondents reliance is placed on a Single Judge decision of this Court in Giriraj Prasad Vs. Shyam Sunder Agrawal, .9. It is nobody's case that rent deed/agreement of tenancy is a document which ought not to have been registered. Since it was not registered, by virtue of Section 49 of Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1908"), it was inadmissible. However, it is said that the document being unregistered is not admissible in evidence in entirety is not correct inasmuch as the document can be relied on for 'collateral purposes'.10. The argument with regard to admissibility of unregistered document and what does it means by the term 'collateral purposes' has to be considered in the light of Section 49 of Act, 1908, which reads as under:"Section 49 . Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.- No document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) or of any other law for the time being in force, to be registered shall-(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or(b) confer any power or create any right or relationship, or(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power or creating such right or relationship, unless it has been registered:Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of part-performance of a contract for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument."11. The aforesaid provision, as it stands today, was not so at the time of initial enactment and, in fact, the proviso thereunder was added in 1929.12. Before amendment of Section 49 of Act, 1908, provision as it stood bereft of proviso had the interpretation of Privy Council in James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) . The plaintiff therein brought a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell an immovable of the value of more than Rs. 100/-. The document, which incorporated the terms of this transaction was construed by Court to amount a deed of sale and not a mere agreement to sell property. Founded on this construction placed upon the deed, the Court was called upon to answer the question whether document could be availed of for supporting a suit for specific performance. It was examined in view of the terms of Section 49 of Act, 1908 particularly the terms 'affect' and 'affecting' used in Section. The Court said, if an instrument, which comes within Section 17 as purporting to create by transfer an interest in immovable property is not registered, it cannot be used in any legal proceedings to bring about indirectly the effect which it would have had if registered. It is not to 'affect' the property and it is not to be received as evidence of any transaction 'affecting' the property. The Court further said:"In, the present case the document under consideration, in addition to creating an interest in the immovable property concerned, provides as one of the terms, and therefore as an integral part of the transfer, that the vendor should, if the vendee so requires, execute a registered sale-deed, and it is contended for the respondent 1 that, notwithstanding the non-registration, he can sue upon this agreement, putting the document in evidence as proof of it. Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that this is within the prohibition of the section. They think that an agreement for the sale of Immovable property is a transaction 'affecting' the property within the meaning of the section, inasmuch as, if carried out, it will bring about a change of ownership. The intention of the Act is shown by the provisions of Section 17(2)(v) which exempts from registration, and therefore frees from the restriction of Section 49 , a document which does not itself create an interest in Immovable property, but merely creates a right to obtain another document which will do so. In the face of this provision, to allow a document which does itself create such an interest to be used as the foundation of a suit for specific performance appears to their Lordships to be little more than an evasion of the Act."13. The Privy Council affirmed the view which was consistent with it's view taken in earlier decisions in James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) , James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) , and James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) .14. Thereafter by Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act No. XXI of 1929, proviso was added to Section 49 of Act, 1908. Despite this amendment, Madras High Court in James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) , took the view that proviso would be applicable where there is separate contract found in an unregistered document purporting to affect the transfer or is otherwise proved and not to cases where there is no such contract. This decision was doubted subsequently in James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) and the matter was considered by a Full Bench in James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) who did not agree with the view taken in Venkadari Somappa Vs. Venkadari Somappa (supra). The Court said as under:"The decisions of this Court which preceded the introduction of the proviso to Section 49 , no longer have application, and we do not agree that an unregistered instrument affecting immovable property is not sufficient to support a suit for specific performance. In such a suit, the production of the document and its proof will be sufficient to support the plaintiffs case if it embodies the whole agreement between the parties and there are no other factors to be taken into consideration. The proviso in express terms says that it may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance."(emphasis added)15. Since then Section 49 of Act, 1908 came to be considered time and again. A Full Bench of Madras High Court in James R.R. Skinner vs. Robert Hercules Skinner and OthersAIR 1929 269 (Privy Council) held by a majority that an unregistered agreement of lease which is required by law to be registered is admissible as evidence of the agreement in a suit for damage for its breach. A Division Bench of Nagpur High Court in Dammulal Babulal Jain vs. Mohammad Bhai Haji SulemanAIR 1955 306 (Nagpur) , said:"When the terms of a contract or of a grant or of any other disposition of property have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence can be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant, or other disposition of property, or of such matter except the document itself or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions of the Evidence Act. This is S. 91 of that Act. In the instant case, secondary evidence is not admissible as the document itself is before the Court. Exhibit P-5 is compulsorily registrable also under S. 17(1)(d) . Registration Act. Section 49 of that Act provides that no document required by S. 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act to be registered shall affect any immovable property comprised therein, or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property, unless it has been registered. There is, however, a proviso to this section under which a document so required to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of S. 53A, T.P. Act, 1832, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. It is thus manifest that the unregistered lease deed Ex. P-5 is inadmissible in evidence in view of S. 40 Registration Act except for the limited purposes specified therein, and S. 91 Evidence Act forbids other evidence to prove the lease or its terms."16. In Dammulal Babulal Jain vs. Mohammad Bhai Haji SulemanAIR 1955 306 (Nagpur) , a Division Bench of Punjab High Court, in para 7 of the judgment, said:"It is clear that the first part of the proviso expressly contemplates a situation where a document required to be registered by law but not so registered may still be received as evidence of a contract if specific performance of the contract is sought, so that it is not at all right to say that an unregistered document can never be looked at far any purpose connected with the property mentioned by the unregistered document. It is also clear from the third part of the proviso that as evidence of a collateral transaction an unregistered document is equally admissible in evidence. It is common ground now that an agreement to sell Immovable property is not required by law to be registered and although there may have been some doubt about this matter prior to 1927, no doubt is left in that connection by the Explanation to Section 17 of the Registration Act which was put into the Act in 1927, and that expressly provides that an agreement to sell immovable property is not required to be registered. Mr. Aggarwal's argument in substance is that an agreement to sell Immovable property is a transaction affecting that property because it refers to and deals with the property. There is, however, no indication in Section 49 of the Registration Act to support the view that every transaction, which may happen to concern immovable property, is a transaction 'affecting such property, and it would not in the ordinary sense be so. What is apparently shut out by Section 49 is the proof through an unregistered document of a transaction which has effect, direct and Immediate, on some immovable properly. An agreement to sell Immovable properly has as such and by itself no effect on the immovable property comprised in the agreement. It is only an agreement and like any other agreement capable of being enforced and equally capable of being the basis of a suit for damages in case breach occurs. It is significant to note in this connection that Section 45 , as it is worded, does not make an unregistered document, even it it 'affects' immovable property, wholly inadmissible in evidence put only rules it out for certain specific purposes and the prohibition cannot, of course, be extended by implication. As I read Section 49 in the light of the proviso, there is, I find, nothing in it to prevent a party from showing from an unregistered document that an agreement to sell immovable property had actually been reached between the parties, even if that document be a deed of sale and consequently useless for proving the sale itself"17. In Dammulal Babulal Jain vs. Mohammad Bhai Haji SulemanAIR 1955 306 (Nagpur) , the Apex Court referred with approval Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , in so far as it held that a document, which should have been registered but not, was admissible to explain the nature of possession of a person, but this would apply only when such person got possession subsequent to the execution of date of document and not otherwise.18. In Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , this Court reiterated that an unregistered document can be admissible for a collateral purpose even if not registered though it is compulsorily registrable. This Court followed Apex Court authorities on this aspect in Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , and decisions of this Court in Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) and Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) .19. It is, thus, evident that an unregistered document can be looked into for collateral purposes, though, otherwise, it is inadmissible in evidence. A collateral purpose is such which is not required to be evidenced or affected by a registered document.20. In M. Chelamayya Vs. M. Venkataratnam (supra), the Court held that under proviso to Section 49 , the Court can admit any unregistered document as evidence of a collateral transaction.21. In Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , the Court said that if the document was not registered, it is not admissible in evidence except to show the character of possession of vendee. The unregistered document, thus, can be taken into consideration for a limited purpose and not otherwise.22. What a "collateral purpose" is not defined in Act, 1908. In Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, expression 'collateral', has been given meaning as "accompanying as secondary or subordinate". To the same effect is the meaning given in Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition. The meaning according to this Dictionary is "supplementary; accompanying, but secondary and subordinate". The Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, published by Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1977, Second Edition defines 'collateral' as something which is by the side of or distinct from, a certain thing. In brief, it can be said that collateral purpose is only a "secondary purpose".23. What a "collateral purpose" is explained in Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) and the Court held that expression 'collateral transaction' in Section 49 is used not in the sense of an ancillary transaction to the principal transaction or a subsidiary transaction to a main transaction. The transaction recorded would be a particular or specific transaction but it would be possible to read in that transaction what may be called the purpose of transaction and what may be called a collateral purpose; the fulfillment of collateral purpose would bring into existence a collateral transaction which may be said to be a part and parcel of the transaction but nonetheless a transaction which runs together with or on parallel lines with the same. In the context of a partition dispute, the Court in para 14 of the judgment further said:"A partition which requires to be effected by a registered instrument may be inadmissible but the severance of "joint status which is not required to be effected by a registered instrument would be collateral transaction evidence of which would certainly be admissible under the proviso to the section". An antecedent title, the nature and character of possession, an admission or an acknowledgment, relationship of parties and their state of mind may be some of the instances of collateral purpose for which a document requiring registration may be looked into even though it is unregistered."24. The decision of this Court in Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , which has relied on an earlier decision in Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , has been cited in this regard, but I find that the decision in Fateh Chand Vs. Mst. Radha Rani (supra) was overruled by a Division Bench in Zarif Ahmad and another Vs. Satish Kumar and another (supra). This Court approved its earlier decisions in Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) , Varatha Pillai and Another vs. Jeevarathammal(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 285 (Privy Council) and in para 10 of the judgment in Zarif Ahmad and another Vs. Satish Kumar and another (supra) the Court held as under:"10. Section 49 of the Registration Act, therefore, puts a complete bar to the admission of a document evidencing the terms of contract for which registration is compulsorily required by Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act or Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. As to the duration for which a lease is given or about the rate of rent, a document unregistered cannot be taken into evidence inasmuch as relying upon an unregistered document for these purposes would result in nullifying the prohibition or the bar imposed by Section 49 . Section 49 prohibits the reception into evidence of any document affecting any immovable property. Under the Proviso to the said Section 49 , only so long as an unregistered document does not purport or operate to do anything said in Section 107 , the same may be considered by a Court. But, the terms and conditions on which an immovable property is leased out and which is an integral part of the same, the law does not permit such a document to be admitted for those purposes."25. This Court clearly said that an unregistered lease-deed cannot be admitted to prove the terms and conditions of lease. It cannot be seen either for the purpose of tenure of lease or the rate of rent at which the premises had been let out. A collateral purpose is any purpose other than of creating, assigning or extinguishing a right to the immovable property.26. This Court has also considered Section 49 recently in Writ Petition No. 12809 of 2003 (Mishri Lal Karak Vs. Sri Dinesh Chandra Agarwal & Ors.) decided on 01.10.2013 and in para 30 of the judgment, it has been said:"This Court finds that permitting document to be received in evidence for limited purpose as such would not have the effect of influencing the rights of the parties vis-a-vis the immovable property concerned. The general legislative policy under Section 49 of Act, 1908 is contained in three clauses i.e. (a), (b) and (c) and proviso carves out an exception in respect to clause (c) only and not (a) and (b) thereof. The inevitable conclusion vis-a-vis the immovable property concerned is that, an unregistered document shall not result in affecting the right etc. over the immovable property in any manner and also shall not confer any power to adopt it. To the extent the proviso operates, it permits that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be given in evidence i.e. where a document remains unregistered and title does not pass, the agreement between the parties which preceded the ineffective document shall remains and may be received in evidence to look into the terms thereof. This by itself would not confer any right since no such right has been conferred under the substantive law. Receiving in evidence does not mean conferment of substantive right. The rule of evidence cannot enlarge or alter the provisions of substantive law. It cannot confer rights, if there are none under the substantive law. In other words, such a document could be used only for the purpose permissible under proviso to Section 49 of Act, 1908 so as to establish part-performance under Section 53A of Act, 1882 but cannot be admitted in evidence to show nature of possession, if the possession was continuing from some date prior to the execution of unregistered deed. Here I find support from Apex Court decision in Dammulal Babulal Jain vs. Mohammad Bhai Haji SulemanAIR 1955 306 (Nagpur) ."27. In Musammat Nasiban vs. Mohammad SayedAIR 1936 174 (Nagpur) , the Court held that an unregistered deed or lease cannot be used for the purpose of proving period of lease. Vivian Bose, J., said:"But the only purpose for which the appellant wants to use it here is to prove her agreement. She sues for possession on the ground that the lease has terminated, and so wants to show the period for which the lease was granted. She also sues for the rent payable under it. Therefore, the document is not receivable in evidence for these purposes."28. In Musammat Nasiban vs. Mohammad SayedAIR 1936 174 (Nagpur) , a Full Bench said that the period of lease and terms of lease cannot be proved by admitting a lease-deed which is unregistered.29. Recently, Section 49 proviso has come for consideration before Apex Court in Musammat Nasiban vs. Mohammad SayedAIR 1936 174 (Nagpur) and the Court said:"1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act.2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration.4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards.5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose."(emphasis added)30. Similarly in Musammat Nasiban vs. Mohammad SayedAIR 1936 174 (Nagpur) the Court considered a case arising from the State of Tamil Nadu where there was no provision requiring even a contract for sale to be compulsorily registered. Therein, an oral agreement for sale of an immovable property was pleaded and to prove it an unregistered sale-deed was sought to be relied and to fortify that there was an oral agreement between parties which ought to have been enforced. The Court held that an unregistered sale-deed in view of proviso to Section 49 of Act, 1908 could have been admitted in evidence as an evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of contract. It also held that such an unregistered sale-deed can also be admitted in evidence of proving any collateral transaction which is not required to be effected by registered document. The Court said:"When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act."(emphasis added)31. In the present case, the Court below has found that the unregistered agreement is not admissible in evidence being unregistered document but having said so, for the purpose of tenure of lease, it has relied thereon. As already said, an unregistered lease cannot be relied for the purpose of rent or the terms of lease mentioned therein since it amounts to taking unregistered document in evidence for extinguishing right to immovable property, which is not permissible.32. With respect to security amount, it was not necessary for the Court below to look into unregistered document since it was a pleading of defendant himself and PW-1, i.e., the plaintiff, as also PW-2, Laxmi Narain, both admitted in their statements of having received Rs. 50,000/- as security. They further added that it was for a five years' lease, but so far as security amount is concerned, it was a fact pleaded by defendant and admitted by plaintiff, and, therefore, for that purpose, there was no occasion to look into the unregistered document.33. However, for the purpose of period of lease, the document in question could not have been relied on to support oral statement of PW-1 and PW-2 that the period of tenancy has expired.34. Except of this unregistered document, no other documentary evidence was brought on record to show that tenancy was for a period of five years. The Court below, therefore, has erred in law in relying on unregistered document for the purpose of tenure of lease and the impugned judgment, therefore, to this extent cannot be sustained.35. Then coming to the second question, this Court finds that the question of validity of notice has not been examined by Court below for the reason that it has been held that it was a tenancy for five years and the period expired on 22.12.1998 in view of unregistered agreement dated 22.12.1993, therefore, tenancy stood terminated by efflux of time after expiry of aforesaid period, hence the question whether a quit notice was valid or not would make no difference.36. The judgment in question also shows that in the notice dated 15.03.1999 tenancy was terminated from the date of giving notice. Court below found that such notice was bad in view of Division Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Jalil Vs. Haji Abdul Jalil (supra) but it overcome the said difficulty by observing that since tenancy was only for a period of five years, which has already expired, even if notice was invalid, it would make no difference.37. In view of the fact that this Court has already held that Court below erred in law in relying on unregistered agreement for the purpose of tenure of lease, the further finding that invalidity of notice would make no difference in the case in hand also stands vitiated.38. So far as decision cited on the part of respondent, i.e., Giriraj Prasad Vs. shyam Sunder Agrawal (supra), I find that there was a case where tenancy contract entered on 16.11.1984 was an admitted fact particularly when the document was also registered one. Therefore, the Court relied on the said document which was admissible in evidence and found that it was a tenancy for a particular period. That is not the case here. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment has no application to the facts of the present case and would not help respondent in any manner.39. In view of above discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that impugned judgment cannot sustain.40. The revision is allowed. Impugned judgment and decree dated 21.03.2005 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 4/Judge Small Cause Court, Banda is hereby set aside and S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 1999 is dismissed.41. Certify this order to the Lower Court immediately.
"2015 (10) ADJ 457, 2016 (3) ALLLJ 362, 2016 (1) AWC 76, 2016 (1) ARC 59, 2015 (52) RCR(Civil) 604,"