Home   |   About us   |   Contact us   |   Request Callback  
 
   
ALREADY A MEMBER ?
Username
Password

Translate

This Page To:

 
SAMBAPPA S/O BABAPPA TELI V/S STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THROUGH THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY AND SECRETARY, (APPEALS AND REVISION), FOREST AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MANTRALAYA, BOMBAY & OTHERS , decided on Wednesday, December 18, 2002.
[ In the High Court of Bombay, WRIT PETITION NO.4059 OF 1993 . ] 18/12/2002
Judge(s) : A.B. NAIK
Advocate(s) : Shri R.D.Deshpande, . Shri B.N.Patil, Nos.2 to 6.
Judgment Full Text : Existing LawyerServices Members, kindly login above.

Non Members, Enter your email address:- and , to request this judgment.

Alternatively, you may send a request by email to info@lawyerservices.in for the Full Text of this Judgment (chargeable).

LawyerServices Facebook Page




sambappa,so,babappa,teli,of,maharashtra,through,the,on,special,and,secretary,(appeals,and,revision),forest,and,revenue,department,mantralaya,bombay,and,

  "2003 (2) BOM.L.R 875"   ==   "2003 (4) BCR 374"   ==   "2003 (4) ALL MR 252"  







judgment - ORAL JUDGMENTIn this petition the petitioner sought following reliefs. :(A) Call for the Record and Proceedings of Rev.Revision No.RTS-5391/CR-199/L-6/CR-44/93 A & R. from the Respondent No.ls Office i.e. from the Officer on Special Duty and Secretary (Appeals and Revision) Revenue and Forest Department Government of Maharashtra Bombay and(B) The writ petition be allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the respondent No.1 on 2.11.1993 vide Exhibit H be set aside and to sanction the rectification of ROR entries in favour of the petitioner i.e. Mutation No.666 vide Exhibit C based on the actual possession of the land in question.2.Few facts that are necessary to be considered in deciding this writ petition. 3.The respondents herein/original revision petitioner filed revision Application U/s 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code before the Additional Commissioner Aurangabad Division Aurangabad in which the present petitioner was the opponent. The parties will be referred to as per their description before the Revisional authority i.e. State Government and they will be referred to hereinafter as revisional petitioner and opponent.4.Land S.No.86 admeasuring 33 acres 37 gunthas situate at village Ahmedpur Taluka Ahmedpur District Latur. (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) was admittedly owned and possessed by one Babu Teli who died leaving behind him three sons. It is the case of the parties that after death of Babu Teli the land was divided amongst the brothers on the basis of the fertility of the land. It appears from the record that intimation was given to the revenue authorities as required U/s 149 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as Code). Pursuant to the said intimation Tahsildar conducted spot inspection some time in the year 1964 and he noticed that the division was not equal and rejected the theory of partition and ordered that each brothers had equal share in the suit land. On the basis of the decision of the Tahsildar a mutation entry has been taken and certified on 5.11.1964 being mutation entry No.299. Vide this mutation entry the names of three brothers i.e. the sons of deceased Baburao Teli were recorded in respect of the suit land in equal shares.5.This position was continued till 1979 and in the year 1979 the opponent Sambhappa gave an application to Tahsildar that he was cultivating S.No.86/1/3 admeasuring 1 hectare 58 Ares but on that portion the name of his brother Bandappa is recorded in Kabjedars column and he requested the Tahsildar to delete the name of Bandappa and record his name as Kabjedar in 7/12 extract in respect of that portion of the suit land.6.The Tahsildar on the basis of the said application conducted an enquiry and by his order dated 9th September 1981 rejected the application filed by the opponent. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 9th September 1981 passed by the Tahsildar rejecting the application the opponent preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer Udgir being Appeal No.1981/ROR/128 (Ahmedpur ME No.666). This appeal came to be allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer Udgir by his judgment and order dated 15.7.1985 and ordered that name of the opponent in the record of rights as owner of land Gat No.86/1/3 to the extent of 1 hectare and 54 Ares to be recorded.7.Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer Udgir the revision petitioners preferred appeal before the Collector U/s 247 of the Code. When the appeal filed by Bandappa was pending before the Collector he died and his heirs and legal representatives were brought on record and they continued the litigation thereafter. The Additional Collector Latur by his judgment and order dated 28.6.1988 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer.8.On dismissal of appeal by the Additional Collector heirs of Bandappa preferred revision Application being Case No.88/Rev./R-59 U/s 257 of the Code and the Addl. Commissioner dismissed the revision application and confirmed the order of the Addl.Collector Latur.9.On dismissal of the Revision by the Addl.Commissioner heirs of Bandappa i.e. Revision Petitioner preferred Second Revision before the Government of Maharashtra invoking the revisional jurisdiction U/s 257. Admittedly the said revision application is heard and decided by the Officer on Special Duty and Secretary (Appeals and Revision) Revenue and Forest Department Government of Maharashtra Mantralaya Mumbai.10.Curiously enough the IInd Revisional authority upset all the three judgments delivered by the Sub-Divisional Officer Additional Collector and the Additional Commissioner and by a cryptic order allowed the revision application by his judgment and order dated 21st October 1993. This order is subject matter of this writ petition.11.Shri R.D.Deshpande learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has raised following contentions :i) Second revision U/s 257 is not at all maintainable and the Officer on Special Duty has exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the Second Revision.ii) Even if it is held that 2nd Revision application is tenable the 2nd Revisional Authority exceeded jurisdiction and interfered with the findings of three authorities that too without assigning any reasons for his decision. Passing of cryptic order shows non-applicatoin of mind by the Second Revisional authority.iii) The Officer on Special Duty has no jurisdiction to entertain Second Revision U/s 257 of the Code when the revisional petitioners have already exhausted remedy by filing a revision U/s 257 which was heard and decided by the Additional Commissioner who has confirmed the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Additional Collector.iv) Even if it is held that Second Revision is competent before the State Government but as the same is heard by the Officer on Special Duty who has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the revision U/s 257 r/w the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India.v) Shri Deshpande submitted that U/s 257 party can invoke jurisdiction at one stage and the second revision at the instance of the said party is not maintainable and the entertainment of such revision therefore amounts to an error apparent on the face of record and the authority who has exercised it lacks the inherent jurisdiction to entertain the Second Revision. To substantiate his contention the learned advocate Shri Deshpande placed reliance on the unreported judgment of this Court by the learned Single Judge (R.M.Lodha J.) in W.P.No.4168/98 decided on 18.2.1999 A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1503 and 2002 Vol.I Maharashtra Law Journal 854).12.Per Contra Shri B.N.Patil learned advocate has contended that considering the true import of Section 257 there is no restriction or prohibiting the State Government to entertain Second Revision. Shri Patil contended that the Additional Commissioner who has decided the first revision is a delegatee exercising delegated powers of the Government. The Revisional power has been exercised by the Additional Commissioner in his jurisdiction U/s 257 which also permits the State Government to exercise the revisional power independently irrespective of the fact that a revision entertained and decided by the Commissioner U/s 257 of the Code by the same party. Shri Patil in other words contended that it is permissible for the State Government to exercise revisional power as the statute does not prohibit or limits number of the revisions. To substantiate these contentions Shri Patil placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in 1997 Vol.2 Maharashtra Law Journal 252. Shri Patil further contended that the question of maintainability of the revision before the O.S.D. was not at all raised by the opponent when the revision was being heard and now it will be impermissible for him to make grievance before this Court and this Court may not ponder on that question and declare that order as invalid. Shri Patil relied on a judgment of this Court reported in 2000 Maharashtra Law Journal 115 and submitted that the Second Revision was competent and as the Revisional authority has considered all the aspect and then interfered in the order passed by the authorities below. Shri Patil in alternate contended that now the parties have approached the Civil Court for getting their rights decided therefore this Court may not entertain this writ petition and leave the parties to abide by the outcome of the Civil Suit which is pending before the competent Civil Court. Shri Patil contended that these proceedings are in respect of mutation of name in Revenue Register which do not confer any title or creates or distinguish any right in respect of the property in question and ultimately the parties have to go to Civil Court to establish their rights.13.Now I will consider the rival contentions in detail. Taking last contention of Mr.Patil first regarding nature of the proceedings of the mutation entries there cannot be any quarrel as the question is already settled by the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1996 Vol.I Mh.L.J. 209. I need not ponder much on the said issue. It is always open for the parties to get their rights decided before competent Civil Court. I would have considered this aspect of the matter if the Second Revisional authority would have directed the parties to abide by the orders of the Civil Court but having not done so but Second Revisional authority interfered in the finding recorded by the three authorities below I have to decide this petition as it is on merit. and to consider whether the finding recorded by Second Revisional authority was proper and whether the 2nd revisional authority has jurisdiction to interfere in the finding of fact recorded by two appellate authorities and confirmed by the Divisional authority in 1st revision. In view of this it will not be proper to dismiss this writ petition on the ground that the parties have already approached Civil Court.14.In order to appreciate the above said contentions it will be necessary to refer to some provisions contained in the Code. The Land Revenue Code enacted to prove land revenue in the State of Maharashtra. Chapter 10 deals with land records and Chapter XIII deals with Appeal Revision and Review. Section 148 and Section 149 of the Code deals with record of rights. As per Section 148 the record of rights to be maintained in every village and which will include names of all persons (other than the tenants) who are holders occupation owners or mortgages of the land as lessees rent or revenue payable etc.It is not disputed in the present case that on death of Babu Teli the parties (three sons of Babu Teli) set up a theory of partition and applied for the mutation entries as per the requirement of Section 148 way back in the year 1964. In those proceedings it revealed by the Tahsildar that the partition and/or division as alleged by the parties being unequal he ordered to correct the record vide mutation entry No.299 by providing 3 equal shares to the parties. It is not disputed that the said entry was corrected and entered in record of rights and from that date till 1979 the position did not change. Section 247 provides for an appeal and the appellate authorities which reads thus:247. Appeal and appellate authorities :- (1) In the absence of any express provisions of this Code or of any law for the time being in force to the contrary an appeal shall lie from any decision or order passed by a revenue or survey officer specified in column 1 of the Schedule E under this Code or any other law for the time being in force to the officer specified in column 2 of that Schedule whether or not such decision of order of the officer specified in column 1 of the said Schedule:Provided that in no case the number of appeals shall exceed two.(2) When on account of promotion or change of designation an appeal against any decision or order lies under this section to the same officer who has passed the decision or order appealed against the appeal should lie to such other officer competent to decide the appeal to whom it may be transferred under the provisions of this Code.Section 248 provides for an appeal to the State Governemnt in some cases referred for in that Section. Section 249 provides for an appeal against an order of revision. Section 250 provides for limitation for filing an appeal. Section 251 permits the appellate authority to entertain the appeal after the period of limitation. Under Section 252 some orders are not made appealable. Section 253 makes a provision to entertain the appeal when the last day for filing the apepal is Sunday or Holiday. Section 255 provides the power of appellate authority. By virtue of Section 256 the appellate authority can stay the order challenged in the appeal. Under section 257 a revision can be filed by the aggrieved party. In this petition the question arose about the scope of revisional jurisdiction it will be appropriate to reproduce Section 257 which reads thus :257. (1) The State Government and any revenue or survey officer nor inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Land Records in their respective departments may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue or survey officer for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as the case may be as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer.(2) A Tahsildar a Naib Tahsildar and a District Inspector of Land Records may in the same manner call for an examine the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them in any matter in which neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been held.(3) If in any case it shall appear to the State Government or to any officer referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified annulled or reversed it or he may pass such order thereon as it or he deems fit:It is the case of the opponent that though he was in possession of 1 hectare and 54 Ares the name of Bandappa was recorded as an occupant. This application was enquired into as per Section 149. On enquiry the Tahsildar found that :The record further shows that the pot Hissa of the land S.No.86/1/C measuring 10/13 gunthas was in the name of Sambappa and thereafter it was sold to Ramchandra Vithalrao and others. The real relief claimed by the applicant. The correction of the entries in the pot Hissa Survey record. This court is not competent to correct the entries of the record preferred by the pot Hissa Survey Officer. The proper remedy to the parties in the present matter is to get the Pot hissa remeasured and correct the record by the said authority.With these observation the Tahsildar held that he being incompetent to give any relief and accordingly the application came to be rejected. The rejection by the Tahsildar was challenged by filing appeal U/s 247 of the Code.Dt.18.12.200215.The opponent then approached the Sub-Divisional Officer Udgir by filing appeal. The learned Deputy Collector heard the parties at length considered the evidence on record and found that the entries which are made in the revenue record are contrary to the factual position. Considering this aspect the learned S.D.O. allowed these appears and set aside the order dated 9.9.1981. The learned Deputy Collector i.e. S.D.O. while allowing the appeal recorded the following finding :The facts discussed above and the documentary evidence on record left to the conclusion that the present entries in the revenue record are contrary to the factual position. It is clear that the appellant is owner in possession of 15 acres 17 gunthas of land. No land is left with the respondent so far. No 86. The disputed portion of 3 Acres 32 gunthas is held and possessed by the appellant. The revenue record needs to be corrected accordingly. The Lower Court has erred in holding that the appellant claims the relief to correct the Pot Hissa record. In fact the relief claimed by the appellant is correction of record of rights for which the lower court was quite competent.16.Being aggrieved by the order passed by the S.D.O. Udgir on 15.7.1985 the Revisional petitioners preferred Second Appeal U/s 247 of the Code before the Additional Collector Latur. The Addl.Collector on considering the evidence produced before the parties held that the evidence which is produced on record goes in favour of the opponent. This observation has been made by the Addl.Collector on scrutiny of the available documents produced by the parties. With these observations the appeal came to be dismissed and the order passed by the S.D.O. came to be confirmed. Accordingly the Addl.Collector Latur by his judgment and order dated 28.6.1988 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the S.D.O. Udgir.17.Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated l5.7.1985 passed by the S.D.O. Udgir and order dated 28.6.1988 passed by the Addl.Collector Latur revision petitioners preferred revision before the Addl.Commissioner Aurangabad Division Aurangabad U/S 257 of the Code. The learned Additional Commissioner on proper analysis of the evidence on record found that the order of the Addl.Collector the first appellate Court being valid and correct dismissed the revision application confirming the orders which were challenged before the Additional Commissioner Aurangabad Division Aurangabad.18.Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 20.2.1991 by the Revisional authority the revision petitioners approached the State Government invoking the jurisdiction U/s 257 by filing Second revision. The second revision was heard by the Officer on Special Duty and he allowed the revision by the order dated 20th October 1991. While reversing the order passed by the three authorities below he found fault with the Addl.Collector and Addl.Commissioner by observing that they have unnecessarily based their judgments on the affidavit filed by the parties. He also recorded a finding that the partition deed is not a partition deed at all. With these observations he allowed the revision application by recording the following finding :I have gone through the record of the case and find that the order passed by the Addl.Collector land Additional Commissioner are very cryptic. They have unnecessarily based their judgment on this affidavit of the revision applicants. The partition deed is not a partition deed at all. It does not state the shares of each brother. Secondly this so-called partition on fertility basis has already been rejected by tahsildar in 1964 and tahsildars order becomes final as it had not been challenged by other party. The sub Divisional Officer has gone beyond this jurisdiction to delete the name of the applicant from Kabjedar column and to record the name of the present opponent in his place. The overwhelming documentary evidence is in favour of revision applicants. The order passed by the lower authorities are not based on sound judgment.19.As I disposed of the last submission of learned counsel Shri Patil now it will be appropriate for me to consider the submissions of the learned advocate Shri R.D.Deshpande he made a grievance that the second revisional authority had interfered in the finding of fact recorded by three authorities by considering the evidence on record. He submitted that in a second revision the revisional authority i.e. State Government can not reappreciate the evidence and interfere in the finding so recorded. Interfering in the finding of fact by second revisional Court itself is a ground to interfere with in this writ petition. It is true that Sub-Divisional Officer Addl.Collector and the Addl.Commissioner have concurrently recorded a finding in favour of the present petitioner by observing that the revenue record is not in consonance with the factual aspect and they have directed to correct the revenue entries. Therefore in my judgment the second revisional authority as such exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the said application and interfering with the finding of fact. By close scrutiny of Section 257 it is clear that a revisional authority has to consider the legality propriety of decision or order impugned. From the order of Officer on Special Duty it is clear that there is no satisfaction recorded by the O.S.D. about legality or propriety of the order. The tenor of the order shows that the O.S.D. has treated the proceedings before him as an appeal which is not the scope of Section 257. On this aspect the grievance of the learned advocate Shri Deshpande is required to be accepted.20.Coming to the much debated question raised by both the learned advocates regarding tenability of the second revision U/s 257 and the question whether the Officer on Special Duty can decide revision application U/s 257. So far as the hearing of the revision filed before the State Government by the Officer on Special Duty is concerned in my judgment the question is concluded by the judgment of this Court in Vinaykumar Kachrulal Abad Vs. Honourable Minister Revenue and Forest Department Mantralaya Mumbai reported in 2002 (1) Maharashtra Law Journal 854). The question which is raised in this petition has squarely fell for consideration before this Court while considering the said issue. The learned single Judge (Khandeparkar J.) posed the following question for his consideration :Who is the competent authority under section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code 1966 to hear and decide the revision application when the same is filed before the State Government.The case of Vinaykumar can be summarised as follows :4. Some times in the year 1996 the petitioner claiming to be owner and possessor of part of the property bearing Survey No.555 situated at Jalna obtained order for conversion of land to Non Agriculture use. In fact the order to that effect was passed by the Collector Jalna on 1.7.1996. The said order of conversion of land for Non Agriculture use was sought to be challenged by predecessors of the respondents No.3 to 15 by filing an application before the Collector Jalna but the same was dismissed by the Collector on 10th April 2000. Thereafter on 11th April 2000 the respondent Nos.2 to 15 filed an application for cancellation of the permission granted to the petitioner for conversion of the land for Non Agriculture purposes to the extent of the part of the land claiming the same to be belonging to the said respondents. The Collector allowed the said application by order dated 14th September 2000. The same was sought to be challenged by the petitioner by filing writ petition No.4975/2000 which was allowed by this Court and the order dated 14th September 2000 was quashed and set aside while permitting the respondents No.2 to 15 to withdraw the proceedings before the Collector making it clear that the withdrawal would not affect the legal rights of the respondent No.2 herein in the proceedings pending in the Civil Court in Civil Suit No.168/98 as well as before the revenue authorities and the withdrawal was permitted without prejudice to the rights and contention of the respective parties. The respondents No.2 to 15 thereafter on 17th January 2001 filed appeal before the Additional Commissioner - respondent No.17 herein challenging the permission granted for the Non Agriculture use of the land by the petitioner alongwith the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The application for condonation of delay was objected to by the petitioner. However the respondent No.17 by his order dated 13.3.2001 condoned the delay of four and half years in filing the appeal. Being aggrieved the petitioner filed the revision application under Section 257 of the Code. The same came to be heard by the Minister of State (Revenue and Forest Department) on 23rd March 2001 and on the very day the order admitting the revision application and granting order of status quo for fifteen days came to be passed. The matter was fixed for hearing on 11th April 2001. Meanwhile on 29.3.2001 the Desk Officer in the Revenue and Forest Department placed the matter before the Cabinet Minister (Revenue) with a note inviting the order of the Cabinet Minister on the point as to the procedure to be followed in the matter particularly in relation to the hearing of the matter i.e. whether it should be heard by the Cabinet Minister or by the Minister of State and in relation to continuation or discontinuation of order of status quo. The Cabinet Minister thereupon on 13th April 2001 vacated the order of status quo passed by the Minister of State and further observed that till the decision of the Additional Commissioner the concerned authorities should take precaution against the alienation or sale of the property in question. The said order was also communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 19th April 2001 by the Desk Officer or Revenue and Forest Department. Consequent thereto the matter before the appellate authority was taken up by the Deputy Commissioner Aurangabad for hearing on 24th April 2001 but was adjourned at the request of the petitioner; however simultaneously the order to maintain status quo was granted. The further hearing was fixed in the matter on 25th June 2001. Meanwhile the present petition came to be filed on 24th April 2001. Since the order of 24th April 2001 before the lower Appellate Authority was passed subsequent to the filing of the petition the same was sought to be brought to the notice of this Court by filing Civil Application No.3750 of 2001.5. The first ground of challenge in the matter relates to the jurisdiction of the Cabinet Minister to hear and decide the revision application under section 257 of the Code. According to the petitioner the jurisdiction to hear and decide the revision application under Section 257 of the Code vests in the Minister of State and not in the Cabinet Minister and therefore the order the dated 13th April 2001 passed by the Cabinet Minister is ab initio bad in law and therefore the said order and the communication dated 19th April 2001 by the Desk Officer are to be quashed and set aside. Attention is drawn in that regard to the various provisions of the Maharashtra Government Rules of Business and Instructions issued thereunder. Reliance is also placed in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Ganeshrao Kishanrao Deshmukh Vs. Devisingh Venkatasingh and others reported in 1972 Mh.L.J. 661 : AIR 1972 Bombay 369. On the other hand it is sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent No.l as well as the other respondents that the Rules of Business duly empower the Cabinet Minister who is the Minister in-charge of the department concerned to hear and decide the revision application filed under the said Code and therefore no fault can be found with the impugned order or communication thereof.On the above said facts this Court has considered the rules of business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India and considering the rules of business this Court came to the conclusion that the Officer on Special Duty has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal. This Court observed thus :6. Section 257 of the Code empowers the State Government and certain other revenue officers to call for and examine the records and proceedings before the subordinate officers and to pass appropriate order in such matters. In exercise of powers conferred by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India the Government of Maharashtra has framed the Maharashtra Government Rules of Business by order dated 26th June 1975. Rule 15 thereof provides that those rules may to such extent as necessary be supplemented by instructions to be issued by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. Accordingly the necessary instructions were issued by order dated 7th May 1964. In terms of those instructions under clause l(v) Minister-in-charge means the Minister appointed by the Governor to be in charge of the department of Government to which a case belongs. Clause 4 therein provides that except as otherwise provided in those instructions cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister-in-charge who may by means of standing orders give such direction as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in the Department. Further the standing orders issued on 10th January 2000 in accordance with the Rule 15 of the Business Rules read with Clause 4 of the Instructions dated 7th May 1964 provide for distribution of work between the Cabinet Minister and Minister of State. Accordingly the matters listed in Schedule I are required to be dealt with exclusively by the Cabinet Minister. The matters enlisted in Schedule III are in Schedule II are to be disposed of by the Cabinet Minister through the Minister of State. Item No.12 of the Schedule III is a residuary clause which provides for all the matters excluding the appeals and revisions which are specifically reserved by the Cabinet Minister for disposal by himself and all other matters which are specifically allotted to the Secretary Joint Secretary or an Officer on Special Duty for their disposal and in relation to the matters concerning revenue and forest department.7. On perusal of the Rules of Business framed on 26th June 1975 the instructions issued thereunder on 7th May 1964 and the Standing Order dated 10th January 2000 it is apparent that the revision applications filed under section 257 of the Code unless they are specifically reserved for being hearing by the Cabinet Minister or they are being allotted to be heard by the Secretary Joint Secretary or Officer on Special Duty in accordance with Clause 12 of the Schedule III of the Standing Order dated 10th January 2000 are required to be heard and decided by the Minister of State. In this connection it was sought to be contended by the learned A.G.P. that by letter dated 13th July 2001 it was clarified that the petitioner in the case in hand was required to forward the revision application before the Cabinet Minister and having not done so nothing prevented the Cabinet Minister from calling the file for his consideration and passing the impugned order. As already stated above the Rules of Business read with Instructions and the Standing Order referred to above nowhere provide that the revision applications filed under the Code are invariably to be heard by the Cabinet Minister.(underline is mine) The respondents have not been able to point out any rule having been framed making it obligatory for the revision applicants to present the revision application before the Cabinet Minister alone when such revision applications are addressed to the State Government. On the contrary Clause 12 of the Schedule III of the Standing order specifically requires an order by the Cabinet Minister to hear the revision application either by himself or an allotment of the matter for hearing by the Secretary Joint Secretary or an Officer on Special Duty. No such specific order of the Cabinet Minister is required for the purpose of hearing of the matter by the Minister of State as the Clause 12 of Schedule III itself empowers the Minister of State to hear all such matters except those are excluded by the specific order by the Cabinet Minister. There is no dispute that the matter in question was not allotted for being heard either by the Secretary or the Joint Secretary or Officer on Special Duty. The records nowhere discloses any order by the Cabinet Minister reserving the matter in question to be heard by himself. Besides the letter dated 13th July 2001 by the Desk Officer addressed to the Government Advocate copy of which is placed on record nowhere refers to any order by the cabinet Minister for reserving the matter for hearing by himself. Such an order is necessarily to be by the Cabinet Minister and mere explanation in that regard by the Desk Officer can be of no assistance.At this juncture it will also be appropriate to refer to the Full Bench decision of this Court in case of Shaikh Mohammed Fatemohamed and etc. Vs. Raisuddin Azimuddin Katil and others reported in A.I.R. 2000 Bombay 353. The Full Bench of this Court was dealing with the situation where the appeal which was filed U/s 2-A of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act was required to be heard by the State Government meaning thereby the Minister incharge but the said appeal was heard by the Officer on Special Duty. The Full Bench after considering the provisions of Section 2-A of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act and also rules of business framed under Article 166 held thus :That the quasi judicial functions would be out of the purview of Art.166 much less that would not be covered by the Rules of business under Rule 15.By observing this the Full Bench approved the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ganeshrao Kishanrao Deshmukh Vs. Devisingh Venkata Singh reported in A.I.R. 1972 Bombay 369. Considering the above judgment of this Court dealing with the subject I am of the view that the Officer on Special Duty has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the revision filed U/s 257 of the Code. On the judgments by this Court (supra) it will have to be declared that the judgment delivered by the Officer on Special Duty is thus without jurisdiction.21. Turning now to the question whether Second Revision is maintainable U/s 257 of the Code. It is not disputed before me that the proceedings initiated on an application filed by the petitioner complaining about the entries in the revenue record. Initially Tahsildar conducted enquiry and rejected the application that rejection gave rise to the respondents to invoke the jurisdiction of the authorities by filing appeal as provided U/s 247. Accordingly First Appeal was filed before the S.D.O. Udgir. Aggrieved by the decision of the S.D.O. Second Appeal came to be filed before the Additional Collector Latur. Section 247 provides for two appeals. This remedy is fully exhausted by the Revision Petitioner. After decision of Addl.Collector Latur the revision petitioners involved the jurisdiction of the Commissioner by filing a revision application U/s 257. The Additional Commissioner Aurangabad Division Aurangabad disposed of the revision and then second revision was filed under the same provision. I have to find out from the Code whether it is permissible for a party to file two revisions or successive revisions as contended by Shri Patil the learned advocate for the respondent. As a matter of fact in my judgment the issue stands concluded in view of the unreported judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.4168/98. The unreported judgment relied on by Shri Deshpande rendered by the Single Judge on 18.2.1999 squarely answers the contention raised by Shri Patil. The learned Single Judge on considering the provisions of Section 257 held that there is no provision for second revision U/s 257 of the Code. The said unreported judgment again came for consideration before another learned Single Judge in case of Ramesh T.Gopalani Vs. Janata Sahakari Bank Ltd. Kalyan and another reported in 2000 (3) Maharashtra Law Journal 115. The learned Single Judge (J.A. Patil J.) was considering a question of second revision filed before the Government of Maharashtra U/s 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act. While considering the issue the judgment rendered by Lodha J. (supra) was considered. In case of Ramesh the judgment in W.P. No.2084/1999 delivered by Gokhale J. was also considered. On considering these two judgments and considering the provisions of Section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act the learned Single Judge held that no second revision lies U/s 154. These judgments are relied on by Shri Patil regarding his contention that the question of jurisdiction was not raised before the Officer on Special Duty when the second revision was heard. He relied on the observation made by the learned Single Judge in Rameshs case in para 6 of the report. I have given my anxious consideration to the observation made in para 6. The said observations are not useful or helpful to substantiate the contention of Shri Patil that the point regarding maintainability of Second Revision was not raised before the Officer on Special Duty. It is no doubt true that the learned Single Judge has relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs. Kallyani Sulochana and others (A.I.R. 1993 Supreme Court 1616). On perusing the fact of the Apex Court judgment Rukminis case it can be distinguished on the facts. In the present case what was contended by Shri Deshpande that the Officer on Special Duty has no jurisdiction at all to entertain the Second Revision for the above said two grounds which are referred to earlier. Therefore question goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the revisional authority and it is well-known that the parties by consent cannot confer the jurisdiction on a Court or authority which has no inherent jurisdiction to deal with the case. In the present case in view of the above said judgments of this Court where this Court has held that U/s 257(a) second revision is not permissible; (b) that the Officer on Special Duty has no jurisdiction to decide the revision application (even if it is first revision). Therefore the question is of the jurisdiction of the Officer on Special Duty that is challenged in this petition. Therefore if the party has not taken the objection before the S.D.O. that does not mean and said that the Officer on Special Duty has a jurisdiction to decide the Second Revision. Merely because the point is not raised before the authority one cannot say that the said party is precluded from raising the question or point after ultimate result of the proceedings. In view of this aspect I am not impressed by the submission made by Shri Patil that the point regarding jurisdiction was not raised shall not be allowed to be raised in this writ petition. As the question goes to the root of the matter. When it pertains to the question of jurisdiction this Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 and 227 has to consider whether the authority which decided a matter has in fact has jurisdiction or not on reading of Section 257 it is clear that there is no provision for 2nd revision empowering the State Government to hear and consider the judgment of a revisional authority rendered U/s 257 in my judgment the State Government has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a revision against an order or judgment passed by a revisional authority though that authority may be inferior to the State Government. As such the point raised in this writ petition will have to be considered which accordingly I considered and held that no second revision lies U/s 257 before the State Government.21A. Shri Patil invited my attention to the Division Bench of this Court in case of Parmeshwar Sihoratan Bohara and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (1997 (2) Maharashtra Law Journal 252). Shri Patil contended that in Parmeshwars case Division Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the question whether under Maharashtra Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order 1975 clause 24 - second appeal is tenable. This Court after considering two judgments of the Apex Court in Rukminis case (supra) and A.I.R. 1987 Supreme Court 203 (Anudal Ammals case) considering the issue the Division Bench proceeded to consider the provisions of Rule 24.6. Now it becomes necessary to refer to clause 24 of the Regulation.24. Power to call for and examine records of proceedings and revise orders - If any person is aggrieved by an order passed by the Collector the Commissioner and if any person is aggrieved by an order passed by the Commissioner the State Government may on an application made to him or it by the aggrieved person within thirty days from the date of receipt of such order stay the enforcement of such order. The Commissioner or the State Government as the case may be may also call for and examine the record of any inquiry or proceedings of the concerned Officer exercising or failing to exercise the powers under this order to add to amend vary suspend or cancel any authorisation issued or deemed to be issued under clause 3 or any supply card issued or deemed to be issued under clause 6 or to forfeit the deposit (or any part deemed thereof) paid or deemed to be paid by a fair price shop or authorised agent as security or to take any other action under the provisions prescribed by or under this order for the purpose of satisfying himself or itself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed by such officer and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer and may pass such order thereon as he or it as the case may be thinks fit:Provided that State Government may at any time during the pendency of any inquiry or proceedings or within one year from the date of any order passed by any officer under the provisions prescribed by or under this order suo motu stay any pending inquiry or proceedings or the enforcement of such order if considered necessary and may call for and examine the record of any such inquiry or proceedings and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit:Provided further that the Commissioner or the State Government as the case may be shall not pass any order under this clause which adversely affects any person unless such person has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard (emphasis supplied).A plain reading of the said clause shows that if a person is aggrieved by the order passed by the Collector revision will lie before the Commissioner; and if one is aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner a revision will lie before the State Government. We may at this juncture advert to the argument advanced by Shri Deshpande learned counsel to the effect that a revision can lie only against the orders passed under clauses 3 and 6 of the Regulation. Clause 3 deals with issue of authorisation to fair price shops to obtain and supply scheduled commodities; and clause 6 deals with power to issue of supply card to a person or class of persons. Clause 3 enjoins that such authorisation can be issued by State Government or Collector and clause 6 says the State Government or the Collector may issue or cause to issue supply card. According to the learned counsel since authorisation under clause 3 can be issued either by the Collector or the State Government and in this case the order was by the Sub-Divisional Officer revision can be entertained by the Commissioner. The further contention appears to be since the Commissioner is not an authority mentioned in clause 3 or 6 an order passed by him is not revisable under clause 24 as according to the learned counsel clause 24 speaks of revision only with respect to orders under clauses 3 and 6. The implication appears to be the order of the Commissioner if at all can be corrected only under the 1st proviso to clause 24. And since according to the petitioner there was no material to exercise the suo motu power under the said proviso the order rendered by the Commissioner is not amenable to the power in the said 1st proviso also.7. We are unable to accept the said interpretation placed by the learned counsel for more than one reason. First of all clause 24 specifically mentions that from the order of the Collector a revision shall lie to the Commissioner; and from the order of the Commissioner the aggrieved party can maintain a revision before the State Government.(underline is mine) It may be that the Commissioner is not mentioned in clause 3 but clause 24 which provides for revision specifically mentions the Commissioner as a revisional authority. The assumption that the revisional power of the State Government does not take in order passed by the Commissioner is not sustainable in view of the language of clause 24. It should not be forgotten that once the revisional authority after hearing the party confirms the order that order alone will be the effective order because of the doctrine of merger. Once the revisional authority confirms the order the order of the lower authority merges with the order of the revisional authority; even otherwise the order of the Commissioner in revision has to be treated as an order under clause 3 of the Regulation. What is significant is that this aspect is taken care of in clause 24 itself because as noted clause 24 says the appropriate authority can suspend or cancel any authorisation issued or deemed to be issued under clause 3. This in our view in effect makes the order passed by the Commissioner as one passed under clause 3; and this can be attained even by the operation of the theory of merger once the contested matter is disposed of by the Commissioner on a proper revision filed before him. Here as noted clause 24 itself makes the order by the Commissioner deemed to be one under clause 3 of the Regulation.8. Inasmuch as clause 24 does not contain any statement as is obtained under sub-section (5) of section 18 of Kerala Rent Control Act making the order of the Collector or Commissioner as final; on the basis of the decision in AIR 1987 SC 203; cited supra it cannot be contended that second revision cannot be maintained. Clause 24 as noted does not employ any word so as to restrict its operation only to one revision. This has to be understood in the context of the fact that this order itself was issued under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955. The preamble part of the said Act states that the same is an Act to provide in the interest of the general public for the control of the production supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in certain commodities. The commodities that would fall within the ambit of the Act are essential commodities and essential commodities are defined under clause (a) of section 2 of the Act. The whole scope of the clauses in the Regulation have to be understood in the context of the aforesaid object of enacting the said Act and also the promulgation of the Regulation. It is pertinent in this context to note that there is absolutely no challenge against the validity of any of the provisions of the said Act or regulation. We do not consider a restricted meaning can be assigned to the power of revision under clause 24 firstly because the language of the said clause does not permit it and secondly the object of the Act and Regulation also does not allow such restricted interpretation. Neither the words employed in clause 24 nor the context support the interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It must be noted that one of the objects of the Act and Regulation is to control the distribution of essential commodities. Distribution is as much important as production. Proper distribution with supervision by the authority concerned is a must in securing the object of the Act as well as Regulation. Incidentally it has to be noted that Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India also directs that the State shall in particular direct its policy towards ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. In interpreting the provision in the Act as well as in the Regulation one should not miss the spirit underlining the said provision under Article 39. The Regulation since is framed as per the provision in the Act is a subordinate legislation. The legislative wisdom in enacting a provision as clause 24 cannot be called in question. The provision of further revision to the 1st respondent is thus competent and the only question is whether as per the language used in clause 24 such revision is possible. As has already noted revisional power is expressly conferred on the State there is no restriction in the clause which would lead to a conclusion that further revision to the State is any way barred.(underline is mine)It is to be noted that this Court was considering clause 24 of the Regulation. This Court in para 7 of the report has quoted in extenso Clause 24. Comparing the provisions of Rule 24 it will be clear that plain reading of Section 257 of the Code there is no scope to come to the conclusion that there is provision for second revision. Shri Deshpande on the other hand placed strong reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Roop Chand Vs. State of Punjab and another (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1503). In Roop Chands case the Apex Court was considering certain provisions of East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act (Punjab 50 of 1948).22. Shri Deshpande learned advocate brought to my notice the majority view whereby the Apex Court while interpreting Section 42 of that Act held that unless the statute specifically provides for a revision one cannot assume jurisdiction and entertain the proceedings. The Apex Court thus held: 7. It is now necessary to set out S.42 on the interpretation of which this petition depends. That section was amended by Act XXVII of 1960 with retrospective effect and it is the amended section that has to be considered by us. The amended section is in these terms :Section 42. The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act call for and examine the records of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.8. The petitioners contention is that an order which can be interfered with under S.42 is an order passed under the Act by any officer in his own right and not an order made by the Government itself or by any officer exercising powers of the Government upon delegation under S.41(1).9. The question really is as to the meaning of the words any order passed... by any officer under this Act in S. 42. Do these words include an order passed by an officer in exercise of powers delegated to him by the Government under S.41(1)? We do not think they do.10. Now there cannot be much doubt that S. 42 makes a distinction between the Government and an officer because under it the Government is given power to interfere with an order passed by an officer and therefore it does not authorise the Government to interfere with an order made by itself. As we understood the learned Advocate General of Punjab who appeared for the respondent State of Punjab he conceded that position. He said that the Government could no doubt have itself heard an appeal preferred under S.21(4) instead of getting it heard by an officer to whom it delegated its power and if it did so then it could not under S.42 interfere with the order which itself passed in the appeal. We think that this is the correct position and we wish to make it clear that we are not basing ourselves on the concession made by the learned Advocate General. We feel no doubt that an order passed by an officer of the Government cannot be an order passed by the Government itself.11. The question then arises when the Government delegates its power for example to entertain and decide an appeal under S.21(4) to an officer and the officer pursuant to such delegation hears the appeal and makes an order is the order an order of the officer or of the Government? We think it must be the order of the Government. The order is made under a statutory power. It is the statute which creates that power. The power can therefore be exercised only in terms of the statute and not otherwise. In this case the power is created by S.21(4). That section gives a power to the Government. It would follow that an order made in exercise of that power will be the order of the Government for no one else has the right under the statute to exercise the power. No doubt the Act enables the Government to delegate its power but such a power when delegated remains the power of the Government for the Government can only delegate the power given to it by the statute and cannot create an independent power in the officer. When the delegate exercises the power he does so for the Government. It is of interest to observe here that Wills J. said in Huth V. Clarke (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391 that the word delegate means little more than an agent An agent of course exercises no powers of his own but only the powers of his principal. Therefore an order passed by an officer on delegation to him under S.41(1) of the power of the Government under S.21(4) is for the purposes of the Act an order of the Government. If it were not so and were to be held that the order had been made by the officer himself and was not an order of the Government and of course it had to be one or the other then we would have an order made by a person on whom the Act did not confer any power to make it. That would be an impossible situation. There can be no order except as authorised by the Act. What is true of S. 21(4) would be true of all other provisions in the Act conferring powers on the Government which can be delegated to an officer under S.41(1). If we are wrong in the view that we have taken then in the case of an order made by an officer as delegate of the Governments power under S.21(4) we would have an appeal entertained and decided by one who had no power himself under the Act to do either. Plainly none of these things could be done.Considering the ratio of the Roop Chands case it is not disputed that appeal and or revision is always creation of statute. The statute which provides for remedy of appeal the proceedings will be governed by the said statute. On plain reading of Section 257 I am of the view that there is no scope to hold that second revision is provided under the said Section. In my judgment therefore the judgment of the Division Bench of Rameshs case is not applicable on the facts of this case as I am construing the provisions of Section 257 of the Code which is not para materia with Rule 24 of the Regulation 1975. In view of this aspect it is not possible for me to accept the contention of Shri Patil and I reject the contentions of Shri Patil.23. To conclude I hold that Officer on Special Duty has committed an error in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by three authorities below;(ii) The Officer on Special Duty has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the revision applications filed U/s 257.(iii) The second revision is not tenable. In view of this the petition succeeds. The order passed by the Officer on Special Duty on 2nd November 1993 is quashed and set aside by issuing writ of certiorari. Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clause (B).24. Taking into consideration the close relations of the parties there will be no order as to costs. It is informed at the bar that the parties have already approached to the Civil Court to get their rights decided. It is made clear that any observation made by this Court or the authorities below shall not mean and construe to decide the rights of the parties. These proceedings are in respect of taking entries in the revenue record. The Civil Court is free to decide the suit on its own merits without being influenced by the result of this petition or by the proceedings taken by the parties before the revenue authorities.