Home   |   About us   |   Contact us   |   Request Callback  
 
   
ALREADY A MEMBER ?
Username
Password

Translate

This Page To:

 
RAJAN VARGHESE & OTHERS V/S SURAJ ABRAHAM GEORGE, decided on Wednesday, September 4, 2002.
[ In the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Thiruvananthapuram, I.A. Nos. 392, 287, 394, 288 & 396 of 2002. ] 04/09/2002
Judge(s) : L. MANOHARAN, PRESIDENT & PROF. R. VIJAYAKRISHNAN, MEMBER
Advocate(s) :
Judgment Full Text : Existing LawyerServices Members, kindly login above.

Non Members, Enter your email address:- and , to request this judgment.

Alternatively, you may send a request by email to info@lawyerservices.in for the Full Text of this Judgment (chargeable).

LawyerServices Facebook Page






#LawyerServices #bestlegalsoftware #legalsoftware #judgment #caselaw

  "2003 (3) CPJ 62"  ==   ""  







    L. Manoharan President:1. The three complaints were disposed of by the District Forum by a common order. Opposite parties in that respective complaints are the appellants in these appeals. These petitions since are for condoning delay of 300 days in filing these appeals are also being disposed of by this common order. To these petitions the respective respondents have filed objections. The ground alleged in the affidavit for condoning delay is that the first appellant who was the first opposite party was laid up due to Rheumatism during the relevant period. Respondents denied the ground for condoning delay. Petitioners have to establish that they were prevented by sufficient cause in not filing the appeals within the period of limitation. In this regard one important aspect to be noted is there are three appellants of whom the first appellant is stated to have been undergoing treatment for Arthritis. The second appellant is the Director of the 3rd appellant institution. When the period of delay sought to be condoned is taken into account which as has noted is 300 days it becomes necessary to go into the question as to whether as a matter of fact the sufficient cause is proved by showing that the first appellant was laid-up. It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the second appellant being a lady cannot be treated to be a person competent to instruct a lawyer who filed the appeal. But what is to be noted is simply because she is a lady one cannot assume that she was not competent to instruct the lawyer in the matter of filing the appeal for herself is the Director of the 3rd opposite party institution. Apart from the same there could be persons to manage the affairs of the 3rd opposite party institution; all that was necessary to instruct the lawyer along with the copy of the order to file the appeal. When there were others to look after such a matter simply because the Principal of the Institution was laid up one cannot say that there was nobody to look after or give instruction to the Counsel to file the appeal. We are of the view since there is no acceptable explanation forthcoming with respect to the feasibility of giving instruction either by the second opposite party or the staff of the 3rd opposite party who could have consulted the first opposite party one cannot say that the delay is properly explained. In this context it must be noted that the first opposite party was not bed ridden he was affected by only Arthritis so even if he is not in a position to go the office of the Advocate as has noted there were others to consult him or give necessary instruction to the Counsel. When such is the situation we are not satisfied the complainant is successful in establishing sufficient cause in not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Therefore these petitions are liable to be dismissed which accordingly are dismissed.