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NEENA MAHENDRU V/S M/S. PAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOLUTIONS, decided on Tuesday, November 11, 2014.
[ In the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, 561-A No. 72 OF 2014. ] 11/11/2014
Judge(s) : JANAK RAJ KOTWAL
Advocate(s) : A.P. Singh. Pranav Kohli.
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    Criminal Procedure Code - section 482 and section 561-A - Negotiable Instruments Act - section 138 section 141 section 141(1) and Section 141(2) – Dishonour of cheque - accused persons are managing the affairs of the company and they had approached the respondent for purchase of various spare parts - In order to discharge a liability the company issued two cheques - Both the cheques were dishonoured by the Bank due to “funds insufficient – Magistrate issued process against both the accused - Petitioner seeks quashing of the criminal proceedings against her and the summoning order –Held that complaint must contain a specific averment as to the role of the Director in conduct of business of the company and issue and bouncing of the cheque in question - bald statement that accused-Director was in-charge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the company in the complaint is not sufficient to attract the application of section 141 of the Act - respondent seems to have made a casual attempt to rope in the petitioner who is a director of the company along with the Managing Director of the company without spelling out as to how and in what manner she was responsible for the conduct of business of the company in general and issue of the cheques in question in particular - petition allowed.Cases Referred:Mrs. Anita Malhotra v Apparel Export Promotion Council and anr. 2011 AIR SCW 6535 National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v Harmeet Singh Paintal and anr. 2010 AIR SCW 1508Saroj Kumar Poddar v. State (NCT of Delhi ) and anr. AIR 2007 SC 912Malwa Cotton & Spinning Mills Ltd. v Virsa Singh Sidhu and ors. (2008) 17 SCC 147S.V.Muzumdar v. Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd. (2005) 4 SCC 173N. Rangachari v. BSNL (2007) 5 SCC 108 S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and anr. (2005) 8 SCC 89 S.M. S. Pharmaceuticals in Saroj Kumar Poddar AIR 2007 SC 912National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. 2010 AIR SCW 1508Mrs. Anita Malhotra 2011 AIR SCW 6535Case Relied:National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and another (2010) 3 SCC 330: (AIR 2010 SC (supp) 569: 2010 AIR SCW 1508]     1. This is a petition under section 561-A Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of proceedings against the petitioner in a complaint for offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for the Act) filed by herein respondent and the summoning order dated 3.10.2013 whereby learned trial Magistrate has issued process against the petitioner.2. Facts which are relevant briefly are that in the complaint respondent (complainant) has arraigned M/S R. N. Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. as accused No.1 and petitioner Neena Mahendru as accused No.2. Accused No.1 is said to be a company and has been arraigned through one Suraj Mahendru as its Managing Director.Petitioner (accused No.2) has been arraigned in her capacity as a Director of the company. Case set up by the respondent in the complaint briefly is that both the accused persons are managing the affairs of the company and they had approached the respondent for purchase of various spare parts. In order to discharge a liability of Rs. 8 28 282/ incurred by the accusedcompany as cost of spare parts and service charges supplied by the respondent the company issued two cheques being cheque No. 613283 dated 22.07.2013 valuing Rs. 2 19 820/ and cheque No. 624011 dated 03.08.2013 valuing Rs. 6 08 462/ in favour of the respondent. The cheques were drawn at J&K Bank Branch Shalamar Road Jammu. Both the cheques however were dishonoured by the Bank due to “funds insufficient”.3. On the complaint coming up before the court of learned Special Mobile Magistrate Electricity Jammu on 30.10.2013 learned Magistrate recorded preliminary statement of the respondent (complainant) and by his order of the even date issued process against both the accused for proceeding against them for commission of offence under section 138 of the Act.4. Petitioner seeks quashing of the criminal proceedings against her and the summoning order dated 30.10.2013 on the ground that the impugned order is an abuse of process of the court inasmuch as the process against her has been issued without there being any material on record to suggest her involvement in alleged commission of the offence under section 138 of the Act. It is contended that the complaint and the preliminary statement of the complainant on their bare perusal would show that there is no averment much less a specific averment in the complaint regarding any role played by the petitioner in the affairs of the company and mere reproduction of the language of the section in the complaint do not suffice for launching criminal proceedings against the petitioner. The cheques relied upon by the respondent are not stated to have been issued by the petitioner.5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record on the file of the learned Magistrate.6. With reference to section 141 of the Act Mr. A. P. Singh learned counsel for the petitioner submitted vehemently that besides the company only a person who at the time the offence was committed was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company can be prosecuted for an offence under section 138 of the Act. To initiate criminal proceedings for offence under section 138 of the Act against the petitioner the complainant was required to state specifically and sufficiently in the complaint as to how the petitioner in her capacity as a Director of the company was responsible for conduct of business of the company and issue of cheque on behalf of the company. Mere reproduction of the language of the section in the complaint which Mr. Singh states has been done in this case would not suffice and issue of process against a Director in such a complaint is abuse of the process of the court. Mr. Singh submitted that even if the petitioner is taken to be a Director of the company namely M/S Pal Infrastructure Solutions the complaint filed by respondent does not suggest that she is concerned with or responsible for conduct of business of the company and issue of the cheques in question. Mr. Singh relied upon Mrs. Anita Malhotra v Apparel Export Promotion Council and anr. 2011 AIR SCW 6535 National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v Harmeet Singh Paintal and anr. 2010 AIR SCW 1508 and Saroj Kumar Poddar v. State (NCT of Delhi ) and anr. AIR 2007 SC 912.7. Per Contra Mr. Pranav Kohli learned counsel for respondent submitted that complainant is not required to state in the complaint the actual role of a Director of a company as it would be for the Director to plead and prove his role at trial. Mr. Kohli would say that one being Director of a company at the time when the cheque in question is issued would be deemed to be in-charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business at that time. Mr. Kohli relied upon Malwa Cotton & Spinning Mills Ltd. v Virsa Singh Sidhu and ors. (2008) 17 SCC 147. Referring to paragraph 2 of the complaint Mr. Kohli submitted that respondent (complainant) has very clearly averred that Mr. Suraj Mahendru is the Managing Director of the company and the accused No.2 (petitioner) is the Director and that both the accused are managing the affairs and responsible on behalf of the company.8. It may be stated briefly that section 138 of the Act creates a criminal liability for dishonour of a cheque issued by a person to another person for discharge of a debt or other liability. Such liability may be incurred by a company too. Since a company is a juristic person section 141 makes a provision for deemed liability of persons besides and other than the company. I may reproduce section 141 dealing with offences by companies:Section 141: Offences by companies.“[1] If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: (emphasis added) Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a Company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a Financial Corporation owned or controlled by Central Government or the State Government as the case may be he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.[2] Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director manager secretary or other officer of the company such director manager secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.9. On its plain reading sub-section (1) of section 141 of the Act provides for two categories of persons who can be made liable for an offence under section 138. They are; i) the company which commits the offence and ii) every person who at the time the offence was committed was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company. Under this category a person holding or not holding any office or designation in a company will be liable under section 138 of the Act if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company at the relevant time. Besides sub-section (2) of section 141 provides for another category of persons who can be made liable and this category comprises of any Director Manager Secretary or other officer of the company with whose consent or connivance or neglect the offence has been committed.10. Sub- section (1) of section 141 of the Act is relevant in this case. Respondent (complainant) in paragraph 2 of the complaint has averred that “accused No.1 is a company and Sh. Suraj Mahendru is the Managing Director and accused No.2 is the Director. Both the accused persons are managing the affairs and are responsible on behalf of the accused No.1 company”. It is averred further that as per the mandate of section 141 every person who at the time the offence was committed was in-charge of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of business of the company as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished.11. Question raised for consideration thus is; Whether the averments as regards the petitioner (accused No.2) in the complaint are sufficient to attract application of section 141 (1) of the Act and to proceed against her for commission of offence under section 138?12. In Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills (supra) relied upon by learned respondent’s counsel matter had landed before a learned two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court by a Special Leave Petition after the High Court in a Petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. (section 561-A J&K Cr.P.C) had quashed complaint under section 138 of the Act on the ground that there were some general allegations that all the Directors were responsible and no special allegation against the accused Directors. The Supreme Court noticed in paragraph 8 of the reporting that “the complaint specifically contained the averments regarding the position of accused Directors in the Company.” The Supreme Court referred to an earlier judgment of a two-Judge Bench of the Court in S.V.Muzumdar v. Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd. (2005) 4 SCC 173 wherein in paragraph 8 their Lordships have observed:“8. We find that the prayers before the courts below essentially were to drop the proceedings on the ground that the allegations would not constitute a foundation for action in terms of Section 141 of the Act. These questions have to be adjudicated at the trial. Whether a person is in charge of or is responsible to the company for conduct of business is to be adjudicated on the basis of materials to be placed by the parties. Subsection (2) of Section 141 is a deeming provision which as noted supra operates in certain specified circumstances. Whether the requirements for the application of the deeming provisions exist or not is again a matter for adjudication during trial. Similarly whether the allegations contained are sufficient to attract culpability is a matter for adjudication at the trial.”13. The Supreme Court also referred to para 11 of Muzumdar’s case where their Lordships have held:“11. Whether or not the evidence to be led would establish the accusations is a matter for trial. It needs not reiteration that proviso to sub-section (1) of section 141 enables the accused to prove his innocence by discharging the burden which lies on him.”14. Besides the Muzumdar’s case the Supreme Court in Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills also referred to another two-Judge Bench judgment of the Court in N. Rangachari v. BSNL (2007) 5 SCC 108 where in paragraph 19 of the reporting it has been observed as follows:“19. Therefore a person in the commercial world having a transaction with a company is entitled to presume that the Directors of the Company are in charge of the affairs of the company. If any restrictions on their powers are placed by the memorandum or articles of the company it is for the Directors to establish it at the trial. It is in that context that Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that when the offender is a company every person who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall also be deemed to be guilty of the offence along with the company. It appears to us that an allegation in the complaint that the named accused are Directors of the company itself would usher in the element of their acting for and on behalf of the company and of their being in charge of the company.”15. The Supreme Court in Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills case therefore held that High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings and allowed the appeal.16. View taken by the Supreme Court in S. V. Muzumdar and N. Rangachari and later relied upon in Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills is that one being a Director of a Company itself would infer that he is acting for and on behalf of the Company and is in-charge of the company and would be sufficient to proceed against him for a criminal liability under section 138 of the Act. It would be open for the complainant to presume that Directors of a company are in-charge of the affairs of the company and launch criminal proceedings under section 138 merely by saying in the complaint that the accused was the Director at the relevant time. In this view of the matter averment in paragraph 2 of the complaint as reproduced above will have to be held sufficient for issuing process against the petitioner for proceeding against her for commission of offence under section 138 of the Act for the simple reason that she is stated to be a Director of the accused-company. Discussion however cannot be closed here only for the reasons to follow.17. It is seen that the two-Judge Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in S.V.Muzumdar and N.Rangachari came respectively on 25.04.2005 and 19.04.2007 and the two-Judge Bench decision in Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills came on 13.08.2008. In between S.V.Muzumdar and N.Rangachari section 141 of the Act however came up for interpretation before a learned three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and anr. (2005) 8 SCC 89 on a reference by a learned two-Judge Bench of the Court for determination of following three questions by a larger Bench of the Court:“(a) Whether for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation read as a whole fulfill the requirements of the said section and it is not necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of or responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.(b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of the business of the company and therefore deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary.(c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary whether in the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business could be proceeded against.”18. Having regard to the above three questions learned three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in paragraph 6 of the reporting in S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals identified the question for consideration as to what should be the averments in a complaint under sections 138 and 141 and observed further in paragraph 7 that as to what should be the averments in a complaint assumes importance in view of the fact that at the stage of issuance of process the Magistrate will have before him only the complaint and the accompanying documents. In paragraph 8 the Supreme Court observed that “the officers responsible for conducting the affairs of the companies are generally referred to as Directors Managers Secretaries Managing Directors etc.”19. The Supreme Court analyzed section 141 of the Act and held in paragraph 10 of the reporting :“10. While analyzing section 141 of the Act it will be seen that it operates in cases where an offence under section 138 is committed by a company. The key words which occur in the section are “every person”. These are general words and take every person connected with a company within their sweep. Therefore these words have been rightly qualified by use of the words: “who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence etc. What is required is that the persons who are sought to be made criminally liable under section 141 should be at the time the offence was committed in charge of and responsible to the company of the conduct of the business of the company. Every person connected with the company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. It is only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of an offence who will be liable for criminal action. It follows from this that if a director of a company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time will not be liable under the provision. The liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely a person not holding any office or designation in a company may be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company at the relevant time. Liability depends on the role one plays in the affairs of a company and not on designation or status. If being a director or manager or secretary was enough to case criminal liability the section would have said so. Instead of “every person” the section would have said “every director manager or secretary in a company is liable. Etc. The legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal liability which means serious consequences so far as the person sought to be made liable is concerned. Therefore only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action.”20. With reference to various provisions of the Companies Act 1956 and upon consideration of large number of case law their Lordships concluded in paragraph 18 of the reporting which I quote:18. To sum up there is almost unanimous judicial opinion that necessary averments ought to be contained in a complaint before a person can be subjected to criminal process. A liability under Section 141 of the Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a Company the principal accused being the company itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable. Section 141 of the Act contains the requirements for making a person liable under the said provision. That respondent falls within parameters of Section 141 has to be spelled out. A complaint has to be examined by the Magistrate in the first instance on the basis of averments contained therein. If the Magistrate is satisfied that there are averments which bring the case within Section 141 he would issue the process. We have seen that merely being described as a director in a company is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 141. Even a non director can be liable under Section 141 of the Act. The averments in the complaint would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case which is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.21. In paragraph 19 of the reporting the Supreme Court gave its answer to the questions posed in the reference as under:“19. In view of the above discussion our answers to the questions posed in the Reference are as under:(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint the requirements of Section 141cannot be said to be satisfied.(b) The answer to question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.(c) The answer to question (c) has to be in affirmative. The question notes that the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. When that is so holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore they get covered under Section 141. So far as signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141. The Reference having been answered individual cases may be listed before appropriate Bench for disposal in accordance with law.”22. The Supreme Court referred to S.M. S. Pharmaceuticals in Saroj Kumar Poddar AIR 2007 SC 912 relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel. Appellant in that case was a Director of a public limited company and it was alleged in the complaints under section 138 of the Act that at the relevant time the said company was managed by the Board of Directors and they were responsible for and were in-charge of the conduct and business of the company. Their Lordships observed in that case that “there is no averment in the complaint petitions as to how and in what manner the appellant was responsible for the conduct of business of the Company or otherwise responsible to it in regard to its functioning. He had not issued the cheque. How he is responsible for dishonor of the cheque has not been stated. The allegations made in paragraph 3 thus in our opinion do not satisfy the requirements of Section 141 of the Act.”23. In National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. 2010 AIR SCW 1508 relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel the question that came up for determination of the Supreme Court was as to “what should be the averments in the complaint under section 138 read with section 141 of the Act against the Director of a company before he can be subjected to criminal proceedings.” The Supreme Court held in paragraph 10 of the reporting:“10. Section 141 is a panel provision creating vicarious liability and which as per settled law must be strictly construed. It is therefore not sufficient to make a bald cursory statement in the complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in-charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of business of company without anything more as to the role of the Director. But the complaint should spell out as to how and in what manner respondent No.1 was incharge of or was responsible to the accusedcompany for the conduct of the business. This is in consonance with strict interpretation of statutes especially where such statutes create vicarious liability. A company may have a number of Directors and to make any or all the Directors as accused in a complaint merely on the basis of a statement that they are in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more is not a sufficient or adequate fulfillment of the requirements under section 141.”24. In one of the complaints involved in National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. it was alleged that accused No.2 is Managing Director and accused No.3 is the Director of the accused-company. The accused Nos. 2 & 3 are the in-charge and responsible for conduct of business of the company and hence liable for offences. Likewise in the other complaint it was alleged that accused Nos. 2 to 9 were in-charge and were responsible to accused-company for the conduct of business at the time when the offence was committed and hence accused Nos. 2 to 9 in addition to accused No.1 are liable to be prosecuted and punished in accordance with section 141 of the Act and further that offence has been committed by accused No.1 with the consent and connivance of accused Nos. 2 to 9. The Supreme Court with reference to the interpretation of section 141 of the Act in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and upon consideration of others decisions of the Court and the provisions of the Companies Act however agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court and held that “in absence of specific averment as to role of the respondents and particularly in view of the acceptable materials that at the relevant time they were in no way connected with the affairs of the company we reject all the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellants. Consequently all the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.”25. Decision in Mrs. Anita Malhotra 2011 AIR SCW 6535 relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel is relevant too. Dealing with a similar question the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 of the reporting has observed:“15. This Court has repeatedly held that in case of a Director complaint should specifically spell out how and in what manner the Director was in charge of or was responsible to the accused company for conduct of its business and mere bald statement that he or she was in charge of and was responsible to the company for conduct of its business is not sufficient. [vide National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and another (2010) 3 SCC 330: (AIR 2010 SC (supp) 569: 2010 AIR SCW 1508]. In the case on hand particularly in para 4 of the complaint except the mere bald and cursory statement with regard to the appellant the complainant has not specified her role in the day to day affairs of the Company. We have verified the averments as regard to the same and we agree with the contention of Mr. Akhil Sibal that except reproduction of the statutory requirements the complainant has not specified or elaborated the role of the appellant in the day to day affairs of the Company. On this ground also the appellant is entitled to succeed.26. Legal position in regard to the liability of the Directors of a company under section 138 read with section 141 of the Act is thus no more re integra and is well settled and clear too. Whereas a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director of a company incurs criminal liability under section 138 of the Act by virtue of his status and designation and no specific averment in the complaint as regards his role in the company is required to be made a Director cannot be made liable and prosecuted by virtue of his status and designation only. Deemed liability under section 138 read with section 141 of the Act will extend to a Director of a company and he can be prosecuted only if at the time of commission of the offence he was in-charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of the business of the company. In order to fasten the extended liability on a Director of a company in terms of sub section (1) of section 141 of the Act and to launch prosecution against him complainant is required to state in the complaint not only that the said Director was in-charge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time but also to spell out as to how and in what manner he had been so responsible. The complaint must contain a specific averment as to the role of the Director in conduct of business of the company and issue and bouncing of the cheque in question. A bald statement that accused-Director was in-charge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the company in the complaint is not sufficient to attract the application of section 141 of the Act.27. In backdrop of the legal position as stated above it is seen that statement in paragraph 2 of the complaint filed by the respondent is nothing more than an hypothetical attempt to bring the case within the sphere of sub-section (1) of section 141 of the Act. What is averred in the complaint is that Sh. Suraj Mahendru is the Managing Director and the petitioner (accused No.2) is the Director of the accused-company and both of them are managing the affairs and are responsible on behalf of the accused-company. This is exactly similar to the averment made in one of the complaints involved in National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. (supra) referred to hereinabove. The respondent (complainant) seems to have made a casual attempt to attract sub-section (1) of section 141 to rope in the petitioner who is a director of the company along with the Managing Director of the company without spelling out as to how and in what manner she was responsible for the conduct of business of the company in general and issue of the cheques in question in particular. Such averment however cannot be held sufficient to fasten criminal liability on the petitioner and to proceed against her for commission of offence under section 138.28. I would thus hold that learned trial Magistrate has fallen into error by drawing the impugned summoning order against the petitioner and issuing process for proceeding against her. It needs to be emphasized that a complaint for offence under section 138 read with section 141 of the Act in which besides the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director a Director of the company is also arraigned as an accused calls for a special attention of the Magistrate taking cognizance in the complaint because for proceeding against the Director the Magistrate has to satisfy himself not only about the existence of a prima facie case but also as regards the fulfillment of requirement of section 141. The impugned summoning order drawn by the learned Magistrate however sans any indication as regards the application and fulfillment of the requirement of section 141 which however is not fulfilled.29. For all that said and discussed above this petition has merit and is allowed. The summoning order dated 03.10.2013 and proceedings in the complaint in relation to the petitioner (accused No.2) are quashed.30. Record of the trial court be remitted back along with a copy of this order.