S.K. MUKHERJEE, J
(1) THAT by an advertisement published by the state Transfer authority, West Bengal, applications were invited for grant of permanent Stage Carriage permits in various inter-State-Routes covering west Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and in serial No. 62 of such advertisement the route from Siliguri to Patna via Bakhtiarpur, Purnia was included; out of four applications, the State Transport Authority granted three permits but the application of opposite party No. 1 for one such permit was rejected, inter alia, on the ground that he was grantee of another permanent permit in the
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ame process of selection in a route from Siliguri to Patna, via Muzzaffarpur against the said decision the opposite party No. 1 preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, being s. T. Appeal before the State Transport Appellate, Tribunal, being S. T. Appeal Rs. 5 of 1991; that the route, Siliguri to Patna via Bakhtiarpur, purnia was again notified by the S. T. A. in serial No. 10 for grant of permit for express service; the petitioner applied as a grantee for the said route and on a Writ application moved by the petitioner, the State Transport authority was directed to consider her application within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of order, dated 11th December, 1991; that through a Memo issued by the Deputy Secretary, State transport Authority, dated 20th August, 1992, the petitioner was informed that since there was an Order of status quo by a Division Bench of the high Court in a proceeding out of the pending appeal of opposite Party No. 1 before the Tribunal as mentioned hereinbefore, operative until further orders of the Tribunal in the appeal pending before it, also at the instance of the opposite party No. 1, her application could not be considered by the state Transport Authority and she was also requested to get the said status quo Order vacated and thereafter approach the State Transport Authority for consideration of her prayer. It is pertinent to note, at this stage, that order of the Division Bench set aside the Order under appeal and directed the State Transport Tribunal to dispose of the appeal pending before it at the instance of respondent No. 1, within a period of six weeks from the communication of the Order of the Division Bench, falling what inter alia, the appellant was given leave to obtain necessary clarificatory Order from the learned Trial Judge on the self-same writ application. The Tribunal thereafter directed in the appeal preferred by the respondent No 1. that status quo would continue till the disposal of the said appeal; the petitioner thereafter preferred, an application before the Tribunal for being added as a party in the State Transport Appeal No. 5 of 1991, where the respondent No. 1 was the appellant and rejection of such application by an order of the Tribunal dated 23rd August, 1993 is the subject matter of challenge in the instant Revisional Application. (2) THE Tribunal rejected the application of the petitioner, inter alia, on the reasons that for adjudication of the dispute involved In the appeal before it, at the instance of respondent No. 1 and which arose out of rejection of the respondent's application for permanent permit, the presence of the petitioner could mot be necessary because at the time of such rejection, the petitioner was not in the picture but came into it only after the second notification was issued by the State Transport Authority. (3) WE have heard and carefully considered the submissions made by the Counsel in support of the cases of their respective clients. It cannot be disputed that in the event of success of respondent No. 1 in the appeal, petitioner will loose her right to be considered to terms of her application in response to the second notification for the same route as with regard to the said route only one permanent permit was to be issued. In the case of J. M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar, reported in AIR 1976 SC 578, while defining 'aggrieved person' could not be laid down rigidly or comprehensively but, at best, in a broad tentative manner. It scope and meaning would depend on diverse variable factors, including the specified circumstances of a case, the nature and extent of the parson's interest and also the nature and ex tent of the prejudice or injury to be suffered by him. The Supreme Court, in the said case, quoted with approval, and observation by Lord Denning a. I. R. in Regina v. Liverpool Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet i Operators' Association, reported in (1972) IJ Q. B. 299 to the effect that the definition should include any person, whose interest may be prejudicially affected by what is taking place and who has a genuine grievance because something which has been done1 or may be done, would affect him. In another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bar Council of maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, reported - AIR 1975 SC 2092, a Bench of seven Judges, inter alia, accepted that normally a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him and/or denies or deprives him of something to which he he is legally entitled. (4) APPLYING the aforesaid principles in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the nature of deprivation of or denial of the petitioner the opportunity to contest the application of the respondent No. 1. the result whereof is bound to affect her adversely, brings her within the definition of 'aggrieved person' and entitles her to hearing in the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 before the State Transport Tribunal. The impugned order, therefore, is vitiated not only by the injustice done to the petitioner but by failure of the Tribunal to act in term of jurisdiction. (5) IN the result the Revisional Application succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The petitioner's application for addition as a party before the Tribunal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Revisional application succeeds.
"1995 (99) CalWN 671"